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A B S T R A C T 
T h i s t h e s i s i s concerned with the t r a n s f e r of 
r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t i s assumed t h a t 
top l e v e l management wish to a l l o c a t e s c a r c e corporate 
r e s o u r c e s as e f f e c t i v e l y as p o s s i b l e . However, top 
l e v e l management do not have enough information to f u l l y 
a s s e s s the p o t e n t i a l r e t u r n from deployment of r e s o u r c e s , 
i n p a r t i c u l a r d i v i s i o n s of the c o r p o r a t i o n . Hence, top 
l e v e l management r e q u i r e d i v i s i o n a l managers who hold 
such information to communicate i t . Any r e s u l t a n t 
a l l o c a t i o n of corporate r e s o u r c e s w i l l c l e a r l y a f f e c t 
the p r o f i t a t t a i n e d by a d i v i s i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s 
assumed d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l be compensated p a r t l y 
on the b a s i s of d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t , i n order to promote 
higher l e v e l s of d i v i s i o n a l management e f f o r t p r o v i s i o n . 
The i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p between the a l l o c a t i o n of corporate 
r e s o u r c e s and d i v i s i o n a l management's r e s u l t a n t compensa-
t i o n , l e a d s to an i n c e n t i v e problem. D i v i s i o n a l managers 
w i l l p e r c e i v e advantages from communicating information 
to top l e v e l management about the d i v i s i o n ' s p o t e n t i a l 
r e t u r n s i n a s t r a t e g i c ( u n t r u t h f u l ) f a s h i o n i n order to 
improve t h e i r compensation. 
I n t h i s t h e s i s i t i s argued t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n should be c o n t r o l l e d . The major r e s u l t 
of the t h e s i s i s to propose a method f o r a l l o c a t i n g s c a r c e 
corporate r e s o u r c e s and compensating d i v i s i o n a l managers, 
t h a t induces them to t e l l the t r u t h and provide appropriate 
l e v e l s of managerial e f f o r t . 
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C H A P T E R ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TRANSFER PRICING 
1.1 General Concepts 
As an economic o r g a n i z a t i o n grows i n s i z e and com-
p l e x i t y , i t becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t f o r the top l e v e l 
d e c i s i o n makers (the c e n t r a l headquarters) to co-ordinate 
and c o n t r o l the lower l e v e l s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . There-
f o r e , there i s a need to delegate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and to 
e s t a b l i s h a d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n making pr o c e s s . The 
d e c e n t r a l i z e d u n i t s t h a t are formed w i l l be c a l l e d the 
d i v i s i o n s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Each d i v i s i o n i t i s 
assumed w i l l be run by a d i v i s i o n a l manager. However, 
f o r t h i s s t r a t e g y of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n to be u s e f u l to the 
c e n t r a l headquarters, the c e n t r a l headquarters must be 
a b l e to co-ordinate and c o n t r o l the d i v i s i o n a l managers. 
T h i s i s p a r t l y done by a c t i v e l y a p p r a i s i n g d i v i s i o n a l 
managers' performance and l i n k i n g the d i v i s i o n a l managers' 
compensation to the outcome of the a p p r a i s a l procedure. 
The o v e r a l l r e s u l t s of the i n t e r a c t i o n s between the 
c e n t r a l headquarters and d i v i s i o n a l managers i s a l s o 
a p p r a i s e d . For i n s t a n c e , shareholders e x t e r n a l to the 
d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n making process of the o r g a n i z a -
t i o n w i l l be i n t e r e s t e d i n the performance of the o r g a n i z a -
t i o n . P r o f i t i s the most widely used general a p p r a i s a l 
measure of o r g a n i z a t i o n s by those e x t e r n a l to the o r g a n i z a -
t i o n . Thus, i t may seem prudent f o r the c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r s to a p p r a i s e d i v i s i o n a l managers' performance by 
measurement of d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t a b i l i t y and, hence, 
encourage d i v i s i o n a l managers to make p r o f i t a b l e d e c i s i o n s . 
However, one of the problems the c e n t r a l headquarters faces 
i n t r y i n g to measure d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t a b i l i t y i s how to 
d e a l w i t h the t r a n s f e r of goods between d i v i s i o n s . The 
c e n t r a l headquarters has to. determine some method by which 
to a s s i g n a " c o s t " f o r the t r a n s f e r of the goods. T h i s 
" c o s t " w i l l be viewed as the revenue generated from the 
p r o v i s i o n of the goods by the s u p p l y i n g d i v i s i o n and, as the 
c o s t of e nsuring p r o v i s i o n of the goods by the r e c e i v i n g 
d i v i s i o n . Hence, t h i s " c o s t " w i l l e n t e r as p a r t of the 
p r o f i t measure of both the s u pplying and r e c e i v i n g d i v i s i o n s . 
The"cost"of p r o v i s i o n of a u n i t of the good i s commonly known 
as the t r a n s f e r p r i c e of the good. 
There w i l l be a number of procedures by which the c e n t r a l 
h e adquarters can a s s i g n a t r a n s f e r p r i c e to i n t e r d i v i s i o n a l 
t r a n s f e r s . The importance of t h i s i s t h a t d i f f e r e n t 
procedures may a f f e c t the performance of the v a r i o u s 
d i v i s i o n a l managers i n d i f f e r e n t ways. That i s , d i f f e r e n t 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures may g i v e r i s e to the d i v i s i o n a l 
managers having d i f f e r e n t i n c e n t i v e s to perform t a s k s . The 
c e n t r a l theme of t h i s t h e s i s i s to c o n s i d e r the i n c e n t i v e s 
f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers under v a r i o u s t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
procedures and how t h i s a f f e c t s the c e n t r a l headquarters. 
1.2 Umapathy's Study of T r a n s f e r P r i c i n g 
Umapathy (1978) conducted a survey of companies i n the 
USA which had d e c e n t r a l i z e d o p e r a t i o n s . The r e s u l t s of the 
survey of 291 responding companies who claimed to have at 
l e a s t two p r o f i t c e n t r e s ( d i v i s i o n s ) i n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n 
l e d Umapathy to conclude^ t h a t the survey 
"shows t h a t most lar g e d e c e n t r a l i z e d US manufactur-
ing f i r m s demonstrate some degree of interdependence 
between p r o f i t c e n t r e s . About 85 per cent of the 
p r o f i t c e n t e r ' s t r a n s f e r goods and t r a n s f e r s of 
s e r v i c e s and j o i n t use of common f a c i l i t i e s e x i s t 
i n 55 per cent and 71 per c e n t of the companies 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus, the n o t i o n of t r u l y independent 
p r o f i t c e n t r e s i s r a r e i f not absent i n US manufactur-
ing f i r m s . The companies i n our sample s p l i t up 
t h e i r o perations i n t o interdependent p r o f i t c e n t e r s , 
even though t h i s p o l i c y i n t r o d u c e s problem areas 
such as t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and p r o f i t 
c e n t e r performance e v a l u a t i o n . " 
I t i s worth noting a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t , a t the sample 
s e l e c t i o n s t a g e , Umapathy only needed to exclude the 
r e t u r n e d q u e s t i o n n a i r e s of 17 f i r m s who d i d not have two or 
more p r o f i t c e n t r e s , i n order to determine the sample of 
f i r m s which had, a t l e a s t , two p r o f i t c e n t r e s . Thus, 
Umapathy's survey r e s u l t s suggest t h a t t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
procedures are widely used i n l a r g e US companies. 
Umapathy a l s o requested those companies who t r a n s f e r r e d 
goods between p r o f i t c e n t r e s to s p e c i f y t h e i r t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s t h a t they used. Of the saeected sample 
group, 9 6 per cent did so. He found t h a t 4 per cent of 
f i r m s used a t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure, based on v a r i a b l e 
c o s t i n g techniques, 26 per cent on f u l l c o s t , 17 per cent 
on c o s t p l u s , 22 per cent on n e g o t i a t i o n and 31 per cent on 
market p r i c e . I n a d d i t i o n then Umapathy's study suggests 
t h a t t h e r e i s no one predominant t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure 
adopted by l a r g e US companies. An important question then 
i s why do we observe such d i v e r s i t y i n the p r i c i n g procedures 
adopted. One could hypothesise t h a t the reason why more 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures were not based on a market p r i c e 
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measure i s because, i n many i n s t a n c e s , a market p r i c e does 
not e x i s t . T h i s s i t u a t i o n could e a s i l y a r i s e as one 
d i v i s i o n could be manufacturing a good which i s used by 
another d i v i s i o n to make the f i n a l product, and t h i s good 
may be what makes the f i n a l product d i f f e r e n t from the 
competition's f i n a l product. Hence, i t would not be i n 
the i n t e r e s t s of the company to have t h i s s p e c i a l i n t e r -
mediate good s o l d e x t e r n a l l y to competitors and, thus, a 
market p r i c e f o r the intermediate good w i l l not e x i s t . 
However, given Umapathy's r e s u l t s , one must e i t h e r assume 
t h a t companies do not wish to use market p r i c e based 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e s for some other reason, or t h a t the amount 
of companies t h a t can not use market p r i c e based t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e s i s a s i g n i f i c a n t proportion of the o v e r a l l sample. 
To summarise then, Umapathy's survey suggest t h a t 
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t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g i s p r a c t i s e d on q u i t e a wide s c a l e i n 
l a r g e US companies, but t h a t t h ere i s a d i v e r s i t y of 
procedures adopted. 
1.3 A Research Strategy f o r the T r a n s f e r 
P r i c i n g Problem 
S e c t i o n 1.2 i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g i s worthy 
of c o n s i d e r a t i o n by academics as many companies f e e l they 
have a need to e s t a b l i s h t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures. From 
here, the academic could f o l l o w two pathways of thought to 
t r y and b u i l d a theory of t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g . 
One pathway could commence with the premise t h a t , i n 
the r e a l world, the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures adopted by 
companies work w e l l because, otherwise, companies would 
not adopt them. Therefore, the r o l e of developing a theory 
of t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g i s to e x p l a i n why d i f f e r e n t companies 
fi n d i t b e s t to use d i f f e r e n t t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures. 
Expressed i n another f a s h i o n , the r o l e of such a theory 
would be to i d e n t i f y a company's environmental c o n d i t i o n s 
t h a t lead to a p a r t i c u l a r procedure being adopted. 
However, one may wish to argue t h a t , i n the r e a l 
world, fi r m s encounter d i f f i c u l t i e s when t r y i n g to 
implement c e r t a i n t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures. 
C l e a r l y , i t would be 
d e s i r a b l e to demonstrate why t h i s may be so, i n order to 
follow t h i s pathway. Having i d e n t i f i e d the major causes of 
problems, one can then attempt to i d e n t i f y t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
procedures t h a t overcome these problems i n order to c o n s t r u c t 
a theory of how t r a n s f e r p r i c e s should be s e t . 
T h i s t h e s i s f o l l o w s the l a t t e r pathway. I t i s shown 
why e x i s t i n g t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures are p r o b l e m a t i c a l . 
One p a r t i c u l a r l y important problem area which w i l l be 
i d e n t i f i e d as " i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y " i s d i s c u s s e d i n 
d e t a i l . I t i s argued t h a t , as a f i r s t s t e p i n c o n s t r u c t i n g 
a theory of t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g , t h i s problem must be d e a l t w i t h . 
Subsequently, a t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure which d e a l s with 
the problem i s c o n s t r u c t e d . The main evidence f o r adopting 
t h i s v i e w j t h a t t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g i s l i k e l y to be p r o b l e m a t i c a l 
i n many i n s t a n c e s ^ i s presented i n Chapter 3. However, a t 
t h i s p o i n t , i t would seem u s e f u l to t h i s cause to quote some 
of the r e c e n t work of Kaplan (19 84) which i s s u s t e n t a t i v e to 
the view t h a t companies f i n d the i s s u e of how to c o n s t r u c t 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures p r o b l e m a t i c a l . I n Kaplan's 
(1984) d i s c u s s i o n of "Developments s i n c e 1925 i n Cost 
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Accounting and Managerial C o n t r o l " , he comments t h a t 
"The t r a n s f e r p r i c e problem remained a thorny i s s u e 
f o r v e r t i c a l l y i n t e g r a t e d or m u l t i - d i v i s i o n a l f i r m s , 
though there are v e r y few r e f e r e n c e s to t h i s s u b j e c t 
u n t i l the most r e c e n t 30 yea r s the t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e i s s u e remains an open problem to t h i s day, 
i t i s probable t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r a c t i c e s among firms i n 1983 
would be i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h a t of t h i r t y y e a r s 
ago, when the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g problem f i r s t 
a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n of academics." 
1.4 O u t l i n e of T h e s i s 
Chapter 2 i s a genera l d i s c u s s i o n of "why, how and 
at what c o s t " o r g a n i z a t i o n s d e c e n t r a l i z e t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s 
and d e c i s i o n making. The d i s c u s s i o n i s intended to h i g h -
l i g h t the major environmental components which promote a 
move towards d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of operations and d e c i s i o n 
making. I t i s intended t h a t Chapter 2 provides a con-
ce p t u a l background to why the i s s u e of determining how to 
p r i c e i n t e r d i v i s i o n a l t r a n s f e r s a r i s e s i n a modern o r g a n i z a -
t i o n . The views expressed i n Chapter 2 are s t r o n g l y 
i n f l u e n c e d by the work of V a n c i l (1978). 
The main r o l e of Chapter 3 i s to e s t a b l i s h t h a t a major 
problem with many proposed t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures i s 
t h a t they are not i n c e n t i v e compatible. Not being i n -
ce n t i v e compatible r e f e r s here to the s i t u a t i o n where 
d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l have a motive to l i e about t h e i r 
d i v i s i o n ' s o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s i n order to b i a s the t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g process i n t h e i r favour. However, one may think 
to e s t a b l i s h the g e n e r a l i t y of t h i s problem, one would have 
to c a r r y out the monumental f e a t of e x h a u s t i v e l y c o n s i d e r -
ing a l l the proposed t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures and show-
mg why they do not guarantee i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y . 
However, i n Chapter 3, i n s t e a d of e x h a u s t i v e c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n of a l l proposed procedures, a t t e n t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d 
to the most important seminal works on t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g ^ . 
These are the works by H i r s h l e i f e r (1957) and the Baumol 
and Fabian (1964) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Dantzig and Wolfe 
(1960) Decomposition Procedure. I t i s shown i n d e t a i l 
t h a t these procedures are not i n c e n t i v e compatible. I n 
a d d i t i o n , i t i s suggested t h a t , i f the e x t e r n a l environment 
under which d i v i s i o n a l managers operate i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by 
u n c e r t a i n t y , t h i s may f u r t h e r aggravate the s i t u a t i o n by 
making i t p o s s i b l e f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers to l i e more 
f u l l y and e a s i l y about t h e i r o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . 
The chapter concludes with a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the 
work by Ronen and Mckinney (1970) on t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g . I t 
i s argued t h a t they were the f i r s t academic accountants who 
recognized the problem of n o n - i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y and 
who p u b l i s h e d a t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure t h a t attempted to 
r e s o l v e the problem. However, i t i s shown i n d e t a i l t h a t they 
di d not succeed i n designing an i n c e n t i v e compatible t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedure. 
I n Chapter 4, a C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n Theorem w i l l be p r e s -
ented which d e f i n e s e x a c t l y , the r u l e s t h a t t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
procedures must s a t i s f y , i n order to guarantee i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y . The number of t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures 
t h a t s a t i s f y t h e s e r u l e s i s very s m a l l and i s d i s c u s s e d i n 
Chapter 4. The Theorem thus provides the r a t i o n a l e f o r why 
e x h a u s t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n was not given to the i n c e n t i v e -
c o m p a t i b i l i t y p r o p e r t i e s of a l l p o s s i b l e t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g X 
procedures, s i n c e only those d e f i n e d by the Theorem guarantee 
i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y . 
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Whereas Chapter 3 was concerned with e s t a b l i s h i n g and 
demonstrating t h a t i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y was a problem 
for a range of t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures, Chapter 4 i s 
the f i r s t chapter concerned w i t h how the problem may be 
r e s o l v e d . The chapter i s -based on the work of Groves and 
Loeb (19 79) . I n order to a p p r e c i a t e the approach taken 
by Groves and Loeb, Chapter 4 commences with a b r i e f 
i n t r o d u c t i o n to the elements of game theory t h a t are used 
by Groves and Loeb. D i r e c t l y a f t e r t h i s , the Groves and 
Loeb (1979) t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure i s presented. 
Groves and Loeb (19 79) choose to d e s c r i b e those 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures t h a t s o l v e the c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r ' s c o - o r d i n a t i o n problem**, w h i l e guaranteeing 
i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y as "optimal c o n t r o l mechanisms". 
The proof e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t the Groves and Loeb (19 79) 
procedure i s an optimal c o n t r o l mechanism i s t h e r e f o r e 
presented. 
Next the work of Green and L a f f o n t (19 77) concerning 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of designing a l t e r n a t i v e optimal c o n t r o l 
mechanisms i s presented. A C h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n Theorem due 
to them i s presented which e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t the only optimal 
c o n t r o l mechanisms t h a t can be designed must be of the general 
7 
form of the Groves and Loeb (19 79) procedure . 
Rather than recommend adoption of the Groves and Loeb 
(1979) t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure, i t i s argued t h a t the 
procedure would encounter some d i f f i c u l t i e s i f i t were 
attempted to be implemented. Two major d i f f i c u l t i e s are 
h i g h l i g h t e d and d i s c u s s e d . The f i r s t of the problems i s 
t h a t , even though i n d i v i d u a l d i v i s i o n a l managers may have 
no i n c e n t i v e to l i e under the Groves and Loeb (1979) t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedure, c o a l i t i o n s of d i v i s i o n a l managers may 
gain from l y i n g . T h i s f a c t i s proven and a d i s c u s s i o n 
of how such c o a l i t i o n s may form i s presented. I t i s , 
however, concluded t h a t , although there i s a p o t e n t i a l f o r 
c o a l i t i o n s to form, t h i s problem i s not l i k e l y to be 
s e v e r e , as such c o a l i t i o n s would be h i g h l y u n s t a b l e . 
The second of the problems d i s c u s s e d r e l a t e s to the 
way d i v i s i o n a l managers would be compensated under the 
Groves and Loeb (1979) t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure. I t 
i s noted t h a t , i n Groves and Loeb (1979), they do not 
d e t a i l how e x a c t l y d i v i s i o n a l managers should be compensated. 
They do, however, d e s c r i b e g e n e r a l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a 
compensation scheme should p o s s e s s . T h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t 
f o r t h e i r purposes, as they assume t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers 
w i l l always attempt to maximize t h e i r d i v i s i o n ' s e v a l u a t i o n 
measure, which i s an a d j u s t e d p r o f i t f i g u r e . However, i t 
i s suggested t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l not s o l e l y be 
i n t e r e s t e d i n maximizing t h e i r compensation. T h i s i s 
because the amount of e f f o r t r e q u i r e d to c a r r y out t a s k s 
a l s o e n t e r s as an argument i n the d i v i s i o n a l manager's 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . S i n c e d i f f e r e n t t a s k s are l i k e l y to 
r e q u i r e d i f f e r i n g amounts of e f f o r t , d i v i s i o n a l managers 
w i l l be p r i m a r i l y concerned with e v a l u a t i n g t a s k s (which 
achieve d i f f e r i n g d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t s ) by c o n s i d e r i n g the 
t r a d e o f f between compensation and e f f o r t . I t i s proven 
t h a t t h i s i n f l u e n c e d e s t r o y s the guaranteed i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y p r o p e r t i e s of the Groves and Loeb (19 79) 
procedure. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s r e s u l t are d i s c u s s e d 
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and i t i s argued t h a t the problems of d i v i s i o n a l managers 
l y i n g and f i n d i n g e f f o r t p r o v i s i o n d i s u t i l i t i o u s are 
c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . I t i s argued t h a t one can not s o l v e 
one of these problems without simultaneously accounting 
f o r the other. 
The chapter concludes with a d i s c u s s i o n of a recommended 
m o d i f i c a t i o n to the o r i g i n a l Groves and Loeb t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedure, provided by Cohen and Loeb (19 8 4 ) . I t 
i s argued t h a t t h i s attempt to simultaneously d e a l w i t h 
the two problems of l y i n g and e f f o r t p r o v i s i o n i s un-
s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
At t h i s p o i n t , one may consider t h a t the r e s e a r c h 
has reached a "dead end". I say t h i s because r e c a l l t h a t 
Chapter 3 e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t a problem with many t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedures i s t h a t they do not ensure t h a t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers r e p o r t t r u t h f u l l y to the c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r s . Having e s t a b l i s h e d the d e s i r a b i l i t y of e n s u r i n g 
t r u t h f u l n e s s , Chapter 4 commences by showing t h a t one can 
only guarantee t r u t h f u l n e s s i f one adopts a Groves and 
Loeb (1979) type t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure. However, the 
chapter concludes by d i s c u s s i n g v a r i o u s u n d e s i r a b l e proper-
t i e s of a Groves and Loeb (19 79) type procedure. 
I t i s , however, important to s t r e s s t h a t t h i s r e s u l t 
does not end the s e a r c h f o r t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures 
with d e s i r a b l e i n c e n t i v e s f o r the d i v i s i o n a l managers. The 
type of guarantee of t r u t h f u l n e s s t h a t Groves and Loeb 
(1979) r e q u i r e i s v e r y strong indeed. They r e q u i r e t h a t , 
when one c o n s i d e r s the i n c e n t i v e s of one d i v i s i o n a l manager 
to l i e , one can only t a l k about guaranteeing the t r u t h f u l -
ness of t h a t d i v i s i o n a l manager's communications i f t h a t 
manager would always t e l l the truth,no matter whether or 
not other d i v i s i o n a l managers choose to l i e . 
T h i s i s an u n n e c e s s a r i l y s e v e r e r e s t r i c t i o n . 
The concept of t r u t h f u l n e s s r e q u i r e d f o r c h a p t e r s sub-
sequent to Chapter 4 i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t . I t i s 
assumed t h a t one can t a l k about guaranteeing t r u t h f u l n e s s 
( i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y ) , i f a d i v i s i o n a l manager always 
t e l l s the t r u t h , whenever a l l other d i v i s i o n a l managers 
are t e l l i n g the t r u t h . 
The above two paragraphs i l l u s t r a t e t h a t , whereas 
Groves and Loeb (1979) could analyse a d i v i s i o n a l manager's 
i n c e n t i v e s i n e x c l u s i o n from those of other d i v i s i o n a l 
managers' i n t h i s new approach one can not. I n order to 
work w i t h i n t h i s new approach, one needs to c o n s i d e r 
e x p l i c i t l y the i n t e r a c t i o n s between d i v i s i o n a l managers. 
I n order to f a c i l i t a t e modelling of these i n t e r a c t i o n s . 
Chapter 5 i s concerned with overviewing the "Theory of 
Games of Incomplete Information". T h i s overview i s 
presented to demonstrate t h a t the theory i s s u i t a b l e f o r 
modelling e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t s of the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g problem, 
when the i n t e r a c t i o n s ( s u b j e c t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s ) between 
d i v i s i o n a l managers must be considered. 
Chapter 6 commences with a p r e s e n t a t i o n of how one 
can e x p l i c i t l y model the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g problem i n a 
d e c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n as a game played between p l a y e r s 
p o s s e s s i n g incomplete information. I n t h i s model, i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y and e f f o r t p r o v i s i o n i s s u e s are both con-
s i d e r e d . A procedure for s o l v i n g t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g problems 
i J . 
i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s presented and an example i s provided. 
I t i s argued t h a t the reason t h i s procedure works i s 
because, i n a d e c e n t r a l i z e d environment, d i v i s i o n a l 
management must be e x p l i c i t l y compensated f o r the 
p r o v i s i o n of e f f o r t and information s e r v i c e s . I t i s 
the recommendation of payment for the l a t t e r s e r v i c e 
which i s new to the l i t e r a t u r e on t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g . A 
c r u c i a l r e s u l t presented i s t h a t c e n t r a l management should 
value d i v i s i o n a l managers' information s e r v i c e s by 
determining how much d i v i s i o n a l managers could gain by 
d i s t o r t i n g the information they communicate to the c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s . 
The model of the d e c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n used i n 
Chapter 6 i s very simple as shown by the example i n the 
chapter. T h i s i s considered a c c e p t a b l e , i n order to 
make i t p o s s i b l e to understand i n t u i t i v e l y how the t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedure works. Chapter 7 i s concerned with 
applying the same general procedure to a f a r more complex 
environment. 
NOTES 
1. Umapathy (19 78) p. 169. I n a d d i t i o n , note t h a t 
on p. 144, Umapathy suggests t h a t he had not 
intended to j u s t consider l a r g e f i r m s . I t j u s t 
turned out t h a t r e l a t i v e l y few s m a l l firms r e s -
ponded to the survey q u e s t i o n n a i r e . 
2. See E x h i b i t B-10, Umapathy (1978). 
3. For a d d i t i o n a l r e f e r e n c e s on su r v e y s of t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedures adopted see Thomas 
( 1980 ) , p. 128, f o r i n s t a n c e . 
4. Kaplan (1984), p. 402. 
5. Some procedures c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the Baumol and 
Fabian (19 64) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Dantzig and 
Wolfe (1960) Decomposition procedure a r e a l s o 
d i s c u s s e d . 
6. For a p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n of optimal c o n t r o l mechanisms see 
s e c t i o n 4.1. 
7. I t may seem strange to the rea d e r t h a t the Green and 
L a f f o n t (1977) work predates t h a t of Groves and Loeb 
(1979). However, the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure 
developed by Groves and Loeb (1979) i s c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d to t h e i r work on p u b l i c i n p u t s presented 
i n Groves and Loeb (19 7 5 ) . T h i s 19 75 work i s the 
b a s i s for the Green and L a f f o n t (1977) a n a l y s i s . 
8. I t a l k of a t r a d e o f f here as i t i s assumed t h a t 
compensation provides u t i l i t y whereas e f f o r t i s 




2.1 The Motivation for D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
The prime f o r c e s m o t i v a t i n g the adoption of managerial 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n can be c l a s s i f i e d under 
two, non-mutually e x c l u s i v e headings. The f i r s t source 
of m o t i v a t i o n s h a l l be d e s c r i b e d as "The Economics of 
Managerial Tasks", with the second source being d e s c r i b e d 
as " D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as an O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Philosophy". 
A simple example f o r each source w i l l now be 
presented and c o n s t i t u e n t problems i d e n t i f i e d . The 
examples a r e intended to i l l u s t r a t e how the motivating 
f o r c e s may a r i s e i n a simple s e t t i n g and are not intended 
to purport to show the only way the m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e s 
may m a n i f e s t themselves. I t i s r e c o g n i s e d t h a t there 
w i l l be many other c a s e s t h a t motivate a move towards more 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . 
2.1.1 The Economics of Managerial Tasks 
L e t us consider the case of a s m a l l , s i n g l e product, 
owner-managed b u s i n e s s . The owner wishes to become more 
prosperous and so i s c o n s i d e r i n g expanding the b u s i n e s s . 
Expansion can be achieved i n a number of ways. The owner 
may wish the b u s i n e s s to expand output of i t s s i n g l e 
product. However, t h i s option i s e v e n t u a l l y l i m i t e d by 
o v e r a l l market demand and competition from other producers. 
In a d d i t i o n , i n order to i n t e r n a l i z e as f a r as p o s s i b l e , 
c e r t a i n input and output market u n c e r t a i n t i e s , the b u s i n e s s 
may attempt to take c o n t r o l (purchase) of the s u p p l i e r s 
of raw m a t e r i a l s and r e t a i l e r s of the f i n a l product. 
However, t h i s may be l i m i t e d by the l a r g e number of 
s u p p l i e r s or r e t a i l e r s concerned. A l s o the s i z e of the 
other o p e r a t i o n s of these s u p p l i e r s and r e t a i l e r s may be 
such t h a t such ventures would be extremely c o s t l y . A 
more l i k e l y l i n e of expansion w i l l be to introduce new 
product l i n e s i n order to reach new markets. 
Given u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n the product markets, the 
b u s i n e s s may a l s o wish to d i v e r s i f y i t s i n t e r e s t s i n t o 
some u n r e l a t e d f i e l d i n order to avoid the r i s k of being 
d e f e n s e l e s s a g a i n s t damaging u n c e r t a i n outcomes t h a t may 
a r i s e i n one product m arkets# 
The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s example i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t , 
as b u s i n e s s grows i n s i z e , t h i s puts i n c r e a s i n g p r e s s u r e s 
on management time as there are now more d e c i s i o n s t o 
make and monitor. S i n c e management time i s a s c a r c e 
r e s o u r c e , one manager w i l l not be able to manage 
e f f e c t i v e l y and so the need w i l l a r i s e to delegate 
d e c i s i o n s and monitoring to someone e l s e . These o t h e r 
managers w i l l be c a l l e d l o c a l managers and, i n order to 
avoid confusion, the o v e r a l l c o n t r o l l i n g management w i l l be 
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c a l l e d c e n t r a l management. T h i s need f o r c e n t r a l manage-
ment to d e l e g a t e c e r t a i n day to day normal ope r a t i n g 
d e c i s i o n s to l o c a l management allows c e n t r a l management 
to spend more time c o n s i d e r i n g c r u c i a l and d i f f i c u l t 
s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s . T h i s f i r s t c o n s t i t u e n t problem 
can, t h e r e f o r e , be summarised as "the need to conserve 
c e n t r a l management time". 
As new product l i n e s are introduced and the b u s i n e s s 
d i v e r s i f i e s i n t o new f i e l d s , more information about new 
and u n r e l a t e d markets w i l l need to be gathered. As 
c e n t r a l management w i l l have l i m i t e d knowledge, informa-
t i o n and time to observe a l l the r e l e v a n t markets and 
a s s e s s a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , these r o l e s w i l l a l s o be 
p a r t l y delegated to l o c a l management. T h i s second con-
s t i t u e n t problem can, t h e r e f o r e , be summarised as 
"the need to c r e a t e information s p e c i a l i s t s " . 
Even though there may only be one person i n a 
b u s i n e s s c o l l e c t i n g information on a product market, a ^ 
l o c a l manager, there may be many other l o c a l managers 
from other b u s i n e s s e s a l s o c o l l e c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . I n a 
competi t i v e product market, i t i s c r u c i a l t h a t , i f the f u l l 
b e n e f i t s from c o l l e c t i n g information are to be gained, 
t h a t the information be q u i c k l y acted on. I t i s 
important t h a t some information can be acted upon by l o c a l 
managers as soon as they observe i t , r a t h e r than i t be 
r e q u i r e d t h a t they t r a n s m i t the information to c e n t r a l 
management. T h i s i s because c e n t r a l management may take 
some time to a s s e s s the information and make d e c i s i o n s . 
For i n s t a n c e , a l o c a l manager may f i n d a new s u p e r i o r 
s u p p l i e r of some raw m a t e r i a l used i n * t h e l o c a l manager's 
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sphere of op e r a t i o n . I t i s c r u c i a l t h a t the manager be 
able to a c t upon such information i n a t i m e l y f a s h i o n , 
r a t h e r than wait p o s s i b l y a number of months for c e n t r a l 
management to process and agree with a change of s u p p l i e r . 
Given t h a t i t must be e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t l o c a l managers 
can f r e e l y a c t on c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n s , i t i s a l s o important 
t h a t they be r e q u i r e d not to take independent a c t i o n s on 
c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n s t h a t may a f f e c t o t h e r p a r t s of the 
b u s i n e s s . For i n s t a n c e , i f the new raw m a t e r i a l 
purchased by the o r i g i n a l l o c a l manager to produce some 
in t e r m e d i a t e product, d i d not s a t i s f y the needs of a 
l o c a l manager who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e s s i n g 
of the intermediate product, then the u n i l a t e r a l d e c i s i o n 
may not be optimal. T h i s t h i r d c o n s t i t u e n t problem i s 
summarised as "the need to ensure c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n s have 
t i m e l y l o c a l responses". 
Given t h a t l o c a l managers are r e q u i r e d to communicate 
some information to c e n t r a l management and t h a t , s i n c e 
c e n t r a l funds a l l o c a t a b l e f o r use by l o c a l management are 
s c a r c e , the c e n t r a l management w i l l have to determine 
how to a l l o c a t e funds between l o c a l managers. I t i s 
c r u c i a l a t t h i s stage t h a t , i n order to stop c e n t r a l 
management being overloaded w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n i t needs to 
p r o c e s s , t h a t l o c a l managers can e f f e c t i v e l y s e l e c t what 
inf o r m a t i o n w i l l be c r u c i a l , and communicate i t i n a 
c l e a r summarised f a s h i o n . T h i s f o u r t h c o n s t i t u e n t 
problem i s summarised as "the need to ease the burden of 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n a l complexity". 
L 
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2.1.2 D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as an O r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
Philosophy 
Whereas the previous s u b - s e c t i o n considered the a c t u a l 
r o l e s t h a t l o c a l management needs to perform, t h i s sub-
s e c t i o n c o n s i d e r s the a t t i t u d e s t h a t l o c a l managers w i l l 
have to i n c r e a s e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and independence and 
how t h i s may a f f e c t t h e i r f u t u r e performance. 
Suppose t h a t one of the production l i n e s of our 
t y p i c a l expanding b u s i n e s s had been p r e v i o u s l y s u p e r v i s e d 
by a foreman. I n t h i s r o l e , the foreman had been r e q u i r e d 
to communicate d a i l y assessments on the f u n c t i o n i n g of 
the production l i n e so t h a t c e n t r a l management could 
a s s e s s and c o n t r o l the production l i n e . I n a d d i t i o n , 
suppose the i n p u t s t h a t were a v a i l a b l e f o r use on the 
production l i n e , such as labour and raw m a t e r i a l s , were 
determined c e n t r a l l y . ~ Hence, the foreman's r o l e i s r e a l l y 
of a p a s s i v e n a t u r e . 
Suppose c e n t r a l management decide to change the r o l e 
of the foreman to a l o c a l manager by d e l e g a t i n g the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r production of the p r o d u c t ^ The previous 
s u b - s e c t i o n i n d i c a t e s some of the new r o l e s the l o c a l manager 
w i l l need to perform. However, what i s a l s o worthy of 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s whether the l o c a l manager s t i l l views the 
production p r o c e s s p a s s i v e l y . Given new r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
and a d d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y , the newly crea t e d l o c a l manager 
may respond by a c t i v e l y s e a r c h i n g f o r improved methods of 
production and may be keen to implement such changes. 
The f i f t h problem then t h a t p r o v i d e s an i n c e n t i v e f o r 
b u s i n e s s e s to d e c e n t r a l i s e s h a l l be summarised as 
"the need to motivate l o c a l management". 
Another important problem i s t h a t , i f c e n t r a l manage-
ment wish to a t t r a c t high p o t e n t i a l a p p l i c a n t s i n t o the 
b u s i n e s s to improve the q u a l i t y of f u t u r e d e c i s i o n s , i t 
i s important t h a t new members be given ch a l l e n g e s to 
s t i m u l a t e them and are given e x p e r i e n c e . One of the 
b e s t ways to achieve such t r a i n i n g of new personnel i s 
to make them l o c a l managers and give them some r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t y and a u t h o r i t y so t h a t they can l e a r n to 
respond to these c h a l l e n g e s . The s i x t h and f i n a l problem 
which a r i s e s i n a b u s i n e s s of some s i z e t h a t provides an 
i n c e n t i v e f o r d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n s h a l l , t h e r e f o r e , be 
summarised as "the need to t r a i n l o c a l management". 
2.2 Implementing D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
The previous s e c t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
may be adopted i n order to overcome a number of o r g a n i z a -
t i o n a l problems. T h i s s e c t i o n c o n s i d e r s how the s t r a t e g y 
of managerial d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n can be implemented. 
D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s synonomous with d e l e g a t i n g a u t h o r i t y 
and e s t a b l i s h i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The c e n t r a l management 
of an o r g a n i z a t i o n can i s s u e two types of a u t h o r i t y to a 
l o c a l manager. The c e n t r a l management can p l a c e c e r t a i n 
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p h y s i c a l r e s o u r c e s , such as machinery, under the 
custody of a l o c a l manager, g i v i n g the l o c a l manager 
the power to decide how to u t i l i z e the p h y s i c a l 
r e s o u r c e s . The c e n t r a l management can a l s o i n d i c a t e 
which d e c i s i o n s the loca'l manager has a u t h o r i t y to 
take without c e n t r a l management c o n s u l t a t i o n . 
At f i r s t , one may then assume t h a t e f f e c t i v e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n w i l l be a c hieved by 
making l o c a l managers 7 only r e s p o n s i b l e f o r those 
resources' and d e c i s i o n s which they had a u t h o r i t y over. 
T h i s may be the case i f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t s d i d not 
i n t e r a c t . However, the very reason fo r a l a r g e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n coming i n t o e x i s t e n c e i s so as to f a c i l i t a t e 
the c o - o r d i n a t i o n ( i n t e r a c t i o n ) of these u n i t s to 
achieve some p r e s p e c i f i e d g o a l . Thus, t y p i c a l l y l o c a l 
managers' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l exceed t h e i r a u t h o r i t y 
to e f f e c t change. The i n t e n t i o n of t h i s p r a c t i c e i s 
to motivate l o c a l managers to work together i n unison, 
r a t h e r than i n s e c l u s i o n from o t h e r s . 
Before c o n s i d e r i n g these important i s s u e s f u r t h e r , 
i t i s important t h a t i t i s e s t a b l i s h e d how l o c a l managers 
are made r e s p o n s i b l e for a c t i o n s taken by them. 
2.2.1 Making l o c a l managers r e s p o n s i b l e 
The c e n t r a l management of an o r g a n i z a t i o n 
monitor the performance of the o r g a n i z a t i o n using a 
f i n a n c i a l measurement system. Thus, one way to make 
l o c a l managers f e e l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a range of 
d e c i s i o n s i s to measure the f i n a n c i a l consequences 
of those d e c i s i o n s and l i n k l o c a l managers' compensa-
t i o n to those f i n a n c i a l consequences. For i n s t a n c e , 
a l o c a l manager may be rewarded on the b a s i s of the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the u n i t i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n which 
the manager had a u t h o r i t y over^". How e x a c t l y the 
c e n t r a l management should make f i n a n c i a l measurements 
w i l l be considered i n l a t e r c h a p t e r s . At t h i s s t a g e , 
what needs to be noted i s t h a t , i n order t h a t l o c a l 
managers should f e e l s u i t a b l y r e s p o n s i b l e , the f i n a n c i a l 
measurement system must f u n c t i o n w e l l to r e f l e c t these 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
2.2.2 E s t a b l i s h i n g an O r g a n i z a t i o n Form 
D e c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r i s e i n many s e t t i n g s 
i n response to some or a l l of the problems d i s c u s s e d 
i n s e c t i o n 2.1. The form of d e c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
t h a t a r i s e i n response to only a p a r t i a l number of those 
problems i s l i k e l y to be d i f f e r e n t from an o r g a n i z a t i o n 
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t h a t d e c e n t r a l i z e s i n response to a l l of th e s e problems 
being p r e s e n t . Having s a i d t h i s , though, the s i x 
c o n s t i t u e n t problems of s e c t i o n 2.1 are l i k e l y to be 
pr e s e n t to a l e s s e r or g r e a t e r degree i n any o r g a n i z a -
t i o n t h a t r e s i s t s d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . However, the 
second c o n s t i t u e n t problem, t h a t of the need to c r e a t e 
information s p e c i a l i s t s does not always a r i s e , p o s s i b l y 
because of the p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s for pro d u c t i o n . 
For i n s t a n c e , on a production l i n e making t i n cans of 
only one s i z e , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n p u t s and 
outputs i s l i k e l y to be a s t a b l e one. Suppose i n 
a d d i t i o n the s u p p l i e r s of raw m a t e r i a l s were s t a b l e 
and reasonably uniformly p r i c e d between a l t e r n a t e 
s u p p l i e r s . A l s o assume the t i n cans were only to be 
used by other u n i t s i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n and not s o l d 
e x t e r n a l l y . I n t h i s type of c a s e , the problem of 
r e q u i r i n g a l o c a l manager to be an information 
s p e c i a l i s t i n the market f o r the production of t i n 
cans does not seem to be v a l i d . What i s needed i s a 
competent l o c a l manager who meets the requirements of 
the f i v e other problems. For i n s t a n c e , the l o c a l manager 
may respond w e l l to the v a l u a b l e t r a i n i n g e x p e r i e n c e 
o v e r s e e i n g the production of t i n cans. 
T h i s type of s t a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n p u t s 
and outputs g i v e s r i s e to the formulation of the de-
c e n t r a l i z e d u n i t concerned as a Standard Cost C e n t r e , 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f i c i e n c y of production. However, 
not only does the e x t e n t of the problems of s e c t i o n 2.1 
vary between o r g a n i z a t i o n s , but a l s o the extent of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y v a r i e s . For i n s t a n c e , some l o c a l 
managers may take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the l e v e l of 
f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s employed i n a d e c e n t r a l i z e d u n i t . 
These u n i t s may then be appraised as Investment C e n t r e s . 
However, t h i s study w i l l r e s t r i c t i t s a n a l y s i s to the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of P r o f i t C e n t r e s . A P r o f i t Centre i s 
defined here as a d e c e n t r a l i z e d u n i t whose performance 
i s measured by p r o f i t and i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a 
l o c a l manager. P r o f i t i s r e q u i r e d to be a meaningful 
concept i n t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between inputs and 
outputs i s an u n c e r t a i n one. For i n s t a n c e , i f the 
supply p r i c e of the raw m a t e r i a l s f o r t i n can production 
had been u n c e r t a i n , the a c t u a l p r i c e paid f o r the raw 
m a t e r i a l s would r e f l e c t the a b i l i t y of the l o c a l manager 
to f i n d the lowest p r i c e s u p p l i e r a t the r i g h t time. 
I n a d d i t i o n , assume t h a t a number of advances are con-
t i n u a l l y t a k i n g p l a c e i n the technology of t i n can 
production. The output of the production l i n e , a 
number of t i n cans c o s t i n g a c e r t a i n amount w i l l a l s o 
vary with the s k i l l of the l o c a l manager. The reason 
f o r the above d e f i n i t i o n of a P r o f i t Centre with i t s 
caveat w i l l become apparent s h o r t l y when the methodology 
of t h i s study i s d i s c u s s e d . B a s i c a l l y , i t r e s u l t s from 
the need to use one s p e c i f i c form of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l form 
to concentrate study upon. 
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2.2.3 The Rig h t D e c e n t r a l i z e d Environment 
( C o n t r o l l e d Autonomy) 
The term autonomy r e f e r s to the w i l l i n g n e s s of 
l o c a l managers to take independent a c t i o n to improve 
the performance of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . The term 
c o n t r o l l e d autonomy i s intended to imply t h a t l o c a l 
managers r e c o g n i s e l i m i t s on t h e i r autonomy. The 
reason th e s e l i m i t s are placed i s because the a c t i o n s 
of one l o c a l manager w i l l o ften a f f e c t another l o c a l 
manager's operating c o n d i t i o n s . I n which c a s e , both 
managers must be aware of t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n and the 
need to take j o i n t d e c i s i o n s . Thus, a c r u c i a l 
determinant of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
i s whether or not l o c a l managers adopt an a t t i t u d e 
of c o - o p e r a t i o n . 
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These sentiments are a l s o expressed by R.F. V a n c i l 
i n the f o l l o w i n g passage: 
"Autonomy i s the word used by managers to permit 
them to t a l k about the ambiguity of a p r o f i t 
c e n t e r manager's r o l e . D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n philosophy t h a t i n e v i t a b l y c r e a t e s 
ambiguity i n t h a t r o l e , by h o l d i n g a p r o f i t center 
manager r e s p o n s i b l e for the f i n a n c i a l performance 
of a b u s i n e s s and, a t the same time, w i t h o l d i n g 
from him the f u n c t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y to c o n t r o l 
shared r e s o u r c e s 
D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n works not o n l y because i t i s a 
powerful concept but a l s o because corporate 
managers work a t making i t work. Having 
designed an ambiguous r o l e , they a l s o design 
a management process and a s e t of management 
systems to h e l p themselves and t h e i r p r o f i t 
center managers cope with the ambiguity. The 
r e s u l t i s , indeed, the b e s t of both worlds: 
m u l t i p l e c e n t e r s of i n i t i a t i v e and a spectrum 
of d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s e s t h a t are used 
s e l e c t i v e l y to ensure t h a t the b e n e f i t s from 
interdependency are not l o s t " . 
T h i s chapter i s e n t i t l e d C o n t r o l l e d D e c e n t r a l i z a -
t i o n i n order to convey an i d e a of the ambiguity t h a t 
V a n c i l d e s c r i b e s t h a t d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n g i v e s r i s e to. 
V a n c i l c l e a r l y conveys the f e e l i n g t h a t , when d e c e n t r a l i z 
t i o n works, i t does so to the g r e a t b e n e f i t of the 
i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . However, the next s e c t i o n c o n s i d e r s 
the problems t h a t may a r i s e when t r y i n g to c r e a t e the 
r i g h t d e c e n t r a l i z e d environments f o r l o c a l managers to 
operate i n . 
2.3 D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , a t What Cost ? 
T h i s s e c t i o n c r i t i c a l l y c o n s i d e r s what may go wrong 
when o r g a n i z a t i o n s attempt to d e c e n t r a l i z e t h e i r opera-
t i o n s . The problem of how to e x a c t l y c r e a t e the r i g h t 
d e c e n t r a l i z e d environment i s soon encountered when 
26 • 
c e n t r a l management t r y to determine s u i t a b l e ( f i n a n c i a l ) 
performance measures f o r l o c a l management. 
2.3.1 Performance Measure-Destruction of Co-operation 
As has been mentioned before, l o c a l managers' 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l o f t e n exceed t h e i r a u t h o r i t y and 
the l o c a l manager's performance measure must r e f l e c t 
t h i s . L e t us now c o n s i d e r a simple case t h a t 
i l l u s t r a t e s t hese i s s u e s . Suppose one l o c a l manager 
i s d i s s a t i s f i e d w ith the product l i n e being produced 
and r e t a i l e d by h i s or her u n i t . Suppose the manager 
i d e n t i f i e s a new product l i n e which the manager b e l i e v e s 
w i l l be v e r y p r o f i t a b l e . However, the new product l i n e 
r e q u i r e s as an i n p u t a new i n t e r m e d i a t e product which 
would be r e q u i r e d to be produced i n another u n i t of 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n , as the l o c a l manager of t h i s u n i t has 
the s k i l l , knowledge and f a c i l i t i e s to produce t h i s new 
intermediate product. I n order t h a t production be 
r e a l i s e d , both l o c a l managers must co-operate to ensure 
t h a t the r i g h t i n t e r m e d i a t e and f i n a l product are produced. 
The performance measure of the i n t e r m e d i a t e product 
producing l o c a l manager w i l l impute some v a l u e to 
t r a n s f e r of the i n t e r m e d i a t e product. Hence, one can 
see t h a t the performance measure of t h i s l o c a l manager 
i s p a r t l y determined by an a c t i o n i n s t i g a t e d by another 
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l o c a l manager. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o n t i n u e d p r o d u c t i o n 
of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t w i l l depend on t h e s u c c e s s 
of t h e o t h e r l o c a l manager's c h o i c e and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n 
of t h e new p r o d u c t l i n e . 
Hence, t h e performance measure of t h e two l o c a l 
managers i s p a r t l y l i n k e d . However, i f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e 
m e a s u r e s do n o t r e f l e c t t h e r e l a t i v e e f f o r t s o f t h e 
l o c a l managers t o s e e t h a t t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e and f i n a l 
p r o d u c t s a r e s u c c e s s f u l , then t h i s may c a u s e disharmony 
between t h e l o c a l managers. I f t h e l o c a l managers 
t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t o t h e r l o c a l managers a r e f r e e r i d i n g 
on t h e i r e f f o r t s and b e n e f i t t i n g a t c o s t t o t h e m s e l v e s , 
b e c a u s e t h e p e r f o r m a n c e measures a r e n o t t r u l y r e f l e c t -
i n g t h e r e l a t i v e s h a r e s o f e f f o r t , t h i s w i l l f o s t e r 
an e n v i r o n m e n t o f non c o - o p e r a t i o n . P u t a n o t h e r way, 
one l o c a l manager may v i e w t h e improvement o f a n o t h e r 
l o c a l manager's p e r f o r m a n c e measure a s p u r e l y a r e s u l t 
o f h i s o r h e r own p e r f o r m a n c e measure b e i n g s e t 
a r t i f i c a l l y low. 
C l e a r l y , i f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e measure f o s t e r s t h e s e 
t y p e s o f v i e w s , i t w i l l n o t l e a d t o e f f e c t i v e d e c e n t r a l i z a -
t i o n where t h e r e i s a c o - o p e r a t i v e s p i r i t among l o c a l 
m anagers. T h i s problem i s a l s o sometimes d e s c r i b e d as 
t h e p r o b l e m o f e x t e r n a l i t i e s i n d e c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a -
t i o n s . ,, 
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2.3.2 P e r f o r m a n c e Measure G e n e r a t i o n o f S t r a t e g i c 
I n f o r m a t i o n S p e c i a l i s t s 
I n S e c t i o n 2.1, i t was i n d i c a t e d t h a t one o f t h e 
i m p o r t a n t r o l e s o f a l o c a l manager may be t o c o l l e c t 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n f o r m a t i o n on, f o r i n s t a n c e , new p r o d u c t i o n 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s , new s u p p l i e r s and/or r e t a i l e r s . I n 
a d d i t i o n , t h e l o c a l manager would be supposed t o make 
t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e t o c e n t r a l management 
i n a c l e a r c o n c i s e form. However, b e c a u s e o f t h e way 
t h e p e r f o r m a n c e measure i s s p e c i f i e d , i t may be i n 
t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e l o c a l manager t o c o n c e a l t h e i n f o r m a -
t i o n u n t i l a l a t e r s t a g e . 
F o r example, t h e p e r f o r m a n c e measurement s y s t e m 
may be b u d g e t o r i e n t a t e d i n t h a t p e r f o r m a n c e i s measured 
r e l a t i v e t o a c h i e v e m e n t o f b u d g e t s p e c i f i e d g o a l s . 
One o f t h e budget g o a l s may be t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f b e i n g 
a b l e t o p r o d u c e o u t p u t a t some c o s t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h an 
i m p l i e d c o s t f u n c t i o n . I f t h e l o c a l manager c o n c e r n e d 
f i n d s i n f o r m a t i o n about a new low c o s t p r o d u c t i o n method 
f o r p r o d u c i n g t h e r e q u i r e d o u t p u t , t h e manager may 
choose t o c o n c e a l t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h e budget 
h a s been s e t and t h e n implement t h e new low c o s t p r o d u c t i o n 
method i f t h i s i m p r o v e s h i s o r h e r p e r f o r m a n c e measure. 
A t t h i s s t a g e , some o b s e r v e r s may remark t h a t t h i s 
p r o b l e m i s e a s y t o overcome b e c a u s e , a t t h e end of t h e 
p e r i o d t h e c o s t f u n c t i o n w i l l be a u d i t e d and i t w i l l be 
found t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s d i f f e r e n t from 
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t h a t s u p p o s e d i n t h e budget. T h i s t y p e o f comment w i l l 
be d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l a t a l a t e r s t a g e w i t h i n a 
more s p e c i f i c framework, b u t a t t h i s s t a g e two p o i n t s 
s h o u l d be n o t e d . 
F i r s t , a t t h e budget s t a g e what i s b e i n g a s k e d f o r 
and f o r m u l a t e d i s e x p e c t a t i o n s . I t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o 
a u d i t an e x p e c t a t i o n i n someone's mind. One o f t h e 
main r e a s o n s why b u d g e t i n g p r o c e d u r e s a r e adopted i s so 
t h a t l o c a l managers h o p e f u l l y communicate t h e i r e x p e c t a -
t i o n s and p o s s i b l y r e v i s e them i n t h e l i g h t o f i n f o r m a -
t i o n g l e a n e d from o t h e r l o c a l m a n a g e r s 1 o r c e n t r a l 
managers' e x p e c t a t i o n s . I f an e x p e c t a t i o n i s n o t 
r e a l i s e d i n an u n c e r t a i n w o r l d , one c o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y 
what p a r t o f t h e v a r i a n c e was due t o c h a n c e , poor p e r f o r m a n c e , 
poor f o r e c a s t i n g o r m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f one's t r u e 
e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e c a s e where t h e 
l o c a l manager c o n c e r n e d i s , and i s employed t o be, t h e 
( p o s s i b l y o n l y ) i n f o r m a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t i n a f i e l d and 
where o t h e r s ' knowledge and i n f o r m a t i o n i s l i m i t e d . 
S e c o n d l y , t h e c r i t i c a l comment t a k e s no a c c o u n t of 
t h e f a c t t h a t , a s an i n f o r m a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t , a l o c a l 
manager must be r e w a r d e d f o r c a r r y i n g o u t t h i s r o l e 
s u c c e s s f u l l y . T h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t t h e r e w a r d s h o u l d 
be a c h i e v e d by t h e s t r a t e g y o f m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f 
a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n . What i s b e i n g a r g u e d i s t h a t i t 
must be c l e a r l y r e c o g n i s e d t h a t l o c a l managers must be 
g i v e n an i n c e n t i v e ( r e w a r d ) t o a c t as i n f o r m a t i o n 
s p e c i a l i s t s . 
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2.3.3 G o a l I n c o n g r u e n t P e r f o r m a n c e Measures 
I d e a l l y , t h e p e r f o r m a n c e measure by w h i c h a l o c a l 
manager i s a p p r a i s e d s h o u l d m o t i v a t e t h e l o c a l manager 
t o be a b l e t o i d e n t i f y and adopt the o v e r a l l g o a l s o f 
t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . However, t h e l o c a l manager's 
s t r o n g f o c u s on t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e measure may l e a d 
them t o s u b s t i t u t e and r e a l i s e t h e i r own p e r s o n a l g o a l s 
f o r t h o s e o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . F o r i n s t a n c e , i t may be 
t h a t c e r t a i n l o c a l managers may be a b l e t o i m p r o v e 
t h e i r own p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s by t a k i n g a c t i o n s a t 
t h e e x p e n s e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n g o a l f u l f i l m e n t . T h i s 
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t y p e o f p r o b l e m i s commented on by K a p l a n i n t h e 
f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e : 
"The measure o f p e r f o r m a n c e t e n d s t o become an 
end t o i t s e l f , more i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e e c o n o m i c 
p e r f o r m a n c e t h a t i t a t t e m p t s t o r e p r e s e n t 
Any s i n g l e measure may be m a n i p u l a t e d t o b e n e f i t 
t h e d e c e n t r a l i z e d u n i t a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e 
c o r p o r a t i o n . T h i s fundamental problem a r i s e s 
b e c a u s e , u n l i k e t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e p h y s i c a l 
s c i e n c e s , t h e a c t o f measurement i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e s 
and i n management changes t h e e v e n t and t h e o b s e r v e r . 
Measurement i s n e i t h e r n e u t r a l n o r o b j e c t i v e . The 
measure c h o s e n f o r e v a l u a t i n g p e r f o r m a n c e a c q u i r e s 
v a l u e and i m p o r t a n c e by t h e f a c t o f b e i n g s e l e c t e d 
f o r a t t e n t i o n . P e o p l e w i t h i n t h e s y s t e m change 
t h e i r b e h a v i o u r a s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e measure c h o s e n 
t o s u m m a r i s e t h e economic p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e i r 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t " . 
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I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p e r f o r m a n c e measure may o n l y be 
a b l e t o p a r t l y communicate t h e g o a l s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
T h i s c o u l d e a s i l y happen when m u l t i p l e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
g o a l s e x i s t w h i c h a r e n o t t o t a l l y i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t 
and need s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
2.3.4 I n c o m p l e t e n e s s o f P e r f o r m a n c e Measures 
Assume t h e f i n a n c i a l p e r f o r m a n c e measure t h a t c e n t r a l 
management w i l l be t r y i n g t o o p t i m i z e i s t h e n e t 
f i n a n c i a l p e r f o r m a n c e o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n a f t e r l o c a l 
managers h a v e been compensated. Hence, t h e c e n t r a l 
management w i l l n o t want t o compensate l o c a l managers 
e x c e s s i v e l y . However, i t i s e q u a l l y l i k e l y t o be 
c o n c e r n e d w i t h u n d e r - c o m p e n s a t i n g good l o c a l managers. 
T h i s i s b e c a u s e , i f good l o c a l managers a r e n o t e a s y t o 
r e p l a c e , low c o m p e n s a t i o n may l e a d t h e good l o c a l 
managers t o d e c i d e t o l e a v e t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a t some 
f u t u r e c o s t t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and t h e c e n t r a l manage-
ment. 
The i m p o r t a n t i s s u e h e r e i s w h e t h e r o r n o t l o c a l 
manager p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s do r e f l e c t how good o r bad 
a l o c a l manager i s . T h i s p r o b l e m a r i s e s b e c a u s e o f t e n 
l o c a l manager p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s c a n be a f f e c t e d by 
u n e x p e c t e d , u n p l a n n e d m a r k e t f o r c e s , w h i c h a r e n o t t h e 
r e s u l t o f a n y t h i n g l o c a l management h a s been a b l e t o do. 
F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e p r o d u c t s o l d by one l o c a l manager's 
u n i t may s u d d e n l y i n c r e a s e i n demand i n an e x p o r t m a r k e t 
b e c a u s e of some u n f o r e s e e n e v e n t o c c u r r i n g i n t h a t 
f o r e i g n m a r k e t . I n o r d e r to meet t h i s e x c e s s demand, 
th e l o c a l manager may n o t need t o expend much e x t r a 
e f f o r t . I f t h i s i s t h e c a s e , i d e a l l y t h e l o c a l 
manager's p e r f o r m a n c e measure s h o u l d t a k e t h i s i n t o 
a c c o u n t . One way o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t e n a t t e m p t t o o v e r -
come t h i s t y p e o f p r o b l e m i s by l i n k i n g t h e p e r f o r m a n c e 
measure t o a f l e x i b l e budget r e p o r t . 
To s u m m a r i s e t h e n , c a r e must be t a k e n m c o n s t r u c t -
i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s , s i n c e t h e y 
may o n l y p a r t i a l l y measure a c t u a l p e r f o r m a n c e , a l t h o u g h 
t h e y o f t e n d e t e r m i n e a c t u a l c o m p e n s a t i o n t o l o c a l 
management. 
2.3.5 The U n c e r t a i n t y i n P e r f o r m a n c e Measures 
Assuming t h a t l o c a l managers o p e r a t e i n an u n c e r t a i n 
e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e measure w i l l depend on 
t h e outcome o f u n c e r t a i n e v e n t s . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e s a l e s 
o f a l o c a l manager's u n i t may depend upon many un-
c e r t a i n t i e s , s u c h a s f i e r c e n e s s o f c o m p e t i t i o n from o t h e r 
c o m p e t i t o r s o r e v e n t h e w e a t h e r i n t h e c a s e o f i c e cream 
s a l e s . G i v e n t h a t t h e c e n t r a l management o f t h e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n h a v e some a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s r i s k , a n o t h e r 
r o l e o f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e measure s h o u l d be t o m o t i v a t e 
l o c a l management t o adopt p r o j e c t s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e 
c e n t r a l management's a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s r i s k . T h i s may 
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no t a l w a y s be r e a l i s e d , however, b e c a u s e t h e p e r f o r m a n c e 
measure may o f t e n o v e r e x p o s e o r o v e r p r o t e c t l o c a l 
management from r i s k . 
2.4 M o d e l l i n g D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
As t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n h a s i n d i c a t e d , t h e c e n t r a l 
t o o l by which c e n t r a l management can i n f l u e n c e t h e 
b e n e f i t s and c o s t s t h a t a r i s e from d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s 
thr o u g h t h e p e r f o r m a n c e measurement s y s t e m f o r l o c a l 
managers. 
The aim o f t h i s t h e s i s i s t o c o n s t r u c t a t h e o r y o f 
how a p e r f o r m a n c e measurement s y s t e m s h o u l d f u n c t i o n i n 
o r d e r t o g a i n t h e maximum a c h i e v a b l e n e t b e n e f i t s from 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . However, t h e m o t i v a t i o n f o r d e -
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n g i v e s r i s e t o many d i f f e r e n t forms o f 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and p e r f o r m a n c e measurement. 
T h i s i s i n r e s p o n s e t o d i f f e r e n t e x t e r n a l m a r k e t c o n d i t i o n s , 
d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r i n n o v a t i o n i n p r o d u c t i o n and 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t s 
f o r i n s t a n c e . The r e s e a r c h methodology a d o p t e d i n t h i s 
t h e s i s i s t o c o n c e n t r a t e a t t e n t i o n on one form o f d e -
c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and t h e n t o s e e how 
b e s t a p e r f o r m a n c e measurement s y s t e m c a n be c o n s t r u c t e d 
f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r d e c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . 
I t i s t h e n hoped t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s made by d e t a i l e d c o n -
s i d e r a t i o n o f one p a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t u r e w i l l be a b l e t o 
be a d a p t e d t o c o n s i d e r o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s . 
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2.4.1 The T r a n s f e r o f an I n t e r m e d i a t e P r o d u c t 
T h i s s t u d y w i l l u s e a s i t s i l l u s t r a t i v e o r g a n i z a -
t i o n , one i n w h i c h t h e r e a r e two d e c e n t r a l i z e d u n i t s 
c a l l e d d i v i s i o n s , r u n by d i v i s i o n a l managers a p p o i n t e d 
by a c e n t r a l management team c a l l e d t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s . The f i r s t d i v i s i o n w i l l be c a l l e d t h e 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n . I t i s assumed t h a t t h e r o l e 
of t h i s d i v i s i o n i s t o produce an i n t e r m e d i a t e 
p r o d u c t . However, t h e s u p p l y and p r i c e o f a t l e a s t 
some raw m a t e r i a l s i s u n c e r t a i n . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e 
c o s t f u n c t i o n o f t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n may 
change from one p e r i o d t o t h e n e x t , s i n c e t h e p r o d u c t i o n 
t e c h n o l o g y i s assumed t o be c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g . 
The s e c o n d d i v i s i o n w i l l be d enoted t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n 
d i v i s i o n . The r o l e o f t h i s d i v i s i o n i s t o f u r t h e r 
p r o c e s s t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t and t h e n s e l l t h e 
p r o d u c t on an u n c e r t a i n e x t e r n a l m a r k e t , whose demand 
c o n d i t i o n s may v a r y from p e r i o d t o p e r i o d b e c a u s e o f 
exogenous f o r c e s s u c h a s c h a n g i n g t a s t e s . As a f i r s t 
s t e p , l e t us assume t h e b a s i s f o r p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e -
ment o f t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers i s d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t . 
I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , c r u c i a l t h a t a p r i c e must be 
d e t e r m i n e d a t w h i c h t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t i s t o be 
t r a n s f e r r e d . What i s v i e w e d a s most i m p o r t a n t i s t h e 
p r o c e s s by w h i c h t h e p r i c e i s d e t e r m i n e d , r a t h e r t h a n 
o n l y t h e a c t u a l t r a n s f e r p r i c e t h a t r e s u l t s . 
I n o r d e r to s e e as c l e a r l y a s p o s s i b l e how t h i s 
p r o c e s s s h o u l d , i n g e n e r a l , t a k e p l a c e , i t w i l l be 
assumed t h a t t h e r e i s no e x t e r n a l m a r k e t f o r the 
i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t . T h i s i s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e n e t 
b e n e f i t s from d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n c a n f i r s t be d e r i v e d 
from i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f o r c e s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e 
r e s u l t of a p a r t i c u l a r form o f m a r k e t e x i s t e n c e . T h i s 
no e x t e r n a l m a r k e t a s s u m p t i o n i s a l s o made so a s t o 
h o p e f u l l y g i v e t h e most g e n e r a l i s e a b l e r e s u l t s . T h a t 
i s t o s a y , i t i s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t an e x t e r n a l market f o r 
an i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t may t a k e many forms between t h e 
p o l e s o f c o m p e t i t i v e and m o n o p o l i s t i c o p e r a t i n g c o n -
d i t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , i f one c a n c o n s t r u c t a t h e o r y o f 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g t h a t i s n o t e x t e r n a l m a r k e t s p e c i f i c 
i n i t s a s s u m p t i o n s , t h e n i t i s hoped t h a t t h i s t y p e o f 
t h e o r y w i l l be g e n e r a l i s e a b l e t o most e x t e r n a l m a r k e t 
c a s e s . I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s assumed t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n a l 
managers a r e n o t h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e l e v e l and t y p e 
o f i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e i r d i v i s i o n , b u t o n l y f o r t h e s h o r t -
t e r m o p e r a t i n g d e c i s i o n s t h a t need t o be made f o r t h e 
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d i v i s i o n . T h i s means t h a t t r a n s f e r p r i c e s b a s e d on t h e 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t d i v i s i o n s a r e i n v e s t m e n t c e n t r e s w i l l n o t 
be c o n s i d e r e d . One r e a s o n why t h i s may o c c u r i n p r a c t i c e 
i s t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers may n o t s t a y i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
d i v i s i o n l o n g enough f o r t h e f u l l b e n e f i t s o f t h e 
i n v e s t m e n t t h e y i n s t i g a t e d t o be r e a l i s e d . The r e a s o n 
t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers may be moved about i s b e c a u s e t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s want t o e n s u r e t h a t a d i v i s i o n a l 
manager does n o t s t a r t t o t h i n k o f a d i v i s i o n ' s a s s e t s 
a s "my a s s e t s " r a t h e r t h a n "our a s s e t s " . 
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The n e x t c h a p t e r t h e n c o n s i d e r s a r e v i e w o f t h e 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g l i t e r a t u r e f o r p r o f i t c e n t r e s . 
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
T y p i c a l l y , t h i s p r o f i t measure w i l l a l s o depend 
on t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f o t h e r u n i t s . 
R.F. V a n c i l , " D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n : M a n a g e r i a l 
A m b i g u i t y by D e s i g n " , pp. 131 - 132. 
R.S. K a p l a n , "Advanced Management A c c o u n t i n g " , 
page 441. A s u p e r s c r i p t r e f e r e n c i n g a n o t e t o 
t h e H e i s e n b e r g u n c e r t a i n t y p r i n c i p l e h a s n o t been 
i n c l u d e d i n t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e o r i g i n a l 
p a s s a g e . 
F o r i n s t a n c e , r e t u r n on i n v e s t m e n t and r e s i d u a l 
income. I n a d d i t i o n , i t w i l l be assumed t h a t 
w o r k i n g c a p i t a l r e q u i r e m e n t s do n o t v a r y w i t h 
o u t p u t . Hence, one does n o t need t o c o n s i d e r 
t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r o r n o t a c h a r g e f o r w o r k i n g 
c a p i t a l n e e d s t o be made t o d e t e r m i n e t h e 
m a r g i n a l c o s t o f p r o d u c t i o n . See A s h t o n (19 84) 
f o r more on t h i s s u b j e c t . 
CHAPTER THREE 
A REVIEW OF THE PROPERTIES OF SOME TRANSFER 
PRICING PROCEDURES WHEN THERE I S NO EXTERNAL 
MARKET FOR INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS 
3 . ] I d e o l o g i e s 
T h e r e a r e a number^ of e s t a b l i s h e d works r e v i e w i n g 
t r a n s f e r o r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e s i n d e t a i l . T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l , 
• i n s t e a d , t r y t o f o c u s a t t e n t i o n m a i n l y on t h e i d e o l o g i c a l 
background of s p e c i f i c p r o c e d u r e s and t h e n g i v e an a c c o u n t 
of t h e p r o c e d u r e s . The r e a s o n t h i s l i n e of a p p r o a c h i s 
t a k e n i s r e l a t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t , i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , 
i t was e s t a b l i s h e d i n t u i t i v e l y t h a t a t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
p r o c e d u r e i n a d e c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s h o u l d p l a y a 
number of r o l e s . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e p r o c e d u r e s h o u l d e n s u r e t h a t 
t h a t 
c e n t r a l management t i m e i s c o n s e r v e d a n d / l o c a l management a r e 
m o t i v a t e d t o p e r f o r m w e l l . However, r e s e a r c h h a s t e n d e d t o 
be o f a p i e c e m e a l n a t u r e J i n s t e a d o f t r y i n g t o d e s i g n 
p r o c e d u r e s s a t i s f y i n g a l l r o l e s , r e s e a r c h e r s have c o n c e n t r a t e d 
on p r o c e d u r e s t h a t would s a t i s f y a s p e c i f i c r o l e . I t i s 
a c c e p t e d t h a t , g i v e n t h e d i f f i c u l t n a t u r e of t h e o v e r a l l 
problem, a p i e c e m e a l r e s e a r c h a p p r o a c h i s a v a l i d f i r s t s t e p , 
a p p r o a c h 
However, t h i s / a i v e s r i s e t o problems when one t r i e s t o a s s e s s 
t h e r e l a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y o f d i f f e r e n t p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h h a v e 
i m p l i c i t l y assumed d i f f e r e n t ( p a r t i a l ) r o l e s f o r t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n q p r o c e d u r e s . 
I t i s r e c o g n i s e d t h a t a l l r o l e s e s t a b l i s h e d on i n t u i t i v e 
g rounds i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s h o u l d be s a t i s f i e d by a 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e w h e r e v e r p o s s i b l e . However, i f 
one i s o n l y a b l e t o d e s i g n p r o c e d u r e s t h a t s a t i s f y a p a r t i a l 
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number of r o l e s , one must t r y and e s t a b l i s h a p r i o r i t y 
r a n k i n q o v e r t h e r o l e s . T h u s , i n t h i s work, i f two 
a l t e r n a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s h o l d d i f f e r e n t p r i o r i t y r a n k i n g o v e r 
r o l e s , t h e y a r e s a i d t o be b a s e d on d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i e s . 
A s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f t h i s ' t h e s i s i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h e s t a b l i s h -
i n g / p r e f e r r e d p a r t i a l p r i o r i t y r a n k i n g o v e r t h e r o l e s t h a t a 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e must s a t i s f y . L e t us now c o n s i d e r 
two o f t h e s e m i n a l works on t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g i n s e c t i o n s 3.2 
and 3.3 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
3.2 The P i r s h l e i f e r A n a l y s i s 
L e t u s assume t h a t t h e c o r p o r a t i o n under c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
h a s two d i v i s i o n s , a m a n u f a c t u r i n g and a d i s t r i b u t i o n 
d i v i s i o n . E a c h d i v i s i o n p r o d u c e s one p r o d u c t and 
t h e d i v i s i o n s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t e x c e p t f o r t h e f a c t t h a t t h e 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n t r a n s f e r s a l l of i t s o u t p u t t o t h e 
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d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e s s i n g . 
F i r s h l e i f e r a d d r e s s e s t h e problem o f how t o c o - o r d i n a t e 
t h e l o c a l d e c i s i o n s o f t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers i n o r d e r t o 
e n s u r e m a x i m i z a t i o n of t h e c o r p o r a t e g o a l ( s ) , w h i c h i s 
s i n g l e p e r i o d 
assumed h e r e t o b e / p r o f i t m a x i m i z a t i o n . H i r s h l e i f e r 
a t t e m p t s t o s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m by m i m i c i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n o f 
a c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t . S p e c i f i c a l l y H i r s h l e i f e r d e m o n s t r a t e s 
t h a t , i f t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t were t o be p e r f e c t l y com-
p e t i v e l v p r i c e d , d i v i s i o n a l managers would t a k e l o c a l 
d e c i s i o n s t h a t would e n s u r e t h a t c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t s w ere 
m a x i m i s e d . T h i s a p p r o a c h i s a l s o sometimes c a l l e d t h e 
"economic a p p r o a c h " , as i t i s b a s e d on t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s 
o f m a r g i n a l economic a n a l y s i s . H i r s h l e i f e r a n a l y s e d t h e 
s i t u a t i o n g e o m e t r i c a l l y a l o n g t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e s . 
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L e t Cla ) ~ m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n s c o s t of p r o d u c i n g 
u n i t s of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t . 
C D ( q D ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s c o s t of s e l l i n g q D 
u n i t s o f t h e f i n a l good and any a d d i t i o n a l 
c o s t s i n c u r r e d i n t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e i n t e r -
m e d i a t e p r o d u c t i n t o t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t . 
R ( q D ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s r e v e n u e from s e l l i n g 
q D u n i t s of t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t . 
D ( q D ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s n e t r e v e n u e f u n c t i o n 
= R ( q D ) - C D ( q D ) . 
L e t u s assume t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n s e l l s t h e 
^ i n a l p r o d u c t on an i m p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t ^ and 
t h e m a r g i n a l c o s t and m a r g i n a l r e v e n u e s c h e d u l e s a r e as 
p r e s e n t e d i n F i g u r e 1. 
To m a x i m i s e c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t s b o t h d i v i s i o n s must 
a g r e e on t h e q u a n t i t y of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t t h a t 
n e e d s t o be produced and t r a n s f e r r e d . The o p t i m a l o u t p u t , 
q*, and p r i c e , p* , w i l l be where t h e n e t m a r g i n a l r e v e n u e 
o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n e q u a l s t h e m a r g i n a l c o s t of 
t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n f o r p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e i n t e r -
m e d i a t e p r o d u c t . 
The i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t o f H i r s h l e i f e r ' s a n a l y s i s i s 
t h a t o n ce c e n t r a l management d e t e r m i n e s t h i s p r i c e p* , t h e 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l manager would i n d e p e n d e n t l y 
c h o o s e an o u t p u t l e v e l q^ a t w h i c h m a r g i n a l m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
c o s t e q u a l l e d p*. A l s o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l 
manager would i n d e p e n d e n t l y w i s h t o a c q u i r e q Q u n i t s of 
t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t where n e t m a r g i n a l r e v e n u e 
e a u a l l e d p*. Hence, s i n c e q D = q^ = q*, t h e l o c a l 
*1 
F I G U R E 1 
COST 
PER UNtT 
P E R UMIT 
OUTPUT 
foR IMCTANCC : 
I 5 i = V © / 5 MARGINAL «E\ J E N U £ 
d e c i s i o n s of t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
t h e d e c i s i o n s t h a t c e n t r a l management would i n s t r u c t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers t o t a k e t o maximise c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t . 
H i r s h l e i f e r d o es n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h how, i n 
p r a c t i c e , h i s p r o c e d u r e s h o u l d be made o p e r a t i o n a l , b u t 
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s u q q e s t s t h a t " T h e r e a r e a v a r i e t y o f ways i n w h i c h 
t h e optimum s o l u t i o n m i g h t be a r r i v e d a t o p e r a t i o n a l l y . 
Some d e v i c e l i k e a n e u t r a l u m p i r e m i g h t be employed t o 
s e t an i n i t i a l t r i a l p r i c e p*.... a f t e r w h i c h t h e d i v i s i o n s 
would r e s p o n d by d e c l a r i n g t e n t a t i v e o u t p u t s and q D > 
I f <$m e x c e e d s q D , t h e p* s h o u l d be a d j u s t e d downward by 
the u m p i r e and t h e r e v e r s e i f q D e x c e e d s q^ u n t i l a 
p* i s found s u c h t h a t t h e p l a n n e d o u t p u t s a r e c o - o r d i n a t e d " 
However, Ronen and Mckinney (1970) have p r o p o s e d an 
o p e r a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e H i r s h l e i f e r 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e . They s u g g e s t t h a t t h e 
m a r q i n a l c o s t s c h e d u l e o f t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n 
be r e p o r t e d t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n , w h i c h t e l l s t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager how much would be p r o d u c e d 
by t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a t any t r a n s f e r p r i c e p*. 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager d e t e r m i n e s t h e d i v i s i o n 
a v e r a q e r e v e n u e c u r v e , w h i c h i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e 
m a r k e t p r i c e o f t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t p and t h e t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e o f t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t p*. The d i v i s i o n w i l l 
w i s h t o p r o d u c e t h e o u t p u t f o r w h i c h 
q* max p q D - P * q D - C ^ ) (1) 
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w h i c h s a t i s f i e s t h e f i r s t o r d e r c o n d i t i o n 
P ~ P* = C ^ ( q D ) (2) 
T h a t i s ^ t h e manager d e t e r m i n e s t h e o u t p u t a t w h i c h a v e r a g e 
r e v e n u e e o u a l s m a r g i n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n c o s t s . The manufac-
t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l manager w i l l a g r e e t o p r o d u c e q£ = q* 
u n i t s a t t r a n s f e r p r i c e p* as 
P* =
 C'<V <3> 
w h i c h a r e t h e f i r s t o r d e r c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
q* max p* - C ( q J (4) 
However, a s s h a l l be d e m o n s t r a t e d below i n s e c t i o n 
3.4.1 t h e r e a r e a number o f problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t r y i n g 
t o make t h e H i r s h l e i f e r p r o c e d u r e o p e r a t i o n a l . H i r s h l e i f e r * s 
p r o c e d u r e i s b e s t v i e w e d a s e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t , i n some 
i n s t a n c e s , a u n i q u e t r a n s f e r p r i c e c a n be e s t a b l i s h e d w h i c h 
w i l l c o - o r d i n a t e t h e l o c a l d e c i s i o n making a c t i v i t i e s o f 
l o c a l managers t o y i e l d o v e r a l l c o r p o r a t e o p t i m a z a t i o n . 
3.2.1 R e g u l a r i t y R e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e E x i s t e n c e o f 
H i r s h l e i f e r P r i c e s . 
The a n a l y s i s o f H i r s h l e i f e r r e s t s on t h e a s s u m p t i o n 
t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a u n i q u e p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e p r i c e 
( s a t i s f y i n g t h e r e q u i r e d m a r g i n a l c o n d i t i o n s ) f o r t h e i n t e r -
m e d i a t e p r o d u c t , which w i l l g u i d e t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers 
t o c h o o s e u n i a u e o o t i m a l o p e r a t i n g d e c i s i o n s . However, i n 
some i n s t a n c e s , S U c h a p r i c e may n o t e x i s t . T h i s s u b -
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s e c t i o n i n v e s t i g a t e s t h e t y p e o f o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
d i v i s i o n s , w h i c h would e n s u r e t h a t a unique c o - o r d i n a t i n g 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e would a l w a y s e x i s t . T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s 
w i l l be c a l l e d t h e r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e problem. 
L e t u s , t h e r e f o r e , c o n s i d e r t h e r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s 
w h i c h a r e s u f f i c i e n t and n e c e s s a r y f o r : 
( i ) t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s u c h u n i q u e t r a n s f e r p r i c e s , and 
( i i ) t h e p r i c e t o g u i d e d i v i s i o n a l management t o make 
d e c i s i o n s w h i c h m a x i m i z e t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r 1 s 
w e l f a r e . 
The f o l l o w i n g m a t h e m a t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n , b a s e d on 
MoeseXe and G h e l l i n k (19 69) w i l l make u s e of v e c t o r 
n o t a t i o n so t h e r e i s no need t o r e s t r i c t a t t e n t i o n t o o n l y 
'two d i v i s i o n s w i t h one i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t . L e t u s 
assume t h e r e a r e N d i v i s i o n s i n d e x e d i = 1, ....n and M 
common r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s i n d e x e d j = l,....m. The 
common r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s r e l a t e t o l i m i t e d c o r p o r a t e 
r e s o u r c e s t h a t need t o be s h a r e d o u t among t h e d i v i s i o n s , 
o r t r a n s f e r s between t h e d i v i s i o n s . L e t t h e p r o d u c t i v e 
a c t i v i t i e s o f d i v i s i o n i be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by n^ v a r i a b l e s , 
summarized i n t h e v e c t o r x^ where 
x i = ( x i l ' X ± n i ) 1 = 1 / ' n 
The p r o f i t f u n c t i o n ( p r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n ) of t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d a u a r t e r s i s assumed t o be t h e sum of a l l d i v i s i o n a l 
p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s w h i c h a r e f u n c t i o n s of t h e a c t i v i t y l e v e l s 
45 . 
nn t h a t d i v i s i o n and can be w r i t t e n as the f o l l o w i n g sunt of 
n f u n c t i o n s : 
n 
max I f . (x, ) (5) 
i = l 1 1 
The p r i v a t e c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t o n l y d i v i s i o n i f a c e can be 
e x p r e s s e d a s : 
x^e X^ ^ i = 1, . . . .n (6) 
where X^ = d i v i s i o n i s f e a s i b l e ( p r o d u c t i o n ) s e t . 
The i m p o r t a n t a s s u m p t i o n h e r e i s t h a t d i v i s i o n i ' s 
p r i v a t e c o n s t r a i n t s e t c a n be s p e c i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y 
o f t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f o t h e r d i v i s i o n s . However, t h i s i s 
n o t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e m common r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s w h i c h 
a r e assumed t o t a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l form: 
9ll( xl> + + 9i N<V * b l ( 7 ) 
+ W V < bm 
I n t h e s i t u a t i o n where, f o r i n s t a n c e , an i n t e r m e d i a t e 
p r o d u c t i s produced i n one d i v i s i o n and t r a n s f e r r e d t o 
a n o t h e r d i v i s i o n , one of t h e g..^ f u n c t i o n s w i l l be p o s i t i v e 
and a n o t h e r n e g a t i v e w i t h t h e a s s o c i a t e d v a l u e b e i n g 
z e r o , where j = 1, m 
L e t t h e n o n - n e g a t i v e m v e c t o r u = ( u . , u ) r e p r e s e n t 
1 m 
t h e t r a n s f e r p r i c e s c h a r g e d t o d i v i s i o n s f o r ea c h common 
r e s o u r c e . E a c h d i v i s i o n t r y i n g t o maximize d i v i s i o n a l 
p r o f i t w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , o p e r a t e a t t h e a c t i v i t y l e v e l x* 
f o r w h i c h 
9 m l < x l > + 
x* max (f ( x . ) - I u g (>: ) } (8) 
1 1 j _ _ ^ J j l l 
s # t . ^ i ^ ^  i 
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.1 
L e t x^ , ,x* d e n o t e t h e a c t i v i t y v e c t o r s t h a t s o l v e e q u a t i o n ( 
e q u a t i o n 
and s a t i s f v / ( 7 ) a s w e l l a s t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t 
n 
T g . . ( x * ) < b. i m p l i e s u. = 0 (9) 
f o r a l l j = 1, m 
t h e n x* s o l v e s t h e o v e r a l l problem d e f i n e d by (5) s u b j e c t 
t o (fi) and (7) . 
PROOF: See Appendix 1. 
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.1 i s a s u f f i c i e n c y theorem f o r e s t a b l i s h -
i n g t h a t , i f t h e above c o n d i t i o n s a r e f u l f i l l e d , t h e n a 
s o l u t i o n t o t h e o v e r a l l c o r p o r a t e problem h a s been o b t a i n e d , 
Note t h a t no a s s u m p t i o n s o f d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y , c o n c a v i t y 
o r c o n v e x i t y o f t h e f u n c t i o n s f . , g.. and s e t s X., i s 
l ' 3 j i x' 
made. 
However, t h e p r o p o s i t i o n does n o t s a y t h a t t h e p r i c e s 
u_. r e q u i r e d by t h e p r o p o s i t i o n , and s o l u t i o n s x£,....,x* 
a l s o r e q u i r e d by t h e p r o p o s i t i o n , w i l l a l w a y s e x i s t . I t 
o n l v s t a t e s t h a t , i f t h e y do e x i s t , t h e n a s o l u t i o n t o t h e 
o v e r a l l c o r p o r a t e problem h a s been o b t a i n e d by s o l v i n g 
( c o - o r d i n a t i n g ) t h e n d i v i s i o n a l s u b p r o b l e m s . 
T h e r e f o r e , l e t u s now c o n s i d e r t h e n e c e s s a r y and 
s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e of a u n i q u e s e t 
O-F t r a n s f e r p r i c e s (one p r i c e f o r each common r e s o u r c e ) 
t h a t e n s u r e t h a t d i v i s i o n a l subproblem o p t i m i z a t i o n l e a d s 
to o v e r a l l c o r p o r a t e o p t i m i z a t i o n . 
L e t r e p r e s e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g convex programming 
oroblem: 
47 . 
max f (x) 
s . t . xeX ( 1 6 > 
h (x) >, O 
n 
where h (x) = b. - E g .' ( x . ) f o r j = l,....m where X i s 
3 3 i = l 3 1 1 
convex, w h i l e f and h a r e c o n c a v e . The L a g r a n g i a n o f 
D_ i s o 
L ( x , u ) = f ( x ) + u h ( x ) ( 1 7 ) 
and i s s a i d t o p o s s e s s a s a d d l e p o i h t i f 
L ( x , u * ) * L ( x * , u * ) <: L ( x * , u ) ( 1 8 ) 
f o r a l l xeX and a l l u > 0 
I n a d d i t i o n , l e t D q s a t i s f y t h e S l a t e r c o n d i t i o n t h a t : 
t h e r e e x i s t s an X ° E X s u c h t h a t h(x°) > 0 ( 1 8 / 
Kuhn-Tucher S a d d l e p o i n t Theorem: I f D i s convex and 
o 
s a t i s f i e s c o n d i t i o n ( 1 8 / , t h e n z* A s o l v e s D q i f , and o n l y 
i'p, t h e r e i s a n o n - n e g a t i v e u* s u c h t h a t ( x * , u * ) i s a 
s a d d l e p o i n t o f L d e f i n e d by ( 1 7 ) . 
C h a p t e r 3 o f 
T h i s theorem i s p r o v e n by Uzawa i n / A r r o w , h u r w i c z 
and Uzawa ( 1 9 5 8 ) . 
At t h i s p o i n t , i t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t t h e u s u a l 
^orm o f t h e Kuhn-Tucher c o n d i t i o n s a ssuming d i f f e r e n -
t i a l l i t v h a v e n o t been u s e d a s i t i s i n t e n d e d t h a t t h e 
^ o l l o w ^ n g t r a n s f e r p r i c e e x i s t e n c e theorem be a p p l i c a b l e 
t o l i n e a r ( n o n - d i f f e r e n t i a b l e ) e n v i r o n m e n t s . 
*8. 
L e t r e p r e s e n t t h e d i v i s i o n a l s ubproblems: 
max f ^ ( x ^ ) 
s . t . x i e X i 
h ^ x . ^ > O. 
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.2 
L e t D be convex and s a t i s f y ( 1 8 ) . 
( a ) I f t h e v e c t o r s 
x£ s o l v e D , t h e n t h e r e e x i s t s a u*> O s u c h t h a t , f o r 
u - u* ,x* s o l v e s D i f o r a l l i = l , n. 
(b) I f D o p o s s e s s e s a s o l u t i o n w i t h c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
s a d d l e p o i n t member u*5. 0 s u c h t h a t , f o r u = u*, t h e x* 
u n i a u e l v s o l v e D i f o r a l l i = l , n, t h e n t h e v e c t o r s 
x* s o l v e D . l o 
PBOOF: See Appendix 2. 
Tn a d d i t i o n , n o t e t h a t t h e s a d d l e p o i n t (x£, u*) o f 
p r o p o s i t i o n 3.2 s a t i s f y (9) b e c a u s e by t h e seco n d i n -
e a u a l i t y o f (18) 
n m n m n 
T f . ( x * ) + F u*b. - I I u * g . . ( x * ) « Z f . ( x * ) + 
i = l 1 1 j = l 3 3 i = l j = l 3 3 1 1 i = l 1 1 
m n m 
y u.h. - r T u, g. . ( x * ) 
A t 3 3 • n • - i h ^ T i l i-l J J i = l 3=1 J 
f o r a l l Uj ^ 0 
P e t t i n g a l l u. = o r e v e a l s t h a t 
3 
m m 
T u* . (b . - E g . , ( x * ) ) « 0 
j = l 3 3 i - l 3 1 1 
S i n c e t h e r e v e r s e i n e q u a l i t i e s ' (7) h o l d , we have 
m n 
S u* ( b . - T g.. ( x * ) ) = 0 w h i c h i m p l i e s (9) 
i = l 3 3 i - l 3 1 1 
To summarize t h e n , p r o p o s i t i o n 3.2 e n s u r e s t h a t f o r 
th e s e t of v e c t o r s x* t h a t s o l v e D , t h e r e e x i s t s a s e t 
1 o' 
u* > O o f r e s o u r c e p r i c e s t h a t s u s t a i n a once e s t a b l i s h e d 
e o u j l l b r i u m among d i v i s i o n s . The Kuhn-Tucher S a d d l e p o i n t 
theorem i s i n t e r p r e t e d a s an e x i s t e n c e theorem t o e s t a b l i s h 
what r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s ' a r e s u f f i c i e n t and n e c e s s a r y 
t o e n s u r e t h e e x i s t e n c e of s u i t a b l e t r a n s f e r p r i c e s . 
However, i f t h e r o l e of a t r a n s f e r p r i c e i s n o t o n l y 
t o s u s t a i n a s o l u t i o n t o D and D., b u t a l s o t o p r o v i d e 
o i 
s u c h a s o l u t i o n , one would r e q u i r e t h e t r a n s f e r p r i c e 
t h a t s o l v e d D t o p r o v i d e u n i q u e s o l u t i o n s t o e a c h D.. 
o i 
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.3 s p e c i f i e s t h e c l a s s of convex programming 
p r o b l e m s D Q f o r w h i c h s u c h u n i q u e n e s s i s a s s u r e d . 
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.3 
I f D h a s a s o l u t i o n , t h e n e i t h e r o f t h e f o l l o w i n g o ' 3 
c o n d i t i o n s e n s u r e s t h e u n i q u e n e s s o f t h e s o l u t i o n x* 
t o f o r u = u* 
(a) f ^ i s s t r i c t l y c o n c a v e on 
(b) t h e r e i s a j s u c h t h a t u* > 0 and g ^ i s s t r i c t l y 
convex on X., I 
PROOF: See Appendix 3. 
-Thus, o h l y when the r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s of 
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.3 a r e s a t i s f i e d a r e H i r s h l e i f e r ' s r e s u l t s 
e n s u r e d . I n s u b s e q u e n t d i s c u s s i o n s o f H i r s h l e i f e r ' s 
a n a l y s i s , i t w i l l be assumed t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e met 
u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d and, i n a d d i t i o n , i t w i l l be 
assumed t h a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f u n c t i o n s a r e ( t w i c e ) 
d i f f e r e n t i a b l e , so t h a t one can t a l k about m a r g i n a l c o n -
d i t i o n s u n a m b i g u o u s l y . 
3'. 3 D e c o m p o s i t i o n A n a l y s i s 
No m a t t e r how one w i s h e d t o make t h e H i r s h l e i f e r 
•procedure o p e r a t i o n a l , somebody would h a v e t o c o l l e c t 
d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n on d i v i s i o n a l c o s t and r e v e n u e 
c o n d u c t l e n g t h y b i d d i n g s e s s i o n s 
s t r u c t u r e s o r / T h i s may be e x t r e m e l y c o s t l y , t i m e consuming 
and p o s s i b l y i n f e a s i b l e , i f a l a r g e number of d i v i s i o n a l 
c o n s t r a i n t s and d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s were i n v o l v e d . The 
d e c o m p o s i t i o n p r o c e d u r e s d i s c u s s e d b e l o w were d e s i g n e d 
o r i g i n a l l y as c o m p u t a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s f o r s o l v i n g l a r g e 
s c a l e c o n s t r a i n e d o p t i m i z a t i o n p r o b l e m s , b u t t h e y a l s o 
h a v e c l e a r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ^ . The 
method bv w h i c h t h e s e c o m p u t a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s work w i l l 
be c o n s i d e r e d i n some d e t a i l a s . t h i s w i l l have a b e a r i n g 
on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c p r o c e d u r e s . 
One s h o u l d , a t t h i s p o i n t , n o t e t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l 
51 . 
f i r s t o n l v be g i v e n t o problems c h a r a c t e r i s e d by l i n e a r 
o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n about o p e r a t i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s w i l l be r e l a x e d a t a l a t e r s t a g e . 
B e f o r e d i s c u s s i n g s p e c i f i c m o d e l s , t h e g e n e r a l 
c o n c e p t of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ' c o - o r d i n a t i o n v i a d e c o m p o s i t i o n 
w i l l be i l l u s t r a t e d u s i n g a s e t t h e o r e t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
7 
o f t h e problem a s f o l l o w s . L e t us assume t h a t t h e 
o v e r a l l c o r p o r a t e r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n p roblem c a n be 
e x p r e s s e d a s a m a t h e m a t i c a l model w h i c h s h a l l be d e n o t e d D. 
Q 
Vox example, t h r e e p o s s i b l e forms t h a t D may t a k e a r e 
i l l u s t r a t e d below: 
B l o c k a n g u l a r s t r u c t u r e ( c o u p l i n g c o n s t r a i n t ) : 
max Z = c,x, + c_x_ + c x 
1 1 2 2 n n 
s . t . A.x, + A _ x 0 + A,x = b_ c o u p l i n g c o n s t r a i n t i i 2 2 n n o i \ (row) 
B 1 x 1 <: b1 
B 2 x 2 * b 2 
B x 4 h n n n 
x, ,x_ x ^ 0 
1' 2 n 
D u a l a n g u l a r s t r u c t u r e ( c o u p l i n g v a r i a b l e ) : 
max U * b'n- + b ' l L + . ... + b ' l l + b'n 1 1 2 x n n o o 
s . t . B ' I ! + A.'n ^ c/ 
ii 1 o 1 
B2 n2 + A 2 V C2 
B n + A n < c 
n n n o n 
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where t h e s u p e r s c r i p t (') i n d i c a t e s t h e o p e r a t i o n of t r a n s -
p o s i t i o n , so t h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e , may r e p r e s e n t t h e 
t r a n s p o s i t i o n o f a column v e c t o r i n t o a row v e c t o r . 
H l o c k a n g u l a r s t r u c t u r e w i t h c o u p l i n g c o n s t r a i n t s and 
v a r i a b l e s : 
+ c x + c y n n oJ 
+ Vn + V = b o 
+ V = b i 
+ E 2 y = b 2 
» i i 
B x + E y = b n n n J n 
w i t h x., >, 0 i = l , . . . n IK ^ 0 i = o , l , . . . n , y >, 0 t h r o u g h o u t . 
The o v e r a l l p r o b l e m D may be e x p r e s s e d as f o l l o w s : 
Out o f a l l meM f i n d one f o r whi c h meM 
where M = t h e f e a s i b l e s e t 
M = t h e a c c e p t a b l e s e t 
T h u s , any me (.MOM) i s a s o l u t i o n t o D. T h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n 
o f D i s g e n e r a l enough t o i n c l u d e o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s b e s i d e s 
o p t i m i z a t i o n , s u c h a s s a t i s f i c i n g . 
The c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s c o u l d a t t e m p t t o c o l l e c t 
enough i n f o r m a t i o n t o f u l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e D and t h e n a t t e m p t 
t o s o l v e D. However, t h e r e may be a d v a n t a g e s g a i n e d by 
a l l o w i n g o n l v a s u b s e t o f a l l t h e p o s s i b l e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t 
c h a r a c t e r i z e s D t o be t r a n s m i t t e d . T h i s c o u l d be a c h i e v e d 
max Z = ti,x.. + e_x-
n 1 1 2 2 
s . t . A l x l + 
B 1 X 1 
P 2 X 2 
N 
5 3. 
i f one p a r t i t i o n e d t h e problem D i n t o an e q u i v a l e n t 
m u l t i l e v e l problem w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g s u b p roblems: 
L e t t h e r e be n s u b p r o b l e m s on t h e l o w e s t l e v e l c a l l e d 
t h e i n f i m a l s u b p r o b l e m s and d e n o t e d ( ) , . , . . D N ( ) 
L e t t h e r e be one subproblem denoted D q on t h e t o p 
l e v e l , c a l l e d t h e s u p r e m a l subproblem. 
\,7hat i s hoped t o be o b t a i n e d by t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n 
o-f t h e problem i s t h a t t h e two l e v e l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
D o ' D l ^ ) ' • • • ' D n ( ) w i l l a t t a i n t h e same s o l u t i o n me(MOM) 
as t h e o v e r a l l p r o b l e m D. 
The i n f i m a l s u b p r o b l e m D..( ) i s s p e c i f i e d a s : 
Out of a l l x.eX. f i n d one f o r w h i c h x.e(X.nx.) where 3 3 3 3 3 
X.. i s t h e f e a s i b l e s e t . 
X j i s t h e a c c e p t a b l e s e t . 
T h e s e s e t s a r e s u p e r s c r i p t e d # t o i n d i c a t e t h a t b o t h 
s e t s and, h e n c e , t h e i n f i m a l subproblem depend on t h e 
p a r a m e t e r % w h i c h i s s p e c i f i e d by t h e s u p r e m a l s u b p r o b l e m , 
and i s t h e means o f c o - o r d i n a t i n g t h e i n f i m a l s u b p r o b l e m s . 
The p a r a m e t e r c o u l d , f o r i n s t a n c e , be a v e c t o r o f r e a l 
numbers r e p r e s e n t i n g a l l o c a t i o n q u a n t i t i e s o f some r e s o u r c e , 
w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e f e a s i b l e s e t , i t s h a l l be assumed t h a t 
t h e u n d e r l y i n g d e t e r m i n a n t s of t h e s p e c i f i c form of t h e 
f e a s i b l e s e t i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t e x t a r e t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
and i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s i n d e p e n d e n t o f S . However, t h e 
a c t u a l a t t a i n a b l e l e v e l of f e a s i b i l i t y i s d e t e r m i n e d b y * . 
Thus, t h e r o l e o f t h e s u p r e m a l subproblem D q w i l l be t o 
d e t e r m i n e a v a l u e o f ** w h i c h l e a d s t o t h e i n f i m a l . s u b -
oroblems a c h i e v i n g t h e same s o l u t i o n as t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s would h a v e a c h i e v e d had i t been a b l e t o f o r m u l a t e 
and s o l v e D, 
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Now l e t D ( ^ ) = (D-^M, ,D (tf)) 
and x = ( x ^ , , x n ^ 
To t r a n s f o r m a s o l u t i o n x t o D(tf) i n t o a s o l u t i o n t o D, 
one needs a mapping Y : x •+ m. However, g i v e n some 
v a l u e of 8 , i t i s n o t t o be e x p e c t e d t h a t any c o l l e c t i o n 
o f i n f i m a l subproblems 5 ( 6 ) , w i l l r e s u l t i n a s o l u t i o n 
t o D bv way o f t h e mapping JI . F o r t h a t p u r p o s e , t h e 
i n ^ i m a l s u b p r o b l e m s must be c o - o r d i n a t e d by t h e s u p r e m a l 
subproblem w h i c h c a n , h e n c e , be s t a t e d a s : 
F i n d & s u c h t h a t 
(1) (X*ft X*) ? 0 f o r j = 1, ,n. 
(2) P (x)e(MdM) 
m 
f o r any x e ( x V>X?)x x(X , r n x j r ) 
1 1 ' n n' 
I n o t h e r words t h e n , t h e p a r a m e t e r \ must f i r s t be 
s u c h t h a t e a c h i n f i m a l subproblem h a s a s o l u t i o n and, 
s e c o n d l v , t h a t any c a n d i d a t e s o l u t i o n t o t h e o v e r a l l 
p r oblem p u t t o g e t h e r from i n f i m a l _ s u b p r o b l e m s o l u t i o n s , 
must s o l v e t h e o v e r a l l problem D. 
T h u s , d e c o m p o s i t i o n i s t h e a c t of p a r t i t i o n i n g t h e 
9 
o v e r a l l problem D i n t o a t w o - l e v e l h i e r a c h y o f subproblems 
( D Q , D < ( S ) ) . I t c a n be s u c c e s s f u l i f ( D Q , D ( t f ) ) i s c o -
o r d i n a b l e r e l a t i v e t o D. T h a t i s t h e p a r a m e t e r would 
have t o s a t i s f y c o n d i t i o n s (1) and (2) f o r t h e s u p r e m a l 
s u b p r o b l e m . The v i r t u e o f s u c h a p a r t i t i o n i n g of t h e 
problem i s s e e n by t h e f a c t t h a t , when t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s a t t e m p t s t o s o l v e D , i t need know n o t h i n g of t h e 
form of or X.. f o r 3 = 1,....n. A l l t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s needs to know i s t h a t t h e n i n f i m a l subproblems 
h a v e s o l u t i o n s f o r some v a l u e of V and t h a t t h e s e a r e 
t h e s o l u t i o n s t h a t a r e communicated t o t h e c e n t r a l head-
o u a r t e r s by t h e d i v i s i o n a l ( s u b u n i t ) managers. 
Note t h e v a l u e of X w h i c h w i l l c o - o r d i n a t e t h e 
decomposed problem ( D Q , D ( 8 ) ) i s u n l i k e l y t o be i m m e d i a t e l y 
o b v i o u s , b u t i f t h e v a l u e of K i s r e d e t e r m i n e d a f t e r e v e r y 
i t e r a t i o n ( a t t e m p t e d s o l u t i o n o f ( D o , D ( S ) ) a c c o r d i n g t o 
some a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e , t h e n i t may be t h e c a s e t h a t such 
a & i s l o c a t e d e v e n t u a l l y . 
The above c o n c e p t of c o - o r d i n a b i l i t y can be viewed 
as an e x i s t e n c e r e q u i r e m e n t , t h a t i s , a m u l t i l e v e l s y s t e m 
i s n o t c o - o r d i n a b l e u n l e s s a ^ s a t i s f y i n g c o n d i t i o n s 
(1) and (2) e x i s t s . However, t h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t , 
g i v e n s u c h e x i s t e n c e o f t h e r e q u i r e d c o - o r d i n a t i n g p a r a -
m e t e r , t h a t t h e s u b u n i t s (when s o l v i n g t h e i r i n f i m a l " 
s u b p r o b l e m s ) w i l l know u n e q u i v o c a l l y a t what l e v e l t o s e t 
t h e i r s o l u t i o n s x, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h c o - o r d i n a b i l i t y under 
t h e mapping F ( x ) . An example of s u c h a s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g m 
w i l l be g i v e n i n s u b s e c t i o n 3.3.1. 
5 C. 
" * . ^ . l The Dantzig and Wolfe D e c o m p o s i t i o n 
P r o c e d u r e and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
L e t t h e o v e r a l l problem D f o r an o r g a n i z a t i o n " 1 " 0 be 
r e p r e s e n t a b l e by t h e f o l l o w i n g m a t h e m a t i c a l model: 
m a x i m i s e c,x. + c . x . + + c x 
1 1 2 2 n n 
s . t . A.x. + A_x„ + + A x < a 
1 1 2 2 n n ^ 
< b 1 
B 2 x 2 « b 2 
' + B x £ b n n n 
" l ' x 2 " * * * * ' X n ^ ^ 
F e r e , x . i s an n. v e c t o r , A. i s an mxn. m a t r i x . B. 
3 3 3 /J ' 3 
i s an m^xnj m a t r i x , b.. i s an m.. v e c t o r , f o r j = l , . . . . n , 
and a i s an m v e c t o r . T h a t i s , i t i s assumed t h e r e a r e 
m c o u p l i n g c o n s t r a i n t s and m.. p r i v a t e c o n s t r a i n t s f a c e d 
bv d i v i s i o n j t h a t p r o d u c e s n.. p r o d u c t s , h e n c e c_. i s a l s o 
an n_. v e c t o r . 
T h i s b l o c k - a n g u l a r f o r m u l a t i o n has a s p e c i a l s t r u c t u r e , 
I f i t were n o t f o r t h e c o u p l i n g c o n s t r a i n t s A^x^ + A 2 x 2 + 
.. . + A n x n a / t n e problem would d i v i d e i n t o n i n 
dependent p r o b l e m s . T h u s , t h i s model has a c l e a r 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . E a c h d i v i s i o n f a c e s a 
s e t of p r i v a t e c o n s t r a i n t s not f a c e d by any o t h e r d i v i s i o n . 
The o n l y s o u r c e o f i n t e r a c t i o n i s through t h e common c o n -
s t r a i n t s . Hence, t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s can i n f l u e n c e 
57 
(and h o p e f u l l y c o - o r d i n a t e ) t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e d i v i s i o n s 
t h r o u g h m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e common c o n s t r a i n t s w i t h o u t need-
i n g t o know t h e p r i v a t e c o n s t r a i n t s . 
F i n c e t h e problem i s a t o t a l l y l i n e a r problem, t h e 
p r i v a t e f e a s i b l e s e t s a r e d e f i n e a b l e a s : 
X j = ' x j ! B j x j « b j ' x j * 0 } f o r e a c h 3 
T'hus X.. i s a c l o s e d convex s e t and any p o i n t i n t h e s e t 
X_. can be e x p r e s s e d a s some convex c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e s e t 
o f e x t r e m e p o i n t s of X.. and i t s s e t o f e x t r e m e r a y s . 1 1 
T h u s , anv x j e X j c a n be e x p r e s s e d a s : 
x . = r X? x ? + E 6r. xr. 
p = l 3 3 r = l 3 3 
where f o r j = l , . . . . n 
x ^ w i t h p= (1 ,. ,P ( j ) ) a r e t h e extreme p o i n t s o f x j 
x^ w i t h r = ( l , . . R ( j ) ) i d e n t i f y t h e extreme r a y s of 
P ( i ) 
Z X P = 1 and a l l X P > 0, 6 r >, 0 D=1 ^ 3 3 
U s i n g O ) one c a n r e p r e s e n t t h e b l o c k a n g u l a r problem D now 
a s : 
n P ( j ) R ( j ) 
m a x i m i z e T. c. (T. X P x p + I ST.xr .) 
j = l 3 p = l 3 3 r = l 3 3 
n P(D) 
s . t . r A . ( T 
j = l 3 p = l 
A?x? 
3 3 
R ( j ) x r ~ r , 
I 6 j X j > < a 
r = l 
P ( j ) 
£ A? = 1 f o r j = l , ...,,n 
p=l 
a l l 0, 6^ > 0 
one t h e n u s e s t h e c o n v e n t i o n t h a t 
w? = c . x ? , = c.x 1:, L ? = A ? x ? and = Ar.xr. 
3 3 3 3 3 3 ' 3 3 3 3 3 3 
t h e n t h e pr o b l e m can be w r i t t e n a s 
n P ( j ) R ( j ) 
(D ) m a x i m i z e I ( I w?X? + 1 wr.6r.) 
j = l p = l 3 3 r = l 3 3 
n P ( j ) R ( j ) 
s . t . 1(1 L ? A ? + I Lr.6r.) 4 a 
j = l p =l 3 3 r = l 3 3 
P ( j ) 
I = 1 f o r j = l , . . . . ,n 
p = l 3 
a l l A? * 0, 6r. >y 0 
3 ' 3 
n 
The o r i g i n a l b l o c k a n g u l a r problem w i t h m + E m . number o f 
j = l 3 
rows o f c o n s t r a i n t s h a s now been r e p l a c e d w i t h a problem 
n 
D w i t h m + n number of rows of c o n s t r a i n t s where I m. i s 
j = l 3 
l i k e l v t o be much l a r g e r t h a n n. However, t h e problem D Q 
h a s as many v a r i a b l e s as t h e r e a r e e x t r e m e p o i n t s and extreme 
r a v s . 
5a 
The Dantziq and Wolfe decomposition procedures works 
by s t a r t i n g with a l i m i t e d number of these p o i n t s and 
r a y s and then p r o g r e s s i v e l y determines new p o i n t s and 
r a y s as r e q u i r e d . T h i s p r o c e s s i s c a l l e d column genera-
t i o n . Mien the problem D' i s formulated with only a 
o J 
number of the p o s s i b l e extreme p o i n t s and r a y s , i t s h a l l 
be c a l l e d the r e s t r i c t e d master problem. 
Suppose II i s an optimal d u a l m u l t i p l i e r v e c t o r 
a s s o c i a t e d with the f i r s t m i n e q u a l i t y r e s t r i c t i o n s of the 
r e s t r i c t e d master problem a t some i t e r a t i o n and l e t 
a = ( a ^ , . . . a ) be the optimal d u a l m u l t i p l i e r v e c t o r 
a s s o c i a t e d with convex weighting c o n s t r a i n t s . For each 
d i v i s i o n j = l , . , . n , the c e n t r a l headquarters communicates 
the shadow p r i c e v e c t o r H and asks the d i v i s i o n a l managers 
to s o l v e t h e i r d i v i s i o n a l ( i n f i m a l ) subproblems. 
D max ( c . - JIA.) x . 
3 3 3 
s. t . B .x . <: b . 
3 3 3 
x . 5> 0 3 
C l e a r l v , the f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n to such a problem w i l l 
occur at an extreme p o i n t or on an extreme ray of the 
d i v i s i o n a l p r i v a t e f e a s i b l e r e g i o n . I f the d i v i s i o n 
determines the optimal s o l u t i o n to be a t extreme p o i n t 
p 
X^eX^ the d i v i s i o n i n d i c a t e s t h i s to the c e n t r a l headquarters 
and communicates the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o i n t . The 
c e n t r a l headquarters then uses the simplex o p t i m a l i t y 
6 O. 
reouirement^ 7' which, f o r extreme points i s i f w?- L ? - a 
> o add the column ( L ? , 0 , . . . 1, . . .0) to the r e s t r i c t e d 
master problem. The f i r s t m components of t h i s column 
v e c t o r are criven by and the l a s t n components are z e r o , 
except f o r the j t h , w h i c h - i s equal to u n i t y . S i m i l a r l y , 
i f the s o l u t i o n to the j t h d i v i s i o n a l informal subproblem 
occurs along an extreme r a y x^ f of the s e t X.. , the c e n t r a l 
13 ~ r 
h eadauarters adds (L_. ,0,. . ,0) as a new column to the 
r e s t r i c t e d master problem. One can d e p i c t the i n f o r m a t i o n 
flows as f o l l o w s : 
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To i l l u s t r a t e the decomposition procedure, suppose 
the o v e r a l l corporate problem were 
max Z = + x 2 + 2y^ + y 2 
s . t . x i + 2 x 2 + 2 y l + y 2 ^ 4 0 
X l + 3 x 2 ^ 30 
2 X 1 + x 2 £ 20 
<: 10 
y 2 $ i o 
y1 + y 2 <? 15 
Thus, f o r two d i v i s i o n s i = l , 2 
C - l = (1, 1) 
A i = (1, 2) 
B l = 1 3 
2 1 
c 9 = (2, 1) 
A- = (2, 1) a = 40 
B 0 = f1 0 
! 0 1 
b l = l 
30 
20 
- J 1i \101 
10 
15 
X « [x^^ , x 2 I x1 + ? X-, < 30, ?x1 + X o « 20, X l , x 2 >, 0} 
y - { y 1 , Y 2 ! y 1 v< 10, y 2 v< 10, Y x + y 2 < 15, y x , y 2 > 0 } 
ITERATION 0 = START 
6 3. 
To s t a r t the i t e r a t i v e procedure, an i n i t i a l b a s i c 
f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n i s r e q u i r e d . B y i n s p e c t i o n one can 
choose: 
x = ( 0 , 0 ) , y „ (0,0) as (0,0)e X and (0,0) 
Thus, A l x ° = f i , 2 ] V = 0 
.0, 
Vo " C"2, l ] fo 
I 0 
c 1x° = ["l, i ] r 0 
0. 
c





Thus, the i n i t i a l r e s t r i c t e d master problem is 
max OA + OX 
X y 
s . t . OX" + 0X° + S = 40 
•* y 
•v O 








been qenerated fo r the r e s t r i c t e d master problem. The 
i n i t i a l b a s i c f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n to the i n i t i a l r e s t r i c t e d 
master problem i s 
(x°, y°, s, A°, A°) = (0, 0, 40, 1, 1) 
with a s s o c i a t e d dual p r i c e s 
(u°, a°, a°) = (O, 0, 0) 
T^FR^TION 1 
The c e n t r a l headquarters informs the d i v i s i o n s that 
t h e r e i s to be no charge (u°=0) f o r the corporate s u p p l i e d 
common re s o u r c e and asks the d i v i s i o n s to determine how 
much of the r e s o u r c e they t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e . The 
d i v i s i o n a l managers, t h e r e f o r e , s o l v e the f o l l o w i n g problems 
f o r d i v i s i o n x 
max z x = x i + x 2 
s . t . x 1eX 
f o r d i v i s i o n y 
max = 2 Y l + y 2 
s . t . y eY 





c 2 y = 25 
A 2y^ = 2 5 
And c^x' 
c 2 y 
u A^x 
-V1 
- a = 14 >0 
x 
- a° = 25 >0 







should be added 
6 5. 
to the r e s t r i c t e d master problem which i s now: 
max 14A 1 + 25 A 1 x y 
s . t . 22X 1 + 25A 1 + S = 40 x y 
A° + A 1 
A° + A 1 
X°, A 1, A^A 1, S >, 0 x' y' y' y' 
The o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem i s 
X x = 4 ' Xx" = i | , A 1 = 1, S = A° = 0 22 22 ' y ' y 
with a s s o c i a t e d dual p r i c e s ( u 1 ^ ^ , ^ ) = (14, 0, 2Q0) 
x y 2 2 2 2 
TTFRATION 2 
The c e n t r a l headquarters now informs the d i v i s i o n a l 
manaqers t h a t the u n i t p r i c e f o r the common r e s o u r c e i s 
1£ and a q a i n r e q u e s t s them to s o l v e t h e i r d i v i s i o n a l 
problems, which are 
max 7 2 = (c, - u ^ - J x 2 = 4 x 2 - 3 x 2 x 1 1 IT 1 TT 2 
2 2 s . t . x eX s . t . x eX 
6 6. 
max Z = ( 
v v 2 
u ^ J y 2 
s . t, y 2 e Y 
11 1 TT 
s . t . y eY 
The s o l u t i o n s are r e s p e c t i v e l y x 2 
. 2 
with c 1 x = 1 0 
AjX = 10 
and c , x 2 = u ^ x 2 - a 1 1 1 x 
so the two new columns 
2 
c 2 y = 
A 2 y 2 = 






0 _ 1 
= (10, 0) 
= (10, 5) 
25 
= 25 
should be added 
to the r e s t r i c t e d master problem, which i s now: 
max 14x1 + 25A* + 10X 2 + 25A 2 x y x y 
s . t . 22A* + 25 + 10A 2 + 25A 2 + S = 40 
y x y 
A° + A 1 + A 2 x x v 
A° A 1 \ 2 \° i 1 •> 2 
x' V V x y V V * 
The optimal s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem i s : 
A - 5 .2 7, r - 1, S=A~ = r = A' = 0 
x T2' A x - T2 y x y y 
2 2 2 
with a s s o c i a t e d dual p r i c e s (u , a ' a ) = (1, 20,50 ) 
x y T ~ 3 *"3* 
TTPRATION 3 
The c e n t r a l headquarters now informs the d i v i s i o n a l 
manaqers t h a t the common r e s o u r c e s u n i t p r i c e w i l l be 
1 and a g a m r e q u e s t s them to s o l v e t h e i r d i v i s i o n a l problems, 
3 
which are: 
3 3 3 max 7 = 2 x: + 1 x^ x ? 1 j 2 
s . t . x 3eX 
max Z 3 = 4y 3 + 2y 3 
Y 3" 1 3" 
s . t . y 3 e Y 
3 
The s o l u t i o n s are r e s p e c t i v e l y x = (6,8) OR (10,0) OR some 
convex combination of these 
two extreme p o i n t s 
y 3 = (10, 5) 
The o v e r a l l optimal s o l u t i o n must, t h e r e f o r e have been 
obtained as the columns generated i n t h i s l a s t i t e r a t i o n 
were added during previous i t e r a t i o n s . 
The i t e r a t i v e s o l u t i o n procedure's convergence 
to the optimal s o l u t i o n i s guaranteed"^in a f i n i t e number of 
i t e r a t i o n s s i n c e t h ere are only a f i n i t e number of extreme 
p o i n t s and r a y s . However, the number of i t e r a t i o n s may be 
verv l a r q e f o r some problems. For t h i s r eason, i t 
may be d e s i r a b l e to terminate the i t e r a t i o n s before 
o p t i m a l i t y i s obtained. A very a t t r a c t i v e f e a t u r e of 
the D a n t z i g and Wolfe decomposition method i n t h i s 
connection i s t h a t i t provides a bound on the optimal 
s o l u t i o n v a l u e . Hence, one can develop stopping r u l e s 
dependent on the s i z e of the bounds. 
To demonstrate t h i s consider a r e s t r i c t e d master 
problem a t some i t e r a t i o n t having optimal s o l u t i o n v a l u e 
Z^ .. For ease of n o t a t i o n , assume the problem only has 
extreme p o i n t and not extreme ray s o l u t i o n s . L e t 
* A , p=l,....P g i v e the optimal s o l u t i o n to the o v e r a l l 
problem. 
s . t . 
P P * 
z* = y, wpA 
p-1 P 
P p * 
I L pA <: a 
p-1 P 
P * = 1 
.£ A 1 P=l P 
m u l t i p l v the f i r s t c o n s t r a i n t by i t s optimal d u a l p r i c e 
v e c t o r u and the second c o n s t r a i n t by i t s optimal dual 
p r i c e o and s u b s t r a c t these two e x p r e s s i o n s from the 
•F i r s t e a u a t i o n . T h i s g i v e s 
P * (w P - u l P - a) z* - (ua + a) = I A { v u l a ) 
p=l P 
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f'he bracketed right-hand s i d e q u a n t i t i e s a r e the 
reduced c o s t c o e f f i c i e n t s and r e c a l l t h a t the c e n t r a l 
headauarters t r i e d to determine the most p o s i t i v e 
reduced c o s t c o e f f i c i e n t s to i d e n t i f y p o t e n t i a l column 
e n t r a n t s so. t h a t 
P * 
Z* - (ua + a) <^ E X (max (WP - u L P - a) ) p=l P p=i,..,p 
Note the r e s t r i c t e d master problem r e q u i r e s t h a t 
p * 
y X = 1. I n a d d i t i o n , note t h a t ( u a + a) i s .the 
p=l p 
optimal s o l u t i o n to the dual problem a t i t e r a t i o n t . 
T h e r e f o r e , s i n c e both primal and du a l are f e a s i b l e , i t 
15 
must be t h a t z t = (ua + a) by the Fundamental Theorem 
of D u a l i t y f o r L i n e a r Programming. Thus 
z* ^ z + max (WP - u L P - a) 
p=l,...P 
L e t us d e f i n e 
z. + max (WP - u L p - a) = z 
P=1,...P * 
Thus zt ^ z* <: z t 
T«Jhere the l e f t - h a n d s i d e i n e q u a l i t y f o l l o w s from 
0 $ z* - zt £ max (WP - u L P - a) 
P=l,.. .P 
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, , 7here the right-hand s i d e i n e q u a l i t y must always be 
P o s i t i v e except when zt = z*. 
To i l l u s t r a t e , consider i t e r a t i o n 2 of the previous 
problem. The lower bound i s c l e a r l y the s o l u t i o n to 
r e s t r i c t e d master a t i t e r a t i o n 2 which i s 
z. = 1 x ( 5.6 + 7.10) + 1 x ( 5 . 8 ) + 2 x l O + l x 5 
t T2 T2 T2 
110 = 36.66 
3 
The upper bound = 110 + 4 0 = 40.30 
~ TT 
The above phase i n the Dantzig and Wolfe procedures 
s h a l l be c a l l e d the i t e r a t i v e phase. Once the optimal 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e s have been determined and i d e n t i f i e d , 
.one must c o n s i d e r how to ensure 
t h a t t h i s s o l u t i o n i s a r r i v e d a t i n p r a c t i c e . T h i s 
phase i s c a l l e d the implementation phase. 
The previous a n a l y s i s d i s c u s s i n g bounding of the 
o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n and convergence showed t h a t i t would be 
p o s s i b l e to stop the i t e r a t i v e process before o p t i m a l i t y 
i s o b t a i n e d , when the c e n t r a l headquarters i s s a t i s f i e d 
with the approximate s o l u t i o n . The q u e s t i o n then i s 
how w i l l the f i n a l operating d e c i s i o n s be implemented. 
^he i d e o l o g y assumed by the H i r s h l e i f e r procedure was t h a t 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e s would be s u f f i c i e n t to guide d i v i s i o n a l 
managers to make unaided o p e r a t i n g d e c i s i o n s t h a t would be 
optimal f o r the c o r p o r a t i o n . 
7] . 
To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s concept, l e t us use the previous 
example. The f e a s i b l e regions and modified o b j e c t i v e 
^unctions faced by the d i v i s i o n s a t the beginning of 
i t e r a t i o n 2 are presented i n F i g u r e 2. Thus, d i v i s i o n 1 
w i l l wish to produce 10 un'its of x^ given the p r e v a i l i n g 
u n i t t r a n s f e r p r i c e of 14, w h i l e d i v i s i o n 2 w i l l wish to 
produce 10 u n i t s of y^ and 5 u n i t s of y 2 . Given these 
d i v i s i o n a l p l a n s , then two new columns are generated f o r 
the r e s t r i c t e d master problem which i s then solved 
qeneratinq a new s o l u t i o n (convex combination of extreme 
p o i n t s ) and a new u n i t t r a n s f e r p r i c e of 1. The f e a s i b l e 
3 
r e q i o n s and modified o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s faced by the 
d i v i s i o n a t the beginning of i t e r a t i o n 3 are presented i n 
Fi g u r e 3. D i v i s i o n 1 w i l l wish to produce ( x ^ , x 2 ) = 
A (6, R) + (1 - A)(10, 0) f o r any v a l u e of A s a t i s f y i n g 
1 > A > 0. D i v i s i o n 2 w i l l wish to produce 10 u n i t s of 
v^ and 5 u n i t s of y 2 as bef o r e . 
However, the optimal corporate s o l u t i o n i s based on 
the assumption t h a t d i v i s i o n 1 produces x = 5 x (6,8) + 
T2 
7 x (10,0) = (25, 10) and d i v i s i o n 2 - produces y = ( 1 0 , 5 ) . 
T2 ~3 T 
Thus, i n order to ensure o v e r a l l o p t i m a l i t y s p e c i f y i n g the 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e i s not s u f f i c i e n t and the c e n t r a l headquarters 
must s p e c i f v f o r d i v i s i o n 1 e x a c t production r e q u i r e m e n t s ^ . 
Th i s tvpe of problem with implementing t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
procedures using the Dantzig and Wolfe decomposition method 
has been known f o r some time. For i n s t a n c e , Baumol and 
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"Tt i s to be emphasized t h a t now d i v i s i o n 
managers must be t o l d by the company what weights 
thev are to employ, i . e . what combination of 
t h e i r p r o posals the company d e s i r e s them to 
produce. There i s no automatic m o t i v a t i o n 
mechanism which w i l l lead d i v i s i o n managers to 
a r r i v e a t such a combination of outputs of t h e i r 
own - v o l i t i o n . I n t h i s way, the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
permitted by decomposition breaks down completely 
a t t h i s p o i n t " . 
I n the example presented here, the problem has a r i s e n 
because of the l i n e a r i t y of the model. One could get 
round t h i s problem by having the c e n t r a l headquarters 
i n s t r u c t the d i v i s i o n s to operate c e r t a i n p l a n s . However, 
t h i s means t h a t the only r o l e f o r d i v i s i o n a l management 
i s to communicate information and c a r r y out i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
There seems l i t t l e room for any d e c i s i o n to be made by 
d i v i s i o n a l management. 
I n t r o d u c i n g Non-Tiinearities i n t o the Dantzig 
and W o l f e Decomposition Method. 
Given a completely l i n e a r environment, the Dantzig 
and tfolfe Decomposition method d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y generate 
the t r a n s f e r p r i c e s t h a t would allow d i v i s i o n a l managers 
to make t h e i r own operating d e c i s i o n s . T h i s i s because 
a l i n e a r programming model can only a r r i v e a t a s o l u t i o n 
( o p e r a t i n g l e v e l ) which i s at an extreme p o i n t of the 
d i v i s i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s e t s . However, the optimal s o l u t i o n 
to the o r i g i n a l block angular corporate problem need not 
be such t h a t any s o l u t i o n occurs at an extreme p o i n t of 
the d i v i s i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s e t s . T h i s i s because the 
extreme p o i n t s of the o r i g i n a l block angular corporate 
problem need not correspond to the extreme p o i n t s of 
independent ( d i v i s i o n a l ) diagonal blocks which only 
p a r t l v d e f i n e the c o n s t r a i n t s e t f o r the o v e r a l l problem. 
The o v e r a l l optimal s o l u t i o n s may w e l l be i n t e r i o r to the 
independent ( d i v i s i o n a l ) diagonal block c o n s t r a i n t s s e t s . 
Onlv by weighting c e r t a i n extreme p o i n t s of the independent 
d i v i s i o n a l problems can these i n t e r i o r p o i n t s be generated. 
Thus, d i v i s i o n a l managers are, being i n s t r u c t e d to take 
s p e c i f i c o p e r a t i n g d e c i s i o n s when such weights have to 
be communicated. However, i f the d i v i s i o n a l o b j e c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n s were non l i n e a r , then non-extreme p o i n t s could 
be obtained without r e q u i r i n g s p e c i f i c weights to be 
s p e c i f i e d . T h i s approach of i n t r o d u c i n g n o n - l i n e a r i t i e s 
i n t o the Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition procedure has been 
considered by Jennergren (1973) and Hass (1968), 
Jennergren's procedure i n v o l v e s u s i n g the Dantzig 
and Wolfe Decomposition procedure to l o c a t e the optimal 
corporate s o l u t i o n . Once t h i s s o l u t i o n i s obtained, the 
c e n t r a l headquarters then informs the d i v i s i o n a l managers 
t h a t common r e s o u r c e s w i l l be p r i c e d according to s p e c i f i e d 
l i n e a r p r i c e s chedules (supply f u n c t i o n s ) of the form 
r ^ + ka.. 
t = 1,2, indexes the i t e r a t i o n 
k > 0 
t t t L e t r = (r1,...rm) and a i = (a1± , .. .. a ^ ) 
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for > 0, t h i s r e p r e s e n t s the quantity of common 
re s o u r c e j r e q u i r e d by d i v i s i o n i to operate a t 
the optimal production l e v e l which s o l v e s the 
r e v i s e d d i v i s i o n a l problem D^ _., 
JEN 
f o r a j i ^ °» t h i s r e p r e s e n t s the qu a n t i t y of common 
re s o u r c e j s u p p l i e d by d i v i s i o n i which o p e r a t e s 
a t the optim a l production l e v e l x..^ which s o l v e s 
D J E N 
Fence a. = x. A. 
1 1 i 
where the s u p e r s c r i p t (/) i n d i c a t e s the op e r a t i o n of t r a n s -
p o s i t i o n . 
The d i v i s i o n a l problems with the Jennergren procedure then 
are • 
D J E N : m a X { c i " ( r + kx^A^A.Jx. 
s . t . x ieX^ 
f o r each i = l , ,n 
Thus the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n of the d i v i s i o n a l problems are 
q u a d r a t i c . The procedure i s implemented by the c e n t r a l 
headquarters choosing i n i t i a l p r i c e schedules and a s k i n g the 
d i v i s i o n a l managers what would be t h e i r optimal o p e r a t i n g 
d e c i s i o n s ( t h a t s o l v e D J E N ) given these p r i c e s c h e d u l e s . 
Given t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n a t i t e r a t i o n t , the c e n t r a l head-
o u a r t e r s then r e v i s e s the p r i c e schedules so t h a t a t the 
next i t e r a t i o n , the d i v i s i o n a l s o l u t i o n s w i l l converge towards 
the optimal s o l u t i o n determined by the Dantzig and Wolfe 
method. Jennergren proved convergence of h i s procedure to 
the optimal s o l u t i o n , but only as the number of i t e r a t i o n s 
becomes i n f i n i t e l y l a r g e . 
7 7. 
Jennerqren's procedure i s b e s t thought of as a 
p o s s i b i l i t y r e s u l t which shows t h a t optimal c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
Via p r i c i n g i s p o s s i b l e r a t h e r than as a p r a c t i c a l approach. 
Th i s i s because Jennergren's procedure does not work u n l e s s 
the Dantzig and Wolfe decomposition method i s f i r s t 
i t e r a t i v e l v c a r r i e d out u n t i l o p t i m a l i t y i s reached and, 
as was mentioned e a r l i e r , f o r p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n s , the 
i t e r a t i o n s a r e l i k e l y to be stopped before o p t i m a l i t y i s 
a t t a i n e d . 
Hass argues t h a t o f t e n the c o r p o r a t i o n under c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n w i l l be o p e r a t i n g i n imperfect markets, where the 
p r i c e i t pays f o r inputs and the p r i c e s a t which i t s e l l s 
outputs depends upon the q u a n t i t y i t purchases or s e l l s of 
the product or r e l a t e d products a l s o purchased or s o l d by 
the c o r p o r a t i o n . Thus, the d i v i s i o n s f a c e downward s l o p i n g 
demand curves and upward s l o p i n g supply curves ( p r i c e 
•^unctions are of the form: 
P j = d + ea.. 
where d and e are c o n s t a n t s . The Hass procedure allows 
f o r any demand dependency which can be expressed i n such a 
way t h a t the d i v i s i o n a l t o t a l revenue e x p r e s s i o n i s a 
polynominal of degree two or l e s s , t h a t i s the o v e r a l l 
corporate problem and d i v i s i o n a l problems are allowed to 
have q u a d r a t i c o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s . A c r u c i a l a s p e c t of 
the Hass procedure, however, i s t h a t i t does not assume 
s e p a r a b i l i t y of the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s of the d i v i s i o n s . 
78 . 
The procedure 1B not only a p p l i c a b l e to q u a d r a t i c pro-
aramming problems, but a l s o to problems with q u a d r a t i c 
o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s which have non-linear convex d i v i s i o n a l 
c o n s t r a i n t s s e t s . 
The Hass procedure works l i k e the Dantzig and Wolfe 
procedure by column g e n e r a t i o n . That i s , the d i v i s i o n s 
17 
subproblems determine new f e a s i b l e points . The r e s t r i c t e d 
master problem then determines the optimal weighting to 
g i v e to a l l the f e a s i b l e p o i n t s known of by the c e n t r a l 
headcruarters. Given a new optimal weighting, the c e n t r a l 
headquarters communicates r e v i s e d p r i c e f u n c t i o n s which 
i n c o r p o r a t e the dual p r i c e s generated by s o l v i n g the r e s -
t r i c t e d master. That i s , the r e v i s e d p r i c e f u n c t i o n s a r e 
a d i u s t e d f o r the c u r r e n t opportunity c o s t s of the s c a r c e 
corporate r e s o u r c e s and f o r the c u r r e n t marginal v a l u e s of 
the dependencies they impose or b e n e f i t by. The i t e r a t i v e 
procedure continues u n t i l the o p t i m a l i t y c r i t e r i o n e s t a b l i s h e s 
t h a t a l l the most r e c e n t d i v i s i o n a l plans ( f e a s i b l e p o i n t s ) 
from the l a s t i t e r a t i o n have been added alr e a d y to the 
r e s t r i c t e d master problem. One d i f f i c u l t y with the Hass 
procedure i s t h a t the d i v i s i o n a l problems may be very 
d i f f i c u l t to s o l v e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f the d i v i s i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s 
are n o n - l i n e a r as w e l l . 
I t should be noted, a t t h i s p o i n t , t h a t the Dantzig and 
^ o l f e Decomposition procedure can a l s o be a p p l i e d to corporate 
problems of the f o l l o w i n g form: 
n 
max T f . (x , ) 
i = l 1 
n 
s . t . T A . x . 4 a 
i = l 1 1 
x^eX^ for" i = l , . . . . n 
where i n s t e a d of being r e q u i r e d to be l i n e a r f u n c t i o n s as 
i n the o r i g i n a l Dantzig and Wolfe f o r m u l a t i o n , each f u n c t i o n 
f ^ i s r e q u i r e d to be continuous and concave and each s e t 
18 
X^ i s c l o s e d , bounded and convex 
The Ten Kare Decomposition Method 
L e t us assume t h a t the o v e r a l l corporate problem has 
the f o l l o w i n g standard block angular s t r u c t u r e as before. 
max c,x, + . + c x 
l i n n 
s . t . A.x,+. - + A x a 
l i n n 
B,x, <: b 1~1 "1 
2 X2 « b 2 
B x « b n n n 
x., x >, 0 
1 n 
where a i s the m-vector a = (a, ......a ) 
1' m' 
FO. 
One can reformulate the problem by p a r t i o n i n g the 
problem so t h a t one can e x p l i c i t l y c o n s i d e r the f e a s i b l e 
production s e t for each d i v i s i o n , i n c l u d i n g any common 
re s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s as f o l l o w s : 
max c,x,+ c x 
1 1 n n 
s . t . A 2 X 1 ~ a l ^ 0 
B1x]_ < b± 
A_,x„ -a„ ^ 0 2 2 "2 
B 2 x 2 
A x -a 4 0 n n n 
B x ~< b n n n 
a, + a_ a = a 
1 2. n 
x^ txo i > x„ ^ 0 l ' A 2 ' » n 
These two formulations are c l e a r l y e q u i v a l e n t so t h a t , 
i f one problem has a s o l u t i o n ( s o w i l l the o t h e r . The 
l a t t e r p a r t i t i o n has c l e a r l y l e f t the c e n t r a l headquarters 
w i t h two groups of d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s to determine, (x,,...x ) 
1 n 
and ( a ^ , a ^ ) . The Ten K a l e decomposition method i s a 
r e s o u r c e d i r e c t i v e decomposition approach where the c e n t r a l 
h e a d a u a r t e r s w i l l hope t h a t , by s e l e c t i n g ( c o - o r d i n a t i n g ) 
a p p r o p r i a t e resource v e c t o r s ( a , a ) , i t can determine 
± ' n ' 
81. 
an optimal s o l u t i o n to the o v e r a l l problem without needing 
to know a l l the information on d i v i s i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . 
T h i s i s i n c o n t r a s t to the Dantzig Wolfe decomposition 
method t h a t can be d e s c r i b e d as a p r i c e d i r e c t i v e de-
composition approach. The above d i s c u s s i o n s i n d i c a t e 
t h a t the two l e v e l h i e r a r c h y of subproblems t a k e s the 
•Following s p e c i f i c form: 
For each d i v i s i o n i the d i v i s i o n a l problem i s : 
z^ = max c-£ x£ 
s. t . A. x. ^ a. 
1 1 1 
B.x. ^ b. 1 1 N l 
x^ ^ > 0 
with the r e s t r i c t e d master problem f o r the c e n t r a l head-
a u a r t e r s being: 
max { z, + z~ + .-tz } 
1 2 n 
n 
s . t . Z a. = a 
i = l 1 
The a l g o r i t h m used f o r s o l v i n g t h i s problem,is based 
on u s i n q the d u a l problem to the o v e r a l l c o r p o r a t e (primal) prob-
lem. I t s r o l e i s to i t e r a t i v e l y approximate the optimal 
f u n c t i o n s f o r i = l , . . . . n . The dual problem to the o v e r a l l 
c orporate problem (expressed i n p a r t i t i o n e d form) i s as 
f o l l o w s : 
82. 
n 
min I F b. + Tla 
i = l 1 1 
s . t . VL^A^ + n^^B^ ^ c i 
- u i + IT = O 
u^t IT i ^ O f o r i = l , n 
where c l e a r l y u^ is -the dial p r i c e on the i d i v i s i o n a l 
common re s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s e t , Th i s the dual p r i c e on 
th 
the i d i v i s i o n a l p r i v a t e c o n s t r a i n t s e t and H i s the 
dual p r i c e on the t o t a l common r e s o u r c e share c o n s t r a i n t . 
Note t h a t f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n s to the d i v i s i o n a l sub-
problems may not e x i s t i f i n a p p r o p r i a t e a^ v e c t o r s are 
chosen, f o r i n s t a n c e , i f the v e c t o r contained only n e g a t i v e 
components. T h i s would g i v e r i s e to dual p r i c e s from the 
s o l u t i o n of the d i v i s i o n a l problem being s e t equal to - °° . 
The reason t h i s o c c u r s can be seen i f one c o n s i d e r s the 
du a l of the d i v i s i o n a l (primal) problems which i s as f o l l o w s 
z . = min (u . a. + II. b.} 1 1 l l l i 
s . t . u.A. + H.B. ^ c. 
l i l i l 
u.,n. > 0 l ' l 
f o r each i = l , . . . , , n . 
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F i n c e the o b j e c t i v e function and c o n s t r a i n t s e t s are 
l i n e a r , anv s o l u t i o n must occur at an extreme p o i n t or 
aloncr an extreme r a y . L e t (u^yH?) f o r p = l , . . . P ( i ) 
r e p r e s e n t the s e t of extreme points of { (u^, IT^ J | u^A i + 
ViB± >y c i ' u i ' n i > °^ a n d l e t ( u i " i 5 f o r r = 1 ' R ( i ) 
r e p r e s e n t the s e t of extreme r a y s f o r the cone { ( u ^ n ^ J u^A 
T T
i P i >, o , u i , n i > 0} 
The d i v i s i o n a l dual problem w i l l have an unbounded 
s o l u t i o n (--°°;) i f the s o l u t i o n occurs along an extreme ray 
the d e f i n e d cone. To prevent such i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
s e l e c t i o n s of a^ v e c t o r s by the c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , the 
•Following c o n s t r a i n t s must be s a t i s f i e d : 
u i a i + n p ^ >y 0 
There f o r e , one can now de f i n e a s e t of p o s s i b l e d i v i s i o n a l 
common r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n s A^ as f o l l o w s : 
Any a^e A^ w i l l ensure t h a t the pr i m a l d i v i s i o n a l 
problems have f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n s where: 
A i = { a i | u j a i + ll*bi > 0 f o r r = l , . . . ,R ( i ) } 
The alg o r i t h m uses the dual d i v i s i o n a l problems to approxi 
mate s o l u t i o n s t o the primal d i v i s i o n a l problems because 
of the e x i s t e n c e by the Fundamental Theorem of D u a l i t y i n 
Li n e a r Programming of the f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s : 
max { c i x i | A i x i < a i , B i x i < b i » x i > °} 
min ^ u ? a H + TT?b-^ P=l, . . , P ( i ) 1 1 1 1 
^ u i a i + ^ i 5 3 ! f o r a n y P = 1 ' • • • •/ p ( i ) 
•For a l l i = 1, n. 
Thus, the c e n t r a l headquarters can s t a r t the i t e r a t i v e 
procedure by o f f e r i n g c e r t a i n a l l o c a t i o n s of common r e s o u r c e s 
a = ( a ^ , . . . . , a ) to the d i v i s i o n s and asking them to s o l v e 
t h e i r p r i m a l (or dual) d i v i s i o n a l problems. Thus, the i 
d i v i s i o n determines the dual p r i c e s a t some i t e r a t i o n p to 
be u^ and n j 3 . 
L e t yP = n^b. 
and y* = n^b. 
i 1 1 
Thus, the c e n t r a l headquarters can ask the d i v i s i o n a l 
managers to communicate the v a l u e s f o r u ? and y ? and t h i s 
I J l 
q enerates the f o l l o w i n g c o n s t r a i n t to the r e s t r i c t e d master 
problem z^ ^ < u i a i + v\ f o r i = 
Thus, what the c e n t r a l heaequarters i s attempting to do 
i s i t e r a t i v e l y determine d i v i s i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s so t h a t the 
r e s t r i c t e d master problem becomes 
8S . 
ma x [ z, + z~ + + z \ 
1 1 2 n 1 
s . t . z, ^ »P-P J. »P 
i . u j a j + y r p = 1, P ( i ) 
i = 1, n 
a^eA^ i = 1, n 
n 
T a. = a 
i = l 3 
Suppose a t some i t e r a t i o n t the s o l u t i o n to t h i s r e s t r i c t e d 
master problem i s ( , . . . . z ^ , a ^ , ,a^) * Each d i v i s i o n i s 
informed of i t s a l l o c a t i o n of common r e s o u r c e a^, and i s asked 
to s o l v e i t s p r i m a l (or dual,) d i v i s i o n a l subproblem. 
t h 
1. TF the i d i v i s i o n a l (primal) problem i s i n f e a s i b l e a t 
i t e r a t i o n t , the c o n s t r a i n t 
IT t 2T 
u\ a i + y^ >, 0 i s ^ added to the r e s t r i c t e d master problem, 
t h 
J>. I F the i d i v i s i o n a l (primal) problem has a f e a s i b l e 
s o l u t i o n a t i t e r a t i o n t , the c o n s t r a i n t 
u^a^ + y^ >, z^ i s added to the r e s t r i c t e d master problem t t ^ t t u . a . + y. << z . 
3. TF the i t n d i v i s i o n a l (primal) problem has a f e a s i b l e 
s o l u t i o n a t i t e r a t i o n t and 
u^ T + y^ » z^ no c o n s t r a i n t i s added f o r d i v i s i o n i . 
86. 
Once a l l the d i v i s i o n a l problems have f e a s i b l e 
s o l u t i o n s and no new c o n s t r a i n t s need to be added to the 
r e s t r i c t e d master problem, the o v e r a l l c o r p o r a t e problem 
has been s o l v e d . 
The u n d e r l y i n g economic r a t i o n a l e f o r Tenkate's 
decomposition method i s t h a t common r e s o u r c e s should be 
r e a l l o c a t e d a t some i t e r a t i o n t by the c e n t r a l headquarters, 
u n l e s s each common resource y i e l d s equal m a r g i n a l r e t u r n 
20 
i n a l l u s e s . To i l l u s t r a t e how the method generates 
such m a r g i n a l r e t u r n v a l u e s , l e t (u^ T ^, be the 
th 
optimal d u a l p r i c e s a s s o c i a t e d with the i d i v i s i o n ' s 
(primal) problem when d i v i s i o n i ' s common r e s o u r c e a l l o c a -
t i o n v e c t o r i s a^ ^eA^. At the next i t e r a t i o n f o r a^eA^. 
z ± ( a ^ ) = min { u ^ a j + y ^ j u j ^ + n*B ± >, c i , 
u. ,JI. > O} 
t-1 A t-1 4 u. 9 i + y. 
, / t-1, t-1 . t-1 a l s o z i ^ a i ' = u i ^ i 
These two r e l a t i o n s imply 
/ t , , t-1, t-1 , t t-1, z i ( a i ) = z i ( a i ) + u ± ( a i - a i ) 
Thus u^ ^ i n d i c a t e s how the optimal s o l u t i o n v a l u e 
o^ the p r i m a l d i v i s i o n a l problem would change i n response 
to s m a l l changes i n a^ T ^. 
87. 
To understand more c l e a r l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the D antzig and Wolfe Decomposition Method and the Tenkate 
Decomposition Method l e t us r e c o n s i d e r the o r i g i n a l block 
anqular o v e r a l l corporate problem i n p a r t i t i o n e d form. 
The d u a l to t h i s problem i s : 
min TT b + F_b- + JI b + Ila 
1 1 2 2 n n 
s . t . - u i + TI = 0 f o r i = 1, ,n 
u i A i + n i B i > y C\ f o r 1 = ' n 
u i , I I i ^ O f o r i - 1, ,n 
One can now apply the Dantzig-Wolfe methodology of 
p r e s e n t i n g t h i s dual problem i n terms of convex combinations 
of extreme p o i n t s and extreme r a y s (defined by u^A^ + 
T T
i P i >• c i d i v i s i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s ) as f o l l o w s : 
min "
 P ( 1 ) n r, R ( ± ) r " r-
z { z >P (IT. ) p b , + z 6 , ( n , ) r b . } + na 
i = l p=l 1 1 1 r = l 1 1 1 
P ( i ) p P R ( i ) r - r s . t . - T X ^ ( u . ) p - Z 6*(u.) + n = 0 f o r i = 1, n 
p-1 1 1 r = l 1 1 
P ( i ) 
Z 
p=l 
 x j = 1 f o r i = 1, n 
X?, X^ >, 0 i ' l 
I f one now takes the dual of t h i s l a s t formulation 
of the problem, with the f i r s t n du a l v a r i a b l e s being 
denoted a^ f o r i = l , . . . , , n and the l a s t n dual v a r i a b l e s 
being denoted z^ f o r i = l , . . . . , n one has: 
max z. + z_ + + z 
1 2 n 
s . t . - u^alj 5 + z ± < n i b i 
- u^a^ nfb. 1 i i 1 
n 
+ F a. v< a 
i = l 1 
which i s j u s t a s l i g h t l y rearranged form of the r e s t r i c t e d 
master problem i n the Tenkate Decomposition Method. Thus, 
applying the Tenkate Decomposition Method i s e n t i r e l y 
e a u i v a l e n t to d u a l i z i n g the o v e r a l l c o rporate problem i n 
pa r t i o n e d form and then applying the Dantzig and Wolfe 
Decomposition Method to the d u a l , t h a t i s the Tenkate 
method can be viewed as the dual of the Dantzig and Wolfe 
method. 
Given t h i s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p , one can see t h a t some 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Dantzig and Wolfe procedure, such 
as being able to compute upper and lower bounds w i l l a l s o 
be p r e s e n t w i t h the Tenkate procedure. As was done f o r 
the Dantzig and Wolfe procedure, one can p r e s e n t a summary 
o f the information flows with the Tenkate Decomposition 
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Before comparing p r o p e r t i e s of the two decomposition 
procedures, i t i s important to c o n s i d e r whether i t i s 
ap p r o p r i a t e to consider a r e s o u r c e d i r e c t i v e a l l o c a t i o n 
mechanism as a t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure. C l e a r l y with 
a r e s o u r c e d i r e c t i v e approach, the c e n t r a l headquarters no 
lonqer s e t s a common t r a n s f e r p r i c e v e c t o r t h a t a l l 
d i v i s i o n s f a c e . However, the responses on dual p r i c e s 
bv the d i v i s i o n a l managers are c l e a r l y b i d p r i c e s f o r 
c e r t a i n a l l o c a t i o n s of common r e s o u r c e s . These b i d p r i c e s 
are c l e a r l y t r a n s f e r p r i c e s , with the property t h a t i n s t e a d 
of the c e n t r a l headquarters i n s t i g a t i n g them, the d i v i s i o n a l 
managers s e t them. So, i n my o p i n i o n , both p r i c e and 
r e s o u r c e d i r e c t i v e approaches can be viewed as t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedures provided one re c o g n i z e s t h a t the t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e s are generated by d i f f e r e n t groups and t h a t the 
i n f o r m a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of p r i c e s i n a p r i c e d i r e c t i v e 
approach a r e not pre s e n t to the same ext e n t i n a re s o u r c e 
d i r e c t i v e approach. S p e c i f i c a l l y i n the p r i c e d i r e c t i v e 
approach one p r i c e f o r each r e s o u r c e i s communicated and 
summarizes a l a r g e amount of i n f o r m a t i o n . However, with 
the r e s o u r c e d i r e c t i v e approach, a d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e 
a l l o c a t i o n needs to be provided t o every d i v i s i o n and each 
d i v i s i o n i s l i k e l y to respond with a d i f f e r e n t t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e f o r a given r e s o u r c e . 
The p r i n c i p a l reason f o r c o n s i d e r i n g the Tenkate 
algorithm was because of the i n a b i l i t y of the Dantzig and 
W o l f e p r i c e d i r e c t i v e algorithm t o co-ordinate o p t i m a l l y the 
op e r a t i n g d e c i s i o n s of d i v i s i o n a l managers a f t e r the f i n a l 
i t e r a t i o n when operating i n a li n e a r environment. This 
problem i s c l e a r l y resolved with the resource d i r e c t i v e 
approach at the f i n a l optimal i t e r a t i o n of the Tenkate 
algorithm each d i v i s i o n a l manager can calculate what i s 
the optimal d i v i s i o n a l operating decision to take, given 
the a l l o c a t i o n of common resources from the central head-
quarters and these decisions w i l l be optimal f o r the 
central headquarters o v e r a l l problem. However, as was 
mentioned e a r l i e r such resource a l l o c a t i o n algorithms are 
u n l i k e l v to be i t e r a t e d to o p t i m a l i t y , hence one i s con-
cerned w i t h properties of the algorithm at some a r b i t r a r y 
intermediate i t e r a t i o n . With the Tenkate algorithm co-
o r d i n a b i l i t y i s assured at any i t e r a t i o n provided the 
the common resource a l l o c a t i o n vector i s fe a s i b l e . That 
is the c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l be s a t i s f i e d with the 
(decentralized) operating decisions t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers 
take, given any fe a s i b l e , but not yet optimal a l l o c a t i o n of 
scarce common resources. However, during the i t e r a t i v e 
procedure, c e r t a i n proposed allocations of common resources 
21 
bv the c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l be unfeasible as the 
central headquarters i s not aware of a l l the constraints 
^aced bv d i v i s i o n s . I f , though, the i t e r a t i v e procedure 
were to be halted at t h i s p o i n t , the central headquarters 
could ensure c o - o r d i n a b i l i t y by using a previous (stored) 
feasible a l l o c a t i o n of common resources. 
The above discussion i s only a short i n t r o d u c t i o n to 
the comoaritive properties of both algorithms. A much more 
detaile d discussion can be found i n Burton and Obel (1979). 
A more d e t a i l e d discussion i s not presented here as both 
o 2. 
a.1 qor i thins suffer from a common problem, which i s discussed 
i n Section 3.4.2. However, i t i s worth noting that the 
Tenkate algorithm can also be extended to non linear 
22 
environments . In addition, many non lin e a r problems 
which can not be solved using p r i c i n g algorithms, because 
o f non-convexities, may be solveable using resource 
23 
d i r e c t i v e algorithms . Also a mixed algorithm which 
uses Dantzig and Wolfe price d i r e c t i v e decomposition for 
some d i v i s i o n s and Tenkate resource d i r e c t i v e decomposition 
for the remaining divisions has been formulated by Obel 
(H7R) . 
3.4 TNCFNTIVF COMPATIBILITY AND UNCERTAINTY 
In Section 2.3 a general discussion was presented which 
considered the problems that may be encountered when organic 
zations attempt to decentralize. This section w i l l consider 
whether the H i r s h l e i f e r and Dantzig and Wolfe transfer 
p r i c i n g procedures overcomes these d i f f i c u l t i e s . To 
summarize the problems that Section 2.3 i d e n t i f i e d were: 
1. Performance measure destruction of co-operation 
2. Strategic information s p e c i a l i s t s 
3. Goal incongruent performance measures 
4. Incompleteness of performance measures 
5 . Uncertainty i n performance measures. 
The f i r s t three problems are i n t i m a t e l y related, as 
the f o l l o w i n g simple case study i l l u s t r a t e s , and w i l l be 
grouped under the heading Incentive Compatibility from here 
on. 
q „ 
.Suppose the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager of the 
p r o t o t y p i c a l organization i d e n t i f i e s a new p o t e n t i a l l y 
successful product l i n e , provided i t can be manufactured 
below a certain cost. The manufacturing d i v i s i o n a l 
manager would then be asked to i d e n t i f y a suitable 
production technique ( i f one exists) and estimate the cost 
conditions for such an operation. The manufacturing 
divisional) manager w i l l not wish to co-operate unless 
the manager perceives some advantage from co-operation. 
In such a s i t u a t i o n , a manager w i l l respond with the 
information that i s most advantageous to communicate from 
his own point of view which need not necessarily coincide 
with the i n t e r e s t s of the corporation. The reason for 
t h i s i s the outcome of his performance measure (ihis 
reward) w i l l be conditional on the information he chooses 
to communicate. 
This simple case study i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t d i v i s i o n a l 
performance measures that are incongruent can lead to un-
co-operative behaviour which takes the form of r e s t r i c t e d 
and or d i s t o r t e d information flows a r i s i n g . A more 
rigorous example of t h i s type of occurrence i s presented 
i n Section 3.4.1 when considering the incentive com-
p a t i b i l i t y properties of the H i r s h l e i f e r transfer p r i c i n g 
procedure. 
Problems four and f i v e give r i s e to an important 
Question i n management accounting. Should d i v i s i o n a l 
managers operating i n an uncertain environment be required 
to share r i s k or should they be protected from r i s k . 
The following discussion uses a model presented 
24 Y Kanodia (197 9) to consider these issues: 
et QM denote the intermediate product 
th q M = quantity of QM produced by manufacturing d i v i s i o n 
X M denotes the sole input used by the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n 
= quantity of XM used i n production of 
QD denotes the f i n a l product 
q d = quantity of f i n a l product QD sold by d i s t r i b u t i o n 
d i v i s i o n 
X D denotes the input used by the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n 
to convert the intermediate product i n t o the f i n a l 
product 
x D = quantity of X^ used i n production 
= quantity of intermediate product QM used by 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n 
= f i x e d price of X M bought on a (certain) external 
market 
P D = f i x e d price of X D bought on a (certain) external 
* 
market 
P = f i x e d price of QD sold on a (certain) external 
market 
In addition assume the technology of the two divisions 
an be represented by the production functions: 
Q = F ( x ) (1) in m ' 
95. 
where F and G are increasing, s t r i c t l y concave, and con 
tinuouslv d i f f e r e n t i a b l e . 
The o v e r a l l corporate problem therefore i s : 
* 
(D ) max p - p x - p_x^ o -D MTI m *u D 
s.t. ( 1 ) , (2) 
and >, c£ 
The Lagrangian f o r t h i s problem Do i s 
max L D 
o 
P qD PmXm " PD XD + X 1(F(x m) - q^, 
D 
+ X2 ( G ( qm' XD ) ~ % ] ) 
F i r s t order conditions give 
fL = p - X2 = 0 
flL -X X 6G (. , .) = 0 
6(3™ 1 2 6cT *m TTI 
fiL = -p + X 6F(. ) _ - T — m l i. = o ox_ 6x m m 
6L_ = -PD + X 6G(. r.) = 
SXD **5 
^rom the f i r s t expression one can su b s t i t u t e A£ = p 
from the second expression and using the above s u b s t i t u t i o n 
t h i s gives 
A = p*<SG( . , .) 
1 <5q " 
thus 
Pm = P ,.) SF (3) 6q_ ~Ex TTI m 
and p D = p* 6G(.,.) (4) 
Note t h a t the f i n a l constraint of D q w i l l hold with equality 
and Eauation (3) i s the H i r s h l e i f e r r u l e , marginal cost 
eauals net marginal revenue. 
Tn Kanodia's model i f one l e t s p/ represent the transfer 
price f o r the intermediate product, then the d i v i s i o n a l 
subproblems w i l l be 
(D ) max p / q M - p„xm M * M m m 
s.t. a = F ( x ) m m 
q .x_ >y 0 m m 
and 
( D D ) max p*q D - p' qJJ - p ^ 
s.t. q D = G(qJJ,d D) 
qD' qS' XD * ° 
^he Lagrangian for the manufacturing d i v i s i o n a l subproblem 
i s : 
L n l. = p'q - p x + A ( F ( x ) - q ) 
97 
F i r s t order conditions give: 
6L = p' - A = 0 
m 
= -p + X 6F ( .) = 0 6x *m in - f — i — -m 6x 
in ' 
which require p = p/ SF (.) (5) 
m 6x 
m 
The Laqrangian f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l d i v i s i o n a l subproblem 
i s : 
LD D - - P'% " PDKD + XD ( G (%' XD ) " (3 D ) 
F i r s t order conditions give: 
= P - A = o 
so; 
P / + A D 6G(.,.) = o 
|L_ = _ p D + XD 6G(.,.) = 0 
which require p = p 6G(.,.) 
and P D = p* 6G(.f .) 
6 XD 
Tf p' i s set c o r r e c t l y , i t w i l l induce the d i v i s i o n a l managers 
M 
to act such t h a t q^ = q Q 
Thus equations (5) and (6) give (3) and (7) i s i d e n t i c a l t o 
(A) . 
Let us now consider how the problem changes on the 
intr o d u c t i o n of an element of uncertainty i n t o the problem. 
Assume that the price of the f i n a l product p i s not known 
25 
with c e r t a i n t y . Suppose i t i s commonly known t h a t 
* * 
there are T possible prices for QD, (p 1,....,P T) but tha t 
the p r o b a b i l i t y (of price occurrence) d i s t r i b u t i o n i s best 
2 6 
known bv the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l d i v i s i o n a l manager . This 
assumption would seem to be consistent with the view th a t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers were information s p e c i a l i s t s i n t h e i r 
own markets. Assuming that QD i s sold i n a p e r f e c t l y 
competitive market, the price p t which i s re a l i z e d can not 
be influenced by any action of the d i v i s i o n a l managers and 
i s observed by both managers expost. Let IT. and I L ^ 
tm tD 
denote the p r o f i t s allocated to the respective d i v i s i o n s 
and assume the d i v i s i o n a l managers are rewarded on the basis 
of l i n e a r compensation functions of the form: = K + k V... K ,k > 0 \8) tM m m tM m' m y ' 
S t D = ^ + kD "tD KD'kD > ° { 8 ) 
Let U (s ) , u_(s_) represent the d i v i s i o n a l managers' m m D D 
27 
u t i l i t v functions . Suppose the central headquarters 
wishes to implement the "certainty equivalent" t o the 
P i r s h l e i f e r type procedure presented above. The ce n t r a l 
headquarters w i l l wish to determine the transfer price Q' 
and 
which equates demand^supply of the intermediate product. 
Let q denote the amount of Q produced and exchanged, m m J ' 
and q D the amount of QD produced and sold, given p' . 
Thus the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager w i l l choose 
that solves: 
max p /q_ - p x TTI *m : m 
(9) 
s.t . a = F(x ) 
m m 
Assume that (a^,...,a ,...,aT) represents the proba-
b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n for the fi n i s h e d product price that the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l d i v i s i o n a l manager perceives. Given the 
argument of the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager's u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n , the manager w i l l desire to maximize the expected 
u t i l i t y from compensation that i s : 
T 
max ^ a ^ {K D + ^ ( p ^ - p'<% - P ^ ) } 
(10) 
F i r s t order conditions f o r the Lagrangian f o r (10) require 
6L = a t ^ D^tD* - Xn = 0 
^ ° (a) 
6% 
where one can use the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
6 V ^ W = 6^tD g 0 < S t D ) 
6 % 5q D 6 s t D 
and l e t t i n g 
UD ( StD> - 6 V f t D l 
to w r i t e the f i r s t order condition (a) as: 
4 | - " V \ a t U D ( S t D ^ P t " " D = ° *% t = 1 
the remaining f i r s t order conditions f o r the Lagrang 
T 
-Sf = til a t 6 U D ( 5 t D ) + XD 6 G<"-> = 0 




6 qM 6qM 
_6L T 
D " ~kD 
M 
* at°D ( StD> P' + AD 6 G ( " ' ) = 0 
t = i r D 6 % 
and 
T 




;L = - kp t = l a T U D ( S ) p D + X 6G(.,.) = 0 (d) 
^ 6 xD 
The c e r t a i n t y equivalent price for QD s h a l l be denoted 
p i s defined by the re l a t i o n s h i p : 
thus since equation (b) requires 
T 
one can express equation (c) as 
J / . kp.. Z a t D D / ( S t D ) p t 6G(.,.) 
K D J ^ D ^ D ' 
using equation (e) t h i s becomes 
p' = P* 6G (. ,.) (11) 
Si m i l a r l y one can express equation (d) as 
T 
kD Z a t U D ( S t D ) 
t = l 
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usina equation (c) t h i s becomes 
P D = p* <SG (. ,.) (12) 
Thus under uncertainty, the f i r s t order conditions 
are very s i m i l a r to those under c e r t a i n t y , with the only 
difference being the c e r t a i n price of the f i n a l product 
beinq replaced by i t s c e r t a i n t y equivalent when the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n operates under uncertain conditions. 
In the case when the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager 
i s not r i s k n e u t r a l , the c e r t a i n t y equivalent price w i l l 
not eaual the expected price as the f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t proves: 
a = covariance t U D ( S D ) , P } , t h a t i s 
o = E {UD(S D),P*> _ E (u^(S D)}.E {p*} 
using the above d e f i n i t i o n of the c e r t a i n t y equivalent price 
bv equation (e) we have 
7"*; 
E(Un'(S 
= p -E 
D )> 
rearranging gives 
p = E {p } + 0 
E ^ D ( S D ) } 
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T h a t i s the c e r t a i n t y equivalent price i s t h e expectation 
of t h e uncertain price plus a remainder term for a r i s k 
aver se ind i v idu a l . 
and U D ( S D ) = < S U D ( S D ) * 0 
Thus the covariance i s negative since as p increases,. 
-increases and marginal u t i l i t y drops making t h e i r co-
variance negative. Since marginal u t i l i t y i s p o s i t i v e , 
we have 
P < E{p } 
Given t h i s r e s u l t , one would expect that the higher 
the r i s k aversion of d i s t r i b u t i o n division's manager , the 
lower w i l l be the c e r t a i n t y equivalent price p , r e s u l t i n g 
i n lower production of the f i n a l product QD and, hence, 
lower demand f o r the intermediate product QM. 
One can express t h i s i n t u i t i v e r e s u l t more formally 
as: 
Kanodia Theorem: The more r i s k averse the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
manager i s , ( i ) the lower w i l l be the division's production 
of and the d i v i s i o n ' s demand f o r the intermediate 
product, at any given transfer p r i c e , p', 
( i i ) the lower w i l l be the equilibrium t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e , p , and 
( i i i ) the lower w i l l be the p r o f i t s that accrue 
to the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager. 
10 4 . 
This corresponds to Theorem 2 i n Kanodia (1979) where 
the theorem i s proven. The importance of the above analysi 
is t h a t i t shows that the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager 
w i l l varv the production decisions taken, depending on 
his or her a t t i t u d e towards r i s k . Given th a t the central 
headquarters may have a d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e towards r i s k , 
t h i s raises the question of whether the actions of the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l d i v i s i o n a l manager w i l l optimize the c e n t r a l 
headquarters' preferences. I f , given the d i f f e r e n t 
u t i l i t v functions, both the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager 
and the central headquarters could always agree on which 
decision to take (output of Q D), then the problem would be 
j u s t a question of how to share r i s k (uncertain compensa-
tio n ) between the d i v i s i o n a l managers and the cen t r a l head-
quarters . To express t h i s i n another fashion, i f 
. there existed a group u t i l i t y f unction which specified 
which decision t o take given external uncertainty which 
a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s agreed w i t h , then an optimal external 
decision (output of QD) could always be identified^and the 
question of how d i f f e r e n t u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n a l forms a f f e c t 
how r i s k needs to be shared could be considered separately 
from the external decision. The essential elements of the 
problem can be developed using the f o l l o w i n g s i m p l i f i e d 
2 8 
example due to P r a t t . The example shows t h a t , i n general 
such a group u t i l i t y function w i l l not e x i s t even i n the 
simpler case of a corporate structure of a cen t r a l head-
quarters and one d i v i s i o n , never mind a structure with two 
d i v i s i o n s and a central headquarters, where a l l parties hold 
d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s towards r i s k . 
10 5. 
Suppose the central headquarters has the u t i l i t y 
^unction U c and the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager has 
u t i l i t v function U D as presented i n Figure 2. Let the 
following l o t t e r y conceptualize the uncertain f i n a l 
product price environment. 
Lottery L 
state (price) p r o b a b i l i t y payoff 
P* .25 -£300 
P*2 .25 -£100 
* 
P3 .25 +£100 
P4 .25 +£300 
The expected monetary value of L i s zero and the 
expected u t i l i t y of L i s negative f o r each i n d i v i d u a l , 
since they are both r i s k averse. However, i t i s possible 
to p a r t i t i o n L so that the expected u t i l i t i e s of the 
pa r t i t i o n e d l o t t e r i e s are both zero as below: 
P a r t i t i o n of L 
state (price) P r o b a b i l i t y payoff to payoff to 
C D 
* 
P1 .25 -E100 -£200 
p*2 .25 -£100 -£200 
P3 .25 £ 0 +£100 
* 
P4 .25 +£200 +E100 
J Ob. 
E {U_(S_)} = - 100 - 100 + 200 = O 
c c IT — ~ 
F.{TJ <F_)} = - 200 + 100 + 100 = O 
~4~ "T" ~T~ 
Since the expected monetary value i s zero, i t can not 
be possible t o r e p a r t i t i o n the l o t t e r y such tha t (E{U C(S C)}> 0 
and F rU D(S D)}> 0 given the r i s k aversiby of the u t i l i t y 
^unctions. Suppose the group members are free to p a r t i t i o n 
the l o t t e r i e s they select. Then for the pairs of u t i l i t i e s 
* 
given i n Figure 2, there i s no group u t i l i t y function U tha t 
the group can use to choose between l o t t e r i e s . To see 
t h i s , suppose to the contrary that such an appropriate group 
* 
u t i l i t y function U did e x i s t . Then since a j u s t acceptable 
p a r t i t i o n can be determined for L, i t must be tha t 
1 U*(- £300) + 1 U*(- £100) + 1U* (+ £100) + 1U*(+ £300) = 0 
A J 1 1 
* 
where we have a r b i t r a r i l y l e t U (0) - 0. 
Using Figure 2 again, one sees that a l o t t e r y L which 
f i v e s a .5 chance of - £100 and a ,5 chance of + £100 i s j u s t 
acceptable to eith e r i n d i v i d u a l and there would be no par-
t i t i o n o f the l o t t e r y that the group members would s t r i c t l y 
prefer to zero. Hence, i t must be that 
1 U* (- £100) + 1 U* (+ £100) = 0 
2 2 
One can then use the two equations above to see that U must 
s a t i s f y the l o t t e r y L + 
1 U* (- £300) + 1 U* (+ £300) = 0 
2 1 
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However L + can never be p a r t i t i o n e d i n t o ( j u s t b a r e l y ) 
a c c e p t a b l e s h a r e s . To see t h i s , we must have 
( 7 ) *1C + S1D = ~ £ 3 0 ° 
(Y) S ? c + S 2 D = + E300 
(X) F l c + s 2 c >, 0 f o r c's share to be acceptable 
(T'T) S 1 D, + S 2 D >y 0 f o r d's share to be acceptable 
adding equations (Z) and (Y) g i v e s 
( P l c + s 2 c ) + ( s 1 D + s 2 D ) = o 
which i m p l i e s equations (X) and (W) must hold with e q u a l i t y . 
T h i s , i n t u r n , i m p l i e s t h a t S 1 Q and S 2 C must l i e between 
-100 and +200 and S 1 D and S 2 D must l i e between -200 and -100. 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r c's a c c e p t a b l e p a r t i t i o n mean t h a t 
P 1 D must be -£200 or l e s s . T h i s means t h a t S 2 D must be 
correspondingly +£200 or more. However, t h i s means to 
ra i r a i n a c c e p t a b l e f o r c, one must have a p a r t i t i o n t h a t i s 
not a c c e p t a b l e to D. That i s , L + i s not j o i n t l y a c c e p t a b l e , 
and no group U can e x i s t . That i s , the group can not a c t 
as a s i n g l e d e c i s i o n maker would 
I t seems the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the above a n a l y s i s are 
t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , s i n c e the e x t e r n a l d e c i s i o n s have to be 
l i n k e d to how r i s k i s shared i n t e r n a l l y , then there w i l l need 
to be T contingent t r a n s f e r p r i c e s . Kanodia (1979) d e a l s 
with t h i s problem by e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n d i t i o n s under which 
d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l view the e x t e r n a l d e c i s i o n s and 
u t i l i t y from r i s k y compensation as s e p a r a t e problems. He 
ac h i e v e s t h i s r e s u l t by s p e c i f y i n g a complete i n t e r n a l con-
t i n g e n t market f o r the u n c e r t a i n optimal Q D d e c i s i o n s , 
] 0<). 
Q^D,....0 ,....Q . The d i v i s i o n a l manager's purchase 
contingent q u a n t i t i e s a t contingent p r i c e s using what 
Kanodia c a l l s t h e i r ex-ante income to s a t i s f y t h e i r r i s k 
p r e f e r e n c e s . Pence, they c l e a r l y wish to maximize t h e i r 
ex-ante income. Kanodia "then d e f i n e s ex-ante income i n 
such a manner t h a t the d i v i s i o n a l managers maximizing ex-
ante income w i l l maximize the c e n t r a l headquarters p r e f e r e n c e 
( l o c a l r i s k s h a r i n g ) . T h i s i s achieved by s e t t i n g the 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e t h a t d e f i n e s ex-ante income equal to the 
c e n t r a l headquarters c e r t a i n t y e q u i v a l e n t p r i c e . 
Kanodia a l s o presents a g l o b a l r i s k s h a r i n g t r a n s f e r 
D r i c i n g procedure which allows f o r r i s k s h a r i n g among a l l 
t h r e e p a r t i e s . T h i s i s based on the l o c a l s h a r i n g procedure, 
but with the contingent p r i c e s s p e c i f i e d to ensure t h a t a l l 
contingent markets c l e a r . 
The above d i s c u s s i o n has i m p l i e d the problem t h a t 
a r i s e s under u n c e r t a i n t y i s t h a t optimal r i s k s h a r i n g 
agreements between d i v i s i o n a l managers and the c e n t r a l head-
o u a r t e r s have to be determined. However as Kaplan (page 
612, 19R2) puts i t : 
" i n p r a c t i c e c a p i t a l markets provide a myriad of 
economic agents to o f f e r r i s k s h a r i n g arrangements 
for the owners of f i r m s . Managers w i l l t y p i c a l l y 
be h i r e d , not because of t h e i r d e s i r a b l e r i s k 
s h a r i n g a b i l i t i e s , but because they have s p e c i a l i z e d 
information, are good a t making and implementing 
d e c i s i o n s and have the c a p a b i l i t y f o r advancement 
to h i g h e r - l e v e l managerial p o s i t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
, Our problem w i l l probably be the opposite 
one: how to s h i e l d the managers from the negative 
consequences of random outcomes from t h e i r d e c i s i o n s " . 
In other words, i n s t e a d of t r y i n g to determine optimal 
r i s k s h a r i n g c o n t r a c t s with managers, u n c e r t a i n t y g i v e s r i s e 
to the problem of how to s h i e l d managers' compensation from 
random outcomes. Thus, t y p i c a l l y some form of budgetting 
IK.. 
procedure which i n c o r p o r a t e s d i v i s i o n a l management f o r e -
c a s t s needs to be i n c l u d e d . However, one must r e c o g n i z e 
t h a t t h i s l e a d s to another problem. Since we have 
recoanized o p e r a t i o n s are o c c u r r i n g i n an u n c e r t a i n 
environment, one can not expect f o r e c a s t s and a c t u a l i t i e s 
to alwavs correspond. Once d i v i s i o n a l managers r e a l i z e 
t h a t information they are providing to c o n s t r u c t budgets 
w i l l a l s o be used to e v a l u a t e t h e i r performance, an i n c e n t i v e 
i s c r e a t e d f o r them to d i s t o r t or b i a s information to 
improve t h e i r performance e v a l u a t i o n measure. D i v i s i o n a l 
managers can a c h i e v e such m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s undetected 
because, when they a c t i n t h e i r r o l e as information 
s p e c i a l i s t s and are asked to f o r e c a s t some v a r i a b l e , s i n c e 
thev have the b e s t information on the v a r i a b l e , when the 
c e n t r a l headquarters observes a v a r i a n c e between the f o r e -
c a s t and the a c t u a l v a l u e of the v a r i a b l e a f t e r the event, 
the c e n t r a l headquarters can not be sure whether the v a r i a n c e 
i s due to randomn chance, poor f o r e c a s t i n g caused by poor 
s k i l l or i n s u f f i c i e n t information, m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , or some 
combination of these f a c t o r s . 
One can sum up the d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s s e c t i o n by conclud-
ino t h a t t h i s s e c t i o n was intended to h i g h l i g h t two problems* 
E x t e r n a l u n c e r t a i n t y and asymmetric a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n 
(to a s s e s s the l i k e l i h o o d of u n c e r t a i n events i n the world 
e x t e r n a l to the c o r p o r a t i o n ) c a n g i v e r i s e to i n t e r n a l un 
c e r t a i n t y ( i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s s u e s ) with regard to 
the p e r c e i v e d t r u t h f u l n e s s of information communicated by 
d i v i s i o n a l managers. 
The f o l l o w i n g two s e c t i o n s w i l l i l l u s t r a t e these i s s u e s 
bv c o n s i d e r i n g whether d i v i s i o n a l managers have i n c e n t i v e s 
to r e p o r t t r u t h f u l l y i n the H i r s h l e i f e r and Dantzig and 
^ o l f e t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures. 
. 4 .1 I n c e n t i v e s to M i srepresent i n the 
H i r s h l e i f e r Procedure. 
L e t us r e c a l l the two d i v i s i o n a l H i r s h l e i f e r t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedure and n o t a t i o n presented i n S e c t i o n 3.2. 
S i n ce we have assumed no e x t e r n a l market f o r the i n t e r -
mediate product, the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager w i l l 
c l e a r l y p e r c e i v e t h a t he or she i s a monopsonistic buyer 
of the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s production. I f the d i s -
t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager chooses to e x e r c i s e monopsonistic 
power, the manager w i l l r e a l i s e t h a t the p r i c e t h a t must 
be paid f o r any given q u a n t i t y of the i n t ermediate product, 
i s given by the manufacturing d i v i s i o n s supply curve, t h a t 
i s the MC^ schedule. T h i s means the monopsonistic p r o f i t s 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n can be optimized 
by choosing the output q f o r which: 
q max D (q) - p q 
s . t . p* = c'(q) 
t h a t i s 
q max D (q) - C /(q).q 
F i r s t order c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e : 
D '(q) = c"(q) .q + C '(q) 
1 1 2 . 
Assuming t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s net marginal 
revenue schedule i s decreasing and the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n ' s marginal c o s t schedule i s i n c r e a s i n g , we have: 
C*(q) .q > 0 
which means t h a t 
D ^(MONOPS) 5 > ° ^(COMPET)* 
on where 3( M0N0PS) i s t h e o u t P u t o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i 
when i t a c t s m o n o p s o n i s t i c a l l y and q , n n M n p [ n > i s the 
output of the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n i f i t acted c o m p e t i t i v e l y 
(as a p r i c e t a k e r ) as required by the H i r s h l e i f e r procedure. 
Thus, when the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager p e r c e i v e s 
the d i v i s i o n ' s monopsonistic power, the manager can i n c r e a s e 
the p r o f i t s of the d i v i s i o n and, hence, h i s or her com-
p e n s a t i o n ^ 0 by purchasing l e s s of the i n t e r m e d i a t e product 
than i f the manager acted as a p r i c e t a k e r . T h i s case 
i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 3. Note t h a t s i n c e C / ( q ) i s 
i n c r e a s i n g , t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t the t r a n s f e r p r i c e i n the 
monopsonistic case w i l l a l s o be lower than i n the competitive 
c a s e . The diagram a l s o i l l u s t r a t e s the r a t i o n a l e f o r the 
c o n d i t i o n s d e r i v e d from the f i r s t order requirements. 
That i s , the a d d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t a t t r i b u t a b l e to 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n when i t s manager a c t s monopsonis-
t i c a l l y i s AREA <P* ( C 0 M P E T ) P * ( M 0 N 0 P S ) D C ) - AREA (ABC). 
I f t h i s monopsonistic a c t i o n merely leads to a r e d i s t r i b u -
t i o n of p r o f i t s between the two d i v i s i o n s , the c e n t r a l 
h eadquarters may not be unduly concerned. However, the 
e f f e c t of the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager's monop-
s o n i s t i c a c t i o n s i s to reduce t o t a l company p r o f i t s by ABD. 
13 3. 
The q u e s t i o n i s how would the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s 
manager be able to r e a l i s e such monopsonistic power un-
d e t e c t e d i f , a t the budget ing s t a g e , the manager i s 
marginal 
r e o u i r e d to f o r e c a s t the d i v i s i o n s expected net/revenue 
f u n c t i o n . F i g u r e 4 shows c l e a r l y t h a t , i f the d i s t r i b u -
t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager u n d e r s t a t e s the d i v i s i o n ' s 
marginal 
expected net/revenue f u n c t i o n as below, he w i l l be able 
to achieve the monopsonistic p o s i t i o n without the c e n t r a l 
h e adauarters or manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager r e a l i s i n g . 
Note the i n c e n t i v e to m i s r e p r e s e n t a r i s e s because 
one can not expect a l i m i t e d number of t r a n s a c t o r s on an 
i n t e r n a l market not to r e c o g n i s e they have some market 
power. Thus, one would expect t h a t , i n t h i s model, the 
manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager p e r c e i v e s t h a t he or 
she has some market power as t h e i r d i v i s i o n i s the monop-
o l i s t i c s e l l e r of the i n t e r m e d i a t e product. 
whereas i n the monopsonistic c a s e , the" d i s t r i b u t i o n 
d i v i s i o n ' s manager d i d not have an input demand schedule, 
but i n s t e a d s e l e c t e d the output on the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n ' s supply schedule t h a t maximized the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
d i v i s i o n ' s p r o f i t s , here the manufacturing d i v i s i o n w i l l not 
have an output supply schedule r e l a t i n g p r i c e and q u a n t i t y . 
The manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager w i l l s e l e c t the output 
on the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s demand schedule t h a t maximises 
the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s p r o f i t s , t h a t i s : 
q max p q - C(q) * / s . t . p = D (q) 
B 
t 
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t h a t i s 
q max D ' (q) .q - C(q) 
F i r s t order c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e 
D \q) + D ''(q) .q = C / ( q ) 
Assuming t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s net marginal 
revenue schedule i s d e c r e a s i n g and the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n ' s marginal c o s t schedule i s i n c r e a s i n g , we have: 
D (q).q < 0 
which means t h a t 
C ( q(MONOP) ) < C ^(COMPETp 
where ^ ( M Q N O P ) -*-s t n e o u t P u t of the manufacturing d i v i s i o n 
when i t a c t s m o n o p o l i s t i c a l l y with ^(coMPET) b e i n 9 
output of the manufacturing d i v i s i o n , i f i t acted com-
p e t i t i v e l y as r e q u i r e d by the H i r s h l e i f e r procedure. T h i s 
s i t u a t i o n i s depicted i n F i g u r e 5 which a l s o shows how the 
manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager i s able ^to r e a l i s e such 
m o n o p o l i s t i c power without the c e n t r a l headquarters or 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager r e a l i s i n g . A l s o the 
diaqram i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t the d i f f e r e n t i a l m o n o p o l i s t i c 
p r o f i t i s l a r g e and given by A R E A ( P * ( C 0 M P E T ) P * ( M 0 N 0 P ) B C > " 
AREA(CDE) and the r e d u c t i o n i n the o v e r a l l corporate p r o f i t s 
i s AREA(BDE). Thus, i n t h i s environment, the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n a l manager has a c l e a r i n c e n t i v e to o v e r s t a t e the 
d i v i s i o n ' s marginal c o s t c o n d i t i o n s . 
L e t us c o n s i d e r a t h i r d f a c t o r t h a t may g i v e r i s e to 
a d i v i s i o n a l manager having an i n c e n t i v e to m i s - s t a t e a 
schedule or hide i t . Suppose F i g u r e 6 d e p i c t s the s i t u a t i o n 
3 17. 
where the d i s t r i b u t i o n and manufacturing d i v i s i o n a l managers 
re p o r t t r u t h f u l l y t h e i r net marginal revenue and marginal 
c o s t schedules i n i t i a l l y . Thus, the agreed t r a n s f e r w i l l 
k e ^ (INITIAL) u n : i - t s °f t n e intermediate product a t the 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e P (I N I T I A L ) " A s s u m e immediately a f t e r t h e s e 
c o n d i t i o n s are e s t a b l i s h e d by the budget ing procedure t h a t 
the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager l e a r n s of a more 
e f f i c i e n t process by which to manufacture the i n t e r m e d i a t e 
qood, such t h a t the marginal c o s t schedule now becomes 
C / ( q ) as depi c t e d i n F i g u r e 6. I f the manufacturing 
E 
d i v i s i o n ' s manager immediately reported t h i s change i n 
operating c o n d i t i o n s , a new t r a n s f e r p r i c e P„ could be 
determined which would g i v e r i s e to a r e s u l t a n t i n c r e a s e 
i n the output of the i n t e r m e d i a t e product. However, the 
change i n the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s p r o f i t would be 
* * 
AREA (DBC), - AREA(P^P ( I N I T I A L ) W , s i n c e the l a t t e r a r e a 
i s a r e a t e r than the former a r e a , the d i v i s i o n ' s p r o f i t and 
hence manaqer's compensation would f a l l . T h i s r e s u l t 
c l e a r l y i s r e l a t e d t o the monopolist s o l u t i o n which r e q u i r e s 
the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager to o v e r s t a t e the 
d i v i s i o n ' s marginal c o s t schedule to i n c r e a s e the d i v i s i o n ' s 
p r o f i t . The r e s u l t i s c l e a r l y of some s i g n i f i c a n t import-
ance as i t r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of why should a manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n ' s manager ever want to introduce new technology ^is\ijp< 
s i n c e i t w i l l not b e n e f i t the manager concerned, s i n c e 
the b e n e f i t s are passed on to the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n and 
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An analogous r e s u l t can hold when one c o n s i d e r s 
whether the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager has no , i n c e n t i v e 
to decrease d i s t r i b u t i o n c o s t s or i n c r e a s e d i s t r i b u t i o n 
revenue so net marginal revenue now becomes D^Cq) as 
d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 7. I f the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s 
manager reported t h i s change i n operating c o n d i t i o n s , a 
* 
new t r a n s f e r p r i c e P £ could be determined which would give 
r i s e to a r e s u l t a n t i n c r e a s e i n the output of the i n t e r -
mediate product. However, the change i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
d i v i s i o n ' s p r o f i t would be AREA (ABC) - AREA ( C D P * / T „ T m T , T . 
(INITIAL) 
* 
P E ) and, s i n c e the l a t t e r i s g r e a t e r than the former a r e a , 
the d i v i s i o n ' s p r o f i t and, hence, the manager's compensation, 
would f a l l . 
Note t h a t , whereas the monopsonistic and m o n o p o l i s t i c 
problems can a r i s e f o r any c o s t and revenue c o n d i t i o n s 
s a t i s f y i n g the r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s , t h i s i s not the case 
for the " c o s t e f f i c i e n c y " and "revenue e f f i c i e n c y " problems. 
For i n s t a n c e , i f i n the " c o s t e f f i c i e n c y " problem, i f the 
net marginal revenue schedule of the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n 
i s r e l a t i v e l y s hallow and the marginal c o s t schedule of 
the manufacturing d i v i s i o n r e l a t i v e l y s t eep, the manufactur-
ing d i v i s i o n ' s manager w i l l have an i n c e n t i v e to introduce 
new more e f f i c i e n t p r o c e s s e s . For the "revenue e f f i c i e n c y " 
problem, i f the net marginal revenue schedule of the d i s -
t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y steep and the marginal 
cost schedule of the manufacturing d i v i s i o n r e l a t i v e l y 
shallow, the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager w i l l have an 
i n c e n t i v e to introduce new more e f f i c i e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n and 
s a l e s t e c h n i q u e s . 
122 . 
3.4.2 I n c e n t i v e s to Misrepresent i n the Dantzig 
and Wolfe Decomposition Procedure f o r 
T r a n s f e r P r i c i n g 
Jennergren (1971) c o n s i d e r s i n d e t a i l the i n c e n t i v e s 
f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers to misrepresent i n the Dantzig and 
32 
Wolfe procedure. He assumes a two d i v i s i o n and c e n t r a l 
headquarters s t r u c t u r e , so that the r e s t r i c t e d master 
problem, D , takes the form: o 
x x *™ w P > P + P z 2 ) w?xP 
, , _ max I W, X% .. 2 2 
1 # 2 p=l 1 1 P = 1 
P ( l ) P ( 2 ) 
s . t . I L ? X P + E L ? X ? * a 
p=l 1 1 p=l Z 1 
P ( D P(2) 
I x P = 1, z x f 
p=l 1 p=l 1 
L e t 
a l l X p, X p >, 0 
L X - aj 
S - n-21 4(2,> 
+\ = ( w j , W^ ( 1 )) 
w
2 = (W*, W 2 ( 2 ) ) 
»I - ^a)> 
12 3. 
where T denotes the o p e r a t i o n of t r a n s p o s i t i o n 
A T - (X 1 A P ( 2 )^ 
and l e t e 1 be d e f i n e d as a P( 1) row vector w i t h the 
number one i n every p o s i t i o n and be defi n e d as a 
P(2) row v e c t o r w i t h the number one i n every p o s i t i o n . 
Thus, one expresses the r e s t r i c t e d master problem more 
s u c c i n t l y as: 
X^, X 2 max W ] ^ i + W 2 A 2 
s . t . L, X., + L„X„ ^ a 1 1 "2 2 
e 1A 1 = 1 
e 2X 2 = 1 
X 1 X 2 >, 0 
I n order t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the set of a l l conceivable 
reduced cost c o e f f i c i e n t s and those which are communicated 
t o the c e n t r a l headquarters l e t : 
= ( L j , , , ) 
W l = ( TV V W l ' } 
represent the reduced cost c o e f f i c i e n t s communicated by 
d i v i s i o n one's manager at i t e r a t i o n s 1, 2, 3, 
12 4. 
In order t o analyse d e t e r m m i s t i c a l l y how d i v i s i o n 
one's manager could o p t i m a l l y cheat, i t i s assumed t h a t the 
manager knows the o v e r a l l problem D and t h a t the c e n t r a l 
headquarters i s using Dantzig Wolfe decomposition t o t r y 
and solve the problem. For the moment, i t i s assumed t h a t 
the i t e r a t i v e process of r e s o l u t i o n w i l l be continued u n t i l 
an o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n t o C has been determined. I n a d d i t i o n , 
o 
i t i s assumed t h a t d i v i s i o n two's manager does not wish t o 
cheat. Jennergren (1971) a l s o assumes t h a t d i v i s i o n one's 
manager w i l l not be able t o cheat undetected by appealing 
t o the argument t h a t u n c e r t a i n t y i n f o r e c a s t i n g has caused 
the discrepancy between fo r e c a s t e d and a c t u a l values. That 
i s , he assumes no e x t e r n a l environmental u n c e r t a i n t y and, 
i n so doing, strengthens the case f o r arguing t h a t mis-
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n can take place s u c c e s s f u l l y , i f he can show 
t h a t , under these more r e s t r i c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , d i v i s i o n s can 
s t i l l cheat. Thus, the cheating (mis r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) w i l l 
be i n the s p i r i t o f the examples i n which d i v i s i o n a l managers 
had no i n c e n t i v e t o i n t r o d u c e new more e f f i c i e n t techniques i n 
the H i r s h l e i f e r procedure, t h a t i s the cheating involves 
" h i d i n g " some f e a s i b l e p r o d u c t i o n schemes. 
The d i v i s i o n a l manager i s assumed t o be able t o b e n e f i t 
from m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by being able t o e x p l o i t i n f o r m a t i o n 
about c o n s t r a i n t s faced by the other d i v i s i o n and the c e n t r a l 
headquarters. Thus, given the assumption t h a t d i v i s i o n 
one's manager knows the form of D o, which the c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r s faces, i n order t o implement any t r a n s f e r p r i c e and 
associated a l l o c a t i o n (and, hence, l e v e l of compensation), the 
manager must ensure t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n he/she communicates 
s a t i s f i e s the c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t s p e c i f y D , t h a t i s : 
125. 
L l Xl + L 2 A 2 * 3 ( i ) 
e 1X 2 = 1 ( i i ) 
e 2A 2 = 1 ( i i i ) 
With regard t o the dimension of the v a r i a b l e s 
communicated by d i v i s i o n one's manager and associated 
v a r i a b l e s , t h i s w i l l depend on the number of i t e r a t i o n s 
i t takes before the c e n t r a l headquarters t h i n k s they have 
determined the o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n . Thus, i f Z i t e r a t i o n s 
are r e q u i r e d L^, e^, A^ would be Z row v e c t o r s . 
I n order f o r the c e n t r a l headquarters t o t h i n k they 
do not need t o c a r r y out any f u r t h e r i t e r a t i o n s , the 
o p t i m a l i t y c o n d i t i o n s f o r the r e s t r i c t e d master problem 
must be s a t i s f i e d , t h a t i s : 
TTL. + cue, 1 W. .. , 1 1 1 1 ( I V ) 
FL ? + a 2 e 2 ^ W2 (v) 
The f i r s t t h ree c o n s t r a i n t s may be c a l l e d the pri m a l 
f e a s i b i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s f o r D o and the next two are the 
dual f e a s i b i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s . I n a d d i t i o n t o these 
r e l a t i o n s , one can determine which c o n s t r a i n t s are bind i n g 
i n t he p r i m a l problem. The p r i n c i p l e of Complementary 
Slackness shows t h a t , i f a c o n s t r a i n t i s non-binding at the 
o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n , then the corresponding dual v a r i a b l e must 
126. 
be zero. Expressed i n another f a s h i o n , the p r i n c i p l e 
means t h a t , i f the i slack v a r i a b l e f o r c o n s t r a i n t i 
t h 
i n the p r i m a l problem i s not zero, then the i dual 
v a r i a b l e must be zero, t h a t i s the dual p r i c e of the i ^ 
i n p u t (resource) i s zero at t h a t l e v e l of operations. 
Thus, the complementary slackness c o n d i t i o n s f o r the above 
i n e o u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s are: 
F ( L 1 A 1 + L 2 * 2 - a) = 0 ( v i ) 
X 1 ( W 1 " n L l ~ °Liei) = 0 ( V ± i ) 
X 2(w 2 - T T L 2 - a 2 e 2 ) = 0 ( v i i i ) 
The s i g n r e s t r i c t i o n s f o r optimal weightings and t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e are t h a t they must be p o s i t i v e however the dual p r i c e s 
associated w i t h the c o n s t r a i n t s ( i i ) and ( i i i ) are un-
34 
r e s t r i c t e d i n s i g n since the c o n s t r a i n t s are e q u a l i t i e s , 
t h a t i s : 
^ 1 ' ^2' ^ > 0, ot^, a 2: no si g n r e s t r i c t i o n 
where and a 2 are s c a l a r s 
F i n a l l y , since the model assumes no e x t e r n a l u n c e r t a i n t y 
and since the c e n t r a l headquarters can determine how much 
of the corporate resource each d i v i s i o n should use and the 
associated d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t , each d i v i s i o n must carry out 
the operations i n d i c a t e d by the o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n . Otherwise, 
the c e n t r a l headquarters would r e a l i s e any discrepancy could 
o n l y be due t o cheati n g . Thus the f i n a l o p t i m a l cheating 
12 7. 
c o n s t r a i n t r e q u i r e s t h a t a plan^operations chosen by the 
( c e n t r a l headquarters) optimal s o l u t i o n can a c t u a l l y be 
implemented e x a c t l y by d i v i s i o n one's manager, t h a t i s ; 
/N A 
L i x i = L i x i ' x i w i ~ - n L i A 1 = xiwi " n**!*! 
f o r someX^ such t h a t e^X^ = 1 and X^  >, 0 
( i x ) 
One would expect the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n f o r d i v i s i o n .one's 
opt i m a l c h e a t i n g problem t o be: 
A A A 
T-'Y , W 1 / X 1 ' X2 ' ^  ' a l ' a 2 raax W 1 X 1 ~ ^ L i ^ i 
However, Jennergren (1971) notes t h a t degenerate s o l u t i o n s 
(where t h e r e mav be many optimal s o l u t i o n s t o the r e s t r i c t e d 
master problem)can o f t e n occur. I t i s l i k e l y t h a t 
d i f f e r e n t o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n s w i l l g i v e r i s e t o d i f f e r e n t 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s and b e n e f i t s from cheat i n g . Given our 
e a r l i e r assumptions, d i v i s i o n one's manager w i l l also be 
aware o f t h i s and so may wish t o r e s t r i c t communications 
so t h a t c e r t a i n degenerate s o l u t i o n s w i t h low or no 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r cheating are not l o c a t e d . That i s , 
d i v i s i o n one's manager w i l l wish t o consider a l l the values 
A A A /N Ss /*S 
L l '^1 '*1 ' X2 ' ^ ' a i '°"> m ^ n w i * i ~ ^ L i ^ -
and then choose the g r e a t e s t of these values t o determine 
what t o communicate. However, the maximum w i t h respect to 
A A 
Lj, and may not be a t t a i n e d because of the degeneracy 
problem so i n s t e a d one would look f o r the l e a s t upper bound 
c a l l e d the supremum. Thus, d i v i s i o n one's o p t i m a l cheat-
ing problem i s : 
1 28. 
r ti \ \ n SUPREMUM (miniW, A. - nL,A,}) 1' 1' 1' 2' n ' a i ' a t 1 1 1 1 
I n order t o understand how d i v i s i o n one's manager 
•\ •v 
w i l l go about cheating suppose t h a t L°, Vv^ , A°,A °, 11°, 
ct°, a 2 were t o c o n s t i t u t e an optimal s o l u t i o n t o the 
o p t i m a l cheating problem. I t must be t h a t X^r A° are 
o p t i m a l i n the r e s t r i c t e d master problem 
^ 0 o ^ o ^ 
X^, X ^  max X^ + w 2^2 
s . t . + L2^2 ^ a 
G 1 A 1 = l f e2*2 = 1 ' X l ^ °' X2 ^ ° 
That i s the s t r a t e g y of the cheating d i v i s i o n i s t o 
determine the r e s t r i c t e d master problem which gives the 
h i g h e s t d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t . To i l l u s t r a t e , suppose the 
o v e r a l l corporate problem D i s ; 
max 3 X n + 2X 2 1 + 3X 1 2 + X 2 2 
s . t . 2 X n + X 2 1 + X 1 2 + X 2 2 « 5 
( X 1 1 ' X 2 1 ) c X l = { ( X 1 1 ' X 2 1 ) I X l l + X 2 1 * 2 ' 
X l l * °' X 2 1 * 0 } 
^ X12 , X22 ^  e X 2 = ^ ^ X12' X22^ ^ X12 + 2 X 2 2 ^ ^' 
x 1 2 » o, x 2 2 >, 0} 
129 . 
Th.i s problem has unique o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n 
= 1, ^21 = ^' X 1 2 = 2 ' X 2 2 = ^ 
w i t h corporate p r o f i t of 11 u n i t s and t r a n s f e r p r i c e of 
1 u n i t , i m p u t i n g p r o f i t of 2 u n i t s t o d i v i s i o n one. 
I n t h i s problem, the extreme p o i n t s of d i v i s i o n one's 
1 2 p r i v a t e c o n s t r a i n t set are X^ = ( 0 , 0 ) , X^ = (2 , 0 ) , 
X^ = ( 0 , 2 ) . Suppose d i v i s i o n one's manager chooses t o 
2 
keep extreme p o i n t X.^  s e c r e t . The o v e r a l l problem which 
w i l l then be solved by Dantzig Wolfe decomposition would 
be : 
max 3X i ; L + 2 X 2 1 + 3 X 1 2 + X 2 2 
s . t . 2 X X 1 + X 2 1 + X 1 2 + X 2 2 .< 5 
( X 1 1 , X 2 1 ) eX^ = I lxn ' X 2 l ' I ^ X H ' X21^ i s 3 c o n v e x 
combination of (0,0) and (0,2)} 
( X 1 2 , X 2 2 ) E X 2 = M X 1 2 , X 2 2 ) | X 1 2 + 2 X 2 2 « 2, 
x 1 2 > o, x 2 2 >. 0} 
This problem has the unique o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n 
X l l = °' X 2 1 = 2 ' X 1 2 = 2 ' X 2 2 = 0 
w i t h corporate p r o f i t of 10 u n i t s , zero t r a n s f e r p r i c e imputing 
p r o f i t of 4 u n i t s t o d i v i s i o n one. 
i.j.o. 
The optimal cheating problem def i n e d above i s a 
very d i f f i c u l t one mathematically. However, the above 
example i l l u s t r a t e s how a d i v i s i o n can use an "approxi-
mate" s o l u t i o n procedure f o r the o p t i m a l cheating problem. 
This "approximate" s o l u t i o n procedure involves determin-
i n g a subset of a l l the d i v i s i o n a l extreme p o i n t s which 
are t o be hidden and not communicated. 
There are two p a r t i c u l a r l y questionable assumptions 
made i n the above di s c u s s i o n on o p t i m a l cheating. F i r s t 
a l l , i t i s u n r e a l i s t i c t o assume t h a t a d i v i s i o n a l manager 
w i l l have f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n about the o v e r a l l corporate 
problem, e s p e c i a l l y when one i s assuming decomposition 
a n a l y s i s i s being used, because the c e n t r a l headquarters 
onl v has l i m i t e d i n f o r m a t i o n . Secondly, i n p r a c t i c e , the 
i t e r a t i v e s o l u t i o n procedure w i l l be terminated a f t e r only 
a few i t e r a t i o n s - most l i k e l y b e f o r e the o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n 
i s determined. I n t h i s case, an o p t i m a l cheating problem 
can not be s p e c i f i e d . However, t h i s i s not t o say t h a t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l n ot be able t o s t i l l cheat p r o f i t -
a b l y . Jemmergren and M u l l e r (197 3) conducted a s i m u l a t i o n 
studv o f cheating w i t h the Dantzig Wolfe Decomposition 
procedure. They terminated i t e r a t i o n s before o p t i m a l i t y 
and assumed t h a t d i v i s i o n i ' s manager adopted the "approxi-
mate" cheating s t r a t e g y of communicating 
L. = B.L. l 1 i 
0 4 B . < 1 
131 . 
where i s c a l l e d the cheating parameter. This i m p l i e s 
t h a t d i v i s i o n i ' s manager i s h i d i n g p a r t of the d i v i s i o n ' s 
f e a s i b l e p r o d u c t i o n area and w i l l , hence, be i n e f f e c t 
communicating a lower demand f o r the corporate resource than 
i f B^ = 1. I n t h e i r s i m u l a t i o n study, they assumed a 
c e n t r a l headquarters and two d i v i s i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s and 
allowed both d i v i s i o n s t o cheat simultaneously d e f i n i n g 
l i a h t cheating as a s i t u a t i o n where B^ + B^ >s 1.6. Jennergren 
and M u l l e r (1973) found t h a t : 
" L i g h t cheating under the Dantzig-Wolfe r u l e i n two 
cases r e s u l t s i n r a t h e r small improvements i n l o c a l 
p r o f i t s f o r one or both d i v i s i o n s I n some cases, 
l i g h t cheating under the Dantzig-Wolfe r u l e even 
r e s u l t s i n small decreases i n l o c a l p r o f i t s f o r one 
or both d i v i s i o n s However, f a i r l y l a r g e improve-
ments i n l o c a l p r o f i t s can be a t t a i n e d under the 
Dantzig-Wolfe r u l e through heavier d i v i s i o n a l cheat-
i n g " . 
Thus, even i n these more r e a l i s t i c cases, i t seems t h a t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l be able t o form an "approximate" 
cheating s t r a t e g y q u i t e e a s i l y and w i l l probably gain from 
such c h e a t i n g , dependent on the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . 
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3.4.3 The G e n e r a l i t y of the existence of i n c e n t i v e s 
t o misrepresent. 
Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 have demonstrated t h a t , i n 
the two t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures presented, there 
e x i s t s a c l e a r i n c e n t i v e f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers t o mis-
represent the f a c t s , t h a t they communicate t o the c e n t r a l 
headquarters. Also, the discussions have shown t h a t 
such cheating w i l l be r e l a t i v e l y easy t o carry out and 
l i k e l y t o be q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l . C l e a r l y t h i s type of 
r e s u l t i s of fundamental importance f o r Transfer P r i c i n g 
Theory as i t negates many of the advantages t h a t t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g i s purported t o convey i n a d e c e n t r a l i z e d organiza-
t i o n . 
However, the above a n a l y s i s o n l y e s t a b l i s h e s the 
p o t e n t i a l prevalence of the m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem f o r 
two t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures. There have been many 
other t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures proposed, however, and 
one may wish t o argue t h e r e f o r e t h a t , before one can 
e s t a b l i s h t h a t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a r e l a t i v e l y pervasive 
problem, one must determine whether a l l the other proposed 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures s u f f e r from t h i s problem. 
However, t h i s lengthy process i s unnecessary. I n 
Chapter 4, a C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n Theorem w i l l be presented 
which e s t a b l i s h e s 
a set o f r u l e s which d e f i n e the class of t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
procedures f o r which d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l not have an 
i n c e n t i v e t o misrepresent the f a c t s . Given t h i s theorem 
t h e n , one can study whether any a r b i t r a r i l y proposed t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedure s a t i s f i e s the r u l e s of the theorem. I f 
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not then, m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . 
I t t urns out t h a t the C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n Theorem d e f i n e s a 
r e l a t i v e l y narrow class o f p o t e n t i a l procedures t h a t 
would be i n c e n t i v e compatible (managers having no i n c e n t i v e 
t o m i s r e p r e s e n t ) . 
Refore p r e s e n t i n g the C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n Theorem, how-
ever, i t w i l l be i n s t r u c t i v e t o end t h i s chapter by con-
s i d e r i n g the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure proposed by Ronen 
and Mckinney (1970) which was the f i r s t s e r i o u s , but un-
s u c c e s s f u l , attempt t o deal w i t h the problem of the i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedures. 
1.4.4 The Ronen and Mckinney tax subsidy t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g procedure. 
Ronen and Mckinney (1970) base t h e i r approach 
i m p l i c i t l y on the r e s u l t s of a n a l y s i s of the type presented 
i n Fection 3.4.1. That i s , they i d e n t i f y the major reason 
whv d i v i s i o n a l managers have i n c e n t i v e s t o cheat as a r i s -
i n g because of the e x i s t e n c e of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e monop-
s o n l s t i c or m o n o p o l i s t i c p o s i t i o n s , w i t h regard t o the 
i n t e r m e d i a t e product. They argue t h a t , i n order t o achieve 
i n c e n t i v e compatible t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g , one should a l l o w the 
d i v i s i o n a l managers t o f r e e l y and openly e x e r t and r e a l i z e 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e monopsonistic and m o n o p o l i s t i c powers 
and, i n so doing, achieve i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y . However, 
t h i s i s a t the cost of d i s s e r t i n g the goal of having a 
" p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e " t r a n s f e r p r i c e co-ordinate the 
o p e r a t i n g plans of the d i v i s i o n s . Note, though, t h e i r 
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procedure does implement an output of the intermediate 
product i d e n t i c a l t o the o u t p u t t h a t would be achieved 
under " p e r f e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e " t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g , i f 
i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y were not a problem, as assumed i n 
the F i r s h l e i f e r a n a l y s i s . 
I n the Ronen and Mckinney procedure, the c e n t r a l head-
qua r t e r s communicates a set of t r a n s f e r p r i c e s t o the 
manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager and asks the manager t o 
determine the output of the i n t e r m e d i a t e product t h a t the 
manager would be prepared t o produce at each c o n s t i t u e n t 
3 5 
p r i c e . Hence, assuming no e x t e r n a l market f o r the 
i n t e r m e d i a t e product, the c e n t r a l headquarters i s e f f e c t -
i v e l y r e q u i r i n g the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager t o 
communicate the d i v i s i o n ' s marginal cost schedule C'(q) . 
The c e n t r a l headquarters then uses the above generated 
data t o d e r i v e the average cost curve f o r the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n , which w i l l be denoted ftC(q). Ronen and McKinney 
araue t h a t t h i s i s p o s s i b l e because assuming the manufactur-
i n g d i v i s i o n ' s t o t a l cost f u n c t i o n , denoted C(q) has v a r i a b l e 
and f i x e d components r e s p e c t i v e l y so t h a t i t can be represented 
as! 
C(q) = 0 (q) + b 
then C (q) / 
also J0 (q) dq = 0 (q) + b 
q C(q) 
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I f i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o conceive the c e n t r a l 
t 
headquarters i n t e g r a t i n g the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s 
marqinal c o s t schedule, there i s an analogous but eq u i v a l e n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . From the standard d e f i n i t i o n o f the 
ope r a t i o n o f i n t e g r a t i o n , we know t h a t i t gives us the 




need do i s determine the area under the curve between o and 
q^ and d i v i d e t h i s by q^ t o give the average c o s t a t output 
q^ f o r the manufacturing d i v i s i o n . 
However, note there i s a problem w i t h Ronen and ^ 
McKinney's argument. Loeb (1975) p o i n t s out t h a t , when 
c a l c u l a t i n g , f o r example, an average cost schedule from a 
marginal c o s t schedule, the only schedule t h a t can be 
derived by i n t e g r a t i o n i s the average v a r i a b l e cost curve 
since 
V(q)dq = 0(q) + b 
where b i s a constant not s p e c i f i e d by the marginal cost 
curve. Thus, f o r the Ronen and Mckinney procedure t o be 
o p e r a t i o n a l , the c e n t r a l headquarters must possess informa-
t i o n on the f i x e d costs f o r a d i v i s i o n beforehand. 
P o s s i b l y c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h i t s communications w i t h 
the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager, the c e n t r a l head-
cruarters communicates a set of p rospective t r a n s f e r p r i c e s 
to the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager and asks the 
manager t o i n d i c a t e at how much of the i n t e r m e d i a t e 
product would be demanded by the manager at each c o n s t i t u e n t 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e . Thus, w i t h no e x t e r n a l market f o r the 
i n t e r m e d i a t e product, the c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l be 
c o l l e c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n on the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s net 
marginal revenue schedule D'(q) . As above, but w i t h some 
caveat assuming t h a t f i x e d net revenue i s known, the 
c e n t r a l headquarters derives the net average revenue 
schedule AD(q) f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n , t h a t i s l e t 
R(q) = 6(q) , R' (q) = 6 '(q) 
Cptq) = e(q) + d, CD'(q) = e'(q) 
/ / / 
so D (q) = 6 (q) - e (q) 
AD(q) = J&'lq) - e'(qp dq 
q 
6(g) - e(g) - d 
q 
Next the c e n t r a l headquarters communicates the ^C(q) 
schedule t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager, where t h i s 
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schedule represents the inverse supply schedule f o r the 
i n t e r m e d i a t e product t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n faces. 
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T'hat i s , f o r any given demand f o r the intermediate p r o d u c t , 
where t h a t o u t p u t cuts the AC(q) schedule determines the 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e f o r t h a t l e v e l of t r a n s f e r of the i n t e r -
mediate product. Thus, the schedule can be denoted P(q) 
t o show e x p l i c i t l y t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . Concurrently, the 
c e n t r a l headquarters communicates the ,D(q) schedule t o 
the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager. This schedule w i l l 
represent the inverse demand schedule f o r the i n t e r m e d i a t e 
product t h a t the manufacturing d i v i s i o n faces. That i s , 
f o r any given supply of the in t e r m e d i a t e product, the 
schedule determines the t r a n s f e r p r i c e t h a t the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n w i l l be paid f o r the t r a n s f e r . Again t o show 
e x p l i c i t l y t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , the schedule s h a l l be denoted 
P* (q) . At t h i s stage, one may wonder i f the c e n t r a l head-
qua r t e r s might encounter d i f f i c u l t i e s i n ensuring t h a t the 
Q u a n t i t i e s s u p p l i e d and demanded are i d e n t i c a l . However, 
t h i s i s not a problem and i t i s easy t o show t h a t both 
d i v i s i o n s w i l l , i n f a c t , agree on a common output q . This 
i s because the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager w i l l choose 
the output q which s a t i s f i e s the f i r s t order c o n d i t i o n s . 
wh i l e the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n w i l l s i m i l a r l y choose the 
output Q t h a t s a t i s f i e s 
m 
C'(0 = D / ( V 
D ( q D ) = C ( q r J D 
t h a t i s / / % = qD q 
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Once the l e v e l of output i s determined as q by both 
d i v i s i o n s , the c e n t r a l headquarters charges the d i s t r i b u -
t i o n d i v i s i o n P(q ) per u n i t f o r the t r a n s f e r r e d i n t e r -
mediate product and c r e d i t s the manufacturing d i v i s i o n w i t h 
p*(q ) per u n i t f o r the t r a n s f e r s . This c r e d i t i s made up 
of the payment from the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n and a subsidy 
from the c e n t r a l headquarters of 
{P*(q ) - P(q ) } q when P*(q ) > P(q ) 
i f P*(q ) < P(q ) the subsidy becomes negative and the manu-
f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n i s being taxed. 
To demonstrate the procedure, consider the f o l l o w i n g 
example i l l u s t r a t e d by Figure 8 where, f o r i n s t a n c e , one i s 
assuming the f i n a l product i s s o l d on an i m p e r f e c t market. 
A f t e r the above s p e c i f i e d communications have taken place, 
the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s manager w i l l choose t o produce 
the o u t p u t of the i n t e r m e d i a t e product a t which D '(q) = C'(g) , 
a f t e r d e r i v i n g the D^(q) schedule from the AD(q) schedule 
communicated by the c e n t r a l headquarters. Thus f o r 
t r a n s f e r r i n g q of the i n termediate product, the manufactur-
i n g d i v i s i o n knows i t w i l l be c r e d i t e d w i t h t per u n i t of 
m ^ 
the i n t e r m e d i a t e product. S i m i l a r l y , using the communicated 
AC(q) schedule, the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager can d e r i v e 
the C ''(q) schedule and determine the output f o r which 
D / ( q ) « c '(q) . For t h i s supply q ' of the i n t e r m e d i a t e 
p r o d u c t , the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n r e a l i s e s i t w i l l have 





The shaded area of Figure 8 thus represents the amount 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n w i l l pay to the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n for the supply of q of the intermediate product. 
The subsidy paid by the central headquarters to the 
manufacturing d i v i s i o n i s thus represented by the area 
(tm " V*'-
The advantages of Ronen and McKinney procedure then 
seems to be th a t the l e v e l of output q/ chosen by the 
di v i s i o n s i s once again the l e v e l of output of the i n t e r -
mediate product consistent with o v e r a l l corporate p r o f i t 
maximisation. I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s claimed that the system 
encourages t r u t h f u l communication by the d i v i s i o n a l managers 
(incentive c o m p a t i b i l i t y ) . 
The Ronen and Mckinney paper was an important develop-
ment i n transfer p r i c i n g theory as i t was the f i r s t paper 
to recognise why misrepresentation occurred^that attempted t o 
deal with t h i s problem systematically. However, i t has 
been proven by Groves and Loeb (1976) that the Ronen and 
Mckinney procedure i s not incentive compatible. Groves 
and Loeb argue t h a t , since the divisions are free to choose 
q^ and q D and, since the c e n t r a l headquarters i s committed 
to subsidising the manufacturing d i v i s i o n , there w i l l be 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r the d i v i s i o n s to game against the central 
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headquarters. Expressing t h i s more formally , Groves and 
Loeb (1976) note t h a t 
"While the j o i n t strategy of the two di v i s i o n s to 
report t r u t h f u l l y i s a Nash, non co-operative 
equil i b r i u m , i t i s not a dominant strategy i n the 
sense that other equilibriums e x i s t where divisions 
report u n t r u t h f u l l y but are both better o f f " . 
To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , Figure 9 depicts a 
s i t u a t i o n where both divisions game against the central 
headcruarters. In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , i t i s 
assumed the cheating strategy both d i v i s i o n s have chosen 
to adopt is:instead of communicating t h e i r true marginal 
schedules (C'^TRUE' ^ ^TRUE*' t h e v choose to communicate 
to the centr a l headquarters t h e i r true average schedules, 
claiming t h a t these are, i n f a c t , t h e i r marginal schedules. 
Thus, the communicated schedules can be denoted (C '(q) , 
GIVEN 
D / ( o ) G I V E N ) . The central headquarters then derives the 
f i c t i t i o u s average schedules denoted (ftC(q) C A L C , A D { < l ) C A L C ) 
and communicates these to the appropriate d i v i s i o n . As 
Fiqure 9 c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s , t h i s r e s u l t s i n an equilibrium 
s i t u a t i o n , because the amount the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n 
wants to buy i s QL (where D ' ( < 3 ) T R U E = C ' ( q ) G I V E N ) , which 
i s i d e n t i c a l to the amount the manufacturing d i v i s i o n wishes 
to supply (where C/{q)TR0E = D / ( q ) G I V E N ) . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , 
both d i v i s i o n s r e a l i s e greater p r o f i t s and t h i s leads to 
corporate suboptimization, because the extra subsidy the 
centre pays ABEF (when the d i v i s i o n s l i e ) i s greater than 
the extra p r o f i t generated by the two divi s i o n s achieving 
the greater output (QL - Q ) by l y i n g . 
1 -1 2. 
US.T 
•rw = ABT>6> TV,
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated t h a t , with two transfer 
p r i c i n g procedures, d i v i s i o n a l managers can report un-
t r u t h f u l l y to the central headquarters. One method of 
cheating involves "hiding"•production p o s s i b i l i t i e s . This 
can occur when a d i v i s i o n a l manager learns of a new 
technology f o r producing or s e l l i n g a product. The 
examples presented i n t h i s chapter show that d i v i s i o n a l 
managers may have an incentive not to report (hide) these 
findings. 
The problem also arises when d i v i s i o n a l managers are 
asked to forecast the value of uncertain v a r i a b l e s , which 
they have expert knowledge of. When the forecasts a f f e c t 
how t r a n s f e r prices w i l l be set and, hence, how d i v i s i o n a l 
managers are compensated, d i v i s i o n a l managers can c l e a r l y 
gain by reporting u n t r u t h f u l forecasts, i n order t o bias 
transfer prices i n t h e i r favour. When the actual values 
of the exante uncertain variables are r e a l i s e d , the central 
headquarters w i l l not be able to detect whether d i v i s i o n a l 
managers have l i e d or not. This i s because any difference 
between forecasted and realised values could have been due 
to a number of fa c t o r s . For instance, the variance could 
arise from poor forecasting, chance, l y i n g or a combination 
of a l l these f a c t o r s . 
I f such d i v i s i o n a l cheating occurs, a l l of the problems 
l i s t e d at the beginning of Section 3.4 arise, when the 
central headquarters attempts to implement con t r o l l e d de-
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n by establishing a transfer p r i c i n g procedure. 
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The ro l e of t h i s thesis from here on w i l l , therefore, 
be to attempt to consider or design transfer p r i c i n g 
procedures which ensure that d i v i s i o n a l managers have no 
incentive to l i e . 
A P P B N J D I X 1 
PROOF; 
For any set of vectors x ieX i 
f ± i x V ~ u j g j i ( x i } » f i ( x i } - u j g j i ( x i ) ( 1 0 ) 
f o r a l l 1 = 1 , n by condition (8). 
Condition (9) ensures that 
n 
u. (b. - r g . . (x*)) = 0 (11) 
i = l J X 1 
f o r a l l j = 1,.. . .m 
N 
since e i t h e r u. = O or b. - I g..(x*) = 0 
3 3 i = 1 y 3 i v i ' 
Thus f o r a l l x i s a t i s f y i n g (7) 
n n 
u.(b. - I g i i ^ ) ) >, u (b. - I g,.(x*)) (12) 
J 3 i = l 3 3 3 i = l 3 1 x 
Fumming (10) over a l l i yields 
n n m 
I f . (x*) - r I u.g. . (x*) >, Z f. (x 
i = l 1 1 i = l j = l 3 3 1 1 i = l 1 
n n  n n m 
,) - I I 
i = l j = l 
u j ^ j i ( x i ^ (13) 
Summinq (12) over a l l j yields 
m n m m n m 
T u .b. - T I u.g,.(x.) ^ Z u .b - Z Z u g (x*) (14) 
j = l 1 11 i = l j = l 3 3 1 1 j = l 3 3 i = 1 j = 1 3 Di i 
which i s equivalent to 
m n m m n m / 
E u .b + r Eu.g..(x*) > E u.b + E Eu.g..(x.) (14) 
j = l 3 3 i = l j = l 3 3 1 1 j = l 3 3 i = l j = l 3 3 1 1 
/ 
Adding 13 to (14) yields , 
n in n m 
E f (x*) + E u.b. ^ E f. (x.) + E u.b. (15) 
i = l 1 1 j = l i = l 1 1 j = l 3 3 
implving the desired r e s u l t Q.E.D. 
f\PP£N^\yL 2 
PPOOF: 
(a) Bv the Kuhn Tucher Saddlepoint Theorem, there 
i s a u* > 0 such tha t x* and u* co n s t i t u t e a saddlepoint 
of the Lagrangian of D o > Hence, by the f i r s t i nequality 
of (1R) f o r a l l x ±e X± 
n m n m n 
I f . ( x ) + E u*b. - E E u*g. (x.) < E f . ( x * ) + 
i = l 1 1 j = l 3 3 i = l j = l 3 3 1 1 i = l 1 1 
m n m 
j 
Z u*b - E E u*g (x*) (19) 
j = l - 3 i = l i = l 3 3 
m substraction of E u*b. from (19) y i e l d s 
j = l 3 3 
n n m n n m 
E f . (x. ) -
i= ] 1=1 3 = 1 J J 1 = 1 1 = 1 :=i J J 
which bv (8) holds for a l l x^X.^, i f and only i f , x* 
solves a l l f o r i = l , . . . . n f o r u = u* . 
(b) Any set of vectors x^ t h a t , f o r u = u*, solve 
D o by (a) also solve a l l the which possess unique 
solutions x* . Hence, for a l l i = l , . . . . n , x^ = x* Q.E.D, 
3 4 7-
PROOF: 
By proposition 3.2(a) a s o l u t i o n x* to D.^  e x i s t s . 
Let there be another solution x.eX. and denote x.= t x * 
i l i x 
+ ( l - t j x . ^ where 0 < t < 1". By s t r i c t convexity 
x i £ X i * I n e i t n e r °f t n e cases (a) or (b), the maximand 
m 
Z = f . ( x . ) - T u.g..(x.) i n (8) i s s t r i c t l y concave as 
j = l 3 3 1 
a non-neqative l i n e a r combination of concave functions of 
which at least one with a p o s i t i v e weight i s s t r i c t , 
vence, 7, (x.) > t z ( x * ) + (l-t)Z(x..) = Z(x*) which i s a 
cont r a d i c t i o n . 
1 p . 
1. For instance, Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974), Thomas 
(1980) and Tomkins (1973). 
?. This environment w i l l be assumed when discussing a l l 
other procedures, unless otherwise stated. 
^ . F i r s h l e i f e r 1 s (1957) 'exact presentation i s s l i g h t l y 
d i f f e r e n t from the presentation here, 
A. Thus, the marginal revenue schedule i s downward 
slopinq. I n the case of a p e r f e c t l y competitive market 
^or the f i n a l product, the schedule would be h o r i z o n t a l . 
However, f o r the fo l l o w i n g procedure, i t i s not c r u c i a l 
which one of the two assumptions one makes. I n a d d i t i o n , 
F i r s h l e i f e r does not make e x p l i c i t any assumptions about 
the convexity or concavity of the schedules. However, 
t h i s issue w i l l be considered i n more d e t a i l s h o r t l y . 
5. H i r s h l e i f e r (1957). 
£. Computational procedures, such as the compact inverse 
method which have no such organizational i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
are not discussed. For a discussion of the compact inverse 
procedure see Lasdon (1970) . 
n. As developed by Jennergren (1976). 
ft. For Section 3.3 the assumption of only two d i v i s i o n s i s 
relaxed. The dimensions of the vectors and matricies here 
w i l l be f u l l y specified l a t e r when each structure i s d i s -
cussed i n t u r n . They are presented here only t o demonstrate 
aenerallv that a s p e c i f i c problem D may take a number of 
•Forms . 
9. More generally, decomposition i s the act of p a r t i t i o n i n g 
the o v e r a l l problem D i n t o a m u l t i l e v e l hierarchy. 
10. The Dantzig and Wolfe procedure can also be used to 
solve many other problems of d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e . The 
reason a t t e n t i o n i s being l i m i t e d to t h i s structure i s 
because i t has a s p e c i f i c organizational i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
11. This theorem has not-been proven as i t i s a commonly 
used theorem i n management accounting when linear pro-
gramming i s studied. However, a detailed discussion can 
be found i n Rockafellar (1970), Sections 18 and 19, for 
instance. 
12. This condition i s e a s i l y derivable from the Lagrangion 
of D 
o 
N P (D ) 
L(TT,ct) = -na + I Jmax( E (w? - TIL? - ct)X?)} + 
j = l p=l 3 3 3 
T 'max( Y (w. - TIL.)<5.)} 
j = l r = l 3 3 3 
s s 
I f (w_. + TIL.. - a) > 0 i s an, as yet, unconsidered 
extreme point s, = 0^ the value of the Lagrangian 
could be increased by g i v i n g some "weight" to t h i s extreme 
point i n the r e s t r i c t e d master problem. 
13. Since no constraint i s set of the extreme ray weights 
*r 
14. Assuming there are no pathological degeneracy cases. 
15. Again, as t h i s i s a commonly used r e s u l t , i t i s not 
proven here. However, a de t a i l e d discussion can be found 
i n Kolman and Beck (1980), Section 3.1. Also note here 
that the dual price II i n Note 12 i s being denoted by u. 
ISO 
16. Tn a d d i t i o n , t r a n s f e r prices may f a i l to d i r e c t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers c o r r e c t l y , i f the corporate optimal 
solution l i e s i n t e r i o r to the d i v i s i o n a l feasible region 
as discussed by Baumol and Fabian (1964), page 16. 
1~> . The o p t i m a l i t y c r i t e r i o n to decide whether or not 
to add new feasible points to the r e s t r i c t e d master 
problem must be applied. See Hass (1968), pp. B - 318. 
1R. Pee Fekine (19 63) for instance. 
19. F e a s i b i l i t y can be assured by adding constraints of 
~ r " r 
the form n^a± + n i b^ > 0 when appropriate. 
?0. The general economic p r i n c i p l e of requiring equal 
marginal retur n of a resource i n a l t e r n a t i v e uses i s a 
s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r an optimal a l l o c a t i o n , but not 
a necessary condition. Freeland and Moore (1977) 
demonstrated t h a t , before equal marginal returns are 
achieved i n an i t e r a t i v e algorithm, some of the d i v i s i o n a l 
problems are l i k e l y t o become degenerate, so that o p t i m a l i t y 
conditions f o r these algorithms are more involved than the 
usual marginal returns condition. 
71. That i s , extreme ray solutions of the dual d i v i s i o n a l 
problem. 
77. Tn f a c t , the Benders (1962) resource d i r e c t i v e algorithm, 
which was designed to function i n special types of non l i n e a r 
environments, preceded the Tenkate algorithm. 
73. Fee, for instance, Heal (1973). 
151. 
? 4. Note, however, that I do not draw the same conclusion 
as Kanodia. 
?5. Kanodia also assumed that markets external to the 
fi r m were incomplete i n the Arrow-Debreu sense, that i s , 
the f i r m can not d i v e r s i f y away a l l i t s r i s k by making 
contingent contracts i n external markets. 
?6. Note Kanodia does not make t h i s assumption. He 
assumes tha t an objective commonly known p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n e x i s t s . 
? 7. I t i s assumed tha t a d i v i s i o n a l manager's only s i g -
n i f i c a n t source of income i s compensation received from 
the corporation and th a t they can't s e l l r i s k y s e c u r i t i e s 
i n c a p i t a l markets which represent claims to t h i s income. 
Pence, one can ignore p o r t f o l i o opportunities i n external 
t h a t 
markets and assume/divisional managers wish to maximise 
the expected u t i l i t y derived from d i v i s i o n a l compensation. 
?«. As presented i n Raiffa (1968), page 211. 
?9. Note there are a few special cases i n which members' 
preferences and judgements can be combined i n t o group 
u t i l i t y and p r o b a b i l i t y functions. See Wilson (1968) 
^or instance. 
Assume d i v i s i o n a l managerial compensation i s a positi v e 
l i n e a r function of d i v i s i o n a l income. 
"*1. Note that by more e f f i c i e n t I mean t h a t , at every 
l e v e l of output, the cost of production of the intermediate 
nroduct i s less. 
. The r e s u l t s of the following analysis are also readily 
aeneraliseable to the case of more than two d i v i s i o n s . In 
ad d i t i o n , i t i s assumed that the problem i s bounded so that 
extreme ray solutions need not be considered. 
152 . 
33. See, f o r instance, page 158, Kilman and Beck (1980). 
34. For an explanation of t h i s r e s u l t see page 148, 
Kfclman and Beck (19 80). 
35. Ronen and Mckinney also discuss s i t u a t i o n s under which 
t h i s assumption i s relaxed. 
36. Where the price paid depends on the quantity supplied. 
37. The concept of a Nash equilibrium w i l l be discussed 
i n some d e t a i l i n the following chapter. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THF GROVES AND LOEB MECHANISM AND A CHARACTERIZA-TION THEOREM 
4.1 Information Strategies 
The transfer p r i c i n g mechanisms discussed i n the 
review chapter were unsatisfactory because they were open 
to manipulation by the d i v i s i o n a l managers. By res-
ponding u n t r u t h f u l l y to the questions of the centre, 
d i v i s i o n a l managers could bias a transfer price i n t h e i r 
favour. 
Given the above argument, i t would seem useful , i f one 
could embed i n t o a transfer p r i c i n g mechanism (procedure) 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the s t r a t e g i c use of information. 
Subsequently, one could then attempt to design transfer 
p r i c i n g mechanisms which promoted d i v i s i o n a l managers to 
choose t r u t h t e l l i n g strategies. 
I n the decentralised corporate environment considered 
here d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l , i n general, not know the 
p r i v a t e constraints of other d i v i s i o n s and w i l l not be 
forming binding agreements with other d i v i s i o n s to share 
information', that i s , i t i s assumed there i s no preplay 
communication. These aspects mean that i t is appropriate 
to formulate the problem as non co-operative game. 
i n game theory 
However, i t i s not usually assumed/that the strategies of 
plavers i s the information they choose to communicate. 
Tn f a c t , the i m p l i c i t assumption of non co-operative game 
theory i s that each player has complete information about 
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the game. This assumption implies that each player 
knows the structure of the game, other players' u t i l i t y 
functions and the p r o b a b i l i t i e s that other players attach 
to playing certain strategies. Consequently, a game des-
c r i b i n g a decentralised transfer p r i c i n g mechanism i s one 
where each player has incomplete information. I n ce r t a i n 
circumstances, though, the incompleteness of information 
can be ignored. For instance, i n the s i t u a t i o n where 
a player can choose a strategy i r r e s p e c t i v e of the 
strategies chosen by other players, information about 
other players* u t i l i t y functions i s not of value. For 
the present, assuming t h i s special case holds., the problem of i n 
completeness of information can be ignored. The task 
now i s to formulate a non co-operative game which con-
ceptualises the decentralised transfer p r i c i n g process. 
I t seems reasonable to assume that the centre can 
specifv which variables i t requires d i v i s i o n s to communi-
cate. For instance, i t may require d i v i s i o n s to 
communicate price signals, demands or conditional p r o f i t 
functions, r e f l e c t i n g a di v i s i o n ' s willingness to pay for 
a common corporate resource"'". Thus, the centre can 
determine the language M i n which d i v i s i o n s communicate 
with the centre. Each element M"^  defines the i ^ 1 
d i v i s i o n a l message (strategy) space, so t h a t for the n 
d i v i s i o n s , the j o i n t message (strategy) space i s : 
M = MXX XMn 
1L5. 
S p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e game i n n o r m a l f o r m r e q u i r e s 
d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s e t o f p l a y e r s , t h e s t r a t e g y s p a c e 
and t h e p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s , t h a t i s : 
N = s e t o f p l a y e r s = number o f d i v i s i o n s 
M = j o i n t s t r a t e g y s p a c e = j o i n t message s p a c e = 
l a n g u a g e 
E = p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s = d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e s 
2 
I t i s assumed h e r e t h a t t h e c e n t r e i s a non p l a y i n g 
p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e game, f o l l o w i n g some r u l e o f 
b e h a v i o u r s u c h as t r y i n g t o a l l o c a t e c o r p o r a t e r e s o u r c e s 
so as t o m a x i m i s e o v e r a l l c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t g i v e n t h e 
m e s s a q e s ( s t r a t e g i e s ) o f t h e d i v i s i o n s . 
I n some c a s e s , i n o r d e r t o be a b l e t o d e s c r i b e w h i c h 
s t r a t e g y a g i v e n p l a y e r w i l l c h o o s e ^ i t i s n e c e s s a r y 
t o a s s i g n a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n t o a p l a y e r . T h i s i s 
b e c a u s e when t h e p l a y e r h a s some e x p e c t a t i o n a b o u t t h e 
s t r a t e g i e s t o be p l a y e d b y o t h e r a g e n t s , t h e p l a y e r ' s 
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s r i s k w i l l d e t e r m i n e w h i c h s t r a t e g y i s 
o c t i m a l , g i v e n p a r t i c u l a r e x p e c t a t i o n s . I f , h o w e v e r , 
t h e r e e x i s t s a s t r a t e g y s u c h t h a t no s u p e r i o r o u t c o m e 
c o u l d b e a t t a i n e d b y any o t h e r s t r a t e g y i n any e v e n t , t h e n 
t h e p l a y e r ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s and a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s r i s k w o u l d 
n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e o p t i m a l s t r a t e g y . 
G i v e n t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e game, t h e r e i s a l s o 
a n e e d t o c o n s i d e r w h a t i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s o l u t i o n 
( e q u i l i b r i u m ) c o n c e p t f o r t h e game. I n t h e f o l l o w i n g 
a n a l y s i s , i t w i l l be a p p r o p r i a t e t o c o n s i d e r t h r e e s o l u t i o n 
c o n c e p t s w h i c h w i l l now be p r e s e n t e d i n o r d e r 3 o f " s t r e n g t h " . 
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Nash F c r u i l i b r i u m : 
I n a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e some p l a y e r i e x p e c t s t h e o t h e r 
p l a v e r s t o c h o o s e s t r a t e g i e s (m^,....,,. m ^ ' m i + i ' • • • * m n ^ 
* 
t h e p l a y e r w i l l s e l e c t t h a t s t r a t e g y iru t h a t m a x i m i s e s 
h i s p a y o f f ( e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e ) , g i v e n h i s a n t i c i p a t i o n o f 
t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s ' b e h a v i o u r . T h u s , i f 
* * 
(m/m^) = (m^ , . . . . , I T K ,.. . .m ) 
t h 




E 1(m/m 1) > E^ (m) f o r a l l I I K E I ^ 
w h e r e m = (m, , m ) 
1 ' n 
H o w e v e r , i f t h e same d e g r e e o f r a t i o n a l i t y i s a t t r i b u t e d 
t o t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s , p l a y e r i w i l l e x p e c t t h e m t o f o l l o w 
t h e same d e c i s i o n r u l e . T h i s may l e a d t o an e x p e c t a t i o n a l 
c i r c l e , w i t h no s t a b l e s t r a t e g i e s . By s t a b l e i t i s m e a n t 
t h a t , i f e a c h p l a y e r i t e n t a t i v e l y a n n ounced a c o m m i t m e n t 
* 
t o a s t r a t e g y ITK , no p l a y e r w o u l d be i n d u c e d t o r e c o n s i d e r 
h i s c o m m i t m e n t on f i n d i n g o u t t h e c o m m i t m e n t s o f o t h e r 
p l a v e r s . T h e r e f o r e , o n l y i f a s t r a t e g y n - t u p l e m e x i s t s 
w h e r e 
* * 
F i (m ) >y E i ( m /m i) f o r a l l I I K C ! ^ and a l l i e N 
w i l l t h e e x p e c t a t i o n a l c i r c l e be b r o k e n . T h i s d e f i n e s a 
Nash e q u i l i b r i u m . T h a t i s , t h e messages c h o s e n b y p l a y e r s 
c o n s t i t u t e a Nash e q u i l i b r i u m i f no a g e n t c an u n i l a t e r a l l y 
i m p r o v e h i s p a y o f f as l o n g as o t h e r s do n o t c h a n g e t h e i r 
m e ssages. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i n many i n s t a n c e s , t h o u g h , t h e 
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Nash e q u i l i b r i u m may be n o n - u n i q u e . The i m p o r t a n c e o f 
t h i s ^ a c t i s t h a t , i f one w e r e t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r p l a y e r s 
w i l l t e l l t h e t r u t h s h o w i n g t h a t t r u t h t e l l i n g i s a Nash 
e q u i l i b r i u m s t r a t e g y , d o e s n o t e n s u r e t h a t p l a y e r s 
w i l l t e l l t h e t r u t h . F o r e x a m p l e , i f a p l a y e r s u s p e c t s 
t h a t a n o t h e r p l a y e r w i l l c h o o s e a s t r a t e g y o f l y i n g , i t 
may be i n h i s i n t e r e s t t o l i e as w e l l . T h a t i s , t h e r e may 
a l s o be a Nash e q u i l i b r i u m w h e r e a l l a g e n t s c h o o s e t o l i e . 
I n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t r u t h t e l l i n g b y a p l a y e r a c t i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l l y , r e q u i r e s t h e s t r o n g e r n o t i o n o f a d o m i n a n t 
s t r a t e g y e q u i l i b r i u m . 
D o m i n a n t S t r a t e g y E q u i l i b r i u m : 
A d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y e q u i l i b r i u m o c c u r s when t h e r e i s 
i ( a s t r a t e g y m.eM
1 f o r e v e r y i s u c h t h a t 
E i ( i n : > i c ' m i ) » V ^ i c ' V 
f o r a l l ro^j^eM and a l l m^eM* 
w h e r e I t ) r ) i C = ( m i t • • • • rm±-l ,m±+l'' ' ' 'mn^ 
T h a t i s , e a c h p l a y e r i h a s t h e same ( b e s t ) r e s p o n s e ITK no 
m a t t e r w h a t t h e r e s p o n s e m.. ( m , m . , , m . m ) 
^ > i e 1 ' ' i - l ' i + l ' n 
i s o f t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s . T h i s means t h a t , i f i t c a n be 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t r u t h i s a d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y f o r a l l 
p l a y e r s , i t f o l l o w s no p l a y e r a c t i n g a l o n e c a n make 
h i m s e l f b e t t e r o f f b y r e p o r t i n g u n t r u t h f u l l y . T h e r e 
may be p o s s i b i l i t i e s , t h o u g h , f o r a g r o u p o f p l a y e r s a c t i n g 
t o g e t h e r t o make t h e m s e l v e s b e t t e r o f f b y r e p o r t i n g u n -
t r u t h f u l l y , e v e n t h o u g h t r u t h i s a d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y when 
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t h e v a c t i n d i v i d u a l l y . T h e r e i s , h o w e v e r , an e q u i l i -
b r i u m c o n c e p t t h a t c an e n s u r e t h a t any g r o u p o f p l a y e r s 
w i l l a l s o r e p o r t t r u t h f u l l y . 
S t r o n q E q u i l i b r i u m : 
A s t r o n g e q u i l i b r i u m ' p o i n t o c c u r s when t h e r e i s 
* 
some messaqe m eM f o r w h i c h 
{ E . ( m * ) } . e C » { E i ( m c , m ; x C ) } i e C 
C 
•For a l l m^eM 
* * i n\C w h e r e m n N C = (m.) eM 
T h u s , t o q u a l i f y as a s t r o n g e q u i l i b r i u m , i t m u s t b e : 
( i ) i m p o s s i b l e f o r one p l a y e r t o change h i s message 
( a l l o t h e r s r e m a i n i n g t h e same) and i n c r e a s e 
h i s e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e , 
( i i ) i t m u s t be i m p o s s i b l e f o r a s u b s e t C o f p l a y e r s 
t o j o i n t l y c hange t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s ( a l l o t h e r 
n\C r e m a i n i n g t h e same) and i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
p a y o f f s , 
( i i i ) i t m u s t a l s o be i m p o s s i b l e f o r a l l p l a y e r s 
j o i n t l y t o change t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s and i n c r e a s e 
t h e i r p a y o f f s . 
A l t h o u g h t h e s t r o n g e q u i l i b r i u m i n v o l v e s t h e a c t i o n s 
o f g r o u p s o f p l a y e r s , i t does n o t i n v o l v e t h e u s e o f 
b i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t s a t t h e e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t a n d , t h u s , 
may be c o n s i d e r e d a non c o - o p e r a t i v e c o n c e p t ( e v e n t h o u g h 
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t h e a c t u a l a c t o f i m p r o v i n g b y a g r o u p a t a n o n -
e a u i l i b r i u m p o i n t may be c o - o p e r a t i v e ) . A n o t h e r a t t r a c -
t i v e f e a t u r e o f t h e s t r o n g e q u i l i b r i u m c o n c e p t i s t h a t 
i t d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h a t a l l l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e c o a l i t i o n s 
4 
may a c t u a l l y f o r m . 
E x i s t e n c e : 
A f t e r d e f i n i n g a p p r o p r i a t e e q u i l i b r i u m n o t i o n s i t 
i s n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r u n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s t h e 
5 
e x i s t e n c e o f a (Nash) n o n c o - o p e r a t i v e e q u i l i b r i u m i s 
e n s u r e d . 
I f , as a b o v e , one l e t s m ^ j - = (m-^ / • • • • / I n i + i ' 
m ) , t h e b e s t r e s p o n s e f o r a p l a y e r i c a n be d e f i n e d 
f o r anv m ^ e M ^ k " w h i c h r i v a l p l a y e r s may c h o o s e . T h i s 
mav be d e n o t e d E j _ ^ i t ) » s o t h a t f o r any meM, t h e r e i s 
a b e s t r e s p o n s e v e c t o r v a l u e d f u n c t i o n 
E(m) - ' E ^ m ^ ) E n ( n » » n c , } 
As t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f a Nash e q u i l i b r i u m g i v e n e a r l i e r 
s p e c i f i e s , a n o n c o - o p e r a t i v e e q u i l i b r i u m i s a f i x e d 
* 
p o i n t o f t h e f u n c t i o n E, so t h a t i f m i s a non c o -
o p e r a t i v e e q u i l i b r i u m message n - t u p l e , i t s a t i s f i e s m = 
* 6 
E(m ) , o r more g e n e r a l l y , i f R i s a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e 
* * 
m (m ) . P r o o f o f e x i s t e n c e t h e n r e q u i r e s t h e d e f i n i -
t i o n o* t h e b e s t r e s p o n s e m a p p i n g and s h o w i n g t h a t i t m u s t 
h a v e a f i x e d p o i n t . T h i s , t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e s p r o o f t h a t 
t h e b e s t r e s p o n s e m a p p i n g s a t i s f i e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a 
'•Pixed p o H n t t h e o r e m . 
T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l f i x e d p o i n t t h e o r e m s , b u t o n l y one 
s h a l l be d i s c u s s e d h e r e , s i n c e ( i ) i t i s t h e one m o s t a p p r o p -
r i a t e f o r t h e Gr o v e s and Loeb t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g m o d e l , and 
( • i i ) i t i s q u i t e g e n e r a l . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , 
t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h f u l n e s s w i l l be d e f i n e d w i t h r e s p e c t 
t o some d e c i s i o n r u l e k ( m ) , w h e r e t r u t h f u l messages l e a d 
t o o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n s b e i n g made. F o r a n y g i v e n t r u t h f u l 
d i v i s i o n a l message I I K , t h e a d d i t i o n o f a c o n s t a n t t o t h e 
mess a g e , so t h a t m. i s c o m m u n i c a t e d ( w h e r e m. = m. + c o n s t a n t ) ^ 1 1 1 
s t i l l l e a d s t o o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n s b e i n g made. Hence, t h e 
b e s t r e s p o n s e m a p p i n g i s a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . K a k u t a n i ' s 
f i x e d p o i n t t h e o r e m c o n s i d e r s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s and w i l l now 
be c o n s i d e r e d ^ . 
KAKUTANI'S FIXED POINT THEOREM: 
I f R(m) i s an u p p e r s e m i c o n t i n u o u s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e 
w h i c h maps a c o m p a c t c o n v e x s u b s e t M o f R N i n t o a c l o s e d 
* 
c o n v e x s u b s e t o f M, t h e n t h e r e e x i s t s a m E M s u c h t h a t 
* * 
m eR(m ) • 
R(m) i s an u p p e r s e m i c o n t i n u o u s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e a t t h e 
* L p o i n t m i f , when t h e s e q u e n c e m , L = 1,2, c o n v e r g e s 
* L L L * * 
t o m , S eR(m ) and S ,L = 1,2, c o n v e r g e s t o S E R ( m ) . 
R i s u p p e r s e m i c o n t i n u o u s i f i t i s u p p e r s e m i c o n t i n u o u s a t 
e a c h p o i n t o f i t s d o m a i n M. 
\ \ \ 
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ I \ \ \ 
\ \ v \ 
i 
1 i 
T h u s , i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n game 
s a t i s f i e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a f i x e d p o i n t r e q u i r e s t h a t 
t h e s e t k o f e x t e r n a l d e c i s i o n be a c o m p a c t s p a c e and t h a t 
t h e l a n g u a g e s e t M be t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f a l l u p p e r s e m i -
c o n t i n u o u s r e a l v a l u e d f u n c t i o n s m^(.) o f k, w h e r e m eM. 
A s s u m i n g a l s o t h a t t h e e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e o f t h e i t h 
p l a y e r i s a s c a l a r v a l u e d f u n c t i o n d e f i n e d f o r a l l m eM i f 
i t i s c o n t i n u o u s and bounded e v e r y w h e r e f o r i = l , N, t h e n 
t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f KakutanV s f i x e d p o i n t t h e o r e m a r e m e t . 
4.2 The G r o v e s and Loeb t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g m e chanism 
G r o v e s and Loeb c o n s t r u c t a mechanism w h e r e t h e 
c e n t r e a s k s d i v i s i o n s t o r e p o r t c o n d i t i o n a l p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s 
and t h e n , u s i n g t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , d e t e r m i n e s t h e a l l o c a t i o n 
o f some common o r i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t . The c e n t r e 
c h a r g e s t h e d i v i s i o n s a c o s t s h a r e t h a t has t h e p r o p e r t y 
t h a t r e p o r t i n g t h e t r u t h f u l p r o f i t f u n c t i o n t o t h e c e n t r e 
i s a d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y f o r t h e d i v i s i o n s i n t h i s game d e f i n e d 
by t h e m e c h a n i s m . I n t h e m e c h a n i s m t h e c e n t r e d o e s n o t s e t 
a t r a n s f e r p r i c e as s u c h , b u t t h e r e s u l t a n t f o r e c a s t e d n e t 
p r o f i t f u n c t i o n c a n be v i e w e d as i m p l i c i t l y d e f i n i n g a 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e . 
The m o d e l c o n s i d e r s a f i r m c o n s i s t i n g o f n d i v i s i o n s 
and a c o r p o r a t e c e n t r e . The p l a y e r s , t h e r e f o r e , c a n be 
i n d e x e d b y i - 0,1,2, N, w h e r e t h e i n d e x i = 0 r e f e r s 
t o t h e c e n t r e . The l a n g u a q e ( o r message s p a c e ) f o r t h e 
game i s t h e t r u e o r f a l s e p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n s 
c l a i m t o h a v e . The c e n t r e w i l l , i n g e n e r a l , n o t g e n e r a t e 
r e v e n u e s and so i t s p r o f i t s w i l l p r o b a b l y be n e g a t i v e ^ " " 
r e f l e c t i n g c e n t r a l c o s t s w h i c h h a v e n o t b e e n a l l o c a t e d t o 
t h e d i v i s i o n s . A f t e r r e c e i v i n g messages f r o m t h e d i v i s i o n s 
t h e c e n t r e t h e n d e t e r m i n e s t h e o p t i m a l a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s 
c o n d i t i o n a l o n t h e d i v i s i o n a l m e ssages. I n k e e p i n g w i t h 
n o r m a l a c c o u n t i n g t e r m i n o l o g y t h e d i v i s i o n a l p a y o f f s w i l l be 
r e f e r r e d t o as t h e d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e s , a n d we 
s h a l l assume d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s a r e r e w a r d e d p a r t l y o n t h e 
p 
b a s i s o f t h e i r d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e . 
As n o t e d b e f o r e , t h e d i v i s i o n s have t o make p r i v a t e 
d e c i s i o n s w h i c h o n l y a f f e c t t h e i r own p r o f i t a b i l i t y , and 
a l s o common d e c i s i o n s w h i c h w i l l a f f e c t o t h e r d i v i s i o n s ' 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y as w e l l . A v e c t o r o f p r i v a t e d e c i s i o n s 
w i l l be d e n o t e d b y L - ( L ,L,,L_, L X 1) . P r i v a t e 
J o-' 1 2 ' N 
d e c i s i o n s may t a k e t h e f o r m o f t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f 
q u a n t i t i e s o f i n p u t s , o u t p u t s o r c h o i c e o f t e c h n i q u e , 
when t h e y h a v e no d i r e c t e f f e c t on t h e o t h e r d i v i s i o n s . 
A v e c t o r o f common d e c i s i o n s o r wh a t c a n a l s o be c a l l e d 
common i n p u t s i s d e n o t e d b y k. T h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s 
q u i t e g e n e r a l a n d , f o r i n s t a n c e , a l l o w s f o r t h e p r e s e n c e 
o f p u b l i c g o o d s , e x t e r n a l i t i e s and i n t e r - d i v i s i o n a l t r a n s f e 
The g l o b a l p r o f i t s o f t h e f i r m c a n be d e n o t e d 
n 
i i ( L , k ) - Z S. (L . ,k) 
i - 0 1 1 
I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d how d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s w i l l 
f o r m u l a t e t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o s p e c i f y , 
w h a t i n f o r m a t i o n t h e y h a v e a b o u t o t h e r s . I t i s assumed 
h e r e t h a t t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l f o r m i s s u c h t h a t t h e i ^ 
d i v i s i o n knows o n l y i t s own p r o f i t f u n c t i o n n ^ ( L ^ , k ) a n d 
t h a t t h e c e n t r e knows o n l y n Q ( L o , k ) and n o t t h e p r o f i t 
f u n c t i o n s o f t h e d i v i s i o n s a t t h e commencement o f 
t h e game. I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h i s i s a game c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
b y i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n , b e c a u s e i n a n o n c o - o p e r a t i v e 
game o f c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n , i t i s assumed t h a t e v e r y p l a y 
knows a l l t h e s e t s o f p u r e s t r a t e g i e s , However 
i f a l l p l a y e r s h a v e a d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y t o p l a y , t h e r e i s 
no n e e d t o e x p l i c i t l y f o r m u l a t e t h e game as one w i t h i n -
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c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . The r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s b e c a u s e 
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y a l l o w s i n d i v i d u a l 
p l a y e r s t o i g n o r e w h a t s t r a t e g i c o p t i o n s o t h e r p l a y e r s 
may h a v e . 
I n o r d e r f o r t h e c e n t r e t o a l l o c a t e t h e common i n p u t 
k, t h e d i v i s i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d t o c o m m u n i c a t e t h e i r p r o f i t -
a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n a l on v a r i o u s a l l o c a t i o n s o f k. The 
c e n t r e t h e n d e t e r m i n e s w h a t a l l o c a t i o n o f k i s c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h g l o b a l p r o f i t m a x i m i s a t i o n , g i v e n t h e d i v i s i o n a l 
m e ssages. By c o n s i d e r i n g o n l y t h o s e e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e s 
w h i c h a r e s t r i c t l y i n c r e a s i n g i n a d i v i s i o n ' s own p r o f i t , 
G r o v e s and L o e b c l a i m t h a t d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s w i l l be 
m o t i v a t e d t o t a k e t h o s e l o c a l d e c i s i o n s w h i c h m a x i m i s e 
t h e i r own d i v i s i o n ' s p r o f i t s , g i v e n t h e p r e d e t e r m i n e d l e v e l 
o f common i n p u t s . P r o v i d e d t h e c e n t r e o n l y h a s t h e 
o b j e c t i v e o f g l o b a l p r o f i t m a x i m i s a t i o n , i t w i l l a p p o r t i o n 
k c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o b j e c t i v e . G i v e n t h e above N 
d i s c u s s i o n , t h i s means t h a t a t t e n t i o n n e e d o n l y b e f o c u s e d 
o n t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f common i n p u t l e v e l s . T h e r e f o r e 
l e t II . ( k ) = max H . ( L . , k ) f o r i =- 0,1,2, ,N, so t h a t 
L. 
N 
g l o b a l p r o f i t s c a n be d e n o t e d n ( k ) = I n . ( k ) . 
i = 0 1 
L e t ITK ( k ) d e n o t e a d i v i s i o n ' s r e p o r t e d p r o f i t f u n c t i o n 
r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t t h i s may n o t be t h e d i v i s i o n ' s a c t u a l 
p r o f i t f u n c t i o n H i ( k ) i f i t d e c i d e s t o l i e . I f t h e a r g u -
ment o f t h e d i v i s i o n ' s c o m m u n i c a t e d p r o f i t f u n c t i o n i s 
16 5. 
s u p r e s s e d , t h e v e c t o r o f messages t h a t t h e c e n t r e r e c e i v e s 
can be d e n o t e d m = (m,,m~, ,m ) . 
1 2 n 
E x p o s t a f t e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a l l o c a t i o n o f k and a f t e r 
t h e d i v i s i o n s h a v e r e a l i s e d t h e i r p r o f i t s , t h e c e n t r e w i l l 
w a n t t o e v a l u a t e d i v i s i o n s - and d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s . T h i s j 
e v a l u a t i o n s h o u l d be on t h e b a s i s o f c o n t r o l l a b l e p e r -
f o r m a n c e , b u t t h e r e i s a d i f f i c u l t y i n t r y i n g t o i n v o k e 
s u c h s e p a r a b i l i t y when t h e r e a r e s u c h i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e s as 
common i n p u t s . G r o v e s and Loeb t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t a 
d i v i s i o n i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e e x t e r n a l i t y i t e n f o r c e s 
on o t h e r d i v i s i o n s when i t i s a l l o c a t e d some o f k. The 
e x a c t m e t h o d o f a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e e x t e r n a l i t y w i l l be g i v e n 
b e l o w . A t t h i s p o i n t a l l t h a t n e e d be s a i d i s t h a t i t w i l l 
d e pend o n o t h e r d i v i s i o n s ' m e s s a g e s , f o r e x a m p l e , a l t e r n a t i v e 
b i d s f o r k^ a l l o c a t e d t o d i v i s i o n i . T h e r e f o r e , d i v i s i o n 
i ' s e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e w i l l d e p e n d on t h e d i v i s i o n ' s own 
r e a l i s e d p r o f i t s and t h e messages o f a l l t h e d i v i s i o n s , 
t h i s c a n be d e n o t e d as E i (IK ( k ) ,m) . 
To s u m m a r i s e t h e a b o v e , we c a n t h e r e f o r e d e s c r i b e t h e 
c o r p o r a t e p r o b l e m as one o f d e t e r m i n i n g an o p t i m a l c o n t r o l 
m e c h a n i s m d e f i n e d as a p a i r C = { k ( m ) , < E . ( I I . , m ) > N } ^ 
1 1 i = l 
w h e r e k (m) i s t h e c e n t r e ' s d e c i s i o n r u l e f o r a l l o c a t i o n o f 
t h e common r e s o u r c e . To be o p t i m a l , t h e m e c h a n i s m m u s t 
s a t i s f y t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s . F i r s t , i t m u s t be t h e c a s e t h a t 
t h e r e e x i s t s a message ITU t h a t m a x i m i s e s E ^ ( I K ( k ) ,m) f o r 
e v e r y m"51C€: M^1C" f o r e a c h i , t h a t i s e a c h d i v i s i o n m u s t have 
a d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y so t h a t t h e i t h d i v i s i o n s b e s t message 
i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e messages o f o t h e r d i v i s i o n s . 
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S e c o n d l y , t h e me c h a n i s m m u s t be e f f i c i e n t so t h a t 
g l o b a l p r o f i t s a r e m a x i m i s e d , t h a t i s , f o r a l l n - - t u p l e s 
m s a t i s f y i n g t h e f i r s t r e q u i r e m e n t , t h e c e n t r e ' s common 
r e s o u r c e d e c i s i o n s k (m) m a x i m i s e II ( k ) . 
B e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r t h e G r o v e s and Loeb 
m e c h a n i s m i s o p t i m a l , t h e r e i s a n e e d t o s p e c i f y r e g u l a r i t y 
c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h d e s c r i b e t h e e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h d i v i s i o n s 
o p e r a t e . S p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s i z e o f t h e message s p a c e 
i s a l s o r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t messages a r e 
a l l o w a b l e . The message s p a c e M m u s t be s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e 
so t h a t , f o r e v e r y c o l l e c t i o n o f p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s a d m i t t i n g 
a s o l u t i o n t o t h e j o i n t p r o f i t m a x i m i s a t i o n , t h e r e a r e 
messages m i n M a l l o w i n g a n e f f i c i e n t s o l u t i o n . I n g e n e r a l , 
t h e s e t o f p o s s i b l e common r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n s k i s assumed 
t o be a c o m p a c t s p a c e a n d t h e message s p a c e M t h e c o l l e c t i o n 
o f a l l u p p e r s e m i - c o n t i n u o u s r e a l - v a l u e d f u n c t i o n s m . ( k ) . 
The d i v i s i o n ' s t r u e p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s I K ( k ) a r e a l s o assumed 
t o be members o f t h e s p a c e M. T h e s e r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s 
e n s u r e t h a t t h e c e n t r e ' s d e c i s i o n p r o b l e m h as a s o l u t i o n , 
t h o u g h t h i s may n o t be u n i q u e . T h a t i s , t h e c e n t r e d e c i s i o n 
r u l e k ( m) i s s u c h t h a t f o r e v e r y 
N 
meM k(m) m a x i m i s e s E m . ( k ) 
i = l 1 
I f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h f u l n e s s i s d e f i n e d s u c h t h a t t r u t h f u l 
* 
d i v i s i o n a l messages rru g i v e r i s e t o k (m) m a x i m i s i n g 
N 
Z I I . ( k ) , t h e n m. ( k ) = n. ( k ) i s n o t t h e o n l y t r u t h f u l 
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d i v i s i o n a l message, s i n c e t h e a d d i t i o n o f a c o n s t a n t t o 
* 9 
ITK w i l l n o t change t h e d e c i s i o n k (m) . 
G r o v e s and Loeb d e f i n e a c o n t r o l m e c h a n i s m C w h i c h 
i s o p t i m a l . To u n d e r s t a n d t h i s , c o n s i d e r f i r s t t h e 
* 
c e n t r e ' s d e c i s i o n r u l e k ( m ) . 
N 
k (m) = k w h i c h m a x i m i s e s JI ( k ) + Z M, ( k ) + c o n s t a n t 
° i = l 1 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o k f o r any c o n s t a n t . 
W i t h t h e r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s s t a t e d a b o v e , a 
maximum w i l l e x i s t , t h o u g h t h i s may n o t be u n i q u e , b u t 
k (m) w i l l s e l e c t a p a r t i c u l a r m a x i m i s e r , t h a t i s k (m) 
i s t h e r u l e m a x i m i s i n g r e p o r t e d p r o f i t s o f t h e f i r m . 
I f i t w e r e t h e c a s e t h a t d i v i s i o n s r e p o r t e d t h e i r t r u e 
p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s , t h e c e n t r e ' s r u l e w o u l d l e a d t o g l o b a l 
p r o f i t s b e i n g m a x i m i s e d . The e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e , t h e r e -
f o r e , s h o u l d be d e s i g n e d so a s t o e n c o u r a g e d i v i s i o n a l 
m a n a g e r s t o r e s p o n d t r u t h f u l l y . I f t h e i 1 " * 1 d i v i s i o n a l 
, 10 e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e w e r e 
* N * 
E°(JI.,m) = II (k (m) ) + n. + Z m . ( k (m) ) f o r i = l , . . . , N . 
1 1 O 1 j * "1 
3^1 J 
i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s s h o u l d i n d u c e t r u t h f u l n e s s , s i n c e t h e 
c e n t r e has d r i v e n t h e d i v i s i o n a l m anager t o h a v e e x a c t l y 
t h e same o b j e c t i v e as t h e c e n t r e , t h a t i s , g l o b a l p r o f i t 
m a x i m i s a t i o n . E x p r e s s e d i n a n o t h e r m a n n e r , t h e 
d i v i s i o n ' s message t o t h e c e n t r e o n l y a f f e c t s E ? t h r o u g h 
16 fa. 
i t s i n f l u e n c e o n t h e c e n t r e ' s c h o i c e o f common r e s o u r c e 
l e v e l k. I f a d i v i s i o n l i e s , t h i s w i l l g i v e r i s e t o 
t h e d i v i s i o n b e i n g a l l o c a t e d a l e s s f a v o u r a b l e amount 
o f k t h a n i f i t w e r e t r u t h f u l . 
I n i t s p r e s e n t f o r m , t h e e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e seems 
somewhat t r i v i a l . The i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i s t h a t i t can 
be m o d i f i e d i n a c e r t a i n manner and s t i l l p r e s e r v e i t s 
i n c e n t i v e p r o p e r t i e s . I n g e n e r a l , l e t a^( n»-,^ c) be any 
s t r i c t l y p o s i t i v e f u n c t i o n o f a l l d i v i s i o n s ' m essages 
t h 
e x c e p t t h e i , and l e t B.(m_._) be an a r b i t r a r y f u n c t i o n 
o f a l l o t h e r d i v i s i o n s ' messages. Then any e v a l u a t i o n 
m e a s u r e o f t h e f o r m 
* o E, (n.,m) = a.(m . ).E7(JI.,m) + B. (m . ) 1 1 l s i c l i ' l ^ac 
t h 
w i l l a l s o m o t i v a t e t h e i d i v i s i o n t o c o m m u n i c a t e t r u t h -
f u l l y . T h u s , t h e r e i s a w h o l e c l a s s o f o p t i m a l c o n t r o l 
m e c h a n i s m s o f t h e f o r m 
* * * N 
C = { k ( m ) , <E (n ,m) > } 
1 i = l 
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , t h e o p t i m a l 
e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e s , p l u s t h e c e n t r e ' s p r o f i t s , w i l l n o t 
sum t o e q u a l o v e r a l l f i r m p r o f i t s f o r a l l p o s s i b l e messages 
m. 
Up u n t i l t h i s p o i n t , t h e i s s u e o f c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y o f 
d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e s has n o t been c o n s i d e r e d . 
i n o r d e r 
G r o v e s and L o e b a r g u e t h a t / f o r t h e e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e s t o 
p r o v i d e m o t i v a t i o n a l b e n e f i t s f o r t h e d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s , 
169 . 
i t i s c r u c i a l t h a t t h e e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e s be c o n t r o l l -
a b l e by t h e d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s . As n o t e d e a r l i e r , 
t h i s i s n o t p o s s i b l e i n a s t r i c t s e n se b e c a u s e o f t h e 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n t r o d u c e d by t h e use o f common 
r e s o u r c e s . G i v e n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d i n t h e 
p r o c e s s , i t i s p o s s i b l e , t h o u g h , t o c a l c u l a t e t h e o p p o r -
t u n i t y c o s t o f a d i v i s i o n c o n s u m i n g common r e s o u r c e s . 
L e t ot ± (m ) = 1 
and B. (m ) = - { n ^ ( k 1 ) + I m. ( k 1 ) } i = i c o j 
w h e r e k 1 = k 1 (m . ) m a x i m i s e s n ( k ) + 1 m, ( k ) 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o k. 
T h i s e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e may be d e n o t e d b y E i (.) and i s 
g i v e n b y : 
E (JT.,m) = JI ( k (m)) - n ( k 1 ) + n . + £ {m. ( k (m) ) - m. ( k 1 ) } 
-L J. \J \j _L ' / • I 1 
3^1 J J 
T h i s e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e a c c o u n t s f o r t h e i m p a c t o n e 
d i v i s i o n ' s c o n s u m p t i o n o f common r e s o u r c e s h as on o t h e r 
d i v i s i o n s and i s , h e n c e , a m e a s u r e o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t 
o f h a v i n g t h e i t h d i v i s i o n . I t i s c o n t r o l l a b l e i n t h e 
l i m i t e d s e n s e t h a t a d i v i s i o n c a n c h o o s e t o c o m m u n i c a t e 
m e s s a g e s , s u c h t h a t i t d oes n o t a f f ect'Ahe c e n t r e ' s 
a l l o c a t i o n o f k. T h i s , o f c o u r s e , w o u l d n o t be o p t i m a l 
1 7' 
b u t i s a m a t t e r t h e d i v i s i o n a l manager has c o n t r o l o v e r . 
However, i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t a d i v i s i o n w o u l d e v e r 
e x e r c i s e t h i s r i g h t . The r e l a t i v e n o n - c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y 
a s p e c t i s an i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t o f d i v i s i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s 
t h r o u g h t h e use o f common r e s o u r c e s and i s n o t t o be 
c o n s i d e r e d as a f a u l t o f t h e G r o v e s and L o e b e v a l u a t i o n 
m e a s u r e . A n o t h e r r e l a t e d f a c t o r i s t h a t , s i n c e t h e 
G r o v e s and Loeb m e t h o d r e l i e s m a i n l y on f o r e c a s t e d d a t a , 
e f f i c i e n c y o r f o r e c a s t i n g v a r i a n c e s i n o t h e r d i v i s i o n s 
a r e a l l o c a t e d s o l e l y t o t h e r e s p o n s i b l e d i v i s i o n t h r o u g h 
t h e r e a l i s e d p r o f i t t e r m . An i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f t h e 
d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e i n s u c h an e n v i r o n m e n t i s 
how t h e c e n t r e d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f 
a d i v i s i o n and t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h a t d i v i s i o n ' s m a n a g e r , 
f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e c a s e w h e r e a g o o d manager i s p l a c e d i n 
an u n p r o f i t a b l e d i v i s i o n . The c e n t r e may, t h e r e f o r e , w i s h 
t o a d j u s t t h e e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e E\ b u t s t i l l r e t a i n t h e 
i n c e n t i v e p r o p e r t i e s o f an o p t i m a l c o n t r o l mechanism. A 
t a r g e t l e v e l T^ c o u l d be s e t so t h a t a d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r ' s 
e v a l u a t i o n m e a s u r e became 
E i(n i,m) = E i(n i,m) - T ± 
I n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n t h e 
t a r g e t l e v e l m u s t be s e t 
and t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f 
i n c e n t i v e p r o p e r t i e s 
p r i o r t o t r a n s m i t t a l 
common i n p u t l e v e l s . 
t h o u g h , t h i s 
o f messages 
i . 1 . 
4.3 C h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n theorem on the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of f i n d i n g other optimal c o n t r o l r e v e l a t i o n 
mechanisms 
I n the previous s e c t i o n , i t i s shown th a t the 
Groves and Loeb mechanism i s optimal, i n the sense t h a t 
i t l e a d s t o e f f i c i e n t a l l o c a t i o n of common r e s o u r c e s , 
w h i l e a t the same time, e l i m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n 
among i n d i v i d u a l agents, because of the e x i s t e n c e of 
dominant s t r a t e g i e s . I n order to a s s e s s the r e l a t i v e 
importance of the Groves and Loeb mechanism, one must 
c o n s i d e r whether t h e r e are other r e v e l a t i o n mechanisms 
t h a t a r e optim a l . Green and L a f f o n t (1977) considered 
t h i s q u e s t i o n and so t h e i r a n a l y s i s w i l l be presented now. 
Given t h a t the ce n t r e l a c k s information about the 
s p e c i f i c environments t h a t d i v i s i o n s operate w i t h i n , i t 
w i l l not be u n t i l a f t e r d i v i s i o n s r e p o r t t h e i r p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
t h a t the c e n t r e can determine charges or payments f o r 
common r e s o u r c e s . From h e r e a f t e r these charges or payments 
w i l l be r e f e r r e d to g e n e r a l l y as t r a n s f e r s and denoted t ^ 
That i s d i v i s i o n s a f t e r t r a n s f e r p r o f i t s can be expressed 
as: 
e ± ( k , t ) = n i ( k ) + t . 
and t h e c e n t r e ' s p r o f i t can be denoted II (k) . 
r o 
The messages t h a t d i v i s i o n s choose to communicate w i l l 
depend on the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g mechanism t h a t the centre 
has chosen t o use. To be more s p e c i f i c , the outcome of a 
1 ? - . 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g mechanism w i l l depend on the message 
( s t r a t e g y ) space of the d i v i s i o n s , the d e c i s i o n f u n c t i o n 
of the c e n t r e k(m) and the t r a n s f e r r u l e t(m) t h a t the 
c e n t r e employs. I n g e n e r a l , there are many d i f f e r e n t 
messages t h a t the c e n t r e may want d i v i s i o n s to communicate. 
I f , though, d i v i s i o n a l messages are r e s t r i c t e d to be 
only v a l u a t i o n f u n c t i o n s f o r common r e s o u r c e s , then i t 
12 
i s p o s s i b l e to d e f i n e a r e v e l a t i o n mechanism R.M. as 
RM = {M,f } 
where M. = {m . I m . : ie> R} 
1 l ' l 
K = s e t of a l l p o s s i b l e a l l o c a t i o n s 
M - M^x xM^ 
and the outcome f u n c t i o n { f ( m ) = { k(m),t^ (m),....,t N(m)} 
N from X.M. = M i n t o < x R such t h a t l l 
f o r each j o i n t message space meM. 
(1) the a l l o c a t i o n of common re s o u r c e s i s determined by 
the d e c i s i o n f u n c t i o n k(m), 
(2) the t r a n s f e r t o d i v i s i o n i i s t^(m) for i= l , . . . . N . 
I n the r e v e l a t i o n mechanism, the d i v i s i o n s w i l l be 
asked to gi v e t h e i r v a l u a t i o n s of the common r e s o u r c e s , 
t h a t i s n ^ ( k ) . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t d i v i s i o n s may not 
re p o r t t h e i r t r u e v a l u a t i o n f u n c t i o n s I K ( k ) , so l e t 
m(k) = {itij (k) , ,m N(k)} r e p r e s e n t the reported v a l u a -
t i o n f u n c t i o n , or i f the argument i s supressed, i t can be 
denoted m = {m^, ,11^ } 
I n order to ensure that the centre uses the d e c i s i o n 
r u l e which maximises reported p r o f i t ( i . e . a l l o c a t e d the 
common r e s o u r c e s o p t i m a l l y , given the informa t i o n i t h a s ) , 
a t t e n t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d to d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n mechanisms 
(D.R.M.) d e f i n e d as f o l l o w s : 
DRM = {m,f} i s a r e v e l a t i o n mechanism f o r which 
* N 
k (nu, ,m ) M A X I M I S E S IT (k) + I m. (k) f o r ke< 
i = l 1 
S i n c e the maximum may not be unique, and K i s a 
compact s e t , a s u f f i c i e n t condition i s t h a t the v a l u a t i o n 
f u n c t i o n s be r e s t r i c t e d to be upper semi-continuous on K. 
T'he allowance of s e t valued mechanisms means t h a t 
r e f e r e n c e can be made to extended d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n 
mechanisms EDRM defined as 
E.D.R.M. _ ' M,F> 
where M = M^x xM^ 
and Ft M-»-KXRN F(m) = (K* (m) ,T (m) , T N ( m ) ) 
* 
i s a correspondence such t h a t for every IUEM, K (m) i s a 
N 
subset of the maximisers of A (k) + £ m. (k) 
° i = l 1 
13 
I t i s now p o s s i b l e to define a Groves' mechanism 
G.M, as f o l l o w s : 
GM = f m , t ) i s a d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n mechanism with the 
s p e c i f i c t r a n s f e r r u l e : 
N 
t , (m) = I m . (k (m) ) + h (m . ) 
j = l 
where i s an a r b i t r a r y d e t e r m i n i s t i c f u n c t i o n of the 
messages of the other d i v i s i o n s . 
I n order to allow the Groves' mechanism to be 
operated when t r a n s f e r s and d e c i s i o n s are not uniquely 
d e f i n e d , there needs to be a d e f i n i t i o n of an extended 
Groves' mechanism EGM = (M,F) where K(m) i s a d e c i s i o n 
correspondence from M i n t o < such t h a t each s e l e c t i o n 
N 
k(m)eK(m) maximises IT (k) + £ m.(k) and 
° i = l x 
t . (m) = I m . (k (m) ) + h . (m .^  ) 
j = l 
where t^(m)e (m) and T^(m) i s an a r b i t r a r y d e t e r m i n i s t i c 
N 
correspondence from M j i n t o R. For n o t a t i o n a l ease 
N 
l e t E d e n o t e E from now. 
Green and L a f f o n t c o n s i d e r p u b l i c goods i n t h e i r work 
and so t h e i r terminology i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t . They 
show the Groves' mechanism i s s t r o n g l y i n d i v i d u a l l y 
i n c e n t i v e compatible ( s ' . i . i . c . ) and s u c c e s f u l . T h i s 
corresponds to showing t h a t a Groves'mechanism has t r u t h 
t e l l i n g as the dominant s t r a t e g y f o r each i n d i v i d u a l and 
t h a t the c e n t r e ' s d e c i s i o n r u l e a l l o c a t e s common re s o u r c e s 
so as to maximise corporate p r o f i t s , t h a t i s , they show 
th a t a Groves' mechanism i s optimal. 
1 ? : 
PPOOF: Suppose t h a t there e x i s t s some dominant s t r a t e g y 
^ such t h a t n i - IK i s not constant. Then t h e r e e x i s t 
* ** 
e>0,K CK , K EK such t h a t : 
^ / ( k * ) = n. (k*) + ct 
„ / ** ** 
v
i (k ) = F i ( k ) + a + 
Now choose m 5 i c t o be the upper semicontinuous f u n c t i o n 
d e f i n e d bv: 
n Q ( k ) + T, m (k ) =-H (k ) - a 
TI (k**) + I m. (k**) =-n.(k**) - a -
^ 0 ( k ) + E m (k) = -supfsupn (k) , sup JI. (k) } - a - e j ^ i J keK 1 keK 1 
f o r ke< , kfk* , k^k** 
Since the d i v i s i o n a l manager wishes to maximise 
H (k) + F. (k) + Z m. (k) 
° 1 j ^ i 3 
* 
then answer le a d s to a l l o c a t i o n k being chosen, while 
/ * * 
the answer T I ^ l e ads to a l l o c a t i o n k being chosen, and s i n c e 
1 7 6 . 
T \ (k*) + H (k*) + I m.'(k*) > n. (k**) + n (k**) + 
1 O . , . 1 1 o 
T m . (k ) 
cannot be a dominant s t r a t e g y by c o n t r a d i c t i o n . That 
i s a l l the dominant s t r a t e g i e s must d i f f e r from TL by a 
constant. 
Given t h a t the normalised s t r a t e g y for a d i v i s i o n a l 
manager i s such t h a t m^(o) = o, by d i s p l a c i n g ITK by non 
zero constant would lead to the d e s t r u c t i o n of the normalisa-
t i o n . The normalised dominant s t r a t e g y (a^=o) i s t h e r e -
f o r e unique. Q.E.D. 
Fin c e each i n d i v i d u a l has a unique normalised dominant 
s t r a t e g v of t e l l i n g the t r u t h , i t must be t h a t the c e n t r e ' s 
d e c i s i o n maximises the sum of the t r u e p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n s , t h a t i s , the Groves* mechanism i s s u c c e s s f u l . 
Having proven t h a t the Groves' mechanism i s optimal, 
Green and L a f f o n t then c o n s i d e r the converse question 
of whether there are any other optimal d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n 
mechanisms. 
A D.R.M. = (m,f) i s s a i d to s a t i s f y the property of 
t r a n s f e r independence and compensation i f 
( i ) t^(m) i s independent of m. at k , t h a t i s for 
m . ,m. ,n/. such t h a t 3 1 c ' i ' l 
k (m . ,m. ) = k (m . m. ) 
21C ' 1 ^1C 1 
then t.(m . .m.) = t.(m . ,m') 1 5lC ' i 1 ^ ic ' i 7 
1 7 ' - . 
( i i ) t i(m ; > i c,m i) - t..(m , 1 ^ ) = Z m . (k ) -
Y m.(k ) where 
j - i 3 
,* maxiniises 1 -m.(k) + m.(k) over K 
*/ / and k maximises I m.(k) + m.(k) over K 
P a r t ( i ) r e p r e s e n t s the idea t h a t a d i v i s i o n ' s t r a n s f e r 
depends on the d i v i s i o n ' s own message only through i t s 
i n f l u e n c e on the centre choice of a l l o c a t i o n k. P a r t ( i i ) 
r e f l e c t s the underlying ideology t h a t , i f a d i v i s i o n by 
changing i t s message, a l t e r s the a l l o c a t i o n k, then the 
c o s t of making the switch i n terms of the a l t e r e d t . 
pavment i s e x a c t l y the c o s t i t imposes on the other d i v i s i o n s 
T h i s means we can now c h a r a c t e r i s e a d i r e c t r e v e l a -
t i o n mechanism as being a Groves' mechanism i f , and only 
i f , 
( i ) k(m) maximises Z m. over K and 
i 
( i i ) t ^ s a t i s f i e s the property of t r a n s f e r independence 
and compensation f o r every i . 
C h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n Theorem: A l l optimal mechanisms 
are Groves' mechanisms. 
PROOF: Consider, i n t u r n , the negation of the two p a r t s 
of the t r a n s f e r independence and compensation property. 
1 ~ • . 
I f ( i ) f a i l s , t h e r e e x i s t s m_ c^ fin^ which lead to the 
* / same k such t h a t : t . (m . ,m . ) > t . (m . ,m . ) i :>ic ' 1 1 ' i 
L e t m^ = 
Then t i(m : > i c,m i) + JL(k*)> t^m^ ± t , n ) + n ± ( k * ) 
and F i s not a dominant s t r a t e g y , 
I - F ( i i ) f a i l s , t h e r e e x i s t s m ^ , I T K ,m^  such t h a t : 
k maximises I m. + m. over K 
j * i 3 
*/ / 
k maximises L in . + m. over tc 
j = i - 3 -
/ * and t i (m^^ ,mi) - t i (m^ ,m ) = I m.(k ) -j ^ i 3 
r *' V i m j ( k > + e 
f o r some e > 0 
L e t m. be d e f i n e d as I 
m.' (k*) = - I m . (k*) 
1 j ¥ ± 3 
A / * / */ 
m. (k ) = - I m. (k ) + e 
1 j * i 3 7 
m i(k) = - c f o r k^k or k ^ k with c > max I m.(k) 
keic j ^ i 3 
nu i s upper semi-continuous, 
A/ */ 
KSote t h a t max m, (k) + m. (k) i s solved at k=k , and 
1 j * i 3 
t h e r e f o r e bv the f i r s t p a r t of the proof 
t . 'm . ,m. ) = t . ^m . „,m. ) i =>xc ' i ' i D K ' l 
so t h a t we a l s o have t h a t 
~ / * */ 
t i ( m ^ i c ' m i ) ~ t i ( m i , m i * = E m i ( k ^ ~ 1 m i ( k J + 
j ^ i 3 j ^ i 3 
* i * ~ / * / -m. (k ) + m, (k ) + e 
1 2 
" / * ~ / ~ I * ( t h e r e f o r e t . (m . ,m.) +m.(k ) > t.(m . ,m. ) + m.(k ) 
Pence, when IT^ = m^ the announcement of would be 
s u p e r i o r which con-tradicts the f a c t t h a t the mechanism has 
t r u t h as the dominant s t r a t e g y f o r each p l a y e r o 
The importance of t h i s r e s u l t i s t h a t the only 
mechanisms t h a t can b e optimal are Groves' mechanisms. 
Green and L a f f o n t a l s o show t h a t optimal extended mechanisms 
(where k i s a correspondence) are isomorphic to extended 
Groves' mechanisms. 
The c l a s s of Groves' mechanisms i s q u i t e l a r g e , given 
the form of t r a n s f e r f u n c t i o n allowed. However, the 
p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s f e r f u n c t i o n proposed by Groves and Loeb 
seems to be the most appropriate f o r the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
problem. However, the above r e s u l t s have been e s t a b l i s h e d 
with the a. (m . ) of the e v a l u a t i o n measure E. (Jl. ,m) 1 Mc 1 i ' 
o f the previous s e c t i o n s e t equal to u n i t y . I t i s , 
however, p o s s i b l e to keep the i n c e n t i v e p r o p e r t i e s 
e s t a b l i s h e d and d e f i n e a p r o f i t s h a r i n g type mechanism 
N 
where a. > 0, R. = 0 and E a. = 1. 
1 i = l 1 
However, with such a mechanism a d i v i s i o n would be 
rewarded p a r t l y on the b a s i s of the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y 
of other d i v i s i o n s even though they may be responding 
t r u t h f u l l y a t the planning stage. Given t h i s argument, 
the modified p r o f i t s h a r i n g type mechanism w i l l not be 
considered f u r t h e r . 
Some of the l i t e r a t u r e on p u b l i c economics has been 
concerned with the f a c t t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , the Groves' 
mechanism does not guarantee a f u l l a l l o c a t i o n of p r o f i t s , 
r e g a r d l e s s of the d i v i s i o n s ' messages. Though, t h i s 
mav r a i s e e f f i c i e n c y problems when c o n s i d e r i n g how to 
share the f u l l c o s t of a p u b l i c good, i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
cause anv d i f f i c u l t y i n s e t t i n g t r a n s f e r p r i c e s , s i n c e i t 
i s not n e c e s s a r y t h a t the sum of d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n 
measures equals corporate p r o f i t . 
Another important question with Green and L a f f o n t ' s 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n theorem i s t h a t , i n d e r i v i n g t h e i r 
uniqueness theorem, they assume a l a r g e domain of p o s s i b l e 
c o n d i t i o n a l p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s . I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g 
to see t h a t i f t h e i r u n i v e r s a l domain assumption was d i s -
pensed with and some more r e s t r i c t i v e domain were assumed 
to h o l d , whether t h e i r uniqueness c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s t i l l 
h eld . 
1 h i . 
L a f f o n t and Maskin (1980) and Holmstrom (1979) 
c o n s i d e r t h i s i s s u e and i t w i l l be commented on 
here because t h e i r r e s u l t s allow us to d e r i v e the 
g e n e r i c Groves mechanism i n a more c o n s t r u c t u r e manner 
and a l s o because the approach provides a bridge between 
the dominant s t r a t e g y approach and the expected u t i l i t y 
maximisation approach (used i n games of incomplete 
i n f o r m a t i o n ) . 
L a f f o n t and Maskin assume t h a t the c o n d i t i o n a l 
p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s f o r each d i v i s i o n are parametrised by 
a v a r i a b l e 0 ^ which the centre i s ignorant o f . I n 
a d d i t i o n , i t i s assumed the centre knows the form of 
the f u n c t i o n s J K f k , 6 ^ . That i s , one can express the 
d i v i s i o n a l a f t e r t r a n s f e r p r o f i t s as 
E ± < k , t ) = n i(k,e.) + t . i = 1, ,n 
The problem the c e n t r e now f a c e s then i s to choose 
the mechanism which w i l l y i e l d the optimal l e v e l of 
a l l o c a t i o n of k, given t h a t i t has i m p e r f e c t information 
about d i v i s i o n s s t a t e s . That i s , a mechanism i n t h i s 
s e t t i n g i s a mapping f ( • ) from the s t r a t e g y space 
n n B = X 0. i n t o R X R when the q u a n t i t y of the common i = l 1 + 
r e s o u r c e has the range R + = }0,0OC . That i s k ( - ) 
a s s o c i a t e s to any n-tuple 6 of announced parameters an 
a l l o c a t i o n k ( 0 ) , w h i l e t ^ (6 ) r e p r e s e n t s the t r a n s f e r pay-
ment to or from d i v i s i o n i . Therefore, a d i v i s i o n ' s 
a f t e r t r a n s f e r p r o f i t s w i l l depend on the reported v a l u e 
of parameter 0. through the d e c i s i o n f u n c t i o n k ( . ) and 
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the r e s u l t i n g t r a n s f e r f u n c t i o n determined. Also, s i n c e 
the c o n d i t i o n a l p r o f i t f u n c t i o n w i l l depend on the t r ue 
A. 
v a l u e of the parameter 6^ which may be d i f f e r e n t from 
the reported 9^, one can express the d i v i s i o n ' s a f t e r 
t r a n s f e r p r o f i t s as 
n ± (k(6) , e i) + t i ( 8 ) i = 1, n 
An a l l o c a t i o n mechanism f(») w i l l have t r u t h t e l l i n g for 
each d i v i s i o n as a dominant s t r a t e g y i f for each i , and 
anv 9 F © 
v. (k(9 , e. ) , e.) + t . ( e . , e. ) 
> (k(e.,e . ) ,e.) + t . ( e , , e. ) 
^ i i ' >^i«- ' i i i ' PIC 
The r e s t r i c t i o n L a f f o n t and Maskin p l a c e on the domain of 
the problem i s t h a t they r e q u i r e : 
f o r i = 1, n, O^beaiopen i n t e r v a l i n R and 
c 
Tl^:R+X9^->- R be a continuously d i f f e r e n t i a b l e f u n c t i o n such n ^ /\ c t h a t f o r any 8e© = X 0. there e x i s t s k (6':eR, for which 
i = l 1 + 
( i ) Y ^. (k* (9) ,6. ) = max I TI. (k, 9 . ) 
i = l 1 1 k>0 i = l 1 1 
* 
( i i ) k (9) i s continuously d i f f e r e n t a b l e . 
I t should be noted t h a t Holmstrom has d e r i v e d a s i m i l a r 
uniaueness c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n but assuming a more general 
r e s t r i c t i o n r e q u i r i n g only that the c o n d i t i o n a l p r o f i t 
f u n c t i o n s be smoothly connected i n p a r t i c u l a r convex 
domains. Also, L a f f o n t and Maskin note t h a t the r e s u l t s 
are q e n e r a l i s a b l e to m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l k a l l o c a t i o n space. 
I f one were to assume t h a t the d i v i s i o n a l parameter 
spaces were one dimensional, i t i s p o s s i b l e to d e r i v e 
the Groves' mechanism i n a simple f a s h i o n when a s u i t a b l e 
d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n i s assumed. Assuming then 
t h a t P.eR 1 f o r i = l , n and t h a t n, (k*(6.,0 . ) , 8 ) 
i ' i 1' 31C ' 1 
A* 
and (^i/G^t.) a r e d i f f e r e n t i a b l e with r e s p e c t to 0^, 
from the above r e s t r i c t i o n ( i ) and the d e f i n i t i o n of a 
dominant s t r a t e g y i t f o l l o w s t h a t : 
6 I i n (k* (6) ,e ±)} = o S~e. i = l I 
and 6 { F . (k* (6) ,6. ) + t . (6)> = 0 
l 
f o r every B 
On s u b s t i t u t i n g the second equation i n t o the f i r s t y i e l d s 
'6 t . (6) = 6 I n . (k* (6) , 9 .) 
~68. 1 -Te. j ^ i 3 3 
which i n t e g r a t e s to the family of s o l u t i o n s 
t . (e) = i n.(k ( e ) , e.) + h. (e ) 
j ^ i 3 3 1 3 1 c 
That i s , the s o l u t i o n i s unique up to the a r b i t r a r y 
f u n c t i o n n j _ (©-jj_c) which i s independent of B^, The 
t r a n s f e r r u l e t h a t has been d e r i v e d here i s , of course, th 
t r a n s f e r r u l e that c h a r a c t e r i s e s Groves' mechanisms. I t 
a l s o c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t the mechanism works by 
d r i v i n g the manager of d i v i s i o n i and the c e n t r e to 
having the o b j e c t i v e of wishing to maximise 
V TT . (k (6. ,6 . ) , Q X ) f o r every 6 i = l 3 1 
'when viewed as f u n c t i o n s of 6. above). 
Fence d i v i s i o n a l managers would wish the same a l l o c a -
t i o n of k as the c e n t r e , even i f they knew 0 o i c 
6 . 4 L i m i t a t i o n s of the Groves' and Loeb t r a n s f e r 
pr i c i n g mechanism 
I n c e n t i v e s for c o a l i t i o n formation. 
The preceding d i s c u s s i o n e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i t i s 
p o s s i b l e to design t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g mechanisms t h a t have 
the d e s i r a b l e property that t r u t h t e l l i n g i s the dominant 
s t r a t e g v f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers a c t i n g i n t h e i r own 
best i n t e r e s t s . I t did not e s t a b l i s h whether t r u t h 
+-ellinq would s t i l l be a dominant s t r a t e g y i f one con-
s i d e r e d i t p o s s i b l e t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers may co-operate 
among themselves to j o i n t l y determine t h e i r messages. I n 
f a c t , i t has been proven by Bennet and Conn (1977) t h a t 
Groves* mechanisms are s u s c e p t i b l e to m a n i p u l a t i o n by 
c o a l i t i o n s . 
The Bennet and Conn proof i s q u i t e g e n e r a l , but i n 
t h e i r manuscript they choose to c o n s i d e r a r e s t r i c t e d 
outcome space which i s not appropriate to the t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g problem. A proof w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , be provided 
with the a p p r o p r i a t e outcome space and then the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of t h i s r e s u l t w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n some d e t a i l . 
I n the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , l e t C g denote a c o a l i t i o n 
of d i v i s i o n a l managers, where the number of d i v i s i o n a l 
manaqers i n C i s #C . A g e n e r i c s t r a t e g y f o r the group 
S 5 
s i s m = ( m . ) . £ C . 
s 
1 8 0 . 
^or each c o a l i t i o n C the c o a l i t i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n measure 
s 
i S 
e s(m) = I ' I I (Mm)) - t (m) } 
i e C s . 
The undominated s t r a t e g y s e t f o r a c o a l i t i o n w i l l be 
the s e t of a l l j o i n t s t r a t e g i e s f o r the c o a l i t i o n , s u c h 
t h a t no a l t e r n a t i v e j o i n t s t r a t e g y e x i s t s which r e s u l t s 
i n a h i g h e r c p a l i t i o n a l payoff. I t i s then p o s s i b l e to 
denote a mechanism as being group i n c e n t i v e compatible 
i f t r u t h f u l r e v e l a t i o n of c o n d i t i o n a l p r o f i t s i s i n the 
undominated s t r a t e g y s e t for every c o a l i t i o n . That i s , 
the undominated s t r a t e g y s e t f o r C g i s defined as 
T S = {m seR* Cs: e*^,™^) > e S (ms ) I 
f o r a l l m eFv s , and f o r a l l m eR r s 
so t h a t the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g mechanism w i l l be group 
s 
i n c e n t i v e compatible f o r the c o a l i t i o n C i f IT (k)eT . 
S 5 
A Groves' mechanism i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by the f o l l o w i n g 
outcomefunction and t r a n s f e r r u l e s : 
N 
k (m) max IT (k) + I m. (k) f o r ke< 
i = l 1 
n n * 
and T t . (m) = I m. (k (m) ) + h. (m . ) 
j = l 1 j = l 3 1 r i C 
On combining t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n with the d e f i n i t i o n 
of a cj^roup i n c e n t i v e compatible mechanism, the fo l l o w i n g 
p r o o f demonstrates t h a t the c l a s s of mechanisms for which 
both c o n d i t i o n s hold i s , i n f a c t , empty. 
PROOF: 
Consider two c o a l i t i o n s and S 2 such t h a t ftS^ } 1 and 
S 2 - P^U{s} where s ^ S 1 . 
Given the d e f i n i t i o n of group i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y , i t 
i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t both 
I t.(m) = I m. (k* (m) ) + h 1(m^ c , ) 
±cS1 1 j?S1 : 3 S 1 
and F t . (m) = I m . (k (m) ) + hi (m A 
i e S 2 1 j ^ S 2 D 5 S 2 C 
prom which i t f o l l o w s t h a t i t must be the case t h a t 
t (m) = Z t ±(m) - I t i(m) i e S 2 i e S ^ 
= - I m. (k* (m) ) + h 2 (m ^ ) - h 1 (m c ) j e s J 2 1 
: i n c e {.s} i s a c o a l i t i o n i n N, i t i s f u r t h e r n e c e s s a r y t h a t 
t (m) = I m. (k (m) ) + h s (m ) 
S . J 3 S C 
T n order t h a t the two expressions may be compatible r e q u i r e s 
t h a t i t must be t h a t 
T m (k (m)) + hto(m , ) + h'(m ) - h z (m _ ^  ) = O 
f o r a l l meRN, 
L e t h°(m=>oc) = h 2 ( m ^ - h 1 ^ ^ ) 
then i t must be t h a t 
T m . (k* (m) ) = h° (m ) - h S (m ) 
i-F i t were p o s s i b l e to prove t h a t t h i s c o n d i t i o n does not 
i n f a c t hold then the r e s u l t i s e s t a b l i s h e d . 
Now suopose t h a t f o r m,m = E in. , e>0 and 
i£s 
A 




3 ' I m. - e j e s 
- s _ s ~ For m and m so defined h (m ) = h (m ) 
J>SC ^ s c ' 
and F in . (k* (•) ) - I m . (k* (•)) 
jeN 3 jeN D 
h°(m ) - h s(rn ) - h° (m ) + h s (rn ) 
ZOC O S C 3 0 C D S C 
h°(m ) - h°(m ) 
3 0 C 3 0 C 
2^ in. + e - 2 I m. = e>o 
i ^ s i ^ s 
] By. 
Now c o n s i d e r two a l t e r n a t i v e messages m and m* such 
t h a t 
1 
I m + 6_ , O < 6 < e , i e S 
" b l 
and 
ITK, 1 = s 
m. + _6_ , i e S , 
Then h s (ni ) = h s (m* ) and 
=Sc DSC 
T m (k* (*) ) - Z m*(k* (*) ) 
ieN 1 ieN 1 
h°(rn ) - h°(ni* ) 
30C 30C 
m. -i e k * fm, + 6 "1 - E m. 
* + e 
Now s i n c e f m ) = (m ) 
V 3 ( X ao c 
(or m = m ) s s 
and Cm ) = (m ) 
3 OC OO C 
1 90. 
h ( m > o c > 
h K o c » 
* _ 
so t h a t 6 + e = h (m ) - h (m ) = h ( m ) - h (m ) = e 
r>oc "DOC D O C ^ O C 
T h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n completes the i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
proof© I t should be no t i c e d t h a t one could have = 1 
and s r e p r e s e n t i n g a s i n g l e d i v i s i o n , i n which case the 
above r e s u l t s hold f o r any c o a l i t i o n of s i z e two or 
g r e a t e r . 
The above r e s u l t i s of g r e a t importance because i t 
seems to imply t h a t the d e s i r a b l e p r o p e r t i e s of any 
Groves 1 and Loeb t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g mechanism w i l l be l o s t , 
because d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l f i n d i t advantageous 
to c o l l u d e and m i s r e p r e s e n t t h e i r c o n d i t i o n a l p r o f i t 
f u n c t i o n s . 
Before t h i s l i n e of argument i s accepted, i t seems 
app r o p r i a t e to r e c a l l what assumptions have been made 
about the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l form of the problem. I t has 
been assumed t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers only have knowledge 
about t h e i r own d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s and t h a t the 
c e n t r e only has knowledge about i t s own p r o f i t f u n c t i o n . 
Hiven t h i s argument, one must c o n s i d e r how a c o a l i t i o n 
could compute i t s optimal ( u n t r u t h f u l ) message. I n 
order to do t h i s , the c o a l i t i o n would need to have 
d e t a i l e d knowledge of a l l other n o n - c o a l i t i o n a l con-
d i t i o n a l p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s . The p o s s i b i l i t y of d i v i s i o n a l 
managers having data on n o n - c o a l i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s i s r u l e d 
out by the o r g a n i s a t i o n form which has been s p e c i f i e d 
i t f o l l o w s t h a t h(m ) 
* 
and h(m _ ) 
]91. 
above, but even i f t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n had not been made, 
i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t a c o a l i t i o n would have a c c e s s to 
such i n f o r m a t i o n s i n c e i t i s c l e a r l y not i n the i n t e r e s t s 
o-F a n o n - c o a l i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n to make such i n f o r m a t i o n 
f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e . 
T h i s argument would not s t r i c t l y h o ld, though, i f 
the qrand c o a l i t i o n of a l l d i v i s i o n s were c o n s i d e r e d . 
However, i t would be an h e r o i c assumption to assume t h a t 
a l l the d i v i s i o n s would j o i n together and t r u t h f u l l y 
share each o t h e r s ' information and then would be i n a 
p o s i t i o n to c a l c u l a t e t h e i r optimal response to the 
c e n t r e . 
However, the above problem of c o l l u s i o n could s t i l l 
be a ve r y s e r i o u s problem as the example d i s c u s s e d below 
shows. Here the d i v i s i o n s forming a c o a l i t i o n do not 
need d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n about other n o n - c o a l i t i o n a l 
d i v i s i o n s ' o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s to c o n s t r u c t "approxi-
mate" c h e a t i n g s t r a t e g i e s . I would now l i k e to p r e s e n t 
a diagrammatic example which shows j u s t how easy i t might 
be f o r a c o a l i t i o n of two d i v i s i o n s to cheat. T h i s 
tvpe of diagrammatic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was f i r s t suggested 
bv v i c k r e y (19^1) and l a t e r d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l by 
Loeb (1977), however he did not co n s i d e r c h e a t i n g . 
Suppose t h a t t h e r e are four d i v i s i o n s , two d i s t r i b u -
t i o n d i v i s i o n s , i = , l , 2 and two manufacturing d i v i s i o n s 
i = 3,4. Assume the intermediate product t h a t i s t r a n s -
f e r r e d i s denoted k. I n such a s i t u a t i o n , the net 
marqinal revenue schedules of the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n s 
-1 c»2 . 
w i l l d e f i n e i n v e r s e demand f u n c t i o n s here denoted 
d^fk^) where the area under the r e s p e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s 
•From 0 to are defined as 
rK. 




F i m i l a r l y , the marginal c o s t schedules of the manufactur-
ing d i v i s i o n s d e f i n e i n v e r s e supply f u n c t i o n s here 
denoted s ^ ( k ^ ) where the area under the r e s p e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s 
from 0 to are defined as 
r K i 
(k)dk 
Note t h a t with r e s p e c t to our g e n e r a l model, i n terms of 
c o n d i t i o n a l p r o f i t f u n c t i o n s , the manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n s ' i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s of p r o v i s i o n of the i n t e r -
mediate good w i l l decrease the c o n d i t i o n a l p r o f i t of 
the d i v i s i o n s i n c e the t o t a l c o s t of producing the i n t e r -
mediate good i n c r e a s e s as output i n c r e a s e s . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e to c h a r a c t e r i s e the Groves' and Loeb 
mechanism by the outcome f u n c t i o n s which determines 
k = ( k^....k^) such t h a t : 
2 4 
£ . . Z D. (K. ) - I S, (K. , k maximises . . l l . _ i l ) i = l i=3 
with r e s p e c t to keF =_ { ( k ^ , . . . . k 4 ) | k i ^ O i = l , . . . 4 and 
k l + k 2 ^ k 3 + k 4 } 
19 3. 
anri where a d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n , i = 1 for i n s t a n c e , 
has the e v a l u a t i o n measure 
D 1 ( k 1 ) - t1 
t 1 =-D (k ) + I S.(k.j)' +{ max D (k ) -
3 = 3 3 3 k ^ l c c F ^ l c 
L , S. ( k . ) } 
j=3 3 3 
where F J l c = { ( k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ) | (°/ ^ 2 ' k 3 ' k 4 ) E F } 
S i m i l a r l y , a manufacturing d i v i s i o n , i=4, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
has an e v a l u a t i o n measure 
2. * * 2 
t. = I D.(k.) - S-,(k_) - {max I D.(k.) -
4 i=i 3 3 3 3 k E F i = l 3 3 3 1 KM(~e o4c 3 1 
- S-(k ) } 
J 3 
where F ^ ^ = { ,k 2 ,k 3 ) | ( k 1 ,k 2 ,k 3 ,0) eF} 
The example of c o a l i t i o n a l cheating w i l l c onsider two 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n s forming a c o a l i t i o n . F i r s t , t h e r e -
f o r e , one must c a l c u l a t e the d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n measures 
usi n g the Groves' and Loeb mechanism when the two d i s t r i b u -
t i o n d i v i s i o n s do not form a c o a l i t i o n . 
194 . 
I f the schedules are as re p r e s e n t e d i n Figu r e 1, 
then the d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n measure f o r d i v i s i o n one 
can be c a l c u l a t e d as f o l l o w s : 
t1 = - D 2 ( k 2 ) = - QAFq 2 
4 
+ E S . (k . ) = ODCBEq 
j = 3 3 3 
+ f « } = + ABCD 
2" q qEBF 
T h i s i s equal to the a r e a q 1GHI s i n c e GHI i s congruent 
to EBF by c o n s t r u c t i o n , implying t h a t the d i v i s i o n a l 
e v a l u a t i o n measure i s JkGHI which i s c l e a r l y g r e a t e r than 
the d i v i s i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n measure u s i n g a H i r s h l e i f e r type 
mechanism. 
S i m i l a r l y d i v i s i o n two has the e v a l u a t i o n measure AFMI. 
I n order to determine i n what f a s h i o n the d i v i s i o n s 
o p t i m a l l y cheat, i t would be n e c e s s a r y to determine what 
e x p e c t a t i o n s or f a c t s a c o a l i t i o n has about n o n - c o a l i t i o n a l 
i n v e r s e demand and i n v e r s e supply f u n c t i o n s . However, i n 
the f o l l o w i n g examples, i t i s assumed t h a t c o a l i t i o n s use 
"approximate" cheating s t r a t e g i e s , which can r e a d i l y be 
formulated. For example, one such r e a d i l y formulateable 
s t r a t e g y would be f o r two d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n s to agree 
to each u n d e r s t a t e t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n v e r s e demand schedules 
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To demonstrate t h i s approach, l e t us consider a 
number of p o s s i b l e p r o s p e c t i v e "approximate" cheating 
s t r a t e g i e s . 
I . Suppose d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n one (d.d.l) under-
s t a t e s i t s i n v e r s e demand schedule as i n Figu r e 2. The 
e f f e c t of such cheating w i l l o n l y b e n e f i t d i s t r i b u t i o n 
d i v i s i o n two (d.d.2) d i r e c t l y by i n c r e a s i n g d.d.2's 
e v a l u a t i o n by I M F F ' M ' I . I n f a c t , t h i s cheating w i l l 
reduce d.d.l's e v a l u a t i o n measure by WXVYZ, as i l l u s t r a t e d 
by F i g u r e 3. To see t h i s , note t h a t D.D.I l o s e s 
F B B ' F ' - I V X I 7 + YGZ. I n t h i s c a s e , note t h a t I M F F / M / I 
> T«TXVZYG so th e r e does seem to be some gains from c h e a t i n g . 
Hence, d.d.2 may o f f e r to pay d. d . l some amount to make 
i t worthwhile to d.d.l to u n d e r s t a t e the i n v e r s e demand 
schedule d^. The important q u e s t i o n i s how w i l l a s u i t -
able payment be determined. Given the assumption t h a t 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n s do not know, i n d e t a i l , the 
i n v e r s e supply s c h e d u l e s , they w i l l w ait u n t i l a f t e r the 
opera t i n g plans have been s p e c i f i e d by the c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r s . At t h i s p o i n t i n time, they w i l l know the 
va l u e of the i n v e r s e supply schedule a t output q^ + q 2 
and may determine what i t would approximately have been a t 
output q^ + q^. The d i v i s i o n s can then determine what 
the net r e s u l t a n t gains ( i f t h e r e are any) from having 
d.d.l cheat and then use some p r e s p e c i f i e d r u l e such as 
" s p l i t the d i f f e r e n c e " i n the net gain to determine the 
s u i t a b l e payment. 
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This s t r a t e g y , however, seems questionable as i t i s 
hard to see how d.d.2's manager can "pay" d.d.l's 
manager without the c e n t r a l headquarters becoming aware. 
A f a r more l i k e l y type of procedure i s a r e c i p r o c a l type 
agreement as d e t a i l e d i n I I . ' 
T J . Suppose d. d . l ' s manager and d.d.2's manager agree 
to a s t r a t e g y i n which d . d . l ' s manager u n d e r s t a t e s the 
d i v i s i o n ' s i n v e r s e demand schedule by some s e t amount and, 
i n r e t u r n d.d,2's manager u n d e r s t a t e s t h a t d i v i s i o n ' s 
i n v e r s e demand schedule by some s e t amount. T h i s type 
of agreement i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 4 and F i g u r e 5. 
F i g u r e 4 demonstrates t h a t d . d . l ' s gain from d.d.2*s 
l y i n g i s IHWG'H' w h i l e l o s i n g TGW by l y i n g f o r d,d.2, 
14 
with net gain i n t h i s case being p o s i t i v e . F i g u r e 5 
demonstrates t h a t d.d.2's g a i n s from d . d . l ' s l y i n g are 
I Q Q ' l / while l o s i n g RSQ by l y i n g f o r a . d . l , with the net 
g a i n c l e a r l y being p o s i t i v e ^ . To r*ecap, note t h a t s i n c e 
under the Groves' and Loeb procedure, i t i s a d i v i s i o n ' s 
a c t u a l i n v e r s e demand schedule expost t h a t i s used to 
e v a l u a t e the d i v i s i o n , plus the e x t r a opportunity c o s t 
term and the c e n t r a l headquarters p r o f i t s . Thus, the 
e v a l u a t i o n measure of d i v i s i o n 2 i n t h i s i n s t a n c e w i l l 
be A /RQ /I + O ' H I ' plus the c e n t r a l headquarter's p r o f i t s . 
I n the Groves' and Loeb procedure, the c e n t r a l headquarter' 
p r o f i t l e v e l i s not the sum of d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t s , but i s 
the c o s t of c e n t r a l l y p r o v i d i n g s e r v i c e s and r e s o u r c e s to 
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any t o t a l v a r i a b l e components of the c e n t r a l headquarter*s 
c o s t s w i l l be l e s s than i f the d i v i s i o n s had reported 
t r u t h f u l l y . Hence, by l y i n g , the d i v i s i o n s can c l e a r l y 
improve t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n measures. 
However, as the above d i s c u s s i o n of net gains from 
l v i n g i l l u s t r a t e s , c o a l i t i o n s between d i v i s i o n s seem-
i n g l y prepared to form r e c i p r o c a l l y i n g agreements are 
l i k e l y to be h i g h l y u n s t a b l e . T h i s i s because 
i t - would be b e t t e r f o r the d i v i s i o n to have 
another d i v i s i o n l i e on i t s b e h a l f , t h i n k -
ing t h a t the other d i v i s i o n was r e c i p r o c a t i n g , but t h a t 
d i v i s i o n would not, i n f a c t r e c i p r o c a t e }and may even 
choose to o v e r s t a t e i t s i n v e r s e demand schedule. F i g u r e 
6 i l l u s t r a t e s such a s i t u a t i o n . The gain to d.d.2 by 
o v e r s t a t i n g i t s i n v e r s e demand schedule and having d.d.l 
u n d e r s t a t e i t s i n v e r s e demand schedule i s CAEDB - EDF, 
which equals CAEGB - DFG. Note i n t h i s example, i t has 
been assumed t h a t the amount d.d.2 o v e r s t a t e s i t s i n v e r s e 
demand schedule i s d i r e c t l y p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the amount 
d.d.l u n d e r s t a t e s i t s i n v e r s e demand schedule, such t h a t 
the aggregate i n v e r s e supply schedule i n t e r s e c t s the 
aggregate i n v e r s e demand schedule at the same output t h a t 
would r e s u l t i f a l l s c h e d u l e s were communicated t r u t h f u l l y . 
F i g u r e 7 provides a composite comparison of the approximate 
cheating s t r a t e g i e s assumed f o r F i g u r e 5 and F i g u r e 6. 
The diagram i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t the approximate cheating 
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i t s e v a l u a t i o n measure i s g r e a t e r by BL(/ MD + QRE - DFG -
CT HL. I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r example, DFG i s approximately 
eaual to REQ and C I ' H L i s very s m a l l . Hence, d.d.2 
i s approximately BLQ'MD b e t t e r o f f . To understand the 
i n t u i t i o n behind t h i s r e s u l t , one should note t h a t , under 
the Groves' and Loeb procedure, the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n 
t h a t consumes the most amount of the i n t e rmediate product 
16 
has the l a r g e s t opportunity c o s t added to i t s e v a l u a t i o n 
measure. Thus, to recap then, although two d i s t r i b u t i o n 
d i v i s i o n s have an i n c e n t i v e to form a c o a l i t i o n and cheat 
by u n d e r s t a t i n g t h e i r i n v e r s e demand s c h e d u l e s , each 
d i v i s i o n ' s manager w i l l a l s o have an i n c e n t i v e t o reneague 
the agreement, hoping t h a t the other keeps to i t s p a r t of 
the agreement, thus such p o t e n t i a l c o a l i t i o n s are i n -
h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e and t h i s w i l l be r e c o g n i s a b l e by the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n s ' managers. 
A d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of p o s s i b l e manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n c o a l i t i o n s w i l l not be presented here, as i t was 
f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n s , as the two c a s e s are 
analogous, except t h a t the manufacturing d i v i s i o n s ' counter-
p a r t to s t r a t e g y I would be to o v e r s t a t e i n v e r s e supply 
s c h e d u l e s . 
Another p o s s i b i l i t y f o r c o a l i t i o n formation to cheat 
would be between a d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n and a manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n . F i g u r e 8 demonstrates the p o s s i b l e advantages 
of such a c o a l i t i o n . However, the approximate cheating 
s t r a t e g i e s are somewhat unconventional, i n t h a t the d i s -




i n v e r s e demand schedule and the- m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n , 
l a b l e d s.d.2 i s re q u i r e d to und e r s t a t e i t s i n v e r s e s u p p l y 
schedule. T h i s diagram has been s p e c i f i c a l l y drawn so 
th a t the ch e a t i n g s t r a t e g i e s r e s u l t i n the a g g r e g a t e 
supplv and demand schedules i n t e r s e c t i n g a t t h e same 
F i r s h l e i f e r p r i c e . T h i s i s to s i m p l i f y the a l r e a a y 
c o n s i d e r a b l y complex diagram and i t should be noted t h a t 
the g e n e r a l r e s u l t s do not r e q u i r e t h i s to be the cas e . 
The e v a l u a t i o n measure of d.d.2 i n c r e a s e d by ABCD -
DFC which equals ABCF - DFE, while the e v a l u a t i o n measure 
of s.d.2 i n c r e a s e s by XYVW - ZVW which equals XYTW - ZVT. 
Once aqain, t h i s type of c o l l u s i o n may be u n s t a b l e , 
s i n c e each d i v i s i o n has an i n c e n t i v e to reneague on any 
r e c i p r o c a l agreement. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , what d i v i s i o n s 
mav do i s o v e r s t a t e t h e i r t r u e schedule to p o t e n t i a l 
c o a l i t i o n a l p a r t n e r s and then, when they a r e , say, 
r e q u i r e d to u n d e r s t a t e t h e i r i n v e r s e demand schedule, 
they do so, and end up communicating to the c e n t r a l head-
cm a r t e r s , an i n v e r s e demand schedule c l o s e to t h e i r t r u e 
schedule's v a l u e . 
The above d i s c u s s i o n has been appli e d to a v e r t i c a l l y 
o rganised o r g a n i s a t i o n with manufacturing and d i s t r i b u t i n g 
d i v i s i o n s . However, the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o a l i t i o n s 
forming to cheat i n h o r i z o n t a l l y organised c o r p o r a t i o n s , 
as i n the Dantzig-Wolfe type model, i s e q u a l l y l i k e l y . 
T h i s i s because the onl y d i f f e r e n c e would be t h a t the 
i n v e r s e supply schedule (of some s c a r c e resource) would 
be f i x e d . 
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The above d i s c u s s i o n has demonstrated how d i v i s i o n s 
may form c o a l i t i o n s to cheat under the Groves' and 
Loeb procedure, but t h a t such c o a l i t i o n s are l i k e l y to 
be i n h e r e n t l y u nstable. 
4.4.2 D i v i s i o n a l managers' d i s u t i l i t y from 
e f f o r t p r o v i s i o n . 
The d i s c u s s i o n of the Groves' and Loeb mechanism 
has p r e v i o u s l y always assumed t h a t the manager of a 
d i v i s i o n i holds as s o l e o b j e c t i v e maximisation of the 
performance measure E^. However, w h i l e c a r r y i n g out 
d i v i s i o n a l management t a s k s , a d i v i s i o n a l manager 
w i l l need to expend e f f o r t . I t i s important to recognize 
t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l e x p e r i e n c e d i s u t i l i t y from 
the p r o v i s i o n of t h e i r e f f o r t s e r v i c e s . I f the 
o b j e c t i v e of the c e n t r a l headquarters i s the arrangement 
of i n t e r d i v i s i o n a l t r a n s f e r s to f a c i l i t a t e maximisation 
of the sum of d i v i s i o n a l performance measures (and, 
hence, corporate p r o f i t s ) , the f o l l o w i n g problem a r i s e s . 
S i n c e d i f f e r e n t d i v i s i o n a l t a s k s w i l l r e q u i r e d i f f e r e n t 
d i v i s i o n a l managerial e f f o r t and a t t r a c t d i f f e r i n g 
amounts of d i v i s i o n a l managerial compensation, each 
d i v i s i o n a l manager w i l l be concerned with the t r a d e o f f 
between h i s e f f o r t and compensation a s s o c i a t e d with a 
g i v e n t a s k (plan of o p e r a t i o n s ) . I n a d d i t i o n , d i v i s i o n a l 
managers w i l l r ecognise t h a t the c e n t r a l headquarters 
w i l l be choosing t a s k s on the b a s i s of information 
209 . 
communicated by the d i v i s i o n a l managers and the task 
s e l e c t i o n procedure employed by the c e n t r a l headquarters 
w i l l not take account of d i v i s i o n a l managers e x p e r i e n c i n g 
d i s u t i l i t y from e f f o r t p r o v i s i o n . Hence, given 
asymmetric a c c e s s to d i v i s i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n , the 
d i v i s i o n a l managers w i l l p e r c e i v e advantages from 
communicating s t r a t e g i c a l l y ( u n t r u t h f u l l y ) to maximise 
t h e i r u t i l i t y . That i s , d i v i s i o n a l managers may choose 
to communicate s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n such a f a s h i o n , such 
t h a t , u n w i t t i n g l y the c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l attempt 
to implement s o l u t i o n s , which not only take account of 
d i v i s i o n a l p r e f e r e n c e f o r compensation, but a l s o the 
d i s u t i l i t y t h a t a r i s e s from any a s s o c i a t e d i v i s i o n a l 
managerial e f f o r t p r o v i s i o n . Thus, the i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y p r o p e r t i e s of the Groves' and Loeb mechanism 
do not hold when i t i s recognised t h a t d i v i s i o n a l 
managers w i l l c o n s i d e r the t r a d e o f f between u t i l i t y 
gained from compensation and the a s s o c i a t e d d i s u t i l i t y 
of e f f o r t p r o v i s i o n . T h i s r e s u l t i s p r o v e n ^ by M i l l e r 
and Murrel (1981) . An a l t e r n a t i v e proof and a d i s c u s s i o n 
of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s r e s u l t w i l l now be presented. 
Suppose we are c o n s i d e r i n g a f i r m c o n s i s t i n g of n 
d i v i s i o n s , indexed i = l , . . . . , n and a c e n t r a l headquarters, 
I t must now be e x p l i c i t l y recognised t h a t the i d i v i -
0 
s i o n a l p r o f i t s do not j u s t f u n c t i o n a l l y depend on the 
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l e v e l of i n t e r m e d i a t e product t r a n s f e r s or the l e v e l of 
p r o v i s i o n of common corporate r e s o u r c e s k^, but a l s o 
the l e v e l of e f f o r t provided by the i * " * 1 d i v i s i o n a l 
manager, denoted e^. Thus, one can express d i v i s i o n i ' s 
p r o f i t a s : 
\ - n ± ( k ^ e . ) 
where n 
" i k 
3TT^  > 0 f o r i = l , . . . . , n 
3k. I 
l e 3IT. > 0 f o r e. < e l I : 3e, 
= 0 f o r e^ ^ 
Also H^(k^,0) ^ d where d i s a p o s i t i v e c o n s t a n t 
f o r a l l k. > 0 l 
m h e penultimate requirement i s based on the assumption 
18 
t h a t t h e r e i s a f i n i t e l e v e l of e f f o r t beyond which a 
d i v i s i o n a l manager can not i n c r e a s e d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t -
a b i l i t v by i n c r e a s e d e f f o r t , given other r e s o u r c e s are 
f i x e d . T'he u s u a l d e c l i n i n g marginal p r o d u c t i v i t y assump-
t i o n i s a l s o made, t h a t i s 
2-8 JT. < 0 f o r e. < e. , l l l ' 
= 0 f o r e 1 > e i 
2] ] . 
F.ach d i v i s i o n a l manager i s assumed to maximise t h e i r 
u t i l i t v f u n c t i o n which i s separable i n reward R. and 
1 
e f f o r t e^, where the f u n c t i o n i s i n c r e a s i n g i n reward 
and d e c r e a s i n g i n e f f o r t , so t h a t one can r e p r e s e n t the 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n a s : 
U i ( R i , e i ) - R. - g i ( e i ) 
where c l e a r l y _ 9 q . > 0 f o r a l l l e v e l s of e. s i n c e 
9e* 1 
d i v i s i o n a l managers g a i n d i s u t i l i t y from p r o v i s i o n of 
2 
e f f o r t . A l s o assume d 9^  > and g^O) = 0 . 
~ 2 
3e. 
£n important q u e s t i o n i s whether the c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r s wishes to maximise corporate p r o f i t s before or 
a f t e r managerial compensation i s charged. One can 
p r e s e n t the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n of the c e n t r a l headquarters 
as r e q u i r i n g 
n n n 
k(m) max I m(k.,e.) - C( I k.) - B I R. 
i = l 1 1 i = l 1 i = l 1 
where ir. (• , •) i s the reported p r o f i t f u n c t i o n f o r d i v i s i o n i . 
Tn t h i s model, B i s a constant which takes on the v a l u e s 
0 or 1 depending on whether the centre e x p l i c i t l y 
r e c o g n i s e s the c o s t s of managerial compensation i n 
determining the optimal s o l u t i o n . 
L e t us f i r s t c o n s i d e r the case when B takes the v a l u e 
zero, so t h a t the c e n t r e ' s o b j e c t i v e i s maximisation of 
corporate p r o f i t before managerial compensation i s charged. 
T'he c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l be aware t h a t f o r any 
th a l l o c a t i o n k. the i d i v i s i o n a l manager w i l l choose 1 ^ * 
the e f f o r t l e v e l e^(k^) defined as: 
e*(k) = argmax { f i ^ k ^ e ^ - g ^ e ^ } 
n s i n c e R. = n. (•,•) + I m . (k . (m)) - C ( I k . (m)) 
1 j ^ i j = l 3 
- A . 
5>1C 
^hus, i n order to determine the corporate optimal 
a l l o c a t i o n v e c t o r k, the c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l r e q u i r e 
i n f o r m a t i o n , e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y on the 
f u n c t i o n g^. Thus, i n a d d i t i o n to sending information 
about the d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t f u n c t i o n M i l l e r and Murrel 
c l a i m t h a t the c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l r e q u i r e 
d i v i s i o n a l managers to communicate a message, q^ r e p o r t -
inq to the c e n t r e the nature of the e f f o r t d i s u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n g^. Note t h a t i n s t e a d one could c o n s i d e r the 
case where the message sent by a d i v i s i o n a l manager con-
c e r n i n q the nature of g^ could be sent i m p l i c i t l y i f the 
* 
d i v i s i o n a l manager r e p o r t s i n s t e a d m^(k^) where 
* -m i ( k i ) = max ' T l ^ k ^ e ^ - g i ( e i ) } 
e 
= n. (k.,e, ( k . ) ) - g. (e. ( k . ) ) I I ' i I ^ i I I 
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Theorem 1. There e x i s t s no reward system t h a t s i m u l t a -
neously enables the c e n t r e to maximise corporate p r o f i t 
(before charqinq managerial compensation) and which induces 
honesty as the optimal s t r a t e g y f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers 
when the reward systems must be s o l e l y f u n c t i o n s of 
messages from the d i v i s i o n a l managers and the c e n t r e ' s 
o b s e r v a t i o n s of r e a l i s e d d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t a b i l i t y . 
PROOF: ^he proof proceeds by c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Assume t h a t 
such a reward system e x i s t s . One can express such a 
* _ 
reward svstem as R.(m. ( k . ) , J T . ( k . , e . ) ) where a l l other 
l i l ' l l ' l 
arquments of the reward system, such as other d i v i s i o n a l 
messaqes are omitted, as they are not d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t to 
t ^ i s proof. Any optimal d i v i s i o n a l management reward given 
the c e n t r a l headquarters o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n should encourage 
manaqers of d i v i s i o n i to provide e f f o r t l e v e l . Thus 
P . ( m * ( k i ) , n i ( k i , 5 i ) ) 
must maximise the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n of the manager of 
_* 
d i v i s i o n i where nu (•) i s the optimal message: 
m"*(k\) = e\ argmax { J L t k ^ e . ^ - g i ( e i ) } 
w ith k^ being the corporate p r o f i t maximising a l l o c a t i o n . 
Given the above assumed r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s , t h i s 
c e n t r a l headquarter's optimum must be unique and, hence, 
the d i v i s i o n a l manager's reward system at e^ must s a t i s f y 
the f o l l o w i n g i n e q u a l i t y : 
? 1 •".. 
R j f w * ^ ) , P i ( k i , i . ) ) > R . ( m . ( k . ) , ri(k.,e°)) 
o _ 
f o r anv e. < e. 
o _ _ -o o 
and where m . (k . ) = n . ( k . , e . ) - g.(e.) 
1 1 I I ' I i 
o 
T'hus there must be some e. f o r which 
I 
-* 0 0 
R . ( m . ( k . ) , IT. ( k . , e \ ) ) = 6 { q . ( e . ) - g . ( e . ) } + R.fm.fk.), 
n ( k . , e°) ) 
where assume that 0 < 8 < 1 
Suppose the d i v i s i o n a l manager determines the s c a l a r value^ 
d>>0 f o r which 
e j = argmax fi^k^e^ - (1 g A ( e ± ) 
E x i s t e n c e of an ap p r o p r i a t e s c a l a r i s guaranteed by the 
r e g u l a r i t y c o n d i t i o n s . Thus, i f the d i v i s i o n communicates 
m°(k\) = e° argmax fi^k^e..) - (1 + <f>)g..(e.) 
i t can expect to r e c e i v e reward 
R i ( m i ( k i ) , Tf(k\,e°) ) 
Thus, the d i v i s i o n a l manager's u t i l i t y when r e p o r t i n g 
_* _ o 
r e s p e c t i v e l y m^(k^) and m^ , when u s i n g the s c a l a r $ i n 
the l a t t e r i n s t a n c e , must s a t i s f y the i n e q u a l i t y 
R i ( m ° ( k i ) , n ( k ± , e j ) ) + 6^g.(i i)-g i(e°)} - g j i j . ) 
> R i(m°(k i) , TT(k.,e°)) - g ± ( e j ) 
which r e q u i r e s 
e f g ^ i . ) - g . ( e ? ) } > g i ( i i ) - S ^ e ? ) 
but t h i s i n e q u a l i t y does not hold s i n c e 0 < 9 < 1. Q 
T h i s r e s u l t c o n t r a d i c t s the assumption t h a t the 
reward system w i l l induce managers to t r a n s m i t informa-
t i o n t h a t a l l o w s the c e n t r a l headquarters to determine 
the corporate p r o f i t maximising p l a n of o p e r a t i o n s . 
Note t h a t the proof c e n t r e s on the o b s e r v a t i o n 
t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers can always i n c r e a s e the s i z e of 
t h e i r bonus by exaggerating the d i s u t i l i t y of e f f o r t i n 
t h i s case by a proportion 4>. 
L e t us now consi d e r the case when B ta k e s the value 
of one so t h a t the c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s . o b j e c t i v e i s 
maximisation of corporate p r o f i t s n e t of managerial com-
pe n s a t i o n . I n order to focus on the e f f e c t of changing 
the c e n t r a l headquarter's o b j e c t i v e to 'net' i n s t e a d of 
'qross', i t w i l l be assumed t h a t e f f o r t does not a f f e c t 
output. The Groves' and Loeb mechanism has been 
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formulated f o r s i t u a t i o n s where the ce n t r e has no pr e -
f e r e n c e s on the l e v e l of managerial compensation. Thus, 
the l e v e l of managerial compensation r e l a t i v e to fi^ = 
ff^(k^) i s not uniquely s p e c i f i e d i n the mechanism. 
theorem 2. There e x i s t s no reward system t h a t s i m u l t a n -
eously enables the c e n t r e to maximise net corporate 
p r o f i t s and which induces honesty as the optimal s t r a t e g y 
f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers when the reward system must be 
s o l e l y f u n c t i o n s of messages from d i v i s i o n a l managers 
and the c e n t r e ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s of r e a l i s e d d i v i s i o n a l 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . 
Before proceeding with the proof, i t s h a l l be 
assumed t h a t t h e r e i s a minimum l e v e l of d i v i s i o n a l 
managerial reward, R ^ , i = l , . . . . n , below which d i v i s i o n a l 
manaaers w i l l not be prepared to work. That i s , reward 
f o r working i n the c o r p o r a t i o n must be g r e a t e r than or 
ea u a l to some p r e s p e c i f i e d l e v e l R \ . 
* n n 
PWOOF; i f k = argmax £ n . ( k . ) - C ( I k.) 
k i = l 1 1 i = l x 
one can denote JI(k ) as the maximum gross corporate p r o f i t . 
T h u s , g i v e n the previous assumption maximum net corporate 
p r o f i t s can be expressed a s : 
_ * n _ 
JT(k ) - E R . 
i = l 1 
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^he Groves' and Loeb mechanism r e q u i r e s t h a t 
R i = o^E^C^^m) - , OK i s constant with ^ 0 
^hus, the only Groves' and Loeb mechanism t h a t 
could achieve maximisation of net corporate p r o f i t s i s 
a Groves' and Loeb mechanism with R^ = a t the optimal 
l e v e l o? p r o v i s i o n of k. Since the optimal l e v e l of 
p r o v i s i o n of k i s not known before d i v i s i o n s choose to 
( s t r a t e a i c a l l y or t r u t h f u l l y ) communicate, R^ = R^ 
can on] y cruaranteed i f a. = 0 and T. = -R. . However u,=0 
i 1 1 1 
destroys the dominance of t r u t h f u l communication fo r the 
Groves' and Loeb mechanism s i n c e a d i v i s i o n a l manager 
w i l l r e c e i v e r e g a r d l e s s of what i s communicated. © 
^he work of M i l l e r and Murrel (1981) c l e a r l y shows 
t h a t , i f d i v i s i o n a l managers are e f f o r t a v e r s e , the 
o r i g i n a l Groves' and Loeb mechanism w i l l not maintain 
i t s i n c e n t i v e p r o p e r t i e s . M i l l e r and M u r r e l l (1981) 
conclude i n the paper t h a t 
"the r e s u l t s of t h i s paper thus s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
g e n e r a l i s e those of Pryor by showing t h a t , not 
only do e x i s t i n g schemes f a i l , but a l s o i t i s 
im p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t any bonus scheme t h a t i s 
e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y from the c e n t r e ' s viewpoint. 
The se a r c h f o r the e l u s i v e optimal bonus scheme i n 
command economies ( B e r l i n e r , 1976) i s thus bound 
to be a f a i l u r e . " 
However, i n my view, M i l l e r and Murrel's i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
c l a i m i s based on a fundamental mistaken premise, as the 
d i s c u s s i o n below w i l l attempt to h i g h l i g h t . 
I n the preceding chapters of t h i s t h e s i s , i t has been 
argued t h a t the c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l wish to employ 
d i v i s i o n a l managers,to c o l l e c t and p r o c e s s s p e c i a l i s e d 
i n f o r m a t i o n and to c a r r y out d i v i s i o n a l t a s k s which the 
c e n t r a l headquarters does not have time to c a r r y out. 
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That i s , one of the fundamental reasons why d i v i s i o n a l 
manaqers are employed i s f o r p r o v i s i o n of t h e i r e f f o r t 
s e r v i c e s . c l e a r l y , the c e n t r a l headquarters r e c o g n i s e s 
t h i s and w i l l a l s o recognise t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers 
are e f f o r t averse and r e q u i r e some inducement to provide 
t h e i r e f f o r t s e r v i c e s . Thus Theorem 1 due to 
f i l l e r and * l u r r e l i s based on the premise t h a t the 
c e n t r a l headquarters i s attempting to maximise corporate 
p r o f i t s by r e o u i r i n g t r u t h f u l i nformation p r o v i s i o n from 
d i v i s i o n a l managers, but t h a t the c e n t r e does not 
r e c o g n i s e t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers need be rewarded f o r 
t h e i r e f f o r t s e r v i c e s . However, I would argue t h a t 
c e n t r a l headquarters do r e c o g n i s e t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers 
need to be rewarded f o r t h e i r e f f o r t s e r v i c e s . 
^he above argument i n t h i s s e t t i n g can be expressed 
i n an a l t e r n a t i v e f a s h i o n i f one u s e s the f o l l o w i n g 
taxonomy f o r i n c e n t i v e problems. "Moral hazard" r e f e r s 
to the problem of inducing d i v i s i o n a l managers to supply 
proper amounts of e f f o r t when t h e i r t r u e d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t 
f u n c t i o n i s not known by the c e n t r a l h eadquarters. 
"Adverse s e l e c t i o n " r e f e r s t o a s i t u a t i o n where the 
r e a l i s e d p r o f i t (a s c a l a r ) of a d i v i s i o n can be observed, 
but i t cannot be v e r i f i e d whether the r e a l i s e d p r o f i t was 
the c o r r e c t l y chosen one from the range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
s p e c i f i e d by the p r o f i t " f u n c t i o n " , which only the 
d i v i s i o n a l manager knows completely. 
^hus i t i s argued t h a t i n a d e c e n t r a l i s e d c o r p o r a -
t i o n , one c a n n o t d e a l w i t h a d v e r s e s e l e c t i o n p r o b l e m s 
w i t h o u t a l s o s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o n s i d e r i n g m o r a l h a z a r d 
i s s u e s . T h i s i s b e c a u s e , as the M i l l e r and M u r r e l 
r e s u l t s show, m o r a l h a z a r d i s s u e s may o f t e n be t h e c a u s e 
o f a d v e r s e s e l e c t i o n p r o b l e m s . Thus, 
what i s wrong w i t h t h e M i l l e r and M u r r e l i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
c l a i m i s t h a t t h e y assume t h a t t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
i s n o t aware o f , o r i s n o t p r e p a r e d t o d e a l w i t h m o r a l 
h a z a r d i s s u e s . 
R e c e n t l y , Cohen and Loeb (1984) have p r e s e n t e d a 
m o d i f i e d v e r s i o n o f t h e G r o v e s ' and Loeb mechanism, w h i c h 
n o t o n l y t a k e s a c c o u n t o f a d v e r s e s e l e c t i o n p r o b l e m s , b u t 
a l s o c o n s i d e r s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y m o r a l h a z a r d i s s u e s . T h e i r 
model w i l l now be p r e s e n t e d . 
To r e c a p , t h e p r o f i t s o f t h e f i r m g r o s s o f t h e c o s t s 
o f r e w a r d i n g t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers and t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d a u a r t e r ' s management can be e x p r e s s e d as: ( 
n n 
n ( k , e ) = I ff ( k . ,e.) - C( I k.) (1) 
i = l 1 1 1 i = 1 i 
w here k = ( k ^ , . . . ^ ) and e = ( e ^ , . . . . , e n ) . 
^he d i v i s i o n a l manager's u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s a r e s e p a r a b l e 
i n r e w a r d and e f f o r t , b e i n g i n c r e a s i n g i n t h e f o r m e r 
argument and d e c r e a s i n g l a t e r . 
U . ( V e i ) = R. - g . f e . ) ^ 
Jn a G r o v e s ' and Loeb mechanism, t h e manager of 
d i v i s i o n i s e n d s a message f u n c t i o n m^(k^) t o the c e n t r a l 
h e a d o u a r t e r s . The h e a d q u a r t e r s t h e n d e t e r m i n e s t h e 
a l l o c a t i o n 
n n 
k(m) = argmax £ m. (k . ) - C( £ k.) (3) 
i = l i = l 1 
•^he G r o v e s ' and Loeb d i v i s i o n a l management re w a r d s y s t e m 
c a n be e x p r e s s e d a s : 
n 
R. = IT + £ m.(k.(m)) - C( £ k. (m) ) - A . ... i i 3 3 ^ = 1 D 5 1 C I * ' 
By c o m b i n i n g e q u a t i o n s (2) and (4) , one s e e s t h a t t h e 
* * 
d i v i s i o n a l manager s e l e c t s ( m ^ , e^) t o m a x i m i s e t h e f u n c t i o n 
G ^ ( m^,e^), d e f i n e d a s : 
n 
G. (m. ,e.) = n (k. (m),e.) + £ m.(k . (m)) - C( I k . ( m ) ) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 j ^ l 3 3 j = l 3 
(5) 
~A . - q . ( e . ) 
^IQ y i v i ' 
N ote t h a t f o r any c o n d i t i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n k^, t h e i d i v i s i o n a l 
* 
manager w i l l choose t h e e f f o r t l e v e l e . ( k . ) d e f i n e d by: 
e * ( k i ) = argmax { ^ ( k ^ e . . ) - g i ( e ± ) } (6) 
g i v e n t h e form of e q u a t i o n ( 5 ) , T h i s e q u a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s 
t h e i d e a t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers c a n choose message s t r a t e g i e s 
w i t h t h e knowledge t h a t t h e y c a n o p t i m a l l y a d j u s t f o r e f f o r t 
a f t e r t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s c h o o s e a k^ v a l u e . 
2 ? 1 . 
t,FWMp i . U nder t h e G r o v e s ' and L o e b m e c h a n i s m i n an 
e n v i r o n m e n t c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y e f f o r t a v e r s e d i v i s i o n a l 
t h 
m a n a g e r s , t h e r e e x i s t s a b e s t message f o r t h e i 
d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e messages o t h e r 
d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s c h o o s e t o c o m m u n i c a t e and t h e e f f o r t 
l e v e l s t h e o t h e r s c h o o s e t o p r o v i d e . The s p e c i f i c 
t h 
f o r m o f t h e d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y f o r t h e i d i v i s i o n a l 
m anager i s t o r e p o r t : 
f o r a n v ( n - 1 ) T t u p l e o f s t r a t e g i e s o f o t h e r d i v i s i o n a l 
m a n a q e r s . 
PROOF: t h e i * " * 1 d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r ' s p r o b l e m i s t o s o l v e 
max n . ( k . ,e.) ( k . ) 9, ( e j 
i 
= n. (k. , e * ( k . ) ) - g. ( e * ( k . ) ) ( 7 ) 
n 
max II ( k . (m) ,e .) + I m . (k . (m)) - C ( E k . (m) ) -
rn^e. 1 1 y/i 3 3 3 = 1 3 
A :>ic 
= max * ± ( k ^ m ) ,e* ( k ± ( m ) ) + I m . ( k . (m)) 
j ^ i J J 
* - r ( T k . (m)) - A . - g, ( e . ( k . (m) ) (8) 
222 . 
Rv e q u a t i o n C 7) 
* * 
1 1 i ( k i ( m ^ i c ' T n i ) ' e i ( k i ^ i c ' ™ ^ ) + 1 mi ( k 
n _ # 
C -4 V ^ i c ' V J - Si c ~ V e i ( k i ( n W 
m i (K-j (ra , ,m ) ) + T m (k . (m ,m .) ) 
n * C( F k (m . ,m. ) ) - A, 
* n 
(k ) + r m. ( k . ) - C ( Z k.) - A . 1 1 j * i D 3 j=l D 
f o r a l l k. 
'f'hus we h a v e : 
* * * 
" C ( j I 1 k j ( m ^ i c ' < > > " S i c 
m (k. (m)) + I m . (k . (m)) 
3*1 3 3 
n 
- C( T k.(m)) - A_. 
j = l 3 
"For a l l m . eM . 
2 23 . 
* 
Hence, ITK m a x i m i s e s t h e maximar r i o f ( 8 ) . 
T h u s , when t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s i s t r y i n g t o 
s o l v e t h e a l l o c a t i o n p r o b l e m , g i v e n t h e f o r m o f t h e 
messaqes f r o m d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s , t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
w i l l a c t u a l l y be t r y i n g t o d e t e r m i n e t h e s o l u t i o n t ^ : 
n n n 
max X Ti (k ,e.) - C ( I k.) - I g , ( e . ) (10) 
e,k i = l 3 1 1 j = i D i = l 1 1 
T h u s , a l t h o u g h t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s s e l e c t s 
a l l o c a t i o n s t o m a x i m i s e a m e a s u r e o f t o t a l c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t s 
q r o s s o f r e w a r d s , * . t c a n be s e e n t h a t i n e q u i l i b r i u m 
t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s can be s u r e t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s 
h a v e r e p o r t e d t r u t h f u l l y as t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s has 
a l l o w e d f o r d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s e x p e r i e n c i n g d i s u t i l i t y 
f r o m t h e p r o v i s i o n o f e f f o r t . 
The a b o v e s u g g e s t e d amendment t b t h e o r i g i n a l G r o v e s ' 
and L o e b m e c h a n i s m by Cohen and L o e b d o e s seem, a t f i r s t , 
t o d e a l w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t a r i s e when i t i s r e c o g n i s e d 
t h a t d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s a r e e f f o r t a v e r s e . However, 
c l o s e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d be g i v e n t o t h e i m p l i e d 
o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n w h i c h t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s i s 
a d o p t i n g . The o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n i s g i v e n b y e q u a t i o n (10) 
n n n 
max I H ( k . ,e.) - C( I k.) - I g. ( e . ) 
e,k i = l 1 1 1 j = l 3 i = l 1 x 
n s i n g e q u a t i o n (2) t h i s c a n be r e w r i t t e n a s : 
max 
n 
Z n, ( k , ,e, ) - C( ( e , k ) i = l 
n 
j = l V 
n 
+ E U . (R . , e . ) 
i = l 1 1 1 
n 
- I 
i = l 
However, t h e o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n of c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
i s much more l i k e l y t o be: 
n n n 
max F T? ( k . e . ) - C( I k.) - E R. 
( e , k ) i = l 1 1 1 j = l D i = l 1 
T'hat i s m a x i m i s a t i o n o f t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
r e s i d u a l c l a i m t o c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t s , a f t e r c o m p e n s a t i n g 
d i v i s i o n a l management. Thus, t h e Cohen and Loeb 
amendment does no t l e a d t o a r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e m o r a l 
h a z a r d - a d v e r s e s e l e c t i o n problem t h a t a r i s e s i n d e -
c e n t r a l i s e d o r g a n i s a t i o n s , a s i t does n o t t a k e c o r r e c t 
a c c o u n t o f t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r ' ; s p r e f e r e n c e s . I t 
a p p e a r s t h a t Cohen and Loeb ( 1 9 8 4 , page 21) a r e aware of 
t h i s , a s t h e y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e y o n l y " p r e s e n t t h e model 
i a s a p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f m o r a l 
h a z a r d and r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n " . 
4.5 E v a l u a t i o n o f R e s e a r c h P o s i t i o n 
I n t h e above a n a l y s i s , a t t e n t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e s i g n i n g t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e s i n 
w h i c h d i v i s i o n a l managers have dominant s t r a t e g i e s w h i c h 
r e q u i r e t r u t h f u l c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I t i s shown above t h a t 
t h e o n l y p r o c e d u r e s g u a r a n t e e i n g t h i s dominance a r e of t h e 
G r o v e s and Loeb t y p e , p r o v i d e d t h e r e a r e no m o r a l h a z a r d 
p r o b l e m s . When moral h a z a r d i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t , i t i s 
shown t h a t t h e G r oves and Loeb p r o c e d u r e and s u g g e s t e d 
m o d i f i c a t i o n by Cohen and Loeb i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
I n C h a p t e r 6, an a l t e r n a t i v e t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
p r o c e d u r e i s t h e r e f o r e d e s i g n e d . T h e r e i t i s a r gued t h a t 
t h e t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g problem i s b e s t v i e w e d as a m u l t i -
p l a y e r game w i t h i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . I n s t e a d o f 
t r y i n g t o d e s i g n a p r o c e d u r e w h i c h h a s dominant t r u t h 
t e l l i n g s t r a t e g i e s as t h e e q u i l i b r i u m o f t h e communica-
t i o n game, a p r o c e d u r e w h i c h h a s B a y e s i a n t r u t h t e l l i n g 
s t r a t e g i e s a s t h e e q u i l i b r i u m w i l l be d e s i g n e d . I n 
o r d e r t o i n t r o d u c e t h e s e new c o n c e p t s C h a p t e r 5, t h e r e f o r e , 
p r e s e n t s an o v e r v i e w o f games w i t h i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n 
and B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i a . 
However, c a r e must be t a k e n a t t h i s p o i n t . I n 
C h a p t e r s 3 and 4 i t i s a r g u e d t h a t one need n o t a n a l y s e 
a l l t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e s t o s e e i f u n t r u t h f u l 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n can a r i s e . T h i s i s b e c a u s e t h e Green and 
L a f f o n t C h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n Theorem e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t o n l y 
G r o v e s and Loeb t y p e p r o c e d u r e s g u a r a n t e e t r u t h f u l n e s s 
when m o r a l h a z a r d i s s u e s a r e n o t c o n s i d e r e d . However, i t 
i s now a r g u e d above t h a t t h e G r o v e s and Loeb t y p e p r o c e d u r e s 
a r e u n d e s i r a b l e and t h a t r e s e a r c h w i l l be c o n d u c t e d w i t h 
a new c o n c e p t o f g u a r a n t e e d t r u t h f u l n e s s , t h a t o f a 
B a y e s i a n " t r u t h f u l " e q u i l i b r i u m . T h u s , i t w i l l now be 
assumed t h a t , u n l e s s a t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e h a s a 
B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m i n w h i c h a l l d i v i s i o n a l managers 
c h o o s e t o r e p o r t t r u t h f u l l y ( e v e n when m o r a l h a z a r d i s s u e s 
a r i s e ) , t h a t u n t r u t h f u l c o m m u n i c a t i o n can a r i s e . 
NOTES 
1 . N o t e t h a t w h i l e t h e d i v i s i o n i s r e q u i r e d t o communi-
c a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t some v a r i a b l e , t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n 
n e e d n o t be c o r r e c t , i f i t i s n o t i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e 
d i v i s i o n t o c o m m u n i c a t e t r u t h f u l l y . 
2. Non p l a v i n g i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e c e n t r e d o e s n o t 
c h o o s e a s t r a t e g y t o p l a y . 
. F e r e " s t r e n g t h " r e f e r s t o t h e i m m u n i t y o f t h e 
m e c h a n i s m t o m a n i p u l a t i o n . T h e r e a r e o t h e r p o s s i b l e 
e a u i l i b r i u m c o n c e p t s , s u c h as t h e B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m , 
b u t t h e s e o t h e r s o l u t i o n c o n c e p t s w i l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d 
u n t i l l a t e r when, f o r i n s t a n c e , i n c o m p l e t e n e s s o f i n f o r m a -
t i o n i s f o r m a l l y m o d e l l e d . 
4. A d d i t i o n a l d e s i r a b l e a s p e c t s o f t h e S t r o n g e q u i l i b r i u m 
w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r . 
5. The i d e a h e r e i s t o e s t a b l i s h e x i s t e n c e c o n d i t i o n s 
f o r t h e " w e a k e s t " e q u i l i b r i u m c o n c e p t f i r s t and t h e n 
c o n s i d e r e x i s t e n c e i s s u e s f o r o t h e r c o n c e p t s when t h e y 
a r e d i s c u s s e d i n a t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g s e t t i n g . 
6. P o i n t t o s e t m a p p i n g . 
n . F o r p r o o f o f t h e t h e o r e m see F r i e d m a n ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
B. The e x a c t d e t a i l s o f a d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r ' s e v a l u a -
t i o n m e a s u r e w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d l a t e r . 
°>. T h a t i s , t h e b e s t r e s p o n s e o f a d i v i s i o n i s n o t 
u n i a u e and t h e r e a r e a s e t o f e q u a l l y p r e f e r a b l e b e s t 
r e s p o n s e s . 
1 0 . H e r e P. r e p r e s e n t s r e a l i s e d p r o f i t . 
1 1 . T h a t i s , communicate a message s u c h as a c o n s t a n t 
so t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n i s n o t a l l o c a t e d any common r e s o u r c e s . 
12. T h i s n o t a t i o n i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t from t h a t w h i c h 
Green and L a f f o n t u s e . 
n . The G r o v e s ' and L o e b t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g mechanism i s 
a s p e c i a l c a s e o f t h e g e n e r a l G r o v e s ' mechanism. G r e e n 
and L a f ^ o n t a l s o assume a^™.,.^-) = 1# w h i c h need n o t 
a l w a v s be t h e c a s e . 
I d . Note t h e n e t g a i n may n o t a l w a y s be p o s i t i v e d e p e n d i n g 
on d.d.2's l y i n g and t h e form of t h e i n v e r s e s u p p l y 
s c h e d u l e s . 
1 ^ . C o r o l l a r y o f n o t e 14. 
l f i . T h a t i s IMF > IHG i n F i g u r e I . 
17. theorems 1 and 3 i n M i l l e r and M u r r e l (1981). 
1«. Tn a d d i t i o n , i t i s assumed t h a t e f f o r t c a n n o t t a k e 
on n a n - p o s i t i v e v a l u e s . 
19. ^ee paae 168 f o r i n s t a n c e . 
? n . t-There o t h e r p l a y e r s ' s t r a t e g i c o p t i o n s a r e i r r e l e v a n t . 
GAMES WITH_ 1NCOMPLETE I N FORMAT TON 
5 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
When d i s c u s s i n g t h e G r o v e s and L o e b m e c h a n i s m , i t w a s n o t e d 
t h a t i n a d e c e n t r a l i s e d a l l o c a t i o n game, t h e d i v i s i o n s h a v e 
i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e o t h e r d i v i s i o n s e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
c o n d i t i o n s . A l s o t h e c e n t r e h a s i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t 
t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e d i v i s i o n s . H o w e v e r , a n 
i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e o f t h e d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y m e c h a n i s m s o f G r o v e s 
and L o e b was t h a t t h e d o m i n a n c e p r o p e r t y was s u c h t h a t d i v i s i o n s 
c o u l d i g n o r e t h e s t r a t e g i e s o f o t h e r d i v i s i o n s a n d , h e n c e , d i d n o t 
ne e d t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e i n c o m p l e t e n e s s o f t h e i r i n f o r m a t i o n . 
I n f a c t , t h i s p r o p e r t y h a s l e d some a u t h o r s ^ t o d e s c r i b e t h e 
d i v i s i o n a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n t h e G r o v e s a n d L o e b 
m e c h a n i s m a s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g u n d e r c o m p l e t e i g n o r a n c e . H e r e 
t h e i g n o r a n c e , o f c o u r s e , r e f e r s t o t h e k n o w l e d g e a d i v i s i o n 
h a s o f a n o t h e r d i v i s i o n a n d n o t t o a d i v i s i o n ' s k n o w l e d g e o f i t s 
own p r i v a t e d e c i s i o n p o s i t i o n . 
I t h a s b e e n a r g u e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r t h a t t h e G r o v e s 
z 
a n d L o e b t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g m e c h a n i s m h a s some i n a d e q u a c i e s . I t 
w i l l be shown i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r t h a t some o f t h e s e i n a d e q u a c i e s 
c a n be d e a l t w i t h by d e f i n i n g new a l l o c a t i o n r u l e s ( t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e s ) t h a t t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e i n c o m p l e t e 
i n f o r m a t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e o f d i v i s i o n s and t h e c e n t r e . T h i s 
c h a p t e r w i l l p r e s e n t a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t h e o r y o f games w i t h 
i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o p o s e d by H a r s a n y i . 
5.2 Game s w i t h I n c o m p l e t e I n f o r m a t i o n P l a y e d 
by B a y e s i a n P l a y e r s 
Games o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n a r i s e when some, o r a l l , 
o f t h e p l a y e r s l a c k f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e ' r u l e s ' o f t h e 
a l l o c a t i o n game. T h i s c o u l d o c c u r when a p l a y e r h a s i n c o m p l e t e 
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t o t h e r p l a y e r s p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s a n d a v a i l a b l e 
s t r a t e g i e s a n d / o r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o t h e r p l a y e r s h a v e a b o u t a s p e c t 
o f t h e game. The i n c o m p l e t e n e s s may a l s o r e f e r t o t h e l a c k o f 
k n o w l e d g e p l a y e r s m a y h a v e o f t h e i r own p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s a n d / o r 
a v a i l a b l e s t r a t e g i e s . 
An a n a l y t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s when o n e w a n t s t o c o n s i d e r 
how p l a y e r s w i l l f o r m t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t o t h e r p l a y e r s 
and f o r m u l a t e s t r a t e g i e s when t h e y h a v e i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . 
The d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t t h e i n c o m p l e t e n e s s o f i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e s 
r i s e t o a n i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s i n r e c i p r o c a l e x p e c t a t i o n s on t h e 
p a r t o f p l a y e r s . H o w e v e r , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o o v e r c o m e t h i s 
d i f f i c u l t y i f i t i s p o s s i b l e t o show t h a t t h e game o f i n c o m p l e t e 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s game t h e o r e t i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t t o a game o f 
c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n , s i n c e one c a n t h e n a n a l y s e t h e e q u i v a l e n t 
game o f c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n i n w h i c h , u n d e r s u i t a b l e r e g u l a r i t y 
c o n d i t i o n s , a s t a b l e s e t o f e x p e c t a t i o n s w i l l e x i s t . 
H a r s a n y i f o l l o w s t h i s a p p r o a c h a n d s h o w s t h a t w i t h a game 
o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o c o n s t r u c t a n 
e q u i v a l e n t game o f c o m p l e t e b u t i m p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n . A 
game o f ( c o m p l e t e a n d ) p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n o c c u r s when a l l 
p l a y e r s know a l l p r e v i o u s m o v e s , i n c l u d i n g c h a n c e m o v e s , w h e r e a s 
a game o f ( c o m p l e t e a n d ) i m p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n o c c u r s when 
a p l a y e r i s i g n o r a n t o f some p a s t move, o r s e t of m o v e s . 
F o r e x a m p l e , p o k e r i s a game o f ( c o m p l e t e a n d ) i m p e r f e c t 
i n f o r m a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e f i r s t r o u n d o f c a r d s i s d e a l t f a c e 
down and a p l a y e r d o e s n o t know t h e v e r y f i r s t move o f t h e game 
( t h e c a r d s d e a l t t o h i s o p p o n e n t s ) . H o w e v e r , t h e p l a y e r 
c a n c a l c u l a t e t h e c h a n c e o f an o p p o n e n t b e i n g d e a l t a 
p a r t i c u l a r c a r d , h e n c e i t i s a game o f c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . 
An a l t e r n a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f i m p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t 
i s t o u s e a game t r e e and c o n s i d e r p l a y e r s i n f o r m a t i o n s e t s . 
S u p p o s e p l a y e r 1 moves f i r s t and h a s t h r e e p o s s i b l e s t r a t e g i e s 
a v a i l a b l e . A f t e r p l a y e r 1 m o v e s , p l a y e r 2 m u s t c h o o s e t o 
a d o p t one o f two a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s . S u p p o s e t h e game 
t r e e i s a s i l l u s t r a t e d b e l o w . 
1 
The s e t o f n o d e s i n d e x e d by p l a y e r 2 ' s i n d e x i s s u b - p a r t i t i o n e d 
i n t o two s e t s c o n t a i n i n g one and two n o d e s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
The e l e m e n t s o f t h i s s u b - p a r t i t i o n a r e c a l l e d t h e " i n f o r m a t i o n 
s e t s " f o r p l a y e r 2 and i n d i c a t e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o 
him a t h i s move. I f p l a y e r 1 c h o s e a l t e r n a t i v e a , t h e n by 
c i r c l i n g t h e node a t t h e end o f a r c a a b o v e , o n e i s i n d i c a t i n g 
t h a t p l a y e r 2 knows u n a m b i g u o u s l y w h a t p l a y e r 1 d i d on h i s 
p r e v i o u s move. H o w e v e r , i f p l a y e r 1 c h o o s e s a l t e r n a t i v e 
b o r c , t h e n b y j o i n t l y c i r c l i n g t h e n o d e s a t t h e e n d s o f 
t h e s e a r c s , we i n d i c a t e t h a t p l a y e r 2 c a n n o t d i s t i n g u i s h 
w h e t h e r b o r c was c h o s e n . He c a n n o t d i f f e r e n t i a t e w h i c h r o d e 
i n t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n s e t he i s a t a n d , t h e r e f o r e , h a s i m p e r f e c t 
i n f o r m a t i o n when i t i s h i s t u r n t o move. 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o a l w a y s r e p r e s e n t t h e p r o b l e m o f l n c o r a p l e t 
k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e n o r m a l f o r m o f t h e game a s i n c o m p l e t e 
k n o w l e d g e by p l a y e r s , o f t h e p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s . 
F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t some s t r a t e g y m^ i s n o t 
a v a i l a b l e t o p l a y e r i i s e q u i v a l e n t game t h e o r e t i c a l l y t o t h e 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t p l a y e r i w i l l n e v e r a c t u a l l y u s e m^ b e c a u s e i t 
h a s an e x t r e m e l y low p a y o f f a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t . T h e r e f o r e , 
p r o v i d e d one d e f i n e s p l a y e r i ' s s t r a t e g y s p a c e t o i n c l u d e a l l 
t h o s e s t r a t e g i e s o t h e r p l a y e r s t h i n k i h a s a v a i l a b l e , a s w e l l 
a s a l l t h o s e s t r a t e g i e s i knows a r e a v a i l a b l e , one c a n a s s u m e 
t h a t t h i s s e t i s known t o a l l p l a y e r s , s i n c e a n y l a c k o f 
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e p a r t o f some p l a y e r j a b o u t M^ c a n be 
r e p r e s e n t e d a s a l a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e n u m e r i c a l v a l u e s 
o f p l a y e r i ' s p a y o f f f u n c t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , i n c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e 
a b o u t t h e p o s s i b l e p h y s i c a l o u t c o m e s o f t h e game i s game 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t t o i n c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e a b o u t s t r a t e g i e 
o f o p p o n e n t s i f s t r a t e g i e s a r e s u i t a b l y d e f i n e d . I t i s now 
p o s s i b l e t o c o n s i d e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m o f a game o f i n c o m p l e t 
i n f o r m a t i o n ( a b o u t p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s ) , 
5.2.1 The A p p r o p r i a t e , Game Form f o r Games with 
Incomplete .Information 
A game o f c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n i n e x t e n s i v e f o r m c o n s i s t s 
o f : 
( i ) a game t r e e , e a c h move i n w h i c h i s a s s i g n e d t o o n e , 
and o n l y o n e , o f t h e p l a y e r s i £ {£, 1, , n } , w h e r e £ 
r e p r e s e n t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c h a n c e moves ( b y n a t u r e ) . 
2J2 . 
( i i ) a n a s s i g n m e n t o f e a c h of p l a y e r i ' s m oves t o some 
i n f o r m a t i o n s e t C . o f i , f o r e a c h ie{£ , 1 , , n } . 
13 
( i i i ) a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f e a c h p o s s i b l e f u l l 
h i s t o r y o f t h e game and an a s s i g n m e n t o f t h a t c o n s e q u e n c e t o t h e 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g end p o i n t . 
( i v ) a n a s s e s s m e n t by e a c h p l a y e r i e { l , , n } o f h 1 s 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n IK : E-t-R1 on t h e s e t E o f a l l p o t e n t i a l c o n -
s e q u e n c e s . 
( v ) a n a s s e s s m e n t by e a c h p l a y e r i e { 1 , , n } of h i s 
p r o b a b i l i t y f u n c t i o n on e a c h o f £ ' s i n f o r m a t i o n s e t s C^_. . 
( v i ) f u l l k n o w l e d g e of ( I ) - (V) on t h e p a r t o f e a c h 
p l a y e r { 1 , , n } . 
Games i n e x t e n s i v e f o r m a r e somewhat c u m b e r s o m e f o r t h e 
p u r p o s e s o f s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s i s . H o w e v e r , t h e y c a n b e r e -
5 
f o r m u l a t e d m ore c o m p a c t l y a s games i n n o r m a l f o r m . E s s e n t i a l l y , 
w h a t t h e n o r m a l f o r m d o e s i s t o d e f i n e a c o m p l e t e p u r e s t r a t e g y 
s e t {m. , m. . m , , . . } , c o n s i s t i n g o f o n e c h o i c e m. f r o m 
i l 12 U ( i ) ^ ^ i - D 
e a c h o f i ' s i n f o r m a t i o n s e t s C.. when t h e number o f i n f o r m a t i o n 
s e t s i f a c e s t o t a l s t o • H o w e v e r , t h e i m p l i c i t a s s u m p t i o n 
w i t h n o r m a l f o r m games i s t h a t p l a y e r s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c h o o s e 
t h e i r ( c o m p l e t e ) s t r a t e g i e s b e f o r e t h e game i s commenced. To 
e x p r e s s t h i s i n a n o t h e r way, we a r e a s s u m i n g t h a t p l a y e r s w i l l 
c h o o s e t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s w h i c h d e t e r m i n e t h e o u t c o m e b e f o r e 
c h a n c e ^ , d e t e r m i n e s a t w h i c h i n f o r m a t i o n s e t t h e y a r e l o c a t e d . 
H a r s a n y i g i v e s some e x a m p l e s w h i c h show t h a t t h e u s e o f n o r m a l 
f o r m g a m e s , i n games o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e r i s e t o c o u n t e r 
i n t u i t i v e s o l u t i o n s t o t h e g a m e s . One o f t h e s e e x a m p l e s w i l l 
now be p r e s e n t e d . 
L e t u s c o n s i d e r a two p e r s o n , z e r o sum game w h e r e 
e a c h p l a y e r may b e l o n g t o one o f two p o s s i b l e a t t r i b u t e 
c l a s s e s . I t i s t h e u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h a p l a y e r h a s a b o u t 
t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s t y p e o f a t t r i b u t e c l a s s t h a t c o n -
c e p t u a l i z e s i n c o m p l e t e n e s s o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e game. 
L e t t h e p o s s i b l e a t t r i b u t e c l a s s e s f o r p l a y e r 1 be d e n o t e d 
a ^ and a ^ a n d t h o s e o f p l a y e r 2 be d e n o t e d b ^ a n d b ^ . 
A s s u m e t h a t t h e j o i n t p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a t t r i b u t e 
c l a s s e s f o r t h e game i s : 
b l b 2 
a l .01 .00 
.09 .90 
be a b l e t o u s e t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n a l 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s ( s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s ) o n c e he o r s h e 
f i n d s o u t t h e a t t r i b u t e c l a s s t h e y a r e . 
p ( b . | a L ) 1 .00 .00 
.o<\ .91 
,2. 
p l a y e r 2 
p U . l b ^ ) 
a l . 10 . oo 
fl2 .90 1 .oo 
A l s o a s s u m e t h a t t h e f o u r p o s s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n s 
o f a t t r i b u t e c l a s s e s and p a y o f f s t o p l a y e r 1 w i l l b e : 
I n c a s e ( a ^ ' b ^ ) w h e r e z ,z 
a r e p l a y e r 2's two p o s s i b l e 
p u r e s t r a t e g i e s and v - L » V 2 a r e 
p l a y e r l ' s two p o s s i b l e p u r e 
s t r a t e g i e s . 
2 1 Z 2 
y l -24 -36 I n c a s e ( a , b 2 ) 
y 2 © 24 
2 1 Z 2 




2 1 Z 2 
y l (2) 20 
y 2 2 13 
I n c a s e ( a 2 , b 2 ! 
w h e r e t h e c i r c l e d e l e m e n t i n e a c h p a y o f f box r e p r e s e n t s 
t h e e q u i l i b r i u m i n e a c h game w h e r e e a c h p l a y e r knows t h e i r 
g 
own and t h e i r o p p o n e n t ' s a t t r i b u t e c l a s s w i t h c e r t a i n t y . 
I n t h e game o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n w h e r e p l a y e r 1 
i s u n s u r e o f p l a y e r 2 ' s a t t r i b u t e c l a s s ( a n d w h e r e 
p l a y e r 1 f o r m u l a t e s h i s o r h e r o p t i m a l s t r a t e g y b e f o r e 
f i n d i n g o u t w h a t a t t r i b u t e c l a s s he o r s h e b e l o n g s t o 
d u r i n g any one p l a y o f t h e g a m e ) , t h e n o r m a l f o r m o f 
t h e g ame i s : 
n 12 21 22 z z z z 
11 
y 1 3 . 3 4 20 . 54 1 1 . 20 19 . 4 
12 
y 5.42 1 5 . 3 2 2.21 1 2 . 1 1 
21 
y 1 3 . 3 1 20 . 51 19 . 55 
22 
y 5 .39 1 5 . 2 9 2.36 1 2 . 2 5 
w h e r e t h e n o r m a l i z e d s t r a t e g y f o r p l a y e r 1 a r e o f t h e 
* 
f o r m s = y = ( y , y . ) w h t T e s = y , ( n - 1,2) i s l n , t n t l n 
t h e o r d i n a r y p u r e s t r a t e g y p l a y e r 1 w i l l c h o o s e i f t h e 
p l a y e r s ' a t t r i b u t e c l a s s i s a ^ , w h e r e a s s ^ = y f c ( t = 1/2) 
i s t h e o r d i n a r y p u r e s t r a t e g y t h e p l a y e r w o u l d c h o o s e 
i f h i s o r h e r a t t r i b u t e c l a s s w e r e . A s i m i l a r 
a r g u m e n t c a n be p r e s e n t e d f o r p l a y e r 2 ' s s t r a t e g i e s . 
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H e n c e , t h e s t r a t e g y p a i r ( y ,z ) i m p l i e s t h a t : 
p l a y e r 1 a d o p t s s t r a t e g y y^ when t h e p l a y e r s ' a t t r i b u t e 
c l a s s i s a ^  
p l a y e r 1 a d o p t s s t r a t e g y y ^ when t h e p l a y e r s ' a t t r i b u t e 
c l a s s i s 
p l a y e r 2 a d o p t s s t r a t e g y z r e g a r d l e s s o f w h a t a t t r i b u t e 
c l a s s t h e p l a y e r b e l o n g s t o . 
T h u s , t h e t o t a l p a y o f f e x p e c t a t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o 
t h i s s t r a t e g y p a i r i s : 
(.01 x 2) + ( 0 . 0 0 x - 2 4 ) + (.09 x 40) + (.90 x 2) = 5.42 
21 21 
The o n l y e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t o f t h i s game i s (y ,z ) . 
T h u s p l a y e r l ' s o p t i m a l ( n o r t r a l i z e d ) s t r a t e g y i s t o : 
p l a y 1^ when c l a s s a ^ 
p l a y y ^ when c l a s s 
and p l a y e r 2 ' s o p t i r - . a l ( n o r m a l i z e d ) s t r a t e g y i s t o : 
p l a y when c l a s s 
p l a y z^ when c l a s s 
S u p p o s e , h o w e v e r , p l a y e r 1 a c t u a l l y b e l o n g s t o a t t r i b u t e 
c l a s s a ^ . G i v e n t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , p l a y e r 1 w i l l be a b l e 
t o i n f e r ( b y c o n d i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s ) t h a t p l a y e r 2 
m u s t b e l o n g t o a t t r i b u t e c l a s s I n a d d i t i o n , s i n c e 
p l a y e r 1 knows t h e c o n d i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s w h i c h p l a y e r 
2 b e l i e v e s , p l a y e r 1 w i l l be a b l e t o c o n c l u d e t h a t p l a y e r 
2 i s a s s i g n i n g a n e a r u n i t y p r o b a b i l i t y (.90) t o t h e 
m i s t a k e n h y p o t h e s i s t h a t p l a y e r 1 b e l o n g s t o c l a s s . 
T h u s , p l a y e r 1 r e a l i z e s t h a t p l a y e r 2 i s e x p e c t i n g t h e 
c o n s t i t u e n t game ( a 2 # b ) t o a p p l y . T h u s , p l a y e r 1 w i l l 
e x p e c t p l a y e r 2 t o a d o p t s t r a t e g y . I f c a s e ( a ,b ) 
d i d r e p r e s e n t t h e a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n t h e n p l a y e r l ' s b e s t 
r e p l y t o s t r a t e g y w o u l d be s t r a t e g y y ^ . H o w e v e r , h e r e 
we a r e a s s u m i n g t h a t p l a y e r 1 knows t h a t t h e a c t u a l c o n -
s t i t u e n t game b e i n g p l a y e d i s ( a ^ b ^ ) . H e n c e , p l a y e r l ' s 
b e s t r e p l y t o s t r a t e g y z ^ i s y ^ n o t y ^ . T h u s , by c h o o s i n g 
y ^ , p l a y e r 1 w i l l be a b l e t o e x p l o i t p l a y e r 2 ' s m i s t a k e n 
b e l i e f t h a t p l a y e r 1 p r o b a b l y b e l o n g s t o a t t r i b u t e c l a s s 
. T h e e x t e n s i v e f o r m o f t h e game w h e r e p l a y e r 












U o o 
b 2_ 
The a b o v e e x a m p l e i l l u s t r a t e d how t h e n o r m a l f o r m o f game 
o b s c u r e s t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e u p d a t i n g o f 
s u b j e c t i v e ( c o n d i t i o n a l ) p r o b a b i l i t i e s when p l a y e r s l e a r n 
o f some i n f o r m a t i o n , s u c h a s w h i c h a t t r i b u t e c l a s s t h e y 
w i l l b e l o n g t o , b e f o r e a game c o m m e n c e s . I t w o u l d , t h e r e -
f o r e seem more a p p r o p r i a t e t o e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i s e t h a t 
games o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n a r e games c h a r a c t e r i z e d 
by d e l a y e d c o m n i t m e n t , w h e r e a 
23B. 
p l a y e r w i l l ( w a n t t o ) w a i t u n t i l he f i n d s o u t a t w h i c h i n f o r m a -
t i o n s e t he h a s l o c a t e d b e f o r e c h o o s i n g a s t r a t e g y . T h e r e -
f o r e , H a r s a n y i c h o s e t o f o r m u l a t e games of i n c o m p l e t e 
i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m . The s t a n d a r d f o r m i s an 
i n t e r m e d i a t e f o r m b e t w e e n t h e ' e x t e n s i v e f o r m and t h e n o r m a l 
f o r m . The s t a n d a r d f o r m s h o w s , t h e r e f o r e , how s t r a t e g i e s 
a r e made up o f c h o i c e s a t i n f o r m a t i o n s e t s . The s t a n d a r d 
f o r m c a n be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e e x t e n s i v e f o r m by a s s u m i n g t h a t 
e a c h i n f o r m a t i o n s e t o f p l a y e r i i s a d m i n i s t e r e d by a s e p a r a t e 
a g e n t , i n d e x e d i j . T h e r e f o r e , t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m d o e s n o t 
o n l y h a v e a p l a y e r s e t N, b u t a l s o a n a g e n t s e t , o r t y p e s e t 
f o r e v e r y p l a y e r i e N . P l a y e r i ' s a g e n t s e t i s a s s u m e d 
t o be a n o n - e m p t y f i n i t e s e t o f p a i r s o f i n t e r g e r s o f t h e 
f o r m i j . The u n i o n o f a l l w i t h i e N i s d e n o t e d C. 
E a c h a g e n t i j ( a t i n f o r m a t i o n s e t c ^ j ) h a s a n o n - e m p t y 
f i n i t e s t r a t e g y s e t j M. . o f a v a i l a b l e s t r a t e g i e s m. . . A 
13 ID 
p u r e s t r a t e g y m^ o f p l a y e r i may, t h e r e f o r e , be t h o u g h t o f a s 
a c o l l e c t i o n o f s t r a t e g i e s f o r h i s a g e n t s . 
( 1 ) m. = (m > 
1 
The l o w e r i n d e x C. i n d i c a t e s t h a t m. c o n t a i n s one e l e m e n t m. 
1 1 i j 
f o r e v e r y l j e C ^ . T h a t i s , p l a y e r i ' s p u r e s t r a t e g y s e t M ^  
i s t h e s e t o f a l l t h e s e c o l l e c t i o n s . 
( 2 ) M. = . X _ M . . 1 l]£C, 11 
x 
A p u r e s t r a t e g y c o m b i n a t i o n i s a c o l l e c t i o n o f p u r e s t r a t e g i e s 
m = ( m j ^ N c o n t a i n i n g one p u r e s t r a t e g y f o r e a c h p l a y e r i e N . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , one c o u l d v i e w a p u r e s t r a t e g y c o m b i n a t i o n a s 
a c o l l e c t i o n o f s t r a t e g i e s m = ^ m i ^ ^ Q c o n t a i n i n g one s t r a t e g y 
m., EM., f o r e a c h a g e n t i i E C . T h e r e i s no n e e d t o make a ID ID 
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n (m. ) . a n d (m . ,) i f b o t h p r e s c r i b e t h e 
1 N 13 C 
same s t r a t e g i e s t o t h e a g e n t s ' i n C. The p u r e s t r a t e g y 
c o m b i n a t i o n M i s t h e s e t o f a l l t h e c o l l e c t i o n s m: 
X M. = X. o) M = A M • = / \ M • • 
1 . N 
1EN ID EC 
P a y o f f s a r e d e f i n e d o n l y f o r p l a y e r s and n o t a g e n t s . A p a y o f f 
f u n c t i o n E on M a s s i g n s a p a y o f f v e c t o r 
E(m) = { E . ( m ) T t o e a c h meM 1 N 
Once a g a i n , t h e l o w e r i n d e x N i n d i c a t e s t h a t E(m) c o n t a i n s one 
c o m p o n e n t E^(m) f o r e v e r y i e N . 
One c a n v i e w M a s a s t r u c t u r e endowed w i t h a l l t h e i n f o r m a -
t i o n on t h e s e t s N, C. and M. M i s s a i d t o be a d m i s s a b l e i f 
1 ID 
a l l t h e s e s e t s a r e f i n i t e a n d n o n - e m p t y . We a r e now i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o g i v e a f o r m a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a game i n s t a n d a r d f o r m . 
S t a n d a r d f o r m : A game i n s t a n d a r d f o r m G = (M,E) c o n s i s t s o f 
an a d m i s s a b l e s e t o f p u r e s t r a t e g y c o m b i n a t i o n s M w i t h t h e 
s t r u c t u r e i n d i c a t e d by e q u a t i o n ( 3 ) , t o g e t h e r w i t h a p a y o f f 
f u n c t i o n E on M . 
N o r m a l f o r m : The n o r m a l f o r m o f a s t a n d a r d f o r m game G = ( H , E ) 
h a s t h e same s t r u c t u r e a s G, e x c e p t t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e 
i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e p u r e s t r a t e g y s e t s g i v e n b y e q u a t i o n ( 
i s s u p r e s s e d . N o t a t i o n a l l y t h e n , one n e e d n o t make any 
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a s t a n d a r d f o r m and i t s n o r m a l f o r m . 
5.2.2 
The s t a n d a r d f o r m o f a qame w i t h i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n 
L e t t h e s e t o f v e c t o r s a , a , . , ..... a . . . .... a . 
01 l i 11 n i 
t a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The f i r s t c o m p o n e n t i s 
t h e v e c t o r o f p a r a m e t e r s o f t h e p a y o f f f u n c t i o n E ^ o f p l a y e r i , 
w h i c h p l a y e r 3 v i e w s a s unknown t o a l l p l a y e r s , w h e r e a s t h e 
o t h e r v e c t o r s r e p r e s e n t t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f E ^ w h i c h , i n p l a y e r 
j ' s o p i n i o n , a r e unknown t o some o f t h e p l a y e r s b u t known t o 
t h e p l a y e r s i n d e x e d by t h e f i r s t s u b s c r i p t t o a . 
The v e c t o r t h a t , i n p l a y e r j ' s o p i n i o n , r e p r e s e n t s t h e 
k n o w l e d g e p l a y e r k h a s o f t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s ' p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s 
, E , e x c l u d i n g t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t p l a y e r j t h i n k s 
a l l n p l a y e r s s h a r e , c a n t h e r e f o r e be d e n o t e d a s a = , . . . a 
f o r k = o, 1, i , .... n. 
H e r e t h e v e c t o r s u m m a r i s e s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t p l a y e r j 
b e l i e v e s none o f t h e p l a y e r s h a v e a b o u t t h e p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s 
v V 
I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , p o s s i b l e t o e x p r e s s w h a t , i n p l a y e r j ' s 
o p i n i o n , i s i n c o m p l e t e l y known by some o r a l l p l a y e r s a b o u t t h e 
p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s E , ...., E a s b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e v e c t o r 
1 n 
a = ( a , . . . . a ) . 
1 n * 
Now d e f i n e a f u n c t i o n V. w h o s e m a t h e m a t i c a l f o r m i s known t o a l l 
1 
p l a y e r s s u c h t h a t 
* 
( 1 ) E . (m , ...,m ) = V. (m,, ....m , a , a ) 
1 1 n 1 1 n o 
a l s o l e t a ^ . c = ( a ^ a i + 1 ' •••»„> 
T h i s means i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e x p r e s s i n c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e 
a b o u t t h e f o r m o f t h e o r i g i n a l p a y o f f f u n c t i o n i n a game 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t f o r m , w h e r e t h e f o r m o f t h e new p a y o f f 
f u n c t i o n i s known t o a l l , a n d i n c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e i s r e p r e s e n t e d 
by t h e v e c t o r s a a 
o ' 
F o r a n y g i v e n p l a y e r 1 , t h e n c o m p o n e n t v e c t o r s o f a ^ , a ^ > i c 
w i l l r e p r e s e n t unknown v a r i a b l e s , t h e r e f o r e a s s u m i n g t h e 
p l a y e r s a r e B a y e s i a n , t h e y w i l l a s s i g n a s u b j e c t i v e j o i n t 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n t o t h e unknown v e c t o r s . P l a y e r i , 
h o w e v e r , w i l l h a v e i n c o m p l e t e . k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e s u b j e c t i v e 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s t h a t t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s a d o p t . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o d e a l w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m i n t h e same manner 
a s i n c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e of t h e form o f p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s was 
d e a l t w i t h . T h a t i s one c a n d e f i n e a s e t o f v e c t o r s 
b = ( b . , . . . . , b. . , b ...... b ) t o d e n o t e t h e p a r a m e t e r 
•3ic l 1 - 1 l + l n 
v e c t o r s o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s t h a t t h e 
o t h e r p l a y e r s u s e . The s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s 
t h a t t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s u s e c a n be d e n o t e d 
P 3 i C = P l ' ' P i - 1 ' P i + 1 ' P N 
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o r e d e f i n e t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n t h a t i h a s o v e r i t s unknown v a r i a b l e s a , a 
o »ic 
and b . a s f o l l o w s : 
( 2 ) P . ( a , a . ; b . ) = R ( a , a . , b . | b . ) 
1 O 3 1 C 3 I C 1 O p l C ^ 1 C 1 
w h e r e R., u n l i k e P. i s a f u n c t i o n w h o s e m a t h e m a t i c a l f o r m i s l l 
known t o a l l n p l a y e r s . H e r e b^ i s t h e v e c t o r c o n s i s t i n g o f 
t h o s e p a r a m e t e r s o f t h e f u n c t i o n P^, w h i c h i n p l a y e r j ' s o p i n i o n , 
a r e unknown t o some o r a l l o f t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s b e s i d e s i . 
T h a t i s , t h e f u n c t i o n R^ i s a f u n c t i o n y i e l d i n g f o r e a c h s p e c i f i c 
v a l u e o f t h e v e c t o r b ^ ( w h i c h i s known t o i ) a p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o v e r t h e v e c t o r r a n g e s p a c e A X A . X B 
3 R O 2 1 C 31C 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o e l i m i n a t e t h e v e c t o r a ^ , unknown t o 
a l l p l a y e r s f r o m e q u a t i o n s one and t w o . F o r e q u a t i o n one 
e x p e c t e d v a l u e s a r e t a k e n w i t h r e s p e c t t o a i n t e r m s o f 
o 
p l a y e r i ' s own s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h a t i s 
one c a n d e f i n e 
( 3 ) V. (m. , . . . . , m , a , b ) 
l l n 1 
, f v . (m., , m , a , a ) d ( a ) R . ( a , a . ,b ^ J b . ) A J i 1 n o o i o D i e s i c 1 i o 
s o t h a t we c a n e x p r e s s t h e e x p e c t e d v a l u e o f p l a y e r i ' s p a y o f f 
m t e r m s o f h i s own s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n a s : 
( 4 ) x. = V. (m , m , a , b . ) 
l l 1 n l 
F o r e q u a t i o n ( 2 ) , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e l i m i n a t e by t a k i n g 
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e m a r g i n a l p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
So d e f i n e 
( 5 ) P. ( a . , b . ) = , J d , . P. ( a , a . , b . ) l 3ic' »i<c A ( a ) l o' 31c 3 i c o o 
a nd d e f i n e 
( 6 ) R . ( a . , b l b . ) = x rd R . ( a , a . , b . l b . ) i a i c s i c 1 i A>J ( a ) i o' ^J-C > i c ' i o o 
t h u s 
( 7 ) P . ( a . , b . ) = R . ( a . , b . l b . ) 
1 DlC 31C 1 31C 3 1C 1 1 
F o r r e a s o n s t h a t w i l l become a p p a r e n t s h o r t l y when we 
d e f i n e a v e c t o r c , i t w i l l be h e l p f u l t o r e - e x p r e s s e q u a t i o n ( 4 ) 
a s 
( 8 ) x = V . (m , m , a , b . , b ) = V . (m , . . . . , m , a , b ) i l l n l >1C l 1 n 
( w h e r e t h e v e c t o r b ^ ^ o c c u r s o n l y v a c u o u s l y ) , a n d r e - e x p r e s s 
e q u a t i o n ( 7 ) a s 
( 9 ) P. (a . , b . _ ) = R . ( a . , b l a . , b . ) 1 3 1 C s i c 1 i 
( w h e r e on t h e r i g h t h a n d s i d e v e c t o r a ^ o c c u r s o n l y v a c u o u s l y ) . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o s i m p l i f y t h e o v e r a l l n o t a t i o n now t h a t t h e 
c o n c e p t s h a v e b e e n d e v e l o p e d . L e t u s d e f i n e 
c . = ( a . , b . ) l 1 1 
c = ( a , b ) 
c ( a . , b ) 3 1 C 3 1 C 5> l C 
w h e r e c ^ r e p r e s e n t s t h e t o t a l i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o p l a y e r i 
i n t h e game, i f one d i s r e g a r d s p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h i s 
i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o a l l n p l a y e r s . The v e c t o r c ^ i s 
s o m e t i m e s r e f e r r e d t o a s p l a y e r i ' s i n f o r m a t i o n v e c t o r o r , 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y , p l a y e r i ' s a t t r i b u t e v e c t o r o r p l a y e r i ' s t y p e . 
C l e a r l y c ^ s u m m a r i s e s some c r u c i a l p a r a m e t e r s o f p l a y e r i ' s 
own p a y o f f f u n c t i o n a s w e l l a s t h e m a i n p a r a m e t e r s o f h i s 
b e l i e f s . So i n t h e m o d e l p l a y e r s ' i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t 
t h e t r u e n a t u r e o f t h e game s i t u a t i o n c a n be r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n g e n e r a l t h e a c t u a l v a l u e o f a p l a y e r ' s 
a t t r i b u t e v e c t o r w i l l be known o n l y t o t h e p l a y e r h i m s e l f a n d w i l l 
n o t be known by a n y o f t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s . 
T h i s m e a n s i t i s p o s s i b l e t o w r i t e e q u a t i o n s ( 8 ) a n d ( 9 ) 
r e s p e c t i v e l y i n more c o n c i s e f o r m a s 
( 1 0 ) x = V. ( m n , . . . . , m , c ) = V. (m, ,.. ,., m , c c ) 
l l l n l l n 1 n 
( 1 1 ) P. ( c ^ ) = V ^ c r l c . ) 
OR 
( 1 2 ) P i ( C 1 C i - l ' C i + l C n } = R i ( C ! C i - l ' C i + l . c c n 1 
244 . 
E q u a t i o n s ( 1 0 ) and ( 1 2 ) c a n be r e g a r d e d a s t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m 
e q u a t i o n s d e f i n i n g t h e p a r t i c u l a r game of i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a -
t i o n c o n s i d e r e d f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f some p l a y e r j . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o d e f i n e t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m o f t h e game 
of i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n f a c e d by p l a y e r j , t h e r e f o r e , by 
t h e o r d e r e d s e t G, s u c h t h a t 
( 1 3 ) G = ( M i ' V c i V v i V R i R N) 
w h e r e f o r i = 1 , . . . . n w e^ w r i t e = ^ m • ] 
<=1 - I ' l l 
w h e r e V. i s a f u n c t i o n f r o m t h e s e t MX....XM XC,X....XC t o 
1 1 N 1 N 
p l a y e r I ' S u t i l i t y l i n e ^ . ( w h i c h i s a c o p y o f t h e r e a l l i n e ) 
and w h e r e f o r a n y v a l u e o f c . t h e f u n c t i o n R. = R . ( c | c . ) 
1 1 1 » i c 1 1 
i s a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n o v e r t h e s e t . 
C . = C.X....XC. . X C , , X . , . . X c„ 
-> 3 1 C 1 l - l l + l N 
5.2.3 T h e . J B a y e s i a n E q u i v a l e n t Game 
A game o f c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n G* game t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e game of i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n G w o u l d be a 
game G* w i t h t h e same p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s V\ and t h e same s t r a t e g y 
s p a c e s M^, The v e c t o r s c ^ w o u l d now be i n t e r p r e t e d a s r a n d o m 
v e c t o r s ( c h a n c e m o v e s ) w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e j o i n t p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n R* = R* ( c , , . . . . c ) = R * ( c ) known t o a l l n p l a y e r s 
1 n 
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o d e f i n e t h e B a y e s i a n e q u i v a l e n t game 
of c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n h e r e a f t e r o n l y d e n o t e d a s G* a s 
G * = < » V M N , C l C N , V 1 
Thus t h e o r d e r e d s e t G* d i f f e r s f r o m t h e o r d e r e d s e t G o n l y i n 
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e n - t y p e R R o c c u r r i n g i n G i s r e p l a c e d 
i n G* by t h e s i n g l e t o n R* . T h e r e f o r e , i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n 
e q u i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n t h e two games, i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t e a c h 
p l a y e r i s h o u l d a s s i g n t h e same n u m e r i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y t o any 
g i v e n s p e c i f i c e v e n t . T h i s , i n t u r n , r e q u i r e s e q u i v a l e n c e 
b e t w e e n t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n R ^ ^ c 3 ^ c l c ^ ) 
and t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n R M C ^ ^ I c ^ ) 
g e n e r a t e d by R * ( C ) . T h a t i s , i n o r d e r t h a t t h e two games be 
B a y e s - e q u i v a l e n t f o r p l a y e r j 
1. The two games m u s t h a v e t h e same s t r a t e g y r a n g e s p a c e s 
M , ,M a n d t h e same t y p e s r a n g e s p a c e s C , C . 
i n . I N 
2. T h e y m u s t h a v e t h e same p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s V ^ » - - - ' V N ' 
3. A l s o , t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n R^ o f e a c h 
p l a y e r i n G m u s t s a t i s f y t h e f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
( 1 4 ) R. ( C . I C . ) = R * ( C J C. ) 
w h e r e R * ( C ) = R * ( C . , C . ) 
=>lC ! 
t h e n 
( 1 5 ) R * ( C _ . I c . ) = R * ( C _ . _ , C . ) 
3 i c ' i 3 i C i 
g i v e n ( 1 4 ) a n d ( 1 5 ) we a l s o h a v e 
( 1 6 ) R M C ) « R M C , . £ , C . ) = V ^ i - I V •/ d ( c , A R M C , i C ' V Jr d, R* c . 
T h e r e f o r e , t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e r e e x i s t s t h e B a y e s i a n 
e q u i v a l e n t game o f c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n G* d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r 
t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s R ( C^^. | ) , . . . . 
R (C | c ) a r e , i n e f f e c t , d e r i v e d f r o m a n u n d e r l y i n g n =>ne 1 n 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n R * ( C . C ) w h i c h s a t i s f i e s 
1 n 
e q u a t i o n ( 1 6 ) . 
The e s s e n t i a l a r g u m e n t f o r d e f e n d i n g s u c h a n e x i s t e n c e 
i s t h a t one may w i s h t o a r g u e t h a t a n y d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e 
s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t p l a y e r s h o l d a r e due e x c l u s i v e l y 
t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n f o r m a t i o n . T h a t i s , a n y d i f f e r e n c e 
b e t w e e n t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t p l a y e r s e n t e r t a i n 
m u s t b e due t o t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e c h a n c e e v e n t 
w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e i r t y p e , i n t h e m o d e l p r e s e n t e d h e r e . 
More g e n e r a l l y , i t i s a s s u m e d t h a t p e o p l e who h a v e a l w a y s 
r e c e i v e d p r e c i s e l y t h e same i n f o r m a t i o n w o u l d h a v e no r a t i o n a l 
r e a s o n f o r m a i n t a i n i n g d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s . 
H o w e v e r , Aumann a r g u e s t h a t , b e c a u s e o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s , 
i t may seem t h a t , " r e c o n c i l i n g s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s 
m a kes s e n s e i f i t i s a q u e s t i o n o f i m p l i c i t l y e x c h a n g i n g i n f o r m a -
t i o n , b u t n o t i f we a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t ' i n n a t e ' d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
p r i o r s " . He i s a r g u i n g t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n d i f f e r e n c e 
a r g u m e n t may n o t be u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d b e c a u s e o f i n b o r n 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n how p e o p l e c a l c u l a t e and 
p e r c e i v e t h i n g s o r how t h e y w i s h t o c a l c u l a t e a nd p e r c e i v e . 
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H o w e v e r , i f i n s t e a d o f c o n s i d e r i n g p e o p l e i n g e n e r a l a s 
t h e p l a y e r s , we r e s t r i c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e s e t of d i v i s i o n a l 
m a n a g e r s , t h e s e i n b o r n p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s may be 
p r e s u m e d t o be v e r y s m a l l d i f f e r e n c e s . The r e a s o n t h i s may 
be t h e c a s e i s b e c a u s e , i n o r d e r t o a t t a i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f 
m a n a g e r ^ p o t e n t i a 1 c a n d i d a t e s w i l l h a v e had t o h a v e b e e n 
s u c c e s s f u l i n s e l e c t i o n t r i a l s . F o r e x a m p l e , t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s 
c h o s e n t o be m a n a g e r s may be t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s w h o s e p s y c h o -
l o g i c a l a t t r i b u t e s a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h o s e o f company 
p o l i c y . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s who a r e " d y n a m i c and 
a s s e r t i v e " w i l l h a v e t h e b e s t c h a n c e o f b e i n g c h o s e n t o be 
m a n a g e r s by a company who w a n t d y n a m i c and a s s e r t i v e m a n a g e r s . 
I n o t h e r w o r d s , w h a t I am a r g u i n g i s t h a t m a n a g e r s a r e p a r t l y 
c h o s e n f o r t h e i r p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t r i b u t e s , s o one w o u l d 
e x p e c t t h a t t h e " i n n a t e d i f f e r e n c e s " t h a t Aumann t a l k s o f 
w o u l d be s m a l l . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s b y a g e n e r a l e x a m p l e , i f 
i t w e r e t h e c a s e t h a t t h e w e i g h t l e s s n e s s s i c k n e s s t h a t some 
p o t e n t i a l a s t r o n a u t s c o u l d e n c o u n t e r ^ w e r e t o t a l l y due t o 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s , t h e n i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e v u l n e r a b l e 
p o t e n t i a l a s t r o n a u t s w o u l d h a v e b e e n d e t e c t e d i n t e s t s . 
H a r s a n y i d e s c r i b e s t h e b e l i e f s o f t h e p l a y e r s a s m u t u a l l y 
c o n s i s t e n t i f t h e r e d o e s e x i s t a b a s i c p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n 
R * ( C , . . . . C ) f r o m w h i c h t h e p l a y e r s ' s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y 1 n 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s c a n be d e r i v e d a s c o n d i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y d i s -
t r i b u t i o n s , R, ( C . I C , ) , . . . . R (C |c ) . T h e r e f o r e , i n t r y i n g 
1 ^ l c 1 1 n a n c ' n 
t o e s t i m a t e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n R * ( C , . . . . C ) , p l a y e r j 
1 n 
s h o u l d t r y and u s e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n common t o a l l n p l a y e r s , 
and t h e n make u s e o f any a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n he h a s a b o u t 
t h e game s i t u a t i o n . H a r s a n y i a r g u e s t h a t , i f p l a y e r j u s e s 
t h i s e s t i m a t i o n p r o c e d u r e , e v e n t h o u g h i t w i l l g u a r a n t e e 
t h e 
i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y b e t w e e n / n p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s 
R,,....R , t h a t p l a y e r j u s e s t o a n a l y s e t h e g a m e . i t may i n ' 
n o t g u a r a n t e e e x t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y among t h e p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s u s e d by d i f f e r e n t p l a y e r s , b e c a u s e of t h e " i n n a t e 
d i f f e r e n c e s " t h a t Aumann t a l k s o f . H a r s a n y i a r g u e s , h o w e v e r , 
t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e w h e r e b y e a c h p l a y e r t r i e s t o e s t i m a t e R* 
a s i f t h e y w e r e an o u t s i d e o b s e r v e r u s i n g t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n 
t h a t was common k n o w l e d g e g o e s a s f a r a s an e s t i m a t i o n 
p r o c e d u r e c a n go i n p r o m o t i n g e x t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . I n 
a d d i t i o n , i f one a s s u m e s t h e r e h a s b e e n some p r e - s e 1 e c t i o n 
c a r r i e d o u t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p l a y e r s a s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , t h e n 
one m i g h t be r e a s o n a b l y c o n f i d e n t o f e x t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . 
I n t h e c a s e w h e r e p l a y e r j h a s i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t p l a y e r i 
i s u s i n g a s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n i n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h h i s , t h e n t h i s d i f f e r e n c e may be e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f 
d i f f e r e n c e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t p l a y e r s h a v e a b o u t 
t h e p r o c e s s d e t e r m i n i n g t h e gam'e s i t u a t i o n , i n w h i c h c a s e one 
c o u l d r e d e f i n e t h e p l a y e r s ' a t t r i b u t e v e c t o r s C t o e n s u r e t h a t 
t h e n p l a y e r s a r e u s i n g m u t u a l l y c o n s i s t e n t s u b j e c t i v e 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , p l a y e r j m u s t 
u s e n o t o n l y t h e i n f o r m a t i o n he h a s o b t a i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y 
a b o u t t h e game, b u t a l s o i n f o r m a t i o n he c a n i n f e r f r o m w h a t 
he knows a b o u t t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s a s s e s s m e n t of p r o b a b i l i t i e s . 
I f he w e r e t o a s s i g n p r o b a b i l i t y P_^(e) t o e v e n t e and d i s c o v e r 
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t p l a y e r i a s s i g n s a v e r y d i f f e r e n t p r o b a b i l i t y 
P M e ) f P_.(e) t o t h e e v e n t , t h e n p l a y e r 3 c a n n o t j u s t r e s t t h e 
m a t t e r w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t he and p l a y e r i a r e a s s e s s i n g 
t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s on t h e b a s i s o f two r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t s e t s o f 
i n f o r m a t i o n . I n s t e a d he m u s t c o n s i d e r w h i c h a s s e s s m e n t i s 
l i k e l y t o be b a s e d on more c o r r e c t a nd more c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i f one w i s h e d t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p l a y e r s ' 
s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s w e r e , i n f a c t , i n c o n s i s t e n t 
t h e n , i n o r d e r t o a n a l y s e t h e p r o b l e m , one must u s e a m o d e l 
o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g B a y e s i a n game s u g g e s t e d by S e l t e n a s an 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e p r i o r l o t t e r y m o d e l i n w h i c h t h e game o f 
i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e p l a c e d by a B a y e s i a n game o f 
c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n , i n w h i c h n a t u r e f i r s t c o n d u c t s a l o t t e r y 
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h R* ( C , , . . . . C ) t o d e t e r m i n e w h i c h subgame 
1 n 
w i l l be p l a y e d . 
S e l t e n ' s m o d e l i s c a l l e d t h e p o s t e r i o r - l o t t e r y m o d e l . 
S u p p o s e t h a t t h e a t t r i b u t e v e c t o r o f p l a y e r i c a n t a k e J 
d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s i n t h e game. Assume t h a t t h e r o l e o f p l a y e r i 
w i l l be p l a y e d a t t h e same t i m e b y d i f f e r e n t p l a y e r s , e a c h 
r e p r e s e n t i n g a d i f f e r e n t v a l u e o f t h e a t t r i b u t e v e c t o r . 
The s e t J . c a n be c a l l e d t h e r o l e c l a s s i . D i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s 1 
i n t h e same r o l e c l a s s i w i l l be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by s u b s c r i p t s 
a s p l a y e r s i , i , . . . . i . T h e r e f o r e , t h e t o t a l number o f p l a y e r s 1 2 J . 1 
i n t h e game w i l l be 
N 
J = Z J 
i = l 1 
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E a c h p l a y e r i j f r o m a g i v e n r o l e c l a s s i w i l l c h o o s e 
some s t r a t e g y ITK f r o m p l a y e r i ' s s t r a t e g y s p a c e M^. A f t e r 
a l l J p l a y e r s h a v e c h o s e n t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s , one p l a y e r 13 
f r o m e a c h r o l e c l a s s i w i l l be r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d a s an a c t i v e 
p l a y e r . The p r o b a b i l i t y o f s e l e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h a n y 
s p e c i f i c c o m b i n a t i o n o f a t t r i b u t e v e c t o r s = C^, C = c' n n 
w i l l be g o v e r n e d by t h e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n R* ( C. C >. 
1 n 
To m o d e l a s i t u a t i o n o f m u t u a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t s u b j e c t i v e 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s , we a s s u m e t h a t when a l l J p l a y e r s 
h a v e c h o s e n t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s , t h e r e w i l l be a s e p a r a t e l o t t e r y 
L ( i _ ^ ) f o r e v e r y p l a y e r i j , i n s t e a d o f t h e r e b e i n g one g r a n d 
l o t t e r y L * f o r a l l J p l a y e r s . F o r e a c h p l a y e r i j i n t h e 
r o l e c l a s s i , h i s l o t t e r y w i l l c h o o s e ( n - 1 ) p l a y e r s a s h i s 
p a r t n e r s t o d e f i n e t h e subgame he p a r t i c i p a t e s i n . I f p l a y e r 
i n h i m s e l f h a s t h e a t t r i b u t e v e c t o r C. = c', t h e n t h e 
1 1 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f h i s ( n - 1 ) p a r t n e r s h a v i n g a n y s p e c i f i c com-
"* / / b i n a t i o n o f a t t r i b u t e v e c t o r s C, = C, , . . . . , C. , = C. ,,C. , = 1 1 l - l 1 - I 1 + I 
c/+ ^ , . . . . = w i l l be g o v e r n e d by t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n R. = R . ( C . | c . = c ' ) w h i c h p l a y e r i h i m s e l f 1 1 3 1 c 1 1 1 r J 
e n t e r t a i n s . 
U n d e r t h i s m o d e l , p a r t n e r s h i p i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a s y m m e t r i c 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , s i n c e i f l o t t e r y L ( i j ) o f p l a y e r i j c h o o s e a 
p l a y e r r j a s a p a r t n e r , t h e n i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t l o t t e r y 
L ( r j ) o f p l a y e r r j w i l l l i k e w i s e c h o o s e p l a y e r i j a s a p a r t n e r 
f o r p i a y e r r j . 
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A n o t h e r d i f f i c u l t y t h a t may a r i s e i s t h a t , i f t h e r e i s 
an a d m i s s a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n R * ( C ) f r o m w h i c h t h e 
s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s c a n be s a i d t o be 
d e r i v e a b l e from", w i l l t h i s a d m i s s a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n 
be u n i q u e . I f u n i q u e n e s s d i d n o t h o l d , t h e n i t may be s e e n 
a s p r o b l e m a t i c , s i n c e t h i s w o u l d g i v e r i s e t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f m u l t i p l i c i t y o f B a y e s i a n games G* B a y e s e q u i v a l e n t t o a 
g i v e n game o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . H o wever, H a r s a n y i 
a r g u e s t h a t one m u s t t h e n d e t e r m i n e t h e d e c o m p o s e d c o m p o n e n t 
games of t h e i n c o m p l e t e game an d p r o v e s t h a t , f o r e a c h i n -
M M 
d e c o m p o s a b l e c o m p o n e n t game G = G(D ) , e v e r y a d m i s s a b l e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n R * ( C ) w i l l g e n e r a t e t h e same u n i q u e l y d e t e r m i n e d 
c o n d i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
M M i M R = R ( C ) = R * ( C | C E D ) w h e n e v e r t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l 
M 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n R g e n e r a t e d by t h i s a d m i s s a b l e 
M 
d i s t r i b u t i o n R* i s w e l l d e f i n e d . H e r e D i s t h e d e f i n i n g 
M 
c y l i n d e r o f t h e game G . 
M y e r s o n ( 1 9 8 3 ) , h o w e v e r , h a s a n a l y s e d t h e i s s u e i n a n o t h e r 
f a s h i o n and h a s a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f c o n s i s t e n c y 
o f b e l i e f s i s n o t an i s s u e o f b a s i c i m p o r t a n c e when s t u d y i n g 
g e n e r a l B a y e s i a n g a m e s , p r o v i d e d one c a n r u l e o u t t h e r e q u i r e -
ment o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r a b i l i t y o f u t i l i t y . 
The c a s e of i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s o f u t i l i t y 
c a n be r u l e d o u t , b e c a u s e f o r games o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n 
e a c h p l a y e r w i l l a l r e a d y know t h e i r own t y p e b e f o r e m a k i n g a n y 
d e c i s i o n . T h u s , when t h e game i s p l a y e d , i n t e r t y p e c o m p a r i s o n s 
o f u t i l i t y a r e d e c i s i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l l y m e a n i n g l e s s , s i n c e o n c e a 
p l a y e r knows h i s t y p e , he c a n n o t be a s k e d t o c h o o s e i t . 
F o r e x a m p l e , i t i s d e c i s i o n - t h e o r e t 1 c a 1 1 y m e a n i n g l e s s t o t r y 
and d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a p l a y e r w o u l d p r e f e r t o be a d y n a m i c 
( t y p e ) m a n a g e r o r a n o n - d y n a m i c ( t y p e ) m a n a g e r , when i n t h e 
game u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e ' p l a y e r ' s t y p e h a s a l r e a d y b e e n 
d e t e r m i n e d and t h e p l a y e r knows w h e t h e r he i s a d y n a m i c t y p e 
o r n o t . 
T h i s r e s u l t m e a n s t h a t u t i l i t y s c a l e s o f d i f f e r e n t t y p e 
c a n be s p e c i f i e d s e p a r a t e l y . From d e c i s i o n t h e o r y , i t i s 
w e l l known t h a t v o n Neumann Morge. n s t e r n u t i l i t y s c a l e s c a n 
o n l y be d e f i n e d up t o i n c r e a s i n g l i n e a r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . 
\Z 
T h u s , two B a y e s i a n games w i t h t h e same d e c i s i o n s e t s a n d 
t y p e s e t s 
G = DN'T! V p! V U 1 V 
and 
/S. A. 
G = (D ,D ,T ,....T ,P ,....,P ,U ,....,U ) 
l N l N l n 1 n 
a r e w h a t " y e r s o n ( 1 9 8 3 ) 
i j c a l l s u t i l i t y e q u i v a l e n t i f a n d o n l y i f t h e y h a v e t h e same 
c o n d i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s ( P ^ = P^ f o r a l l i ) 
and t h e r e e x i s t s n u m b e r s a . ( t . ) and b . ( t . ) f o r e a c h i and 
1 1 1 1 
e a c h t . i n T., s u c h t h a t l l ' 
a . ( t . ) > 0 and U . ( d , t ) = a . ( t . ) U . (d , t ) + b . ( t . ) i i l i l l 1 1 
f o r a l l d e n a n d a l l t E T . 
T h u s u t i l i t y e q u i v a l e n t B a y e s i a n games d i f f e r o n l y i n 
t h a t t h e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s o f some t y p e s of some p l a y e r s may 
be l i n e a r l y r e s c a l e d , and t h e B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i a o f t h e two 
u t i l i t y e q u i v a l e n t games w i l l be t h e same. 
I n B a y e s i a n games, w h e n e v e r a p l a y e r c h o o s e s an a c t i o n 
o r d e c i s i o n , h i s c r i t e r i o n f o r t h e b e s t d e c i s i o n i s t h a t i t 
s h o u l d g i v e him t h e h i g h e s t c o n d i t i o n a l l y e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y , 
g i v e n h i s a c t u a l t y p e . E x p e c t e d u t i l i t y i s d e t e r m i n e d by 
m u l t i p l y i n g u t i l i t i e s t i m e s p r o b a b i l i t i e s and t h e n summing 
o v e r a l l p o s s i b l e v a l u e s o f t h e u n k n o w n s . F o r e x a m p l e , 
i f some f u n c t i o n 6: T-*-D d e t e r m i n e d how t h e p l a y e r s ' d e c i s i o n s 
d e p e n d on t h e i r t y p e s , t h e n t h e c o n d i t i o n a l l y e x p e c t e d 
u t i l i t y f o r t y p e o f p l a y e r i w o u l d be 
1 P i ( t * i c 'V U i ( 6 ( t ) ' t } t . e T . 
T h u s , one c a n d e f i n e z^:DXT->-R by 
z . . ( d , t ) = P i ( t ; > i c | t i ) U i ( d , t ) 
f o r a l l d£D a n d a l l t e T 
and c a l l z ^ t h e e v a l u a t i o n f u n c t i o n f o r p l a y e r i . S i n c e 
o n l y t h e p r o d u c t o f p r o b a b i l i t y t i m e s u t i l i t y m a t t e r s m 
c o m p u t i n g e x p e c t e d u t i l i t i e s , one c a n s a y t h a t two B a y e s i a n 
games a r e p r o b a b i 1 i t y - e q u i v a 1 e n t i f a n d o n l y i f t h e y h a v e t h e 
same d e c i s i o n s e t s D. and t y p e s e t s T. a n d e v a l u a t i o n f u n c t i o n s 
l l 
z ^ f o r a l l p l a y e r s , t h a t i s 
V ^ i d V Vd'fc) = VSiJV V d ' t > 
f o r a l l deD and a l l t e T 
G i v e n t h i s r e s u l t , c o n s i s t e n c y o f b e l i e f s i s n o t an i s s u e o f 
b a s i c i m p o r t a n c e , b e c a u s e by s u i t a b l e s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f u t i l i t y 
s c a l e s , one c a n e n s u r e t h a t B a y e s i a n games l i k e G a n d G w i l l 
h a v e t h e same B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i a . 
T h u s , a more g e n e r a l e q u i v a l e n c e r e l a t i o n c a n be d e f i n e d 
among B a y e s i a n games. Two B a y e s i a n games G and G w i t h t h e 
same d e c i s i o n s e t s and t y p e s e t s a r e e v a l u a t i o n - e q u i v a l e n t 
i f , and o n l y i f , t o r e v e r y p l a y e r i , t h e r e e x i s t f u n c t i o n s 
a . : T R 1 l 
a nd b : T -»• R s u c h t h a t 1 
a . ( t . ) > 0 e v e r y t . a n d i i 1 l 
V t 3x« J ti , Ui ( d' t ) = W V ^ i c I W*'^ + b i ( t ) 
f o r a l l deD and a l l t E T. 
N o t e h e r e t h a t t h e a d d i t i v e c o n s t a n t c a n d e p e n d on a l l p l a y e r s 
t y p e s , w h i l e t h e m u l t i p l i c a t e c o n s t a n t c a n o n l y d e p e n d on i ' s 
t y p e . T h u s , B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i a w i l l be i n v a r i a n t u n d e r 
a n y e v a l u a t i o n - e q u i v a l e n t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e game. 
5.2.4 B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m s t r a t e g i e s 
T h e n e x t i s s u e t o c o n s i d e r i s when one c a n d e r i v e 
some B a y e s i a n game G* e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e game o f i n c o m p l e t e 
i n f o r m a t i o n , w i l l i t h a v e an e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t , a n d i f s o , 
w h a t f o r m w i l l t h e s t r a t e g i e s t a k e . The f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i -
t i o n s w i l l a l w a y s r e f e r t o a f i x e d game i n s t a n d a r d f o r m . 
A m i x e d s t r a t e g y q o f p l a y e r I i s a p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o v e r p l a y e r i ' s s e t o f p u r e s t r a t e g i e s , w h e r e 
qMm^) d e n o t e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y a s s i g n e d t o ra . A m i x e d 
s t r a t e g y i s s a i d t o be c o m p l e t e l y m i x e d i f l ^ f 1 1 1 ^ 1 S 
p o s i t i v e f o r e v e r y p u r e s t r a t e g y m^EM^. The s e t o f a l l 
m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s o f p l a y e r i i s d e n o t e d Q . 
A c o m b i n a t i o n q = ( q ^ ) ^ o f m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s i s c a l l e d a 
m i x e d c o m b i n a t i o n and c o n t a i n s a m i x e d s t r a t e g y q^ f o r e v e r y 
i E N . The s e t o f a l l c o m b i n a t i o n s of t h i s k i n d i s d e n o t e d by 
Q. F o r q = (q.)„ and m = (m.) i t i s c o n v e n i e n t t o u s e t h e 
I N I N 
n o t a t i o n 
q (m ) = II q . ( n ^ ) 
i EN 1 
T h a t i s , q(m) i s t h e p r o d u c t o f a l l q^(m) w i t h i E N . The 
p r o d u c t q(m) i s c a l l e d t h e r e a l i s a t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y o f m u n d e r q. 
The d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e p a y o f f f u n c t i o n E i s e x t e n d e d f r o m M t o Q. 
E ( q ) = I q ( m ) E ( m ) 
m EM 
The e q u a t i o n s f o r E a r e v e c t o r e q u a t i o n s w h i c h h o l d f o r e v e r y 
c o m p o n e n t E ^ o f E . 
An i - i n c o m p l e t e c o m b i n a t i o n o f m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s i s a com-
b i n a t i o n w h i c h c o n t a i n s one m i x e d s t r a t e g y f o r e v e r y p l a y e r 
w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f i . An i - i n c o m p l e t e c o m b i n a t i o n o f 
m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s i s d e n o t e d 1 3 ^ c . S i m i l a r l y H ^ ^ d e n o t e s t h e 
s e t o f a l l i - i n c o m p l e t e c o m b i n a t i o n s o f p u r e s t r a t e g i e s and Q ^ c 
d e n o t e s t h e s e t o f a l l i - i n c o m p l e t e m i x e d c o m b i n a t i o n s . A l s o 
l e t q ^q d e n o t e t h a t qEQ, c o n t a i n i n g t h e c o m p o n e n t s q^ and 
q ^ . I f f o r a l l p l a y e r s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f p l a y e r i , 
t h e s t r a t e g i e s i n q . a g r e e w i t h t h o s e i n q, we c a l l q 
s i c J1C 
p r e s c r i b e d by q. 
A n o t h e r ( r e l a t e d ) t y p e o f s t r a t e g y w a r r a n t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
i s b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g i e s . F o r t h e s e we n e e d f i r s t t o d e f i n e 
l o c a l s t r a t e g i e s . A l o c a l s t r a t e g y b o f an a g e n t i j i s a 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n o v e r h i s c h o i c e s e t • The 
p r o b a b i l i t y a s s i g n e d t o m. eM . . by b. i s d e n o t e d b. (m .) . 
I D I D J I D I D I D 
The s e t o f a l l p o s s i b l e l o c a l s t r a t e g i e s o f a g e n t i'fy i s 
d e n o t e d B... 
T h e r e f o r e a b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g y f o r a p l a y e r i 
b . = (b . ) 1 1: c i 
i s a c o l l e c t i o n o f l o c a l s t r a t e g i e s c o n t a i n i n g one f o r e a c h 
o f p l a y e r i ' s a g e n t s . The s e t o f a l l p o s s i b l e b e h a v i o u r a l 
s t r a t e g i e s o f p l a y e r , i i s d e n o t e d B^. I t w i l l be c o n v e n i e n t 
t o u s e t h e f o l l o w i n g n o t a t i o n s o m e t i m e s -
b . (m . ) = II b . (m . ) 
i ] B C . J i 
f o r b. = ( b 1 and m. = (m. ) l i ] C l i n C . l l 
L e t b . ( m . ) be c a l l e d t h e r e a l i s a t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y o f m. u n d e r 1 1 l 
b ^ . T h e r e f o r e , b^ c a n be l o o k e d upon a s a s p e c i a l t y p e o f 
m i x e d s t r a t e g y and f r o m t h e r e a l i s a t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s b ^ ( m ^ ) , 
one c a n r e c o n s t r u c t t h e l o c a l s t r a t e g i e s w h i c h make i t up. 
T h u s , a b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g y i s u n i q u e l y d e t e r m i n e d by i t s 
r e a l i s a t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s . T h u s , b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g i e s 
c a n be l o o k e d upon a s a s p e c i a l t y p e o f m i x e d s t r a t e g y w h e r e 
B^ i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h some s u b s e t o f Q . 
W i t h a m i x e d s t r a t e g y , a p l a y e r m u s t c o n s t r u c t a l l 
p o s s i b l e p u r e s t r a t e g i e s o r p l a n s , a s s i g n a p r o b a b i l i t y t o 
e a c h o n e , and t h e n p e r f o r m a r a n d o m e x p e r i m e n t w i t h t h e a b o v e 
d e t e r m i n e d p r o b a b i l i t y w e i g h t s t o d e t e r m i n e h i s c h o i c e o f 
p u r e s t r a t e g y t o p l a y . The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s u c h a s t r a t e g y , 
t h e r e f o r e , may i n v o l v e a g r e a t amount o f c o m p u t a t i o n and 
i n f o r m a t i o n s t o r a g e . B e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g i e s a r e much more 
" 1 n f o r m a 1 1 o n a 1 1 y e f f i c i e n t " b e c a u s e , u n l i k e a m i x e d s t r a t e g y 
w h i c h a s s i g n s a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n t o e a c h p u r e 
s t r a t e g y , a b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g y s i m p l y a s s i g n s a p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n t o e a c h l o c a l i n f o r m a t i o n s e t w h i c h d e f i n e s t h e 
p r o b a b i l i t y w e i g h t t h a t t h e p l a y e r w i l l u s e i n d e c i d i n g upon 
any one o f h i s a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s a t t h a t s e t . 
To i l l u s t r a t e t h e e f f i c i e n c y a r g u m e n t , c o n s i d e r t h e 
f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e . A p l a y e r i s g i v e n a c a r d f r o m a d e c k o f 
f i f t y - t w o c a r d s and i s t h e n r e q u i r e d t o p a s s o r b e t a f i x e d 
a mount. The t o t a l number o f c o n c e i v a b l e p u r e s t r a t e g i e s i s 
5 2 
2 s i n c e t h e r e a r e f i f t y - t w o c a r d s , e a c h g i v i n g r i s e t o two 
a l t e r n a t i v e s . S i n c e m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s a r e a l l p o i n t s i n a 
u n i t s i m p l e x , h a v i n g a d i m e n s i o n o f one l e s s t h a n t h e s e t 
t h e y a r e d e f i n e d o v e r , t h e s e t o f m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s i s o f 
5 2 
d i m e n s i o n 2 - 1. A b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g y , h o w e v e r , g i v e s 
t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f b e t t i n g w i t h e a c h h a n d , h e n c e t h e r e a r e o n l y 
52 s u c h s t r a t e g i e s . 
I n some g a m e s , h o w e v e r , o p t i m a l m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s o f i n t e r e s t 
a r e n o t r e a l i s a b l e b y u s e o f b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g i e s , f o r 
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I n t h i s game, p l a y e r o n e ' s p u r e s t r a t e g i e s a r e L L , LR, RL 
and RR. A m i x e d s t r a t e g y i s a t o u r d i m e n s i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y 
v e c t o r q = ( q , q , q , q ) s p e c i f y i n g t h e p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h 1 2 3 4 
w h i c h p l a y e r one w i l l u s e any of h i s f o u r p u r e s t r a t e g i e s . 
A b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g y i n t h i s game i s a p a i r o f two d i m e n s i o n a l 
p r o b a b i l i t y v e c t o r s ( b 1 , , ( b 2 ' 1 - b 2 ' w n e r e b^ i s t h e 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f m o v i n g l e f t a t move one and 1-b^, i s t h e 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f m o v i n g r i g h t } s i m i l a r l y f o r b^ ; l - b ^ a t move 
tw o . N o t e t h a t f o r a n y c h o i c e o f b.^ and b^ , a m i x e d s t r a t e g y 
i s d e t e r m i n e d i n w h i c h t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s a t t a c h e d t o t h e 
p u r e s t r a t e g i e s L L , L R, RL and RR a r e g i v e n a s {b^) {b ) , 
( b . ) ( l - b ) , ( 1 - b W b ) , and ( (1-b• ) ( 1 - b ) ) . S i n c e t h e game 1 2 1 2 1 2 
i s a z e r o sum game, m i n i - m a x s t r a t e g i e s w i l l be o p t i m a l . 
ft 
I n t h i s game, t h e o p t i m a l m i x e d s t r a t e g y i s ( , 5_, 2_, ) . 
7 7 
N o t e t h a t no m a t t e r w h a t v a l u e s a r e c h o s e n f o r b, a n d b , a 
1 2 
p l a y e r w i l l n o t be a b l e t o r e p l i c a t e t h e m i x e d s t r a t e g y by 
u s e o f a b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g y . H o w e v e r , t h e a b o v e game i s 
one o f i m p e r f e c t r e c a l l , w h i c h a r i s e s when a p l a y e r m a k e s a 
move when he i s n o t a b l e t o remember one o r more o f h i s p r e v i o u s 
m o v e s . An i m p o r t a n t t h e o r e m due t o Kuhn ( 1 9 5 3 ) i s t h a t i n 
e v e r y game w i t h p e r f e c t r e c a l l , w h e r e a p l a y e r r e m e m b e r s a l l 
h i s p r e v i o u s m o v e s ( e v e n t h o u g h he may be u n c e r t a i n a b o u t 
p r e v i o u s moves o f o t h e r p l a y e r s ) , a r e a l i s a t i o n e q u i v a l e n t 
b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g y c a n be f o u n d f o r e v e r y m i x e d s t r a t e g y o f 
a r e a l p l a y e r i . 
To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s , r e c o n s i d e r t h e p r e v i o u s game w i t h 
r e d e f i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n s e t a s b e l o w -
/ 
The a n a l y s i s o f m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s i s a s b e f o r e . H o w e v e r , 
t h e b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g i e s a r e now d e f i n e d by t h r e e , two 
d i m e n s i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y v e c t o r s , ( b ^ , l - b ^ ) , ( b ^ f l - b ) an d 
( b ^ - / l ~ b ^ ) , s i n c e t h e r e a r e now t h r e e i n f o r m a t i o n s e t s . 
H e r e , b ^ , b^ a n d b ^ a r e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y w e i g h t s a t t a c h e d 
t o m o v i n g l e f t a t a n y one o f p l a y e r o n e ' s i n f o r m a t i o n s e t s , 
l a b e l l e d A, B and C r e s p e c t i v e l y . The o p t i m a l m i x e d 
s t r a t e g y c a n now be a c h i e v e d by s e t t i n g b = 5_, l _ b = 2_, 
7 7 
b 2 = °' 3 _ b 2 = !' b 3 = 1 a n d 1 ~ b 3 = °-
Games o f i m p e r f e c t r e c a l l w i l l be e x c l u d e d f r o m t h i s 
a n a l y s i s , a s t h e y a r e o n l y o f i m p o r t a n c e when one w a n t s t o 
e x a m i n e games w h e r e some p l a y e r s a r e t e a m s o f a g e n t s i n w h i c h 
e a c h a g e n t moves a t a d i f f e r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n s e t o f t h e p l a y e r 
o f w h i c h he i s a member. I t m u s t a l s o be a s s u m e d t h a t t h e 
t e a m a g e n t s c a n n o t c o m m u n i c a t e f r e e l y among e a c h o t h e r . 
N a s h ' s t h e o r e m , on t h e e x i s t e n c e o f e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t s 
f o r f i n i t e g a m e s, g u a r a n t e e s t h a t e v e r y game i n s t a n d a r d f o r m 
h a s , a t l e a s t , one e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t i n m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s ( N a s h 
1 9 5 1 ) . S i n c e a t t e n t i o n w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d t o games w i t h 
p e r f e c t r e c a l l w h e r e K u h n 1 s t h e o r e m h o l d s , we s h a l l be a b l e 
t o r e l y on t h e e x i s t e n c e o f e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t s i n b e h a v i o u r a l 
s t r a t e g i e s . 
An e q u i l i b r i u m o f a B a y e s i a n game i s a s e t o f c o n ] e c t u r e s 
a b o u t how e a c h p l a y e r w o u l d c h o o s e h i s s t r a t e g y a s a f u n c t i o n 
of t h e i r t y p e s o a s t o m a x i m i s e c o n d i t i o n a l l y e x p e c t e d 
u t i l i t y . F o r m a l l y (m.,....m ) i s a B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m o f 
i n 
t h e B a y e s i a n game G* i f , and o n l y i f , f o r e v e r y p l a y e r i , 
m. i s a f u n c t i o n f r o m i ' s t y p e v e c t o r T. t o t h e i r i l 
s t r a t e g y s p a c e M^, s u c h t h a t f o r e v e r y t ^ i n T\ 
Z P. ( t I t )D . ( m ( t ) , t ) 
t . T . 3 3 i c Z z ic_ 
max E P . ( t ^ . | t . ) U . ( ( m . ( t . ) , m * ) , t ) 
A l t>ic 1 l l 5 i c i i c ' i ' 
m . CM . t . CT . 
1 1 ^ l t "blc 
w h e r e m ( t ) = ( M ( t ) , . . . . m ( t ) ) 
1 1 n n 
and ( m i l c ( t a . t ) , m * ) = ( m ^ t ^ m. _ l ( t ._ 1 ) , m* , m. + x ( t . + 1 ) , 
. . . ,m ( t ) ) 
n n 
The a b o v e e q u a t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t i f p l a y e r i i s o f t y p e 
t a nd p l a y e r i e x p e c t s t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s t o e m p l o y s t r a t e g i e s 
* 
m . ( t ) , t h e n t h e s t r a t e g y m , ( t . ) = m. w o u l d be o p t i m a l 
f o r h i m , i n t h a t i t m a x i m i s e s h i s c o n d i t i o n a l e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y 
261. 
The f u n c t i o n o f a B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m seems a d e s i r a b l e 
c o n s t r u c t a s , u n l e s s t h e p r e d i c t i o n s o f t h e p l a y e r s c o n -
s t i t u t e a B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m , a t l e a s t when one p l a y e r 
i s one t y p e , t h e y w o u l d e x p e c t t o g a i n by u s i n g some 
u n p r e d i c t e d d e c i s i o n . T h a t i s , a p l a y e r ' s b e h a v i o u r c a n 
be r a t i o n a l l y s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g i f , and o n l y i f , i t i s a 
B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m . 
The f o l l o w i n g s i m p l e e x a m p l e i l l u s t r a t e s t h e n o t i o n o f 
a B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m . S u p p o s e t h e r e a r e two p l a y e r s w i t h 
M l = ( a ! ' b i ) ' M 2 = ( a 2 ' b 2 ) ' T l = ' I 2 = ( 2 v ' 2 z ) 
P 1 ( 2 y | l ) = 0 . 9 , p ( 2 z | l ) = 0.1 and t h e two t y p e d e p e n d e n t 
p a y o f f m a t r i c i e s a r e 
tl = 1 ' t 2 = 2 y t 1 = 1, t 2 = 2z 
3 2 b 2 a 2 b 2 
a l 3,3 9,4 a x 4 ,10 2,9 
b l 8,5 6,6 b L 8,8 5,7 
I n t h i s game, b ^ i s a d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y f o r t y p e 2y a n d 
i s a d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g y f o r t y p e 2 z . T h e r e f o r e , p l a y e r one 
w a n t s t o p l a y e i t h e r a ^ o r b ^ , d e p e n d i n g on w h a t t y p e o f 
p l a y e r one e x p e c t s p l a y e r two t o b e . G i v e n t h e p r o b a b i l i s t i c 
b e l i e f s o f p l a y e r one a b o u t w h a t t y p e o f p l a y e r two i s , t h e 
e x p e c t e d v a l u e o f p l a y i n g 
2 f > L'. 
s t r a t e g y a i s = 0.9 x 9 + O . l x 4 = 8.5 
s t r a t e g y b i s = 0 . 9 x 6 + 0 1 . x 8 6 . 2 
t h a t i s , p l a y e r w i l l c h o o s e t o a d o p t s t r a t e g y a a n d t h e 
u n i q u e B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m o f t h e game w i l l be 
" l ( 1 ) = 3 1 ' m 2 ( 2 y ) = b 2 ' m 2 (2z ) a 2 
The e x a m p l e s h o w s t h a t t h e B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m i s 
d i f f e r e n t i n n a t u r e f r o m t h e N a s h e q u i l i b r i u m o f a c o m p l e t e 
i n f o r m a t i o n game, w h e r e p l a y e r t w o ' s t y p e i s common k n o w l e d g e . 
I n t h e c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n c a s e , t h e N a s h e q u i l i b r i u m 
s t r a t e g i e s w o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d by a n a l y s i n g e a c h b i m a t r i x 
s e p a r a t e l y , w h e r e t h e e q u i l i b r i u m s t r a t e g i e s of t h e game w o u l d 
be ( a 1 f b 2 ^ i f P l a y e r t w o ' s t y p e i s 2y a n d ( b ^ a ) i f p l a y e r 
t w o ' s t y p e w e r e 2z . F u r t h e r , i t i s w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t , i n t h i s 
c a s e , p l a y e r two h a s no i n c e n t i v e t o c o m m u n i c a t e h i s t y p e t o 
p l a y e r o n e . T h i s i s b e c a u s e p l a y e r two p r e f e r s ( b ^ a ) t o 
( a ,b ) when he i s o f t y p e 2y a n d he p r e f e r s ( a ,b ) t o (b ,a ) 
J- ^ 1 2 1 2 
i f he i s o f t y p e 2 z . T h u s , i f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w e r e a l l o w e d , 
p l a y e r two w o u l d a t t e m p t t o m i s l e a d p l a y e r one by c l a i m i n g he 
was t y p e 2z when h i s t r u e t y p e was 2 y , and c l a i m he was t y p e 
2y when h i s t r u e t y p e was 2 z , i n o r d e r t o a t t a i n t h e p r e f e r r e d 
o u t c o m e . 
5.3 C o n c l u s i o n 
The a b o v e d i s c u s s i o n h a s shown how p l a y e r s c a n d e t e r m i n e 
r a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s when t h e y h a v e i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t 
t h e p a y o f f f u n c t i o n s i n t h e game t h e y a r e p l a y i n g . L e t u s 
now r e c a l l o u r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e G r o v e s a n d L o e b t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g m e c h a n i s m , i n c l u d i n g t h e Cohen and L o e b s u g g e s t e d c h a n g e s . 
The i n i t i a l d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e G r o v e s and L o e b 
m e c h a n i s m c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t one n u s t r e c o g n i s e 
t h a t d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s ' s t r a t e g i e s a r e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n 
t h e y c h o o s e t o c o m m u n i c a t e . I n a d d i t i o n , C o h e n and 
L o e b d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t , when d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s a r e 
e f f o r t a v e r s e , i t m u s t be r e c o g n i z e d t h a t d i v i s i o n a l 
m a n a g e r s ' s t r a t e g i e s a r e made up o f two c o m p o n e n t s ; 
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h e y c h o o s e t o c o m m u n i c a t e a n d t h e e f f o r t 
l e v e l t h e y w i s h t o p r o v i d e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p r o b l e m s 
w i t h t h e C o h e n and L o e b s u g g e s t e d c h a n g e s i n d i c a t e t h a t 
t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r ' s p r e f e r e n c e s s h o u l d be m o d e l l e d 
and t h a t t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d 
a s a " p l a y e r " i n t h e game r a t h e r t h a n j u s t a p a s s i v e 
o b s e r v e r . T h a t i s , t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s i s a l l o w e d 
t o a c t s t r a t e g i c a l l y . T h u s , i f we w i s h t o m o d e l t h e 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o b l e m a s a game o f i n c o m p l e t e 
i n f o r m a t i o n , i t m u s t a l l o w f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e 
d i v i s i o n a l ( m a n a g e r s ) p l a y e r s a n d t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
w h e r e d i v i s i o n a l p l a y e r s ' s t r a t e g i e s i n v o l v e c o m m u n i c a t -
i n g i n f o r m a t i o n and p r o v i d i n g c e r t a i n l e v e l s o f e f f o r t . 
T h e t y p e o f s t r a t e g y t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s s h o u l d a d o p t 
s h o u l d a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d a n d t h e p r e f e r e n c e s o f t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s s h o u l d be m o d e l l e d . I n a d d i t i o n , 
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n h e l d by v a r i o u s p l a y e r s s h o u l d a l s o be 
m o d e l l e d . 
T h e n e x t c h a p t e r p r e s e n t s s u c h a m o d e l o f a B a y e s i a n 
game, e q u i v a l e n t t o a game w i t h i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n , 
w h i c h a l l o w s f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n a d e c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a 
t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e o r i g i n a l g e n e r a l i z e d m o d e l was 
due t o M y e r s o n ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 
NOTE? TO CHAPTER 5 
1 . S e e d ' A s p r e m o n t and G e r a r d - V a r e t ( 1 9 7 9 ) , f o r i n s t a n c e . 
2. And t h a t t h e C o h e n and L o e b amendment i s i n a d e q u a t e . 
3. H a r s a n y i ( 1 9 6 7 a n d 1 9 6 8 ) . 
4. C o n s i d e r a two p l a y e r game o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . 
P l a y e r l ' s s t r a t e g y c h o i c e d e p e n d s on w h a t p l a y e r 1 
e x p e c t s t o be p l a y e r 2 ' s p a y o f f f u n c t i o n U , a s t h e f o r m 
o f t h i s f u n c t i o n w i l l i n f l u e n c e t h e way p l a y e r 2 w i l l p l a y 
t h e game. T h i s e x p e c t a t i o n a b o u t c a n be c a l l e d p l a y e r 
l ' s f i r s t o r d e r e x p e c t a t i o n . H o w e v e r , p l a y e r 1 w i l l 
r e a l i z e t h a t U i s n o t t h e o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n p l a y e r 2 u s e s 
t o c h o o s e a s t r a t e g y . P l a y e r 2 ' s f i r s t o r d e r e x p e c t a t i o n 
a b o u t p l a y e r l ' s p a y o f f f u n c t i o n U , w i l l i n f l u e n c e p l a y e r 
2 ' s v i e w o f w h a t s t r a t e g y he o r s h e t h i n k s p l a y e r 1 w i l l 
p l a y a n d , h e n c e , w h i c h s t r a t e g y he o r s h e s h o u l d c h o o s e . 
T h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f p l a y e r 1 a b o u t w h a t f i r s t o r d e r 
e x p e c t a t i o n p l a y e r 2 a d o p t s c a n be c a l l e d p l a y e r l ' s 
s e c o n d o r d e r e x p e c t a t i o n . H o w e v e r , p l a y e r l ' s c h o i c e o f 
s t r a t e g y w i l l a l s o d e p e n d on w h a t p l a y e r 1 e x p e c t s t o be 
p l a y e r 2 ' s s e c o n d o r d e r e x p e c t a t i o n . T h i s may be c a l l e d 
p l a y e r l ' s t h i r d o r d e r e x p e c t a t i o n - a n d s o on ad i n f i n i t u m , 
H a r s a n y i s h o w s t h a t t h i s k i n d o f s e q u e n t i a l e x p e c t a t i o n s 
m o d e l , w h e r e a game o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n h a s t o be 
a n a l y s e d i n t e r m s o f i n f i n i t e s e q u e n c e s o f s u b j e c t i v e 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s o v e r s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s c a n be r e p l a c e d by a m o d e l w h i c h a n a l y s e s 
t h e game o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t e r m s o f one u n i q u e 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
5. A game o f c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n i n n o r m a l f o r i ? 
c o n s i s t s o f , ( 1 ) a non empty s e t c o n s i s t i n g o f a l l 
p u r e s t r a t e g i e s m^ f o r p l a y e r 1 , f o r e a c h p l a y e r I C N , 
( i i ) a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n U :M,X XM R 1 f o r e a c h 
1 1 N 
p l a y e r I E N a n d ( i n ) f u l l k n o w l e d g e o f ( i ) and ( n ) on 
t h e p a r t o f e a c h p l a y e r i£N. 
6. T h i s c a n be a c h i e v e d b e c a u s e c o n d i t i o n ( v i ) i m p l i e s 
t h a t e v e r y p l a y e r knows ( 1 ) t h e s e t s £, M M o f 
1 N 
p u r e s t r a t e g i e s , ( i i ) e a c h p l a y e r I ' S u t i l i t y U ( e f ^ m ^ , 
,m ) ) f o r e v e r y (£,m. m )e£_XM- XM . ( i i i ) 
n ' l n i l N V 
e a c h p l a y e r I ' S p r o b a b i l i t y f u n c t i o n P ^ f ' ) o n £• H e n c e , 
e a c h p l a y e r i 1 s u t i l i t y e v a l u a t i o n 
k 
U . ( m w ,m ) = I u. ( e { e 3 ,m. , m ) P r ( e 3 ) 
l l n . , i 1 n t, l 
D = l 
o f e v e r y (m^, ' m n ^ i n M i X X M n * S c o m i r ' o n k n o w l e d g e 
i n t h e s e t N = ( l , . . . , n ) o f p l a y e r s when n a t u r e c a n 
a d o p t a n y o f k " s t r a t e g i e s " . 
7. A much more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f a t t r i b u t e c l a s s e s 
a n d r e l a t e d i s s u e s i s p r e s e n t e d i n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n . 
* * 
8. I n a two p e r s o n z e r o sum game, t h e p o i n t (Yj_»zj_) 
* 
i s an e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t i f , and o n l y i f , y ^ i s a maxim'n 
s t r a t e g y f o r p l a y e r 1 and z ^ i s a m i n i m a x f o r p l a y e r 2. 
9. T h i s n o t a t i o n i s i n t e n d e d t o i n d i c a t e t h a t M and 
l 
a r e t h e r a n g e s p a c e s o f p o s s i b l e m^ and c ^ r e s p e c t i v e l y 
1 0 . H a r s a n y i a s s u m e s x^ i s p l a y e r i ' s p a y o f f e x p r e s s e d 
i n u t i l i t y u n i t s s o t h a t one c a n w f i t e x. = U. (m. , . . . . ,m ) 
i l l n 
V . (m m , c , , c ) . 
I I n 1 n 
2 G G 
1 1 . Aumann ( 1 9 7 6 ) . 
12 . G i v e n t h e f o r n o f e a r l i e r n o t a t i o n , t h e d e c i s i o n 
s e t s D , , D c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e s t r a t e g y s e t s 
H. , . . . . ,M„, t h e t y p e s e t s T. , . . . . ,T c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e I N I N 
a t t r i b u t e s e t s C^,....,C . T h e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u -
t i o n s P^ , . . . . f P N # c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s R R a n d t h e u t i l i t y s e t s U, , . . . ,U 
i n I N 
c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e p a y o f f s e t s V,,....,V . 
1 n 
1 3 . To s e e t h i s n o t e t h a t t h e p a y o f f m a t r i x f o r p l a y e r 1 
l s : 
T h i s c a n be r e p r e s e n t e d d i a g r a i r . a t i c a l l y a s : 
placer 
So the maximm s t r a t e g y i s some n i x e d s t r a t e g y w i t h RL 
and LR h a v i n g p o s i t i v e w e i g h t s . I f p i s t h e probab-
i l i t y t h a t p l a y e r 2 adopts s t r a t e g y L, then we can 
de t e r m i n e t he o p t i m a l s t r a t e g y s i n c e 
l p + ( 1 - p ) . 6 = 3p + ( 1 - p ) . 1 
g i v e s P = 5_ and 1-p = 2_ 
1 7 
That i s , t h e o p t i m a l mixed s t r a t e g y i s (0,5^,2^,0) . 
7 7 
14. Note here t h a t t he ty p e s s e t T^X X T n c o r r e s P o n < ^ E 






BAYESIAN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION: 
6.1 A Generalised Principal-Agent Game of 
Incomplete Information 
In the Bayesian games considered i n the previous chapter, each 
player's strategy depended solely on t h e i r type. In order to be 
able t o a p p l y t h e above p r i n c i p l e s of d e c i s i o n making w i t h 
i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o r e s o l v e a l l o c a t i o n problems such 
as t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g , i t i s necessary t o a l l o w f o r communication 
between t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s and d i v i s i o n a l management. 
For i n s t a n c e , t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s may r e q u i r e a d i v i s i o n 
t o r e p o r t i t s t y p e and, on the b a s i s of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s may take d e c i s i o n s which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t 
a d i v i s i o n . The c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s may a l s o w i s h t o 
recommend t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers t a k e c e r t a i n a c t i o n s t h a t 
are u n o b s e r v a b l e by t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s . For example, 
d i v i s i o n a l managers may be r e q u i r e d t o r e p o r t t h e i r t r u e i n v e r s e 
demand f u n c t i o n ( t y p e ) as i n t h e Groves and Loeb mechanism. 
The c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s can the n u t i l i s e t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n t o 
de t e r m i n e t r a n s f e r p r i c e s . The c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s may a l s o 
recommend t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers p r o v i d e c e r t a i n l e v e l s o f 
e f f o r t i n o r d e r t o implement t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s p l a n s . 
1 
I t i s now p o s s i b l e t o f o r m u l a t e t h e above g e n e r a l problem as 
a Bayesian i n c e n t i v e game o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h 
communication. 
l e t D 0 = t h e s e t of e n f o r c e a b l e a c t i o n s t h a t t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s t a k e s , such as t h e s e t t i n g of a 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e , or t h e a l l o c a t i o n of c e n t r a l l y 
p r o v i d e d i n p u t . 
D ^  = t h e s e t of a l l p r i v a t e a c t i o n s c o n t r o l l e d by 
d i v i s i o n a l managers, such as e f f o r t l e v e l s . 
The term p r i v a t e i n t h i s c o n t e x t means t h a t t h e 
a c t i o n i s u n o b s e r v a b l e by t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
and o t h e r d i v i s i o n s . 
D = D XD,X XD = t h e s e t of a l l p o s s i b l e combina-
o 1 N 
t i o n s of a c t i o n s t a k e n by t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
and t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers. 
where d = (d ,d, , ,d ) = an outcome i n D. 
o 1 n 
T = (TjX X T N ' = t h e s e t o f a 1 1 P o s s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n s 
of i n d i v i d u a l t y p e s . 
where t = ( t , , t ) = a s p e c i f i c s t a t e i n T. 
1 n 
I t i s assumed t h a t T and D are non-empty f i n i t e s e t s . 
The above f o r m u l a t i o n means t h a t t h e s t r a t e g y o f a 
d i v i s i o n a l manager now i n v o l v e s communication about some 
v a r i a b l e t h r o u g h t h e message ( s t r a t e g y ) ITK , and t h e p r o v i s i o n 
of some p r i v a t e a c t i o n d^. The r o l e of t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r 
i s t o i n f l u e n c e d i v i s i o n a l managers' b e h a v i o u r by c h o i c e o f d Q . 
The domain of t h e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s u^, i = o , l , . . . . , n a r e th u s 
DXT = (D XD,X XD ) X (T,X XT ) 
o 1 N 1 N 
Thus u^:DXT+R = t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n 
f o r i = o. 
u^ :DXT-*-R = d i v i s i o n a l manager ( p l a y e r ) i ' s u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n f o r i = 1, ,n. 
So f o r any (d,t) E. (DXT) , u ^ f d j t ) r e p r e s e n t s the expected u t i l i t y payoff 
f o r d i v i s i o n a l manager i , or t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s when 
1=0. The p a y o f f i s measured by some von Neumann-Morgenstern 
u t i l i t y s c a l e , where management a c t s a c c o r d i n g t o the d e c i s i o n s 
d, and where d i v i s i o n a l managers' i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e p r e s e n t e d 
by t h e v e c t o r of ty p e s t . Any random v a r i a b l e n o t observed 
by anyone s h o u l d be i n t e r g r a t e d o u t , u s i n g t h e i r c o n d i t i o n a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s g i v e n t , t o compute the expected u t i l i t y 
u ± ( d , t ) . 
P* = t h e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n on T such t h a t P * ( t ) 
i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t = ( t . . . . , t n ) , as assessed 
by t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s or by any d i v i s i o n a l 
manager e x a n t e , b e f o r e any d i v i s i o n a l manager has 
t h e i r t y p e r e v e a l e d t o them. 
However, once a game commences, each d i v i s i o n a l manager 
h . 1 '. • r ~ " - - -
w i l l be aware o f t h e i r t y p e and may wish t o r e v i s e h i s con-
j e c t u r e s about o t h e r d i v i s i o n a l managers' t y p e s , g i v e n t h i s 
i n f o r m a t i o n . That i s , t h e c o n d i t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s or 
b e l i e f s (p,,....,P ) t h a t t h e p l a y e r s w i l l h o l d should be 1 n 
computed from P * ( t ) by Bayes theorem, t h a t i s 
(1) p ( t | t . ) = P* ( t ) 1 0 1 c 1 1 — 
p. ( t . ) 1 1 
f o r a l l t.eT. and a l l t . £T . . 
1 1 i l C .PIC 
where p * ( t . ) = I P * ( t ) 
1 1 t . ET v S I C 5 l C 
f o r a l l t.ET.. 
1 1 
H e r e a c o n v e n t i o n i s b e i n g u s e d t h a t , w h e n e v e r t . t 
and t a p p e a r i n t h e same f o r m u l a , t h e n t i s t h e v e c t o r o f 
t y p e s w i t h t h e 1 t h c o m p o n e n t t a nd a l l o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s a s 
i n S i c " 
S i n c e t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s i s t a k i n g d e c i s i o n s on 
t h e b a s i s o f i n f o r m a t i o n c o m m u n i c a t e d t o i t by t h e d i v i s i o n s 
l e t r i ( d , d . . . . . . d t t ) d e n o t e t h e c o n d i t i o n a l 
o 1 n 1 n 
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s w i l l c h o o s e i n 
D a n d r e c o m m e n d t h a t e a c h d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r u s e d m D o ^ 1 1 
i f e a c h ( p l a y e r ) d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r r e p o r t e d h i s o r h e r t y p e 
t o be t ^ . T h e n u m b e r s H ( d | t ) m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , s a t i s f y t h e 
f o l l o w i n g p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n c o n s t r a i n t s . 
(2) I H ( d | t ) = 1 and I I ( d | t ) > O 
dCD 
f o r a l l d£D a n d a l l t E T . 
A f u n c t i o n I I : DXT+R t h a t s a t i s f i e s t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s d e n o t e d 
a m e c h a n i s m f o r t h e B a y e s i a n game. 
I f e v e r y p l a y e r r e p o r t s t h e i r t y p e h o n e s t l y and o b e y s 
t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , t h e n t h e 
c o n d i t i o n a l e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y f o r t y p e t o f d i v i s i o n a l 
m a n a g e r l f r o m m e c h a n i s m H w o u l d b e : 
( 3 ) u (H | t ) T. I P . ( t J t ) I I ( d | t ) u ( d , t ) 
1 1 „ , „ l D l C ' l ' 1 t £T . dCD 31C -31C 
N o t e t h a t c a r e m u s t be t a k e n n o t t o c o n f u s e t h e c o n d i t i o n a l 
e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y IK a n d t h e e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y f r o m ( d , t ) . 
2 7 2 . 
However, i t may be t h a t each d i v i s i o n a l manager may choose 
t o l i e or disobey t he c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s , 
s i n c e t h e p l a y e r s ' types can not be v e r i f i e d by the c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s , and each s e l e c t i o n o f a p r i v a t e a c t i o n d.£D. 
1 1 
f o r i = l , . . . . n i s c o n t r o l l e d by d i v i s i o n a l manager 1. Thus 
t h e c o - o r d i n a t i o n mechanism i n d u c e s a communication game GJJ 
i n which each d i v i s i o n a l manager must s e l e c t h i s or her type 
r e p o r t and p l a n f o r choosing a p r i v a t e a c t i o n i n as a f u n c t i o n 
o f t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r ' s recommendation. The c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s must a l s o t a k e some p u b l i c a c t i o n D . Thus, 
o 
f o r m a l l y one can d e f i n e as 
Gn = ( D o ' D i D n ' T i V p i V u i V 
where f o r 1 = 1, n 
D i = { ( " i ' ^ i ) l * 1 ^ ^ and 6 ^ ^ - ^ } ? 
Here (m ,6^) r e p r e s e n t s d i v i s i o n a l manager i ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
s t r a t e g y or p l a n , where m ^  i s a f u n c t i o n which d e t e r m i n e s 
what t y p e a d i v i s i o n a l manager w i l l r e p o r t he or she i s , g i v e n 
h i s or her t r u e type and 6. i s a f u n c t i o n which determines 
l 
/•v 
what p r i v a t e a c t i o n d 1 c D 1 a d i v i s i o n a l manager should employ 
g i v e n t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r *s recommendations t h a t p l a y e r l 
s h o u l d adopt . 
T h e r e f o r e , i n g e n e r a l , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o express d i v i s i o n a l 
manager i ' s c o n d i t i o n a l e xpected u t i l i t y , g i v e n t h e p a r t i c i p a -
t i o n s t r a t e g i e s of a l l d i v i s i o n a l managers and t h e i r types and 
the c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s p u b l i c d e c i s i o n as 
U ( (d , (m. , 6. ) , (m ,6 ) ) , t ) 
l o l l n n 
t . CT , d ED -5lC Die 
1 P i ^ i J V 1 1 ^ K ' V 
u . ( (d , (6 (d. ) , 6 (d ) ) , t ) 
l o i l n n 
We s h a l l a s s u m e t h a t e a c h d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r c o m m u n i c a t e s 
w i t h t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s s e p a r a t e l y a n d c o n f i d e n t i a l l y , 
so t h a t i t s e e m s p l a u s i b l e t o a s s u m e t h a t d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r 
i ' s p r i v a t e a c t i o n d o e s n o t d e p e n d on t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t o 
t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s . 
S u p p o s e d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r i was o f t y p e t ^ a n d c h o s e t o 
u s e t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n s t r a t e g y ( i , 6^) i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
game w h e r e IIK ^ t ^ . I f a l l o t h e r d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s w e r e 
e x p e c t e d t o r e p o r t t h e i r t y p e s h o n e s t l y a n d c h o o s e t h e i r p r i v a t e 
a c t i o n s o b e d i e n t l y , t h e n d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r i ' s c o n d i t i o n a l 
e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y w o u l d b e : 
(4) U * ( I i , 6 ,m | t ) = I I P i ( t 3 i C l t i ) I I ( a l t » i c ' m i ) ' t . E T . dED •=> iC 31C 
• u . ( ( d 3 . c , 6 . ( d . ) ) , t ) 
wh ere ( d ^ , 6. (d . ) ) = ( d ^ V l ' W ' d i + l V 
a n d ( t3-.«- ' m - i > = ( t l f . . . . , t ,m , t , . . . . t ) 
3 i t i 1 i - l i i + l n 
A m e c h a n i s m i s s a i d t o be B a y e s i a n i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e 
i f , a nd o n l y i f , i t i s a B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i u m f o r a l l p l a y e r s 
t o r e p o r t t h e i r t y p e s h o n e s t l y and t o o b e y t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s when m e c h a n i s m ^ i s u s e d . T h u s H 
i s B a y e s i a n i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e i f , a n d o n l y i f 
(5 ) U (n i t ) > U (n, 6. ,m. | t ) 1 1 l l i l l 
f o r a l l I = 1, ,n 
f o r a l l t £T I l 
f o r a l l m . ET . 
i l 
f o r a l l 6 :D ^ D i l l 
B e s i d e s l y i n g a b o u t t h e i r t y p e a n d / o r b e i n g d i s o b e d i e n t , 
d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s may r e f u s e t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s 
by r e f u s i n g t o c o m m u n i c a t e , o r t h e y may s i m p l y r e s i g n f r o m 
t h e i r p o s t . T h e r e f o r e , a m e c h a n i s m m u s t a l s o be c o n s t r a i n e d 
t o be i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l f o r t h e d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s , i n 
o r d e r f o r i t t o be i m p l e m e n t a b l e . How we s p e c i f y t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t d e p e n d s on t h e m o d e l . 
F o r i n s t a n c e , we m i g h t r e q u i r e t h a t t h e m e c h a n i s m p r o v i d e s 
a d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r w i t h a c o n d i t i o n a l l y e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y 
g r e a t e r t h a n he o r s h e c o u l d g a i n i n some o t h e r f o r m o f 
e m p l o y m e n t . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i f t h e p r i v a t e a c t i o n o f a 
d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r r e p r e s e n t e d h i s o r h e r e f f o r t l e v e l and t h e 
d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r p r e f e r r e d l e s s e f f o r t t o more e f f o r t a n d he 
o r s h e was r e w a r d e d i n m o n e t a r y t e r m s , t h e n t h e c o n d i t i o n a l l y 
e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y t h e m a n a g e r g a i n e d f r o m m o n e t a r y r e w a r d m u s t be 
g r e a t e r t h a n , o r e q u a l t o , t h e c o n d i t i o n a l l y e x p e c t e d d i s u t i l i t y he 
7. 
i n c u r s f r o m p r o v i d i n g e f f o r t . The l a t t e r c a s e w i l l be u s e d 
h e r e , s o we c a n s a y a m e c h a n i s m H i s i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l 
i f , a n d o n l y i f 
( 6 ) U . ( n | t . ) >, o f o r t . E T and a l l i = 1, n. 
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t t h e r e may be 
many d i f f e r e n t B a y e s i a n e q u i l i b r i a o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n game G^, 
e v e n i f II i s i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e . A l s o a t t e n t i o n h a s b e e n 
r e s t r i c t e d t o d i r e c t m e c h a n i s m s w h e r e 
m ( t ) £T. 1 1 i 
a nd t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s p r i v a t e a c t i o n m e s s a g e s h a v e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r ' s 
b e e n d i r e c t , t h a t i s d r a w n f r o m t h e / m e s s a g e s p a c e D 
> o c 
H o w e v e r , one may w a n t t o c o n s i d e r i n d i r e c t m e c h a n i s m s w h i c h 
do n o t r e q u i r e d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , t h e d i r e c t 
r e v e l a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t w i l l now be d r o p p e d s o t h a t c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n c o u l d be g i v e n t o i n d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n m e c h a n i s m s . T h u s , 
we now a l l o w f o r d i v i s i o n a l i n d i r e c t m e s s a g e s f o r w h i c h 
m^(t^);£T^. A l s o , t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r * s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
f o r p r o v i s i o n o f p r i v a t e a c t i o n s may be i n d i r e c t . T h u s , we 
d e n o t e t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r ' s m e s s a g e s a s c ^ , w h e r e i t may 
be t h a t c . ifD . . 
l l 
I n o r d e r t o a l l o w f o r t h i s e x t e n s i o n , we w i l l now r e d e f i n e 
t h e p o s s i b l e m e s s a g e a n d d i r e c t i v e s p a c e s a s f o l l o w s : 
= t h e i * " * 1 d i v i s i o n a l m e s s a g e s p a c e . 
= t h e i ^ * 1 p r i v a t e a c t i o n d i r e c t i v e s p a c e . 
T h u s , we c a n a l s o d e f i n e 
M = M X XM 
1 N 
c = c,x xc 
1 N 
Also we now have 
U ( n , 6 , , m . l t . ) = I E I P . ( t . I t ) II (d , c: I m ( t ) ) 
1 1 1 ' 1 _ , _ _ 1 31C 1 1 O 1 t . ET . d ED c£C
OIC 31C O O 
.u (d Q,6(c,t),t) 
w h e r e m ( t ) = ( m _ ( t , ) , ,m ( t ) 
1 1 n n 
( 6 ( c , t ) ) = ( 6 . ( c . , t . ) , ,6 ( c , t ) ) 
l J. I n n n 
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s (m^,6 ) f o r e a c h i w i l l f o r m an 
e q u i l i b r i u m i f , and o n l y i f , f o r e v e r y i a n d e v e r y a l t e r n a t i v e 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n s t r a t e g y (m^,6^) 
(7) U . ( H , 6 . , m . | t . ) 
l l l 1 l 
> U . ( I I , 6 . ,m . t . = E E L P. ( t . t . ) H ( d ,c m . ( t . l ' l ' l ' l . i s i c 1 x o' 1 3 l C 31C t . E T . d ED C E C 31C »ic o o 
m i ( t . ) ) . U i l d ^ r j s . » S i c ) i 6 i ( c i f t i ) f t ) 
f o r a l l t . E T . f o r a l l i = 1, ,n. 
1 1 
w h e r e 
( n , ^ i o ( t ^ i c } ' m i ( t i n = < V V m i - l ( t i - l ) ' " i ( t i ) ' m i + l ( t i + l ) 
,m ( t ) ) n n 
( S i c ^ 3 i c ' S i c , ' 6 i ( c i ' t i ) ) = ' V ^ ' H 1 6 i - i ( c i - i ' t i - i ) ' 
6 . ( c . , t . ) , 6 ( c , t ) , ,6 ( c , t ) ) 
i l l l + l i + l i + l n n n 
Since t h e r e a r e many c o n c e i v a b l e i n d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n 
mechanisms, i t may seem t h a t a n a l y s i s t o d e t e r m i n e whether 
t h e r e are any i n d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n mechanisms t h a t p e r f o r m 
b e t t e r t h a n d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n mechanisms would be i m p o r t a n t , 
b u t d i f f i c u l t . However," i t can be shown t h a t f o r any 
i n d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n mechanism, t h e r e e x i s t s a d i r e c t r e v e l a -
t i o n mechanism which performs a t l e a s t as w e l l as the i n d i r e c t 
due t o Myerson (1979) 
r e v e l a t i o n mechanism. This r e s u l t / i s known as t h e R e v e l a t i o n 
P r i n c i p l e and t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n w i l l now be f o r m a l l y s t a t e d 
and proven . 
R e v e l a t i o n P r i n c i p l e : Given any e q u i l i b r i u m of p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
n 
s t r a t e g i e s (m.,6 ) . , i n any c o - o r d i n a t i o n mechanism ( d i r e c t i i i = l n 
or i n d i r e c t ) d e f i n e d by (M . , C. ) . ,,Tl ) , t h e r e e x i s t s an 
i i i = l 
i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e d i r e c t mechanism II i n which t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s gets t h e same expected u t i l i t y as i n t h e g i v e n 
e q u i l i b r i u m o f t h e g i v e n mechanism. Thus, t h e o p t i m a l 
i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e d i r e c t c o - o r d i n a t i o n mechanism i s a l s o 
o p t i m a l i n t h e c l a s s of a l l c o - o r d i n a t i o n mechanisms. 
PROOF; Given some e q u i l i b r i u m of p a r t i c i p a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s 
n * 
(m^,6 ) l e t 6 ( d , t ) be t h e set of a l l messages t o t h e 
d i v i s i o n a l managers such t h a t each d i v i s i o n a l manager i would 
respond by c h o o s i n g p r i v a t e a c t i o n d^ i s h i s t y p e were t ^ . 
That i s 
6 * ( d , t ) = f c I 6 ( c . , t . ) = d. f o r a l l i } ^ 1 l l i l 
Then d e f i n e Jl :DXT-+R s o t h a t 
* n ( d | t ) = l JI(d ,c|m_ ( t . ) , . . . . ,m ( t ) ) x / J ^ o 1 1 1 ' n n C E 6 (d , t ) 
I I i s t h e d i r e c t c o - o r d i n a t i o n , m e c h a n i s m w h i c h s i m u l a t e s 
t h e o v e r a l l e f f e c t o f t h e o r i g i n a l m e c h a n i s m . T h a t i s 
I I ( d , t ) i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s w i l l 
c h o o s e d and e a c h d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r w i l l c h o o s e d i f t i s o 1 
t h e v e c t o r o f t y p e s , when e a c h d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r I c h o o s e s 
h i s r e p o r t i n g s t r a t e g y a c c o r d i n g t o i r ^ . T he c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s d e c i s i o n s and t h e m e s s a g e s t o t h e a g e n t s a r e 
d e t e r m i n e d f r o m t h e s e r e p o r t s by II a n d e a c h d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r 
u s e s 6^ t o t r a n s l a t e h i s r e c e i v e d m e s s a g e i n t o a d e c i s i o n i n 
D^. IT g i v e s t h e same e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y t o t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s a n d t h e same c o n d i t i o n a l l y e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y t o t h e 
d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s a s t h e o r i g i n a l l y g i v e n m e c h a n i s m , s i n c e 
t h e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n o v e r d e c i s i o n v e c t o r s f o r a n y 
t y p e v e c t o r i s t h e same. To c h e c k t h a t II i s i n c e n t i v e com-
p a t i b l e s u p p o s e ( t o t h e c o n t r a r y ) t h a t d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r I 
c o u l d g a i n when i s h i s t y p e by r e p o r t i n g and t h e n 
d e t e r m i n i n g h i s p r i v a t e a c t i o n by 6: Dj,~*"D£ i n v i o l a t i o n o f 
e q u a t i o n < 5 ) . T h e n i f t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s (m, 6^) 
f o r t h e o r i g i n a l i n d i r e c t m e c h a n i s m , w h e r e 
m.Ch.) = m . C K ) , m ( t . ) = m . ( t . ) i f t . ? "f. l i 1 1 1 1 l i l i 
S. ( c . , f . ) = 3 ( 6 . ( c . , * . ) ) , 6. ( c . , t . ) = 6. ( c . , t . ) i f t . ? + 
i l l i l l i l l i l l I I 
T h a t i s (m.,6 ) d i f f e r s f r om (m ,6 ) i n t h a t , when "t- i s 1 1 1 1 l 
I ' S t r u e t y p e , i s e n d s r e p o r t s a s i f w e r e i ' s t y p e and 
t h e n d e t e r m i n e s p l a n n e d r e s p o n s e s by 6 f r o m w h a t he w o u l d 
h a v e done i f + ^ w e r e I ' S t y p e . T h u s , i f p l a y e r i was t y p e 
^ and u s e d t h e d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n s t r a t e g y C^ " , <5) t h i s 
* 
w o u l d v i o l a t e e q u a t i o n ( 5 ) f o r n , a n d s i m i l a r l y t h e 
i n d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n s t r a t e g y (m^,6^) w o u l d v i o l a t e (7 ) 
f o r t h e o r i g i n a l l y g i v e n i n d i r e c t m e c h a n i s m , w h i c h w o u l d 
c o n t r a d i c t t h e f a c t t h a t (m^,(S^) i s an e q u i l i b r i u m s t r a t e g y 
* 
f o r i . T h u s TI m u s t be i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e . Q.E.D. 
A n o t h e r p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e R e v e l a t i o n P r i n c i p l e 
i s t o n o t e t h a t an e q u i l i b r i u m i n a f i n i t e - m o v e e x t e n s i v e 
f o r m game w i t h e x p l i c i t d e s c r i p t i o n o f s e q u e n c i n g o f i n f o r m a -
t i o n e x c h a n g e and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g w i l l a l w a y s c o r r e s p o n d t o 
some e q u i l i b r i u m i n a o n e - s h o t game w i t h s u i t a b l y a u g m e n t e d 
m e s s a g e s p a c e s . The o n e - s h o t game c a n t h e n be r e d u c e d t o a 
game w h e r e t r u t h f u l i n f o r m a t i o n i s p a s s e d . A l s o , ^ r a n d o m i s a t i o n 
i n t h e p o s s i b l y v e r y c o m p l e x e x t e n s i v e f o r m game w i l l s t i l l be 
c a p t u r e d by s i m p l e d r a w s f r o m a u n i f o r m d i s t r i b u t i o n ( h o n e s t l y 
r e p o r t e d i n e q u i l i b r i u m ) . I n t h e p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n a o n e -
s h o t game c o r r e s p o n d s t o d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n a nd f i n i t e move 
e x t e n s i v e f o r m game c o r r e s p o n d s t o i n d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n . T h a t 
i s a d i r e c t c o - o r d i n a t i o n m e c h a n i s m s i m u l a t e s t h e o v e r a l l 
e f f e c t o f t h e ( f i n i t e move) i n d i r e c t c o - o r d i n a t i o n m e c h a n i s m 
a s t h e d i a g r a m b e l o w i l l u s t r a t e s . 
' OQZ 
Expressed i n yet another f a s h i o n , the R e v e l a t i o n 
P r i n c i p l e i m p l i e s t h a t any v e c t o r of expected u t i l i t y 
p o i n t s f o r the c e n t r a l headquarters and d i v i s i o n a l 
managers which can be achieved i n a mechanism in which 
d i v i s i o n a l managers l i e and/or d i s o b e d i e n t l y provide 
t h e i r e f f o r t s e r v i c e s , can be achieved by a mechanism 
which induces honesty and obedience. Thus, the c e n t r a l 
headquarters can r e s t r i c t i t s a t t e n t i o n to outcomes t h a t 
are p o s s i b l e under d i r e c t mechanisms when t r y i n g to 
f i n d the b e s t a c h i e v a b l e outcome using any p o s s i b l e 
mechanism. 
6.2 A p p l i c a t i o n of the G e n e r a l i s e d P r i n c i p a l -
Agent Game of Incomplete Information to the 
T r a n s f e r - P r i c i n g Problem 
I n S e c t i o n 6.1, a very g e n e r a l model of a P r i n c i p a l -
Agency problem was presented. I n order to show t h a t 
t h i s a n a l y s i s i s a p p l i c a b l e to the t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g problem, 
one must s p e c i f y i n much more d e t a i l the communication 
process between the c e n t r a l headquarters and d i v i s i o n a l 
managers f o r t h i s s p e c i f i c problem. For i n s t a n c e , the 
p u b l i c a c t i o n space D o must be s p e c i f i e d i n much more d e t a i l . 
I n c l u d e d i n the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of D must be the method 
o 
by which d i v i s i o n a l managers are to be compensated. I t 
i s important t h a t the compensation f u n c t i o n s be determined 
w i t h i n the model and not imposed exogenously. That i s to 
say, i t i s not admissable t o , f o r i n s t a n c e , assume t h a t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers are paid a f i x e d share of t h e i r 
d i v i s i o n s ' p r o f i t . T h i s i s because the c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r s has the a b i l i t y to determine how i t wishes to 
compensate d i v i s i o n a l managers and so one must c o n s i d e r 
how the c e n t r a l headquarters could determine the b e s t 
method by which to compensate d i v i s i o n a l managers. 
D i f f e r e n t compensation f u n c t i o n s w i l l a f f e c t how 
d i v i s i o n a l managers perform and, hence, the net corporate 
p r o f i t s t h a t w i l l accrue to the c e n t r a l headquarters. 
Before undertaking t h i s t a s k , though, l e t us r e c a l l 
the r o l e of the c e n t r a l headquarters i n the G e n e r a l i s e d 
P r i n c i p a l - A g e n c y model. The c e n t r a l headquarters w i l l 
wish to determine the d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n mechanism, which 
induces d i v i s i o n a l managers to adopt honest and obedient 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s and which maximise the c e n t r a l 
headquarter's u t i l i t y , while s t i l l being i n d i v i d u a l l y 
r a t i o n a l f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers. 
I n the f o r m u l a t i o n presented here, the c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r s p o s s e s s e s no p r i v a t e information, which means 
th a t the c e n t r a l headquarter's problem can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
a s : 
maximise U (I I ) = I I P ( t ) H ( d | t ) u (d,t) 
n ° t c T deD ° 
s u b j e c t to ( 2 ) , (5) and ( 6 ) . 
I n the f o l l o w i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n , i n order to s i m p l i f y 
the p r e s e n t a t i o n , without d e s t r o y i n g the e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t s 
of the problem, i t w i l l be assumed t h a t a l l d i v i s i o n a l 
managers' b e l i e f s are c o n s i s t e n t with a common p r i o r (as 
i n equation ( 1 ) ) . Furthermore, i t w i l l be assumed t h a t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers' t y p e s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t random 
v a r i a b l e s i n t h e common p r i o r , t h a t i s : 
* N * 
P ( t ) = X p ( t ) 
i = l 
f o r a l l t e T 
He r e P ^ ( t ^ ) i s the m a r g i n a l p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t p l a y e r 1 
i s t y p e t.^. 
L e t us assume t h e r e a r e two d i v i s i o n s , a m a n u f a c t u r 
i n g and a d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n , r e s p e c t i v e l y . The 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n p r o d u c e s an i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t 
y u s i n g two i n p u t s and x.^, w h i c h h a v e a s s o c i a t e d 
f a c t o r i n p u t p r i c e s o f and t r e s p e c t i v e l y . The 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n u t i l i s e s y and a n o t h e r i n p u t z 
t o p r o d u c e a f i n a l p r o d u c t q. The i n p u t z has a u n i t 
p r i c e o f e Q and t h e t r a n s f e r p r i c e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h y i s 
d e n o t e d p. I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s assumed t h a t t h e f i n a l 
p r o d u c t i s s o l d on a c o m p e t i t i v e e x t e r n a l market a t 
p r i c e 0. I t w i l l be assumed t h a t t h e s p e c i f i c p r o d u c -
t i o n t e c h n o l o g i e s f o r t h e model a r e a s f o l l o w s : 
3 5 
y = f (x1,x2) = x* x" 
, , .5 .1 
q = g (y ,z) = y z 
The c o r p o r a t e o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n c a n be e x p r e s s e d a s : 
x , , x ~ , z max ©q - e^z - e x , - tx„ 1 2 ' ^ D m l 2 
.5 .1 
s . t . q = y z 
.3 .5 
y = x x x 2 
L e t u s i n t r o d u c e i n c o m p l e t e knowledge of i n f o r m a -
t i o n by a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e i s u n c e r t a i n t y r e g a r d i n g 
what t h e f a c t o r p r i c e t , f o r t h e f a c t o r i n p u t w i l l 
be, f o r any f o r t h c o m i n g p e r i o d . I t i s common knowledge 
t h a t t h e f a c t o r p r i c e m a r g i n a l p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n 
i s 
( 0.1 f o r t = 5 
( 
( 0.3 f o r t = 4 
p ( t ) = ( 
( 0.4 f o r t = 3 
( 
( 0.2 f o r t = 2 
I t i s assumed t h a t t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l 
manager o b s e r v e s t h e a c t u a l v a l u e o f t a t t h e b e g i n n i n g 
o f t h e p e r i o d u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n and, h e n c e , knows 
t h e t r u e v a l u e o f t p r i v a t e l y . One c o u l d s i m i l a r l y 
assume t h a t t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t p r i c e G i s u n c e r t a i n 
and t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager p r i v a t e l y 
o b s e r v e s i t s v a l u e , w h ereas o t h e r s o n l y have common 
knowledge o f t h e m a r g i n a l p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 0. 
However, i n o r d e r t o s i m p l i f y t h e example, i t w i l l be 
assumed t h a t 0 c a n o n l y t a k e on one v a l u e w h i c h i s 0 = 7. 
To i n t r o d u c e m a n a g e r i a l e f f o r t a s an argument i n t h e mode 
i t c o u l d be assumed t h a t i s t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n 
manager's l e v e l o f e f f o r t p r o v i d e d and z i s t h e d i s t r i b u -
t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s manager's l e v e l o f e f f o r t p r o v i d e d . I t 
w i l l be assumed t h a t t h e a s s o c i a t e d f a c t o r c o s t e ^ o f 
e f f o r t z i s 1 and f o r x, t h e a s s o c i a t e d f a c t o r c o s t e 
1 m 
L e t d = ( d o , d i ; d 2 ) 
where i n t h i s model d^ = x^ 
d 2 = z 
L e t d o = ( d S p ' d o p ' d o y ' d o q ' doc' d o c ' doJl' d o n ) 
where d m s p e c i f i e s t h e t r a n s f e r p r i c e t h a t t h e op 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n f a c e s 
D 3 d Q p s p e c i f i e s t h e t r a n s f e r p r i c e t h a t t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n f a c e s 
d™y s p e c i f i e s t h e o u t p u t o f t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e 
p r o d u c t r e q u i r e d frcm t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
d i v i s i o n 
s p e c i f i e s t h e o u t p u t o f t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t 
r e q u i r e d from t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n 
d m , d D s p e c i f i e s t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n a c c r u i n g t o t h e oc oc 
r e s p e c t i v e d i v i s i o n a l managers 
m D d ^.d n s p e c i f i e s t h e p r o f i t a d i v i s i o n s h o u l d e a r n oil oil 
4 
The d i v i s i o n a l p r oblems c a n be e x p r e s s e d a s 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n x,,x_ max py - e x, - t x ~ ^ 1' 2 ^J m 1 2 
. 3 . 5 s . t . y = x 1 x 2 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n y,z max 0q - py - e D z 
. 5 . 1 s . t . q = y z 
I n a d d i t i o n , assume t h a t t h e s o l e argupient of t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n i s c o r p o r a t e 
p r o f i t and t h a t i t i s r i s k n e u t r a l , so t h a t U o ( f o ( d , t ) ) 
= f 0 ( d , t ) . 
G i v e n t h e above n o t a t i o n , one can c l e a r l y w r i t e 
t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r ' s problem a s : 
d max f Q ( d , t ) 
s . t . (5) and (6) 
i f t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s w i s h e d t o choose a s i n g l e 
pure s t r a t e g y d. 
However, i f i t i s r e c o g n i s e d t h a t t h e t y p e s ' 
v a r i a b l e t c a n t a k e on a number o f v a l u e s w i t h a s s o c i a t e d 
m a r g i n a l p r o b a b i l i t y p ( t ) , t h e n t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
may w i s h t o s p e c i f y i t s c h o i c e of s t r a t e g y d a s c o n -
d i t i o n a l on t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e of the m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
d i v i s i o n . Note t h a t , s i n c e t h i s i s p r i v a t e l y known o n l y 
by t h a t d i v i s i o n ' s manager, t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
w i l l be b a s i n g i t s d e c i s i o n on a communicated v a l u e of t , 
w h i c h may n o t be t h e t r u e v a l u e . A l s o t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s may w i s h t o choose a mixed s t r a t e g y ^ , r a t h e r 
t h a n a pure s t r a t e g y i f i t b e n e f i t s from t h i s . T h e r e f o r e 
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r 
o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n becomes: 
n ( d | t ) max P ( t ) n ( d | t ) f ( d r t ) 
s . t . ( 2 ) , (5) and (6) 
Suppose t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers' u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s a r e 
o f t h e form: 
?r,7 
c - e x , in m l 
CD ~ 6 d Z 
where and c D d e n o t e s t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n r e c e i v e d by 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g and d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n ' s managers 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n a d d i t i o n , assume t h a t i n d i v i d u a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s r e q u i r e d t h a t : 
and U D (•, •,•) >, 0 
Suppose, f o r t h e moment, t h a t t h e r e were no i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y p r o b l e m s a s t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s c o u l d 
p e r f e c t l y o b s e r v e t , 0, x, and z. Then t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r ' s o v e r a l l problem** r e d u c e s t o : 
( d | t ) max 0q - e^z - e x , - t x . 
D m l 2 
5 1 
s . t . q = y z , J -
.3 .5 
y = x i x 2 
c = e x, m m l 
CD = G D Z 
where t h e f i n a l c o n s t r a i n t s e n s u r e i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y . 
I t i s p r o v e n i n t h e Appendix t o t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t , i n 
t h i s e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e o p t i m a l t r a n s f e r p r i c e g i v e n 
p e r f e c t o b s e r v a b i l i t y and, h e n c e , t h e g u a r a n t e e o f 
t r u t h f u l c o m m u n i c a t i o n of t y p e s v a r i a b l e s and o b e d i e n t 
p r o v i s i o n o f d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r i a l e f f o r t i s : 
U (c ,e ,x,) m m' m 1 
and U D ( c D , e ,z) 
P = 2 »4 .7263t 
Thus t he o p t i m a l t r a n s f e r p r i c e f o r : 
t = 5 i s P = 5.1899 
t = 4 i s P = 4.7468 
t = 3 i s P = .4.2308 
t = 2 i s P = 3.5974 
I n t h i s model, where d™ = ' op = d
D = p, once t h e t r a n s f e r op ' 
p r i c e i s d e t e r m i n e d t h e o p t i m a l o u t p u t of e a c h d i v i s i o n 
c a n be d e t e r m i n e d i n e a c h c a s e a s : 
f o r t = 5 / y = .3770 
q = .5590 
t = 4 y = .4608 
q = .6247 
t = 3 y = .5970 
q = .7217 
t = 2 y = .8599 
q T .8838 
(See t h e end o f t h e Appendix f o r d e r i v a t i o n of t h e s e v a l u e s 
Under e a c h t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g r e g i m e , t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s would compensate t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers a s 
f o l l o w s : 
p = 5.1899 x* = .5869 = r m 
z* = .3913 = r D 
p r o v i d e d t h e i r d i v i s i o n s e a r n t h e p r o f i t s 
p = 4.7468 x, = .6563 = r 
c 1 m 
z* = .4375 = r D 
p r o v i d e d t h e d i v i s i o n s e a r n t h e p r o f i t s 
n = .4373 ni 
n D = 1.7479 
p = 4.2308 x1 = .7578 = r m 
z* = .5052 = r r 
p r o v i d e d t h e d i v i s i o n s e a r n t h e p r o f i t s 
n = .5051 
m 
nD = 2 . 0 2 1 0 
p = 3.5974 x, = .7734 = r 
1 m 
z* = .6187 = r D 
p r o v i d e d t h e d i v i s i o n s e a r n t h e p r o f i t s 
II = .6185 m 
n D = 2.4745 
The above d i s c u s s i o n d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t , once t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s knows t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e f o r the 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n , i t c a n s p e c i f y a s u i t a b l e t r a n s f e 
p r i c e and a s s o c i a t e d c o n t r o l s s u c h a s o u t p u t t a r g e t s 
and b u d g e t e d p r o f i t s . I t i s t h u s p o s s i b l e t o s p e c i f y a 
p a y o f f t a b l e a s below where t h e o t h e r d Q arguments b e s i d e 
p = d m have been s u p r e s s e d . op 
PAYOFF TABLE 
P = 5.1899 P = 4.748 P = 4.2308 P = 3.5974 
t = 5 X 
t = 4 X 
t = 3 X 
t = 2 X 
The c r o s s t h a t i s found i n any one row i n d i c a t e s 
t h e o p t i m a l t r a n s f e r p r i c e f o r t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , 
g i v e n any known v a l u e o f t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e . 
However, l e t u s now r e l a x t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n ' s manager i s h o n e s t and o b e d i e n t . 
When su c h i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s s u e s n e e d t o be 
c o n s i d e r e d , one must c o n s i d e r t h e p a y o f f s t h a t would a c c r u e 
t o t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n ' s manager i n t h e non - c r o s s e d 
b oxes o f t h e p a y o f f t a b l e . T h i s i s b e c a u s e t h e s e a r e 
t h e outcomes t h a t w o uld a r i s e i f t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
d i v i s i o n a l manager c h o s e t o l i e about t h e d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e s 
v a r i a b l e and t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s u s e s t h e o r i g i n a l l y 
d e r i v e d c o n t r o l s d Q . Thus, the f u l l p a y o f f t a b l e w i l l 
now be s p e c i f i e d . The e n t r y i n e a c h p a y o f f box i s t h e 
u t i l i t y t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l manager a c h i e v e s . 
I f t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s can e n s u r e t h a t d i v i s i o n a l 
managers a r e h o n e s t and o b e d i e n t , i t can e n s u r e t h a t t h e y 
PAYOFF TABLE 
P = 5.1899 P = 4.7468 P = 4.2308 P = 3.5974 
t = 5 0 -. 2953 - 1. 0174 - 3M995 
t = 4 • 1822 0 - • 4661 - 2.1165 
t = 3 • 336 3 • 2501 0 - 1' 0504 
t = 2 •4594 • 4497 « 3724 0 
n 
c 
1» 9565 2»1852 2*5261 3» 093 
are " j u s t " p a i d enough to make i t i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l 
f o r them to c a r r y out c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r 1 s d i r e c t i v e s . 
Hence, the e n t r i e s on the diagonal of the payoff t a b l e 
are a l l z e r o . I n sbme c a s e s , the manufacturing d i v i s i o n a l 
manager would not b e n e f i t from l y i n g and so those p a r t s 
of the payoff t a b l e c o n t a i n negative e n t r i e s i n the boxes. 
The f i n a l row i n d i c a t e s the p r o f i t s t h a t accrue to the 
c e n t r a l headquarters and i s determined by adding the two 
d i v i s i o n s ' p r o f i t s under each t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g regime 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . To i l l u s t r a t e how the u t i l i t y of the 
manufacturing d i v i s i o n a l manager i s determined, l e t us 
c o n s i d e r the case where the manufacturing d i v i s i o n ' s 
manager communicates t h a t the d i v i s i o n ' s types v a r i a b l e 
i s t - 3. 
I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s would 
g 
have s e t t h e t r a n s f e r p r i c e a t 4.2308 and r e q u i r e d the 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n t o produce .597 u n i t s of the i n t e r -
m e d i a t e p r o d u c t , w h i l e the d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n i s 
r e q u i r e d t o produce .7217 u n i t s o f t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t . 
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l manager w i l l 
9 
be compensated w i t h .7578 u n i t s of c o m p e n s a t i o n , 
p r o v i d e d t h e d i v i s i o n e a r n s .5051 u n i t s o f p r o f i t . The 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l manager w i l l be compensated w i t h 
.5052 u n i t s of compensation, p r o v i d e d t h e d i v i s i o n e a r n s 
2.0210 u n i t s of p r o f i t . I t w i l l now be d e m o n s t r a t e d 
t h a t , i f t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n ' s t r u e t y p e s v a r i a b l e 
were t = 4, t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n a l manager would f i n d i t 
d i s u t i l i t o u s t o communicate the d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e s v a r i a b l e 
a s b e i n g t = 3, i f t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s u s e s P = 4.2308 
and a s s o c i a t e d c o n t r o l s . When t h e d i v i s i o n ' s t r u e t y p e s 
v a r i a b l e i s t = 4 and t h e manager communicates the v a l u e 
t = 3 t o t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s t h e n s p e c i f i e s t h e c o n t r o l s d m 4.2308 op 
-,m a oy .597 
d m .7578 oc 
d m .5051 
and r e q u e s t s t h a t : 
.7578, remejnbering t h a t t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s w i l l n o t be a b l e t o 
observe t h e v a l u e o f d 
As f a r a s t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s i s c o n c e r n e d 
dm.n = py - c - tx„ - .5051 
oil ^J m 2 
s i n c e c i s s e t e q u a l t o e x,. S i n c e py and c a r e in ^ m l C J m 
s e t ( c o n t r o l l e d ) by t he c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , once 
t h e d i v i s i o n a l manager communicates t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e , 
i t must e n s u r e t h a t , i f t h e d i v i s i o n ' s t r u e t y p e s 
v a r i a b l e t i s d i f f e r e n t from t h e communicated v a l u e t , 
* * 
t h a t t x 2 = t x 2 i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h e budgeted p r o f i t . 
I n t h i s c a s e : 
t * x * = 3 x (. 4210) = 1.263 
so i f t = 4 
x = 1.263 = .31575 
^ 4 
I n o r d e r t o meet t h e p r o d u c t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t of the i n t e r -
m e d i a t e p r o d u c t , i t must be t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n a l manager 
p r o v i d e s enough e f f o r t ( x ^ ) so t h a t 
x " x 2 = .597 ( w i t h B =«5) 
x" = .597 , ( w i t h a = .3) 
(.31575)' 
x± = 1.2235 
and u (c ,e , x n ) = .7578 - 1.2239 = -'4661 
m m m 1 
A * 
A s i m i l a r argument can be p r e s e n t e d f o r t = 5, t = 3 , 
showing t h a t (•,*,•) would be n e g a t i v e . 
However, suppose t h a t t = 2 and t = 3 , when the 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s s e t s t h e same c o n t r o l s and r e q u e s t s 
t h e same e f f o r t l e v e l from t h e d i v i s i o n a l manager. 
x
2
 = 1 - 2 6 3 = .6315 
0 1 B C O T x x~ = .597 x 2 
g i v e s x™ = .597 1 ( w i t h B =.5) 
(.6315)" 5 
g i v e s x^ = .3854 ( w i t h a = .3) 
and u ( c ,e .x,) = .7578 - .3854 = .3724 
m m m 1 
C l e a r l y , t h e d i v i s i o n a l manager c a n b e n e f i t from 
o v e r s t a t i n g t h e v a l u e o f t h e d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e s v a r i a b l e , 
b e c a u s e t h e manager c a n a c h i e v e t h e budgeted l e v e l of 
p r o f i t by u s i n g more o f i n p u t x„ w h i c h i s , i n f a c t , 
c h e a p e r t h a n t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s e x p e c t s and l e s s 
e f f o r t , w h i l e s t i l l r e c e i v i n g t h e same c o m p e n s a t i o n . 
L e t u s u s e t h e c o n v e n t i o n t h a t : 
d i = (d™ = d° = 5.18, d m = .377, d D = .559, d m = .5869, o op op ' oy ' oq oc 
d o c = - 3 9 1 3 ' d S i T - 3 9 1 4 ' d o i r 1 - 5 6 5 1 ) 
d^ = (5.1899, .377, .559, .5869,,3913, .3914 , 1.5651) 
d^ = (4.7468, .4608, .6247, .6563, .4375, .4373, 1.7479) 
= ( 4 . 2 3 0 8 , . 5 9 7 , . 7 2 1 7 , . 7 5 7 8 , . 5 0 5 2 , . 5 0 5 1 , 2 . 0 2 1 0 ) 
d ^ = ( 3 . 5 9 7 4 , . 8 5 9 9 , . 8 8 3 0 , . 7 7 3 4 , . 6 1 8 7 , . 6 1 8 5 , 2 . 4 7 4 5 ) 
and t h a t d* = . 5869 
d^ = . 6563 
d^ = . 7 5 7 8 
d j = . 7734 
L e t 
IT* = n ( d o , d ^ , d ^ | t * = 5 , 0 = 7 ) n J = n ( d ^ , d J , d ^ 
= n ( d ^ d ^ , d ^ | t * - 5 , e = 7 ) n 2 = n ( d ^ , d J , d ^ 
= n(d^,dj,d^|t* = 5 , e=7 n ^ = n ( d ^ , d j , d ^ 
4 4 4 4 , * 4 4 4 4 
n* = n ( d j , d j , d ^ | t =5,0=7 n ^ = n(d^,d^,d^ 
= n ( d j , d ] ; , d ^ | t*=3,0=7 )n^=n(d^,d];,d^ 
n 3 = n ( ^ d ^ , d ^ | t*=3,0=7) 1^=11 ( d ^ d ^ d * 
3 3 3 3 i * 3 3 3 3 
= n ( d ^ , d j d ^ | t =3,0=7) n ^ = n ( d ^ , d j , d ^ 
4 4 4 4 . * 4 4 4 4 
= i M d ^ d ^ d J j l t =3,0=7)n^=n(d^,d^,d2 
t =4,0=7) 
t* = 4,0= 7 ) 
t * = 4,0= 7 ) 
t * = 4 0=7) 
t* = 2,0= 7 ) 
t* = 2,0= 7 ) 
t* = 2,0= 7 ) 
t* = 2,0= 7 ) 
The e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y t o t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s f r o m 
t h e d i r e c t m e c h a n i s m i s : 
T. I 
t e T deD 
P ( t ) n (d I t , 0 ) f o ( d , t , G ) 
where T = ( t = 5 , t=4 , t = 3 , t=2) 
d~d7d d d r d:.d d,d' D 
I t i s r e q u i r e d t h a t 
and 
n ( d | t , 0 ) > 0 
Z n ( d | t , 0 ) = 1 
deD 
f o r a l l deD and a l l t e T 
i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t I I ( d | t ) i s a v a l i d c o n d i t i o n a l 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s f o r t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n 
r e q u i r e t h a t : 
I I P ( t ) n ( d | t , 0 ) U ( d , t , 0 ) 
t e T deD m 
> z i p ( t ) n ( d i t / 0 ) u m ( d ^ ,6 (d,) , t ) 
t e T deD m 3 1 1 x 
f o r a l l t e T and a l l t e T and a l l 6 , : d , + d . 
1 1 1 
where d d d,d ) 
and (d , 6 ( d 1 ) ) = ( d o , 6 1 ( d 1 ) , d 2 ) 
2 9 7 
A l s o t h e i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s f o r t h e 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n r e q u i r e 
^ ( T l t ) > o f o r a l l t * T 
Thus, we c a n w r i t e t h e o v e r a l l problem f o r t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s a s : 
max 
{•195711* + « 2 1 8 5 n ^ + '2526JI:? + ' 3 0 9 3 I l f * 5 5 5 5 
+ - 5 8 7 0 I I 1 + « 6 5 5 6 n 5 + ' 7 5 7 8 n ^ + • 9 2 7 9 n 4 4 4 4 4 
+ '782611* + • 8 7 4 1 I I 2 ! + l - 0 l 0 4 I I g + l - 2 3 7 2 n ^ 
+ ' 3 9 1 3 R 2 + '4370112 + -5052112 + - e i s e n ^ } 
s . t . n* + + + = 1 ( i ) 
1 2 3 4 
+ + + = 1 (3) 
1 2 3 4 
n 2 + n 2 + H 2 + n 2 = 1 ( 4 ) 
•4594 I I * + -4497n2 + -3724JI2 
•4594 H* + '4497H2 + -3724II3 
(5) 
45941^ + '4497H2 + '3724 R 3 
(6) 
4 5 9 4 n i + « 4 4 9 7 n ^ + -3724 Ti3. 4 4 4 
4 5 9 4 n 2 + '4497H2 + -37.24 I I 3 
459411^ + « 4 4 9 7 n ^ + -3724I1 3 
(7) 
33631^ + ^ S O i n ^ - l'05o4JIg 
3 3 6 3 n 2 + - 2 5 0 i n 2 - 1-0504II2 
(8) 
3 3 6 3 n i + - 2 5 o m ? - 1*0504 I I I 
3363117 + ^ S O l i n - 1-050411 
(9) 
3363n^ + ^ S O i n ^ - l - 0 5 0 4 n * 
3 3 6 3 n J + -250111? - 1'050411* 
d o r 
1 8 2 2 J H - - 4 6 6 i n ^ - 2 - 1 1 6 5 I K 4 4 4 









18221^ - -4661II 3 , - 2 -1165J1 4 4 4 4 
1822112 - - 4 6 6 i n 2 - 2 -1165JI2 
(13) 
-•2953R^ - 1-017411^ - 3-4995I1 4 (14) 






-•295311^ - l«0174n^ - 3.499511* 
(15) 
-•2953n^ - 1-017411^ - 3.4995II* 
-•2953n^ 
o 
- l«0174n^ - 3*499511* 
(16) 
-•2953II2 - 1*0174112 - 3*4995112 
-•2953n^ - l«0174n^ - 3«4995nf >r 0 (17) 
1822JI* - »466in^ - 2'1165JI 4 1 >, 0 4 4 4 (18) 
336311* + - 2 5 0 i n ^ - 1-0504 II 4, >, 0 3 3 4 (19) 
4 5 9 4 n ^ + '4497JI2 + .3724n^ >, 0 (20) 
a l l I C 5- 0 
The f i n a l b a s i s f o r t h i s l i n e a r programming p r o b l e m has 
o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n v a l u e = 1.9566 
*5 = 1 





1 S 2 0 = •4594 
Where t h e S - v a n a b l e s a r e s u r p l u s v a r i a b l e s and where 
t h e s u b s c r i p t i n d i c a t e s t h e c o n s t r a i n t t h e y p e r t a i n t o . 
Thus, t h e o p t i m a l mechanism would be i m p l e m e n t a b l e 
by t h e f o l l o w i n g d e c i s i o n r u l e . No m a t t e r what t y p e 
t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l manager c l a i m s t o be, t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s w i l l a l w a y s s e t t h e o r d e r e d d -
t u p l e t o be: 
d* = ( 5 - 1 8 9 9 , -377, -559, -5869, -3913, -3914, 1-5651) 
d^ = -5869 
= -3913 
I t i s q u i t e e a s y t o s e e t h a t t h e r e a s o n why t h i s 
a l l o c a t i o n mechanism e n s u r e s i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y 
i s b e c a u s e d Q i s c o n s t a n t no m a t t e r what t y p e i s 
r e p o r t e d and t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l manager w i l l 
a l w a y s p r e f e r d^, d^, d ^ f t o be implemented ( w h a t e v e r 
t y p e t h e d i v i s i o n i s ) r a t h e r t h a n a n o t h e r s e t o f c o n t r o l s 
and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o compare t h i s i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e 
s o l u t i o n w i t h t h e s o l u t i o n t h a t would a r i s e i f t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s had p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n , b e i n g a b l e t o o b s e r v e 
a l l d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s and outcomes. I f t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
d i v i s i o n a l manager c l a i m e d h i s o r h e r d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e s 
v a r i a b l e was t=4, i n t h e p e r f e c t l y o b s e r v a b l e w o r l d , t h e 
2 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s would setlT ^  = 1, t h a t i s u s e c o n t r o l s 
2 2 2 and recommendations d d , d 0 . T h i s would mean t h a t t h e o 1 2 
t r a n s f e r p r i c e would be s e t a t 4.7468 and t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
3' J 
d i v i s i o n w i l l be r e q u e s t e d t o produce .4608 u n i t s of 
t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t b e i n g p a i d .6563 u n i t s p r o v i d e d 
t h e d i v i s i o n e a r n s t h e t a r g e t l e v e l o f p r o f i t o f 
.4373 u n i t s . 
I n t h e example above, where t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
does not have p e r f e c t o b s e r v a b i l i t y , t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s would need t o s e t TI^ = 1 ( p l u s o t h e r v a r i a b l e s 
as s p e c i f i e d i n t h e s o l u t i o n ) i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y . C l e a r l y , t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l 
manager e x p e c t s t o be .1822 u n i t s b e t t e r o f f when t h e r e 
i s n o t p e r f e c t o b s e r v a b i l i t y and t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
r e q u i r e s i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y . A l s o t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s c a n e x p e c t t o be .2287 u n i t s (2.1852 - 1.9565) 
worse o f f . However, n o t e t h a t t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
does n o t have a c o n s c i o u s c h o i c e between p e r f e c t and 
i m p e r f e c t o b s e r v a b i l i t y . I t must do t h e b e s t i t can w i t h 
i m p e r f e c t o b s e r v a b i l i t y . Thus, one can i n t e r p r e t t h e 
.1822 u n i t s e x t r a a s an e x p e c t e d premium w h i c h t h e 
d i v i s i o n a l manager i s p a i d f o r d i s s e m i n a t i n g p r i v a t e 
i n f o r m a t i o n . I f i n d t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a p p e a l i n g , b e c a u s e 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e a n a l y s i s we have been assuming t h a t 
d i v i s i o n a l managers p r o v i d e two c a t e g o r i e s o f s e r v i c e s t o 
t h e c o r p o r a t i o n . T h e s e a r e t h e e f f o r t s e r v i c e s t h e y 
p r o v i d e and t h e s p e c i a l i s t i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e y c o l l e c t 
and c a n c o n v e y . G i v e n t h a t b o t h s e r v i c e s a r e v a l u e a b l e 
t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers s h o u l d be p a i d f o r p r o v i d i n g b o t h . 
T h a t i s , t h e y s h o u l d n o t o n l y be compensated f o r p r o v i d i n g 
e f f o r t , b u t a l s o f o r p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . 
On a c c e p t i n g t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , t h i s g i v e s r i s e t o 
t h e d i f f i c u l t problem o f how t h e n c o u l d a c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r s v a l u e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i s s i o n s e r v i c e s 
t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers p r o v i d e . T h i s t h e s i s s u g g e s t s 
t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers s h o u l d be rewarded j u s t enough 
f o r t h e i r i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s e r v i c e s , so a s t o e n s u r e 
t h e y c a n n e v e r g a i n from t r a n s m i t t i n g u n t r u t h f u l 
i n f o r m a t i o n a t c o s t t o t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s . 
I n a d d i t i o n , n ote t h a t t h e d i r e c t t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
p r o c e d u r e p r o p o s e d h e r e whereby the c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
c h o o s e s a p u r e o r mixed s t r a t e g y i n terms o f t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e s t h a t would have been s e t under c o m p l e t e o b s e r v -
F o r i n s t a n c e , 
a b i l i t y i s n o t t h e o n l y p r o c e d u r e p o s s i b l e . / g i v e n t h e 
R e v e l a t i o n p r i n c i p l e , t h e r e may be an i n d i r e c t t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e t h a t would implement t h e same outcome. 
6.3 V i r t u a l U t i l i t y a s an E x p l a n a t i o n o f B a y e s i a n 
I n c e n t i v e C o m p a t i b l e Mechanisms. 
So f a r , i t h a s been i m p l i c i t l y assumed t h a t t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s i s f r e e t o choose w h a t e v e r a l l o c a t i o n 
mechanism II i t w i s h e s and t h a t i t w i l l a l w a y s c h o o s e an 
i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l ^ i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e mechanism. 
However, l e t us c o n s i d e r what c o n d i t i o n s need t o be 
s a t i s f i e d i n o r d e r t h a t s u c h mechanisms e x i s t . 
R e c a l l t h e o v e r a l l problem f o r t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
i s : 
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n ( d | t ) max E Z P ( t ) n ( d | t ) u ( d , t ) 
t e T deD ° 
s . t . ( 2 ) , (5) and (6) 
The L a g r a n g i a n f o r t h e problem where one o n l y c o n s i d e r s ^ 
t h e i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s can be w r i t t e n 
as 
Z Z P ( t ) n ( d | t ) u ( d , t ) 
t e T deD 
n 
+ i = l t . e T . ~ 1 - ^ a°(6 t | t ) { U (H|t ) -l i t . e T . 6.:D.+D. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
V n / s . ^ J t . ) } (9) 
The s a d d l e p o i n t c o n d i t i o n s o f L a g r a n g i a n a n a l y s i s r e q u i r e 
t h a t : 
Z E P ( t ) n ( d | t ) u ( d , t ) - r.ax ( Z Z P ( t ) TT (d 11) u (d, 
t e T deD i T ( d | t : e n t e T deD ° 
i = l t . eT . t e T . 6 . : t), +D . l I l l I 
U . t T T ^ ^ t . l t . ) 
H = s e t o f a l l o c a t i o n mechanisr.s t h a t s a t i s f y c o n s t r a i n t 
(2) . 
304 
and ct°(6 ; t . | t . ) { U . ( H | t . ) - U . ( I I , 6 . t | t . ) } = 0 (9) 
1 , ' 1 1 1 1 V 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 ' V ' 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . , a l l t . e T . and a l l <5.:D.-»-D. 
1 l ' l i i l l 
w i t h U . (III t . ) - u . ( n , 6 . , t . | t . ) 0 1 1 1 l ' l ' l ' l 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . , a l l t . e T . and a l l 6.:D.+D. 
l i l i i l l 
Note t h a t a ^ ( 6 i , t i | t ^ ) r e f e r s t o t h e L a g r a n g i a n m u l t i p l i e r 
f o r l y i n g and b e i n g d i s o b e d i e n t , where i t i s c l a i m e d t h a t 
t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e i s t ^ when r e a l l y i t i s , and t h e n 
r e i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s recommendations 
by u t i l i s i n g f u n c t i o n 6i:D^->-D^. However, i t i s p o s s i b l e 
t o s e p a r a t e t h e L a g r a n g e m u l t i p l i e r i n t o c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s 
a s f o l l o w s . One c a n d e t e r m i n e t h e L a g r a n g i a n m u l t i p l i e r 
f o r l y i n g by c l a i m i n g t h e ^ t y p e s v a r i a b l e t o be t ^ when 
i t r e a l l y i s t i and r e i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
recommendations i n any f e a s i b l e f a s h i o n a s : 
a . ( t . t . ) = I a°(6.,t. t . ) i i 1 i . i i ' i ' i 
6.:D.+D. V J - U ; i l l 
w i t h a . ( t . | t . ) > 0 f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . , a l l t . e T . 
I I ' I ' I l ' l i 
a l l d.eD. and a l l d.eD. l i l i 
However, we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e c a s e where t h e 
p l a y e r l i e s and c h o o s e s t h e b e s t method by w h i c h t o r e p l y 
t o t h e recommendation d^, g i v e n t h a t t h e p l a y e r c l a i m s 
t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e t o be t ^ when i t r e a l l y i s t ^ . 
L e t ( d ^ | d^ , t ^ , t ^ ) r e p r e s e n t a c h o i c e o f r e a c t i o n 
t o t h e recommendation d^ when i t i s c l a i m e d t h a t t h e t y p e s 
v a r i a b l e i s when i t r e a l l y i s t ^ . Note i t may be 
o p t i m a l f o r t h e p l a y e r t o choose a mixed s t r a t e g y o v e r 
r e a c t i o n s i n r e p l y t o t h e recommendation when l y i n g . 
Hence we r e q u i r e : 
^ i ( d i | d i , t i , t i ) >, 0 (11) 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . , a l l t . e T . , a l l d.eD. and a l l d.eD 
' 1 1 ' 1 1 ' l i l i 
and S V i ( d i | d i V t i , t ) = 1 (12) 
d. eD. l l 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . , a l l t . e T . and a l l d.eD. 
l i ' l i l i 
where ^ ( d i | d i , t ^ , t ^ ) i s t h e mixed s t r a t e g y o v e r r e a c t i o n s 
w h i c h i s o p t i m a l f o r t h e p l a y e r , t h a t i s 
/\ /\ /\ 
. I I - E P. ( t . J t . ) IT (d| t . t ) V . ( d . | d . , t , t . ) 
t j r ^ j 1 3 l C ' l / V | O l C ' 1 1 l ' l ' l ' 1 a i c e T . deD d.eD. ^>ic 1 1 
• U i < d 3 i c ' d i ) ' t ) 
max U * ( n , 6 i , t i | t i ) (13) 
6.:D.+D. i l l 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . and a l l t . e T . 
' l i l i 
Thus, when ) T ( d i I d ± , t i , t ± ) s a t i s f i e s ( 1 1 ) , (12) 
and (13) we c a n d e t e r m i n e t h e L a g r a n g i a n m u l t i p l i e r f o r 
l y i n g and c l a i m i n g t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e t o be t i when i t 
r e a l l y i s t ^ and r e a c t i n g o p t i m a l l y t o t h e c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r s r ecommendations t o be 
a . ( t . | t . ) = Z 
1 1 1 1 - ~ , A \ 
f o r a l l i , a l l d.eD . , a l l d.eD. , a l l t . e T . and a l l t.eT.. 
' 1 1 ' l l ' l i l i 
I n t h e c a s e where a . ( t . | t . ) = 0, t h e n 6 . ( d . I d . , t . , t . ) 
I I ' I ' I I ' I ' I ' I 
s t i l l must be c h o s e n t o s a t i s f y ( 1 3 ) . 
Thus we c a n now, f o r i n s t a n c e , e x p r e s s c o n s t r a i n t (9) 
as r e q u i r i n g : 
0 = a i ( t i | t i ) { U i ( i r | t i ) - max U ± ( TT , 6 ±, \ t±)} = 0 
6 . l 
(14) 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T and a l l t . e t . . 
' l l i 
Note t h a t t h e s a d d l e p o i n t c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e : 
a ° ( t j t . ) { u . (n| t . ) - U* (11,6. , t . ) } = 0 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . a l l t . e T . and a l l 6.:D.-»-D. 
' l i l i i l l 
(15) 
3 O 7 . 
and a J ( t i H i ) f u . (n| t i ) - U* (H , ^  , t ± | t ± ) ) = O 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . , a l l t . e T . and a l l 6 . :D .-»-D . 
1 i ' l i i l l 
t ? e n ? £ A Z * £ «?(t.|t.i{ U . ( n i t . ) 
a l s ° i = l t . e T . t . e T . S.:D.+D. ^ 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
(16) 
u. ( n , 6 . , t . t . ) } = o i ' i ' i i 
n ^ 
and I I I . I a°(t.|t.){U.(n|t.) 
• - i t „ m £ _ „ r _ _ _ 1 1 1 1 ' 1 i = l t . e T . t . e T . 6.:D.eD. l i i i i i i 
u. ( n , 6 . , t . | t . ) } = o i ' i ' i " i 
now f o r e a c h i I ^ l a . ( t . 11.) U. (II11.) 
t . e T . t . e T . i i i i i 
1 1 1 1 
I E a . ( t . I t . ) U . ( n i t . ) 
l l 1 l l 1 i ' t . e T . t . e T . 
1 1 1 1 
so t h a t f o r e a c h i E I a . ( t . | t . ) U . ( n , 6 . , t . | t . ) 
/v 1 1 X 1 1 1 1 t . e T . t . e T . 
1 1 1 1 
I a, ( t J t , ) U * ( n , 6 , , t J t < ) l i ' l l ' i ' i ' I 
t . eT. t . e T . 
1 1 1 1 
Now l e t us d e f i n e t h e f o l l o w i n g f u n c t i o n : 
i 
n 
v ( d , t , a , t f ) = u ( d , t ) + I 
° ° i = l 
( Z a ( t . 1t, ) u . ( d , t ) 
/ \ 1 -L X 1 
t.eT. 
1 l 
a.(t,\t.) ^ Z ^ ( d j d ^ t - . t . ) 
t . eT i i d.eD, 
,u.((d^. ,d.) , ( t _ , t . ) ) ) 
P . ( t . ) 
(17) 
Thus, e q u a t i o n (9) can be e x p r e s s e d a s 
Z P ( t ) Z n ( d | t ) V ( d , t , a , V ) 
t e T deD ° 
(18) 
where we r e q u i r e : 
Z n ( d | t ) V ( d , t , a , f l ) 
deD ° 
max V ( d , t , a , t f ) 
deD ° 
(19) 
f o r a l l t e T . 
Thus, g i v e n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p d e s c r i b e d by e q u a t i o n ( 1 7 ) , we 
ca n s t a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g theorem: 
Theorem: I f II i s an i n c e n t i v e ; c o m p a t i b l e a l l o c a t i o n mechanism 
t h e n II w i l l m a x i m i s e t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s u t i l i t y i f and 
o n l y i f t h e r e e x i s t s v e c t o r s a and 6 s u c h t h a t c o n s t r a i n t s 
( 1 0 ) , ( 1 1 ) , ( 1 2 ) , ( 1 3 ) , ( 1 4 ) , (19) a r e s a t i s f i e d . 
As t h e above a n a l y s i s shows, t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e Theorem 
f o l l o w from t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
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i i p ( t ) n ( d | t ) u ( d , t ) 
t e T deD 
n ~ ~ 
+ Z Z „ Z E a°(6 , t I t ) {U (H|t ) -
i - 1 t . e T . t . e T . 6.:D +D 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
u* ( n , 6 i , t i | t ± ) } 
l p * ( t ) Z n ( d | t ) v ( d , t , a , t f ) 
t e T deD 
and s a d d l e p o i n t c o n d i t i o n s of L a g r a n g i a n a n a l y s i s . 
The f u n c t i o n v (d,t,a , l S ) w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r ' s v i r t u a l u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . To u n der-
s t a n d how t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s d e t e r m i n e s an i n c e n t i v e 
c o m p a t i b l e a l l o c a t i o n mechanism, one must t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r 
how t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s v i r t u a l u t i l i t y d i f f e r s from 
t h e u t i l i t y t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s c o u l d a c h i e v e i f t h e r e 
were no i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y p r o b l e m s . 
S i n c e one o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of L a g r a n g i a n a n a l y s i s 
i s t h a t 
u. ( n l t . ) - u. (n,6 . , t . t . ) >, o i ' i I ' I ' I i x 
f o r a l l i , a l l t . e T . , a l l t . e T . and a l l 6.:D.->-D. 
' l l ' 1 1 i l l 
and s i n c e i t i s a l s o r e q u i r e d t h a t 
~ * a . ( t . | t . ) > 0 and p . ( t . ) > 0 
I I ' I ^ * i I ' 





T h i s reans t h a t t h e b r a c k e t e d term f o r e q u a t i o n (17) 
i s p o s i t i v e . T h a t i s , i t i s c o s t l y t o t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n s u r e i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y . The 
l e v e l o f t h e c o s t t o t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s i s 
d e t e r m i n e d by how much e x t r a t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s 
must pay t o t h e i = l , . . . . , n d i v i s i o n a l managers i n o r d e r 
t o e n s u r e t h e y h a v e no i n c e n t i v e t o l i e o r be d i s o b e d i e n t . 
Thus, when i n c e n t i v e - c o m p a t i b i l i t y problems a r i s e , t h e 
s t r a t e g y o f t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s s h o u l d be t o c h o o s e 
t h e a l l o c a t i o n mechanism t h a t m a x i m i s e s t h e c e n t r a l h e a d -
q u a r t e r ' s v i r t u a l u t i l i t y . 
6.4 C o n c l u s i o n 
I n t h i s c h a p t e r , I h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d how one c a n 
a d a p t M y e r s o n ' s G e n e r a l i z e d P r i n c i p a l - A g e n t Model t o 
a n a l y s e t h e p r o b l e m o f t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g . The r e s u l t of 
s u c h a d a p t i o n i s t h a t I h ave been a b l e t o f o r m u l a t e a 
new method o f t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g . One of t h e m a j o r f e a t u r e s 
o f t h e new method i s t h a t i t r e q u i r e s e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n 
t o be g i v e n t o t h e r o l e o f d i v i s i o n a l managers a s i n f o r m a t i o n 
s p e c i a l i s t s . I t i s a r g u e d t h a t , u n l e s s d i v i s i o n a l managers 
a r e r e w a r d e d f o r c a r r y i n g o u t t h i s r o l e , t h e y w i l l u s e t h e i r 
a s y m m e t r i c a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n t o f u r t h e r t h e i r own g o a l s , 
i n a way w h i c h i s n o n - o p t i m a l f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a s a 
w h ole. I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s shown t h a t t h e s e t t i n g of 
a p p r o p r i a t e r e w a r d s i s d i f f i c u l t . I t i s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t 
t h e r e w a r d s t r u c t u r e h a s t o be d e r i v e d from a l i n e a r program 
w h i c h models t h e i n c e n t i v e problems w i t h i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
I t i s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n S e c t i o n 6.3 t h a t t h e above 
arguments f o r d i v i s i o n a l managers b e i n g rewarded f o r b e i n g 
i n f o r m a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t s ( i n o r d e r t o s t o p them e x p l o i t i n g 
t h e i r a s y m m e t r i c a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n ) can be d e r i v e d 
e x p l i c i t l y from t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r 1 s g e n e r a l u t i l i t y 
m a x i m i z a t i o n problem. I n t h e s e c t i o n , t h e c e n t r a l head-
q u a r t e r ' s v i r t u a l u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n i s d e f i n e d . I t i s 
shown t h a t , when i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y problems a r i s e , 
t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s s h o u l d adopt an o b j e c t i v e of 
v i r t u a l u t i l i t y m a x i m i z a t i o n . The c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r 1 s 
v i r t u a l u t i l i t y d i f f e r s from c o n v e n t i o n a l u t i l i t y (when 
t h e r e i s no i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y p roblems) b e c a u s e i t 
i n c l u d e s t h e c o s t s o f e n s u r i n g i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y 
when s u c h problems c o u l d a r i s e . 
CHAPTER 6 
NOTES 
1. The o r i g i n a l G e n e r a l i s e d P r i n c i p a l - A g e n t Model 
i s due t o Myerson ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 
2 . As w i l l be c l e a r l y shown l a t e r , i t w i l l be assumed 
t h a t d o a l s o s p e c i f i e s d i v i s i o n a l manager's c o m p e n s a t i o n 
f u n c t i o n s . 
3. T h i s a l l o w s us t o model a s i t u a t i o n where a s u p p l y -
i n g and b u y i n g d i v i s i o n f a c e d i f f e r e n t t r a n s f e r p r i c e s 
f o r t h e same i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t , i f r e q u i r e d . 
4. B e f o r e i n t r o d u c i n g u n c e r t a i n t y r e g a r d i n g t h e v a l u e 
o f t . 
5. The r a t i o n a l e f o r c h o i c e o f a mixed s t r a t e g y w i l l 
be d i s c u s s e d i n some d e t a i l b e l o w . 
6. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s need o n l y 
c o n s i d e r p u r e s t r a t e g i e s . 
7. T h i s i s a s suming t h e d i v i s i o n s a c h i e v e t h e i r budgeted 
p r o f i t l e v e l w h i c h t h e y w i l l do i f t h e y a r e t r u t h f u l and 
o b e d i e n t o r t h e y l o c a t e a t one o f t h e boxes below t h e 
d i a g o n a l . At p o o n t s above t h e d i a g o n a l , t h e y c o u l d n o t 
a c h i e v e t h e i r budgeted l e v e l o f p r o f i t u s i n g i n d i v i d u a l l y 
r a t i o n a l methods. 
8. The "would h a v e " p r o v i s o r e f e r s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s 
i s t h e s t r a t e g y t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s would f o l l o w i f i t 
was c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l manager 
was h o n e s t and o b e d i e n t . I f i t i s n o t so c o n v i n c e d , i t 
may adopt an a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g y . 
9. F o r i n s t a n c e , assume t h e u n i t s o f c o m p e n s a t i o n and 
p r o f i t s a r e t h o u s a n d s of pounds s t e r l i n g . 
10. T h a t i s , where a l l p a y o f f s a r e d e f i n e d so t h a t t h e y a r e 
i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l and a l l mechanisms a r e r e q u i r e d t o be 
f e a s i b l e . 
j 1 3 . 
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TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF TRANSFER PRICING WITH 
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
I n Chapter S i x , the d e t a i l s o f how the c e n t r a l headquarters 
could implement a t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g procedure were presented f o r a 
s i t u a t i o n where the i n c o m p l e t e l y known types v a r i a b l e s were d i s c r e t e 
random v a r i a b l e s , but where a d i v i s i o n a l manager observed the a c t u a l 
r e a l i s e d v a l u e of the t y p e s v a r i a b l e j u s t before the commencement 
of the communication p r o c e s s . However, i t i s p o s s i b l e to extend the 
model to a l l o w a n a l y s i s of the problem when the types v a r i a b l e s a r e 
continuous random v a r i a b l e s . T h i s e x t e n s i o n i s most u s e f u l as i t 
a l l o w s g e n e r a l statements about how t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g mechanisms 
should be s e t i n an environment of incomplete i n f o r m a t i o n , to be 
p r e s e n t e d and proven. 
T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l , therefore, be concerned w i t h extending the 
a n a l y s i s of the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r t o the case where the types v a r i a b l e s 
are d i s t r i b u t e d c o n t i n u o u s l y and where a d i v i s i o n a l manager observes 
the a c t u a l v a l u e of the t y p e s v a r i a b l e . 
7.2 C o n s t r u c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l , i n c e n t i v e compatible 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g mechanisms under incomplete i n f o r m a t i o n 
L e t us assume t h e r e a r e n manufacturing d i v i s i o n s indexed i = 1, 
,n and t h a t t h e r e a r e m d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n s indexed l = l,...m. 
I t i s assumed t h a t i t i s common knowledge t h a t the manager of 
the manufacturing d i v i s i o n attempts to maximise the d i v i s i o n ' s 
p r o f i t s by choosing a p p r o p r i a t e i n p u t s such t h a t : 
322. 
x 3 , max py-1 - e 3 x 3 - t" 1*?. 
(1) 
s . t . y3 = ( x j ) ( x 3 ) 
L i k e w i s e , i t i s assumed t h a t i t i s common knowledge t h a t the manager 
of the l ^ d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n attempts to maximise the d i v i s i o n ' s 
p r o f i t s by choosing a p p r o p r i a t e i n p u t s such t h a t : 
1 1 ~ i l l 1 1 y , z max fc) q - py - e^z 
(2) 
. * i x 6 i 
s . t . q = (y ) (z ) 
Assume i t i s common knowledge t h a t a l l t" 1, 3=1,....,n a re bounded 
w i t h i n known i n t e r v a l s t 3 to t" 5 (t" 1 < t 3 ) and t h a t i t i s common 
knowledge t h a t a l l 0 1, i=l,....m a r e bounded w i t h i n known i n t e r v a l 
0 1 to G 1 (G 1 < 6 1) 
F o l l o w i n g the B a y e s i a n approach, we s h a l l assume t h a t the 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s and a l l d i v i s i o n a l managers, exante, h o l d some 
s u b j e c t i v e p r i o r p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the unknown parameters, 
t 3 , © 1 f o r j = l , . . . . n , l = 1, m. L e t f ^ f t 1 1 ) and h i (Q 1) be the 
d e n s i t y f u n c t i o n s f o r the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s f o r i = l , . . . . n , 
j = l , m. I t i s assumed a l l d e n s i t y f u n c t i o n s are continuous m 
t h e i r arguments w i t h f_^(t"') > 0 over the i n t e r v a l it?, t?) and 
h i ( G 1 ) > O over the i n t e r v a l { 0 1 , 0 1 } w i t h F ( t 3 ) and H.^01) 
denoting the r e s p e c t i v e c u m u l a t i v e d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n s . L e t the 
j o i n t d e n s i t y f u n c t i o n f o r a l l the unknown input p r i c e s and u n c e r t a i n 
output p r i c e s ( t y p e s v a r i a b l e s ) be denoted: 
323 . 
g ( t , 0 ) = X f ( t . ) . X h (9 ) (3) 
I t s h a l l be a s s u m e d t h a t t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s w i s h e s 
t o m a x i m i s e e x p e c t e d p r o f i t s , t h a t i s 
m n f t 
1 1 3 D v r I q ,z ,x ,x max L z, i " 
i = l 3 = 1 J t 1 >J 
• i ~ t n r 0 m 
t J Q m 
g ( t , 0 ) 
•{©V - e^z 1 - e 3 x 3 - t 3 x 3 } at\...dtn D m 1 2. 3 
dO 1 d 0 m ) 
* 6 i l i i i ( 4 ) s . t . q = ( y ) ( z ) 
. a . . 3 
y 3 = ( x 3 ) 3 ( x 3 ) 3 
f o r i = l f . . . . n , 3 = 1, ....m. 
The method by w h i c h t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s a c t i v e l y 
a t t e m p t s t o a c h i e v e t h i s g o a l i s by u s i n g a t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g mechanism. Thus, t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s f i r s t 
d e t e r m i n e s t h e s e t o f e n f o r c e a b l e and recommended c o n t r o l s 
(d = d Qd^d^) t h a t i t would adopt i f i t c o u l d p e r f e c t l y 
o b s e r v e t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e s and would be s u r e t h a t d i v i s i o n a l 
managers f o l l o w e d i t s recommendations and s a t i s f i e d i t s 
c o n t r o l s ( b u d g e t s ) . I t t h e n c h o o s e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n ( c o - o r d i n a t i o n mechanism) o v e r c o n t r o l schemes 
t h a t i t w i l l a d o p t , c o n d i t i o n a l on i n f o r m a t i o n of t h e 
r e a l i s e d v a l u e o f t y p e s v a r i a b l e s communicated t o i t by 
t h e d i v i s i o n a l managers. Thus, we c a n now s p e c i f y t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s problem a s : 
n ( d | t , 0 ) max [--"J g ( t , 0 ) n ( d | t , 0 ) f Q ( d , t p ) d t d 0 d d (5) 
m n 
where f ( d , t , 0 ) = I Z Q1q1 - e^z - e 3 x ? o ' ' , ^ D m l 1 1 3 1 
. * 6. 
s . t . q =(y ) ( z ± ) 
a . 3 . 
y 3 = ( x j ) D ( x ^ ) J 
d = (d ,d ,d ,d ,d _) op' oy' oq' oc oil 
w i t h d p op 
d j = y D o y J J 
j . l d l = q oq 
d 3 = e D x ? oc m l 
j i i d l e^z oc D 
d n j = py-5 - e^x^, - t ^ x ^ oil m m 2 
d o R i = 0 q - py - e D z 
(5) 
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f o r j = l , . . . . n , 1=1,....m. 
Note t h a t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e 
f f d t d0 dd 
~n f Q1 C Q m f d , / d . / d n / d , 
I o l / on+rn / 1 / n+m 
0 1 ^ 0 m J d J d , x/d, v^d 
o l -on+m -1 -n+m 
dt^". . . . d t n , d0^", . . . . d0 m , d d dd . ,dd,,....dd , 
' o l ' on+m' 1' n+m 
G i v e n t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s c h o o s e s some c o -
o r d i n a t i o n mechanism I I ( d | t , 0 ) t h e e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y o f 
h o n e s t and o b e d i e n t 
the/manager o f t h e j m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n (who 
o b s e r v e s t h e d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e s v a r i a b l e t o be t- 1) from t h e 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n mechanism, i f a l l o t h e r d i v i s i o n a l 
managers r e p o r t t r u t h f u l l y and a c t o b e d i e n t l y i s 
u . . ( i i | t j ) = J . . . J g ( t ^ j c # 0 | t j ) n ( d | t , 0 ) 
• u^ ( d j t ^ J d t ^ * - d0dd (6) 
where (•••[ d t 3 ^ c d O d d i s / a b o v e e x c e p t t h a t a t e r m f o r 
r * j 
t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o v e r t ^ , ( dt- 3) i s n o t i n c l u d e d as 
t h e manager h a s o b s e r v e d t h e a c t u a l v a l u e o f t h e t y p e s v a r i a b l e f o r t h e d i v i s i o n i n t h e f o r t h c o m i n g p e r i o d . 
h o n e s t and o b e d i e n t 
S i m i l a r l y f o r the/manager o f d i s t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n i , 
who o b s e r v e s p r i v a t e l y t h e o u t p u t p r i c e 0 1 , we have 
u i ( n | e 1 ) = J . . . J g ( t , 0 5 i c l e 1 ) n ( d | t , 0 ) 
(7) 
• u ± ( d , t , 0 ) d t d 0 > l c d d 
where t h i s t i m e no 0 d0' t e r r a a p p e a r s 
y0-
G i v e n t h a t i t i s b e i n g assumed t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e s 
v a r i a b l e s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t random v a r i a b l e s i n t h e common 
p r i o r 
g ( t ^ j S © I t 3 ) = g ( t , G ) 
f : ( t j ) 
T hus, t h e e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y t o d i v i s i o n a l manager j, e x a n t e , 
b e f o r e h i s o r h e r d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e i s r e v e a l e d (from b e i n g h o n e s t 
and o b e d i e n t ) 
3. 
J t 3 
r t 1 
J 
f j ( t D ) u _ . (n| tJ) dtJ 
r 3 (8) n+m 
g ( t , 0 ) n ( d | t f 0 ) u (d t , 0 ) d t d 0 d d 
n+m 
S i m i l a r l y f o r d i v i s i o n a l manager i , e x a n t e , b e f o r e h i s o r 
h e r d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e i s r e v e a l e d h i s o r h e r e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y 
i s : (from b e i n g h o n e s t and o b e d i e n t ) 
3?7. 
< 0 1 
h i ( G 1 ) u i ( n | e i ) d o 1 
(9) 
t 1 r 5 + 
n g ( t , 0 ) n ( d | t , 0 ) u . ( d t , 0 ) d t d O d d 
i 1 
I n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t H ( d | t , 0 ) i s a v a l i d c o n d i t i o n a l 
p r o b a b i l i t y f u n c t i o n we r e q u i r e t h a t : 
n ( d | t , 0 ) ^ 0 r ^ o l H ^n+m - ' ' I n ( d | t , 0 ) d d = 1 ( 1 0 ) 
"d . i d , - o l -n+m 
f o r a l l ( t f 0 ) € T X 0 
L e t us now c o n s i d e r t h e i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s 
We r e q u i r e , t h a t i f d i v i s i o n j ' s t y p e s v a r i a b l e i s t?, 
t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n a l manager does a t l e a s t a s w e l l by b e i n g 
h o n e s t and o b e d i e n t a s by r e p o r t i n g t ^ and t h e n u s i n g 
6 ^ ( d j ) when r e q u e s t e d t o u s e d^, g i v e n t h a t o t h e r managers 
a r e p l a n n i n g t o be h o n e s t and o b e d i e n t . Thus i t i s 
r e q u i r e d t h a t : 
( n i t 3 ) >. U* ( 1 1 , 6 ^ ^ 1 ^ ) 
f o r any t J / t J where t J e T J 
f o r a l l j = l , . . . . , n , 
J2C. 
* " 1 , 1 
Here (11,6 , t J I t ) d e n o t e s t h e e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y 
of d i v i s i o n a l manager j i f he or she u n t r u t h f u l l y 
communicated t h e j^1 d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e s v a r i a b l e t o be 
t - 1 , when i t r e a l l y was t? , and where e f f o r t l e v e l 
6 (d ) was u s e d r a t h e r t h a n t h e recommended d.. Thus 
3 3 3 
we have: 
^ t 1 r a . 
i l n+m . 
g f t ^ S e l t ^ I U d l t ^ S t ^ G ) u * (n,6 , t J | t j ) = 
t 1 a + 
-n+m (12) 
u^ ( (d ,6^ ( d j ) ) , t f 0 ) d t : , : , c d 0 d d 
where ( t ~ > j c , t j , 0 ) = ( t 1 , . . . t j _ 1 , t j , t j + 1 . . . t n , B1, . . . ,Qm) 
and (d . ,6 ( d . ) ) = (d ,d,,...d. ,,6 (d ) d . d , z>3c j j o' 1 D~l J 3 D + l n' 
d d ) n+1 n+n 
S i m i l a r l y t h e n we r e q u i r e : 
u i ( n | 0 i ) >> u * ( n , 6 i , G 1 | e 1 ) 
(13) 
^ i i ^ i f o r any 0 0 where 0 - £ 0 
f o r a l l i = l , . . . . m 
329. 
E 1 - a * 
/ n+m Where U (11,6. , 0 1 | 0 1 ) = I - g ( t , 0 3 1 c I 0 1 ) 
-1 -n+m 
n (d| t , 0 3 ,0-"-) ? i c n ^ i ( 1 4 ) 
* U i ( d : > n + i c ' t , 0 ) d t d 0 > l c d d 
Where ( t , © ^ , ? 1 ) = ( t 1 , . . . , t n , 0 X , . . . 0 i _ 1 , 0 1 , 0 i + 1 , . . . .Qm) 
a n d ( d
3 n + ^ ' 6 i ( d n + i , ) = ( d o ' d l - - " d n ' d n + l " - ' d n + i - l ' 
6 i ( d n + i > ' d n + i + l " - - - d n + m ) 
t 1 ^ d" 
n+m L e t n (<i | 0 , ' , - ) = .../ g ( - , • I 0 1 ) ntdl©1, • , •) 
t 1 * + 
- -n+m 
. d t j d 0 5 i c dd 
t 1 „ d + n+m 
And n ( d | t 3 , •,•) = / • / g ( - , - | t J ) n ( d | t j , - , - ) 
V J d + -n+m 
. d t ^ ^ d O d d 
I n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s r e q u i r e 
U ^ l l l t 3 ) > O f o r a l l ] = 1 , . . . f n (15) 
IT (II I© 1) >, O f o r a l l i = l , . . . , m (16) 
3 3u. 
Thus, t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r 1 s o b j e c t i v e i s t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h e f e a s i b l e a l l o c a t i o n mechanism n ( d | t , 0 ) 
w h i c h d e f i n e s a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over t r a n s f e r 
p r i c e s , p r o d u c t i o n , c o m p e n s a t i o n and d i v i s i o n a l p r o f i t s , 
w h i c h m a x i m i s e s t h e e x p e c t e d p r o f i t s t h a t a c c r u e s to t h e 
c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s . T h a t i s 
n ( d | t , 0 ) max 
J 
n+m r t r d 
g ( t , 0 ) J I ( d | t , 0 ) f o ( d , t , 9 ) 
4-1 J H 
- -n+m (17) 
dtd0dd 
s u b j e c t t o ( 5 ) ' , (10), (11) , (13) , (15) , (16) 
THEOREM 1. T h e r e e x i s t s c o n t r o l s and recommendations d 
su c h t h a t t h e c o - o r d i n a t i o n mechanism H( d | t , 0 ) i s an 
i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b l e and i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l mechanism 
i f , and o n l y i f , H ( d | t ^ , •,•)!£ a n o n - i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n 
f o r a l l m a n u f a c t u r i n g d i v i s i o n a l managers j=l,....n and 
I H d l O 1 , - , * ) i s a n o n - d e c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n f o r a l l d i s -
t r i b u t i o n d i v i s i o n a l managers i = l , . . . m . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t 
i s r e q u i r e d t h a t 
/ - t 1 / d _L ( f n+m 
2 / (u ( d , t , 0 ) + 3^ ' 1 ) g ( t , 0 ) 
-n+m J 





r t f d 
- , " I ( u (d,t,0) - "KG 1) \ g ( t , 0 ) n ( d | t , 0 ) 
i = l J , . / 3 ' t 1 ^d , h i i Q l ) -n+m 
. dtdGdd 
^ 0 
I n a d d i t i o n , given any i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l i n c e n t i v e 
compatible mechanism, f o r a l l i and j , U ^ (H | t- 3) i s non-
i n c r e a s i n g , U K n l © 1 ) i s non-decreasing and 
n m 
£ u ( n | t D ) + z u . ( n I 0 1 ) 
D=l : i = l 1 
n . m 
T, min U. ( t 1 1 ) + I min U^O 1) 
j = 1 t j E { t j , t j } i = 1 0 i e { 0 i , 0 i ) 
n f ^ r d n+m 
= 1 "• ( u ^ ( d , t , 9 ) + F j ( t 3 ) - l ) g ( t , 9 ) n(d |t,0) 
i = i 7 i J, ^ ^ — 7 
J t " 1 d_._. f . t t 3 ) =n+m ' " j 
. dtdOdd 
m r t 1 r d ^ / I n + m H i 1 \ 
+ 1 J , r J ( u (d,t,0) - 2 i l _ L ) g ( t , 0 ) n(d|t,0) 
i = i i r ~ ' 
dtd0dd 
Proof of the theorem i s given i n the Appendix t o t h i s 
chapter. 
~»J2. 
Theorem 1 e s t a b l i s h e s the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g mechanisms must s a t i s f y i f they are t o be 
i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l and i n c e n t i v e compatible f o r 
t h e r e f o r e , attempt t o determine the mechanism n * ( d | t , 0 ) 
f o r which 
subject t o the c o n d i t i o n s of Theorem 1 being s a t i s f i e d . 
7.3 Conclusion 
Even though the c e n t r a l headquarters's problem 
developed i n s e c t i o n 7.2 may be a very d i f f i c u l t one t o 
solve, i t s s p e c i f i c a t i o n alone gives us some val u a b l e 
i n t u i t i o n as t o q u a l i t a t i v e l y how t r a n s f e r p r i c e s should 
be s e t . One o f the requirements of Theorem 1 i s t h a t 
U_.(n|t,^,) be non-increasing and (IT | © , 1 ,) be non-
decreasing. R e c a l l t-' i s the cost manufacturing 
d i v i s i o n j ' s manager i n c u r s i n buying i n raw m a t e r i a l 
Thus, manufacturing d i v i s i o n a l managers can only expect 
t o increase t h e i r expected u t i l i t y by buying i n raw 
m a t e r i a l s a t a lower cost. S i m i l a r l y , d i s t r i b u t i o n a l 
d i v i s i o n a l managers can only expect t o increase t h e i r 
expected u t i l i t y by being able t o s e l l the f i n a l product 
at higher p r i c e s , given the n o n o t o n i c i t y requirements. 
d i v i s i o n a l managers. The c e n t r a l headquarters should, 
n+m r 
g ( t , 0 ) J l ( d t,0)U ( d , t 0 ) d t d Q j n*(d t,0) max 
—n+m 
LEAAr\A/\ A . \^  TV ( d \ t > 6 ^ \b ar\ \rvcey\Vvoe c£>rv\po^W rY\ecWmis>rr> 
a \ \ v cvr>dj > TV d \ t J j * ^ - ) and U j C ^ l t 4 ) ^ v^ om mcreasing 
oja- Wave t 1 
U LV V>& consider a. ^ f>vca\ fy^ cui^ AA^ -tVuX^ YN£j dw isvov\ ^  . RccaU O£JAAOA\OI\ (t) 
t 1 d 
So sv*™W\^ we Wxve 
t 1 d m n r x 
were -H-v«. -fcc \^AaUr>j V^olds S\YVLC W« a<fe OSSVAWMYVJ ~VWxV -W\€ 
d>^iOrts ^ p e i , ane "rrdepevv3.^V randoms v a r i a n t s . ~TV\\*s w« 
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I t h a s been a r g u e d by some i n d u s t r i a l commentators 
t h a t m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y i s s t a r t i n g t o go t h r o u g h a 
new i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . I t i s an i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n 
where p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s a r e becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y 
automated. However, i n s t e a d of t h e t h r u s t of t h e 
r e v o l u t i o n b e i n g t o w a r d s mass p r o d u c t i o n of l i k e i t e m s , 
s u c c e s s i n t h e new i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n depends on t h e 
a b i l i t y o f m a n u f a c t u r e r s t o produce e f f i c i e n t l y a wide 
range o f d i f f e r e n t i a t e d p r o d u c t s , i n a t i m e l y f a s h i o n , n o t 
n e c e s s a r i l y on a v a s t s c a l e and w i t h p r o d u c t l i v e s b e i n g 
p o s s i b l y q u i t e s h o r t . I n such an e n v i r o n m e n t i n t r o d u c i n g 
i n n o v a t i v e p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s and p r o d u c t s i s c r u c i a l . 
Under t h e s e o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , d i v i s i o n a l managers a r e 
i n c r e a s i n g l y r e q u i r e d t o be s p e c i a l i s t s i n t h e i r f i e l d s 
who c a n communicate a c c u r a t e l y and c o n c i s e l y t o t h e c e n t r a l 
h e a d q u a r t e r s a b o u t t h e need t o , and p o s s i b i l i t y t o , change 
p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s and p r o d u c t s . However, t h e r e may 
be a problem i f d i v i s i o n a l managers a r e a s s e s s e d a c c o r d i n g 
t o management a c c o u n t i n g p r a c t i c e s t h a t were d e v e l o p e d t o 
a i d a s s e s s m e n t when p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s and p r o d u c t s were 
r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e . R a t h e r t h a n u s i n g t h e i r e x p e r t i n f o r m a -
t i o n t o f u r t h e r t h e g o a l s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , d i v i s i o n a l 
managers may u s e t h e i r s u p e r i o r a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n i n a 
s t r a t e g i c f a s h i o n t o f u r t h e r t h e i r own g o a l s . T h i s may 
o c c u r p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h e management a c c o u n t i n g p r a c t i c e s 
o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n do n o t c o n v i n c e d i v i s i o n a l managers 
354 . 
t h a t i t i s i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t s t o f r e e l y make known t h e i r 
s p e c i a l i s t i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s t h e s i s c o n s i d e r s one 
i m p o r t a n t management a c c o u n t i n g p r a c t i c e t h a t can a i d 
a s s e s s m e n t o f p r o d u c t i o n and d i v i s i o n a l management 
p e r f o r m a n c e . 
The p r a c t i c e o f t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g . 
I n my t h e s i s , I a r g u e t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers who 
h o l d s p e c i a l i s t i n f o r m a t i o n may f i n d i t i n t h e i r own 
b e s t i n t e r e s t s t o w i t h o l d i n f o r m a t i o n and r e p o r t s t r a t e -
g i c a l l y t o t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , i f c a r e i s n o t t a k e n 
when d e v i s i n g t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e s . My m a j o r 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i s t o a d a p t t h e G e n e r a l i z e d P r i n c i p a l Agent 
Model of Myerson (1982) t o model s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e t r a n s f e r 
p r i c i n g p r o b l e m . T h i s model h a s a l l o w e d me t o make new 
p r o p o s a l s f o r how t r a n s f e r p r i c e s s h o u l d be s e t . I n 
a d d i t i o n , I h a v e shown t h a t t h e model can be a d a p t e d 
( a l o n g t h e l i n e s recommended by Myerson and S a t t e r t h w a i t e 
( 1 9 8 3 ) ) t o be a p p l i c a b l e t o q u i t e g e n e r a l t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
s e t t i n g s . 
I t i s hoped t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g 
p r o c e d u r e d e v e l o p e d h e r e w i l l go some way t o h e l p i n 
d e s i g n i n g t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g p r o c e d u r e s t h a t can be adopted 
by o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h i s t r a n s i t i o n from t h e o r y t o p r a c t i c e 
i n my v i e w w i l l o n l y be a c h i e v e d i f i t i s c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z e d 
t h a t d i v i s i o n a l managers s h o u l d be rewarded f o r t h e i r 
i n f o r m a t i o n s p e c i a l i s m a s w e l l as t h e i r e f f o r t s e r v i c e s . 
A c e n t r a l i s s u e t h e n i s t o d e t e r m i n e how t o e v a l u a t e t h e 
v a l u e t o t he o r g a n i z a t i o n of a d i v i s i o n a l manager's 
s p e c i a l i s t i n f o r m a t i o n . I n t h i s t h e s i s , i t h a s been 
argued t h a t t h e l e a s t v a l u e one can a s s i g n to such 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d by how much a d i v i s i o n a l 
manager c o u l d g a i n by n o t r e p o r t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n t r u t h -
f u l l y . 
I t would be u s e f u l t o e x t e n d t h i s r a t i o n a l e f o r 
t r a n s f e r p r i c i n g t o o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t s . 
F o r i n s t a n c e , c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e c a s e where d i v i s i o n s 
a r e a s s e s s e d a s i n v e s t m e n t c e n t r e s would be an i m p o r t a n t 
e x t e n s i o n . A n o t h e r u s e f u l e x t e n s i o n would be t o where 
t h e d i v i s i o n ' s t y p e ' s v a r i a b l e i s a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s -
t r i b u t i o n o v e r u n c e r t a i n v a l u e s f o r some p a r a m e t e r . 
Here, i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y would r e f e r to whether o r 
n o t d i v i s i o n a l managers r e p o r t e d t h e t r u e p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r t h e u n c e r t a i n e v e n t o r n o t . 
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